(en) France, Organisation Communiste Libertarie -lyon (OCL) - Courant Alternatif, CA #236 - , Some thoughts on the current situation in Egypt (fr, pt)

I had not been back in Egypt since early June. Since then the situation has changed 
dramatically. There was the big event on June 30 organized by the "movement Tammarrod" 
(Rebellion). On 3 July, the army took the initiative to dismiss the Islamist president 
Morsi, to dissolve the assembly and conduct of extreme political repression against the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), now deprived of power, imprisoned and forced to hiding. A heavy 
human toll remains the most dramatic aspect of these events. Meanwhile, a constitution was 
drafted by a commission appointed by the authority to which the FM were excluded. It will 
be submitted to a referendum to be held on 14 and 15 January 2014. Back here, I spent a 
lot of time talking with friend (s) and knowledge of different political persuasions. This 
text aims to give a picture, quick and necessarily imprecise, the situation facing Egypt today

Almost three years after the fall of the Mubarak regime, the situation in Egypt is very 
confusing and any attempt serious analysis is extremely difficult. The military regime 
seems to settle over time. For this, two major tools are put at the service of its 
strategy. A relentless repression against the Islamists, particularly the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but also affects all party and political trends, and a constitution tailored. 
These two points, repression and constitution, even the dominant topics of current debates.

Punishment

After the huge demonstration on 30 June, which brought together millions of people and the 
"release" by the army of President Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood power on July 3, a 
dramatic repression was exercised methodically against Islamist militants the brotherhood. 
The balance sheet is extremely heavy with hundreds of deaths, probably thousands of 
arrests and many injuries. Successive trials with charges more serious. Yesterday, 
December 18, prosecutors announced new charges against the ousted president and senior 
executives of the Brothers. They are now accused of high treason, which could lead to a 
sentence of death and execution. One has the impression that the choice made by the 
current government is to remove "physically" because they can do politically. But contrary 
to what people think, especially to the outside, repression affects not only the 
Islamists. Far from it.

From the first days after July 3, the police and the army began to monitor, challenge and 
stop activists from other political trends including the left and civil society. Some are 
currently in prison awaiting trial. Many trials are expected for many leftists and beyond 
the left. Saturday, December 14, police raided at night the offices of the Egyptian 
Association for Social and Economic Rights (ECESR) office searched, folders, drives and 
computers away and arrested five people, including a militant movement of 6 April very 
active since the mid-2000s. Several hours later, four were released but the activist April 
6 is still under arrest and no information could be obtained about his whereabouts. His 
friends have not even received a confirmation that it is in the hands of the security 
services. This gives a fairly accurate idea of the extent of the repression.

Ongoing debates

Current policy debates distinguish three main trends. The first is that of the radical 
opposition to the military coup and all measures and policies that followed. This trend 
represents the Islamists, particularly the members and supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who lost power last July 3.

The second trend, which expresses support for military assumed, that is worn by the 
"everything but the Islamists' (IST). It generally includes historical Nasserists, the 
"Arab nationalists" secularists "radicals", mainly the upper middle classes, the Copts 
(part of the Copts would support any political force opposed to the Islamists) of the 
business (a Some of them are known and influential Islamist) and "survivors" of the 
Mubarak regime landed in February 2011.

The third trend may be summarized by the "neither Islamic nor military." This trend 
includes the members and supporters of the radical left and some Liberal Democrats and 
secular.

In addition to group and individual activities "members" different trends (events, 
articles, media appearances), debate more or less peaceful, but sometimes very violent, 
focus in recent weeks about the new constitution, the writing was ordered by the new 
power-so by the army. Thus, for reasons of projects and diverse and often conflicting 
discourses, these debates reveal three different-actually quite conventional-votes in the 
upcoming referendum (to be held on 14 and 15 January 2014): The Yes, clear support 
military or radical opposition to the Islamists, the Non radically opposed to the military 
that the new constitution provides a stronger role in the political system (the army 
guardian of Egypt against the "risk" or Islamic "projects" revolutionaries) and abstention 
(ni-ni). To defend and strengthen the chances of influencing the outcome of the 
consultation, all means of conviction are mobilized. Some have not hesitated to change 
important parts of the draft of the new constitution to be submitted to vote. Thus we find 
false draft constitution counter as true almost everywhere in bookstores and public spaces 
and sidewalks of Cairo. However, no doubt here that the final result will certainly quite 
massively positive in favor of the new constitution. So the debates and policy actions 
being that needs to be paid first.

