(en) France, Organisation Communiste Libertarie: What future for the Kurds in Syria? by Cengiz Gunes* (fr)

The growing geopolitical importance of the Kurdish minority in Syria has brought a new 
dimension to the conflict increasingly bloody. ---- The probability of Kurdish autonomy in 
Syria has brought hope that the long period of oppression of the community was over and 
gave new impetus to the wider debate on the position and status of the Kurds in the Middle 
East General. ---- While the events in Syria continue to dominate the headlines in the 
news around the world, the growing geopolitical importance of the Kurdish minority in 
Syria has brought a new dimension to the conflict increasingly bloody. Kurds took control 
of the majority Kurdish towns along the border between Syria and Turkey, including Afrin 
and Ayn al -Arab ( Koban? ) in northern Syria, and Ras al- Ayn ( Ser?kaniy? ) in 
northeastern Syria in July 2012.
 
The majority of Kurdish areas are not an enclave continuously, and areas populated by 
Arabs and other ethnic groups divided their population centers.
 
Like other areas held by the rebels in Syria, the Kurds manage their own affairs in areas 
under their control, including providing education in Kurdish. Units Protection of the 
People ( YPG for its Kurdish acronym ) won the trust of the people defending the 
communities located in areas under Kurdish control. The rise of the Kurds in the past year 
underscores the growing importance for the Syrian opposition. However, a big question 
remains : what the future holds for the Kurds in Syria?
 
The past year has seen the political disagreements between Syrian Kurds resurface, but 
their differences did not lead to a conflict. The agreement negotiated by the Regional 
Government of Kurdistan [ Iraq ] ( KRG ) in July 2012 led to the creation of the Kurdish 
Supreme Council - an umbrella organization grouping the main Kurdish political party, the 
Party of the Democratic Union ( PYD in its Kurdish acronym ) and the Kurdish national 
Council ( KNC ), composed of other smaller political parties - and the establishment of a 
form of power-sharing administration in areas under Kurdish control, including 
coordination of YPG.
 
Constituting about 10 % of the population of Syria, the Kurds can not acquire the 
political and military power to determine the outcome of the conflict, and the future 
evolution of the position of Kurds in Syria depends heavily on their relationships with 
others sectors of the Syrian opposition, as well as the actions of regional powers. While 
the Kurdish political parties in Syria do not advocate the creation of their own 
independent Kurdish state, their goal is a broad autonomy for the Kurds, pluralist 
democracy and the recognition of the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities in 
Syria. In addition, the PYD has always maintained that they do not support further 
increased militarization of the conflict or the interference of external powers. This 
caused friction between the PYD and other sectors of the Syrian opposition, which advocate 
a more intense military confrontation, including outside intervention against the Assad 
regime. Since October 2011, and in collaboration with other left parties in Syria, the PYD 
participated in building a coalition of opposition forces, the National Coordination 
Committee for Democratic Change.
 
The growing influence of jihadist groups in areas controlled by the rebels during the last 
year areas has coincided with a significant increase in attacks against Kurdish 
-controlled areas. This has become especially true since mid- July 2013, when fighting 
broke out between al- Jabhat Nosra affiliated with Al- Qaeda and the YPG in Ras al- Ayn. 
Currently, the fighting continues in a number of areas, whereas YPG were able to defend 
their positions, they could not prevent Jabhat al- Nosra of murder, beheaded and remove 
Kurdish civilians. These attacks clearly demonstrate the danger easily run the Kurds to be 
further drawn into a civil war more bloody and brutal conflict that can evolve along 
ethnic lines.
 
The recent influx of Kurdish refugees in the Iraqi Kurdistan that demonstrate high levels 
of anxiety and insecurity felt by the Kurds in Syria. Competition for resources and 
decision strategically important cities were cited as the main reason behind the attacks 
by al- Jabhat Nosra and the Islamic State in Iraq and al- Sham (ISIS). However, the 
underlying ideological and antagonisms based on ethnic differences should also be 
highlighted. The purpose of jihad to establish an Islamic state is in stark contrast to 
the vision of the Kurds in Syria a democratic and pluralistic. The rhetoric of the first 
target of increasing secularism of PYD and his views on gender equality.
 
In addition to the Kurdish population in areas with Kurdish majority, a large number of 
Kurds living in mixed areas, such as Aleppo and the surrounding area. Here, since the 
beginning of 2012, the Kurds are organized militarily as Jabhat al- Akrad ( Kurdish 
Front), which operates as independent units under the Free Syrian Army ( SLA). However, 
because of the jihadist attacks against areas controlled by the Kurds and against Kurdish 
civilians in the Aleppo region areas, the relationship between the SLA and Jabhat al- 
Akrad have severely strained since July 2013.
 