Two important events occurred last week and we deserve to be fairly closely interested. 
The first is social. After several weeks of strikes the steel workers of Helwan (south 
suburb of Cairo) obtained satisfaction for all of their claims: higher wages, better 
social coverage and working conditions and ensuring "transmission" automatic the use one 
of the children of the workers who stop working to retirement, disability or death. Even 
though the government and the management of the company have rallied against union action, 
they relented on almost all points in negotiations.

Obviously, we know that this is the risk of the entire economy suffer severely and 
permanently for a possible generalization of movement throughout the industry that led the 
state to negotiate and compromise. But this event also proves that the process of social 
protest that started in 2006 in Mahalla Alkobra the middle of the Delta, is still active 
and has not been too affected by the coup. It is not entirely unreasonable to suggest that 
the crackdown against Islamists and other political activists likely strengthened the 
labor movement and the social process.

Should we all think that Islamists may return the window after being chased by the door? 
Obviously, it remains a possible hypothesis. However, a second important event occurred 
last week. The doctors' union, run by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood for a good thirty 
years, held internal elections for its direction (Friday, December 13). The election ended 
in a crushing defeat of FM and taking the union by a current "independent" could be 
described as center-left Democratic trend. Real weakened following repeated blows of the 
army and the police, or simple tactic of Islamist militants to be more discreet pending a 
possible lull? Speeches and actions, sometimes violent FM that show no strategy to forget 
the time of the storm, leads us to believe that their failure in the union election rather 
reflects their actual impairment at least for a certain period.

Scenarios

The current government feels strong enough and "popular" or "legitimate", and does not 
seem to be in search of compromise. Eradication of FM seems like a goal regardless of the 
price. The hundreds of deaths at events organized by the Brothers since July 3 leave no 
doubt. With or without the support of different political forces, the army is not ready to 
give any political benefits inherited from the era of Nasser and strengthened since early 
July.

At the same time, part of the current opposition including the radical fringe claiming the 
leadership of the revolution will not give up. Moreover, the social process more or less 
framed by many unions, is still strongly present. In this context, consider the possible 
scenarios in the weeks and months ahead is quite uncomfortable. But we can still consider 
some possible developments.

Once the constitution approved without surprises, there will be presidential and 
legislative elections. Repression and election boycott by the FM lead to a minority of 
Islamist presence in the next parliament (especially Salafist part of which supports the 
current policy), which will certainly be dominated by liberal Democrats. The risk of 
further confrontation is real, and maybe even a radicalization of FM that could take 
violent forms of action (already power, his supporters and the vast majority of terrorists 
called FM). In this case, no one will be safe and might attend a long period of armed 
violence mainly between radical elements of FM and security forces. Political freedoms are 
further reduced and Islamist radicalization there would be a radicalization of power and 
security forces. This is the worst case scenario but still, in my opinion, the less likely.

The second scenario is a compromise between power and FM. Little evidence to consider it 
so both sides are determined to win the showdown and are willing to pay the price it 
takes. Even after the elections, and whatever the next elected president and the color of 
the new assembly, the army holding the new constitution of emergency powers, they could 
not enforce the compromise without the agreement with the latter.

A third possible scenario is a new coup led by Islamists. Like all coups, it is impossible 
to predict or exclude it completely. On the one hand the current instability can consider 
it, but on the other hand, the current determination of the army and its supporters do not 
leave much room for such a scenario. "Wait and see."

Finally, the scenario that seems most likely this is the dramatic worsening of the already 
deep economic and social crisis that could, in the medium term, reproduce political 
conditions that had finished by the fall of the Mubarak regime and the start of 
revolutionary process in the mid 2000s. It must be remembered that the most important 
success of this revolutionary process is the fall of the wall of fear before the plan. 
Impoverished people and is no longer restrained by fear is able to change everything in a 
relatively short time. The last three years, with its many twists and turns, prove it. The 
demonstration on 30 June which put in Egyptian streets of Alexandria to Aswan via Cairo, a 
good fifteen million demonstrators clearly shows that on the Nile, everything is possible. 
The worst and the best.

Habib Ayeb, December 23, 2013