The relations between the Kurds and other sectors of the Syrian opposition are less 
antagonistic, but so far, the Syrian National Council (SNC ) - the representative body of 
the opposition - has failed to integrate the Kurds in its structure : some Kurdish 
representatives were part of the CNS, but not the PYD nor KNC are currently represented. 
Recently, the CNS has intensified its efforts to integrate Kurdish representative 
organizations in its structures, the organization of meetings between Kurdish political 
parties and representatives of the NSC. However, it is not clear whether the CNS will be 
able to fully meet the Kurdish demands for autonomy and, more importantly, to meet the 
growing threat to the Kurds created by the attacks of al- Jabhat Nosra and ISIS.
 
The Kurdish demand for autonomy was also seen with suspicion by Turkey on the grounds that 
it would lead to the collapse of Syria. The main concern of Turkey also stems from the 
fact that the PYD, which has close ideological affiliations with the Workers' Party of 
Kurdistan ( PKK), will play a leading role in the government of such an entity. Turkey 
fears that this situation increases the power of the PKK as a regional player and be able 
to put more pressure on Turkey to grant more political rights to its Kurdish minority, a 
turning that Turkey has never really agreed to take over the last thirty years of the 
conflict. Recently, the growing importance and rising international legitimacy of PYD seem 
to have convinced Turkey to continue the dialogue and less confrontational policy, which 
is reflected in the visits of the co- president of PYD Salih Muslim, in Turkey July and 
August. These visits represent significant progress, especially as previously, Turkey 
threatened to invade Syria if Kurdish autonomy was established under the leadership of PYD.
 
However, it is too early to say that the policy of Turkey will change. This is because the 
Turkish policy towards the Kurds in Syria is designed in its overall policy to manage its 
Kurdish conflict. During the last decade, despite the existence of significant 
opportunities to resolve the conflict, Turkey has failed to develop a new policy framework 
for the process and possibly discontinue. So far, Turkey has followed a piecemeal approach 
on the issue of collective rights to the Kurdish minority. The establishment of a TV 
channel in Kurdish language, TRT6, within the network of state broadcasting in January 
2009, and the creation of departments in some state universities in which Kurdish language 
is taught and studied are often cited as the main measures taken by the government. 
However, until now, the government remains opposed to the main Kurdish claims on 
decentralization and autonomy, and a full recognition of language rights of the Kurds, 
such as the education provided in Kurdish. Recognition of Kurdish identity and related 
rights require major changes in the identity of Turkey as a state, and they can only be 
established if there is a will and consensus to redefine dominant conception of 
citizenship, universal rights and the rights of minorities and special groups. The public 
debate reveals much rigid ideology of Turkish nationalism and its reluctance to accept the 
legitimacy of claims and Kurdish political rights.
 
Despite the fact that the de facto Kurdish autonomy in Syria is coming under increasing 
pressure, the Kurds seem to have managed to find a delicate balance in an uncertain 
situation. For many in the Kurdish community, the possibility of Kurdish autonomy has 
brought hope that the long period of oppression was over and they have now put their 
destiny into their own hands. In addition, the probability of Kurdish autonomy in Syria 
has given new impetus to the wider debate on the position and status of the Kurds in the 
Middle East in general. What is indisputable is the growing influence of the Kurds in the 
region during the last decade. The consolidation of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, and the 
possibility that it can generate for the creation of an independent Kurdish state, has the 
potential to disrupt the international borders in the region. Moreover, the existence of 
an autonomous Kurdish entity as KRG, strengthens the Kurdish develop a new regional 
framework in the Middle East for the satisfaction of claims Kurdish attempt.
 
The " peace process " underway in Turkey, if successful, is also very important. Not only 
does it lead to a major transformation in regional politics, but it would also create the 
impetus for the peaceful resolution of other Kurdish conflict by meeting the rights and 
Kurdish demands within existing state borders. Therefore, developments in other Kurdish 
areas will have a positive impact on the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question in 
Syria. However, the actual fact that the Kurds become an important regional player depends 
on their ability to forge a common Kurdish position, which requires a higher level of 
political unity among the various Kurdish movements degree. During the 1990s, intra 
-Kurdish rivalry led to conflict, but more recently, the need for cooperation on common 
goals has won the support of Kurdish political circles. It remains to be seen whether 
these goals will be achieved. The recent decision to convene the Kurdish National Congress 
in November 2013 in Erbil ( Hewl?r ) could be an historic step in this direction. So far, 
representatives of the main Kurdish political parties and NGOs in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and 
Syria participated in the preparatory meetings of the Congress, and the search for a pan- 
approach Kurdish to overcome the threats that the Kurds in Syria face should be placed at 
the top of its agenda.
 
Source: Jadaliyya.com
 
Translation: XYZ / OCLibertaire
 
(*) Cengiz Gunes is an academic and author of The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey, 
 From Protest to Resistance ( Routledge, 2012) and co-editor (with Welat Zeydanl ? Oglu ) 
of a forthcoming book, The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, 
representation, and Reconciliation (Routledge, 2014).
 
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