(en) Britain, AFED Organise! #82 - To what extent are Nozick?s notions of self-ownership, inviolable liberty and capitalism valid?

Robert Nozick?s interpretation of libertarianism, as a form of society guided by the 
invisible hand outwith the influence of the state, has generated criticism from many areas 
of the political spectrum. In order to avoid getting embedded in abstraction, attempts to 
directly address the structure of his interpretation of libertarianism must focus on 
testing the internal degree of theoretical cohesion, in regards to his perception of what 
values constitute the term libertarianism, and the external compatibility of this 
definition within his minarchic-capitalist outlook. Such a task will hereby be undertaken 
in a two-part investigation into Nozick?s philosophical thought; firstly that of 
critically examining the extent of rapport between selfownership and inviolable liberty, 
in regards to libertarianism, and secondly the condition of these in regards to 
free-exchange capitalism.

To facilitate this exercise,
Nozick?s libertarian thought will
be summarised and referred to
into three key aspects:

a) the jurisdiction of self-
ownership is the sanctuary of
liberty, and that there are ?things
no person or group may do to
them[1]? without resulting in their
violation

b) the state is not a moral agent,
and that only the ?minimal state,
limited to the narrow functions of
protection against force, theft,
fraud, enforcement of contracts,
and so on, is justified[2]? and not
in violation of personal liberty

c) property ownership is an
extension of self-ownership, and
that only voluntary exchange
? i.e. without the interference
of government ? can preserve
liberty

In regards to etymology, the
use of the term libertarianism
is disputed.Historically,
libertarianism has been
associated with left-anarchism
as described by Joseph
Dejacque, expressed to be the
?abolition of government in all
its guises...abolition of personal
property, ownership of the
soil...and of anything that is an
instrument of labour, production
or consumption[3]?. What he
proposed to replace capitalism
and the state was ?collective
property, one and indivisible,
held in common[4]?. The
emergence of right-libertarian
etymology as a self-identifying
school of thought, on the other
hand, has been reflected upon
by right-libertarian Murray
Rothbard in his statement that
the term was ?captured...from
the enemy[5]?. The distinction
between the two has been
articulated in the reflection that
?libertarianism...had long been
simply a polite word for left-
wing anarchists...for anti-private
property anarchists, either of the
communist or syndicalist variety.
But now we had taken in over...
since we were proponents of
individual liberty and therefore
of the individual?s right to his
property[6]?.Libertarianism
is therefore a contested term
in regards to property in
particular[7], so for the purposes
of this essay libertarianism
will allude to Nozick?s right-
libertarian interpretation, unless
otherwise specified.

The premise for Nozick?s
interpretation of libertarianism
lies in a two-part claim that
human rights are inviolable and
that human beings are ends
in themselves and thusly self-
owners (a). What is implied by
his argument is given that human
beings are self-owners and have
inviolable rights, it only follows
that they ought to have complete
jurisdiction over their own activity,
save cases where it infringes
upon the liberty of others, and
that any violations of this private
sphere are a violation of liberty
de facto[8].Self-ownership
and inviolable rights to liberty
are thusly considered equitable
by Nozick and advocates of his
school of thought, wherein the
right to liberty transpires from a
right to self-ownership[9]. This,
if respected, ought to guarantee
the sanctity of liberty. It is this
first point that ought to be held to
scrutiny first of all.

So as to test the compatibility
between inviolable rights and
self-ownership, it is helpful and
constructive to specify that
the latter value in a libertarian
context must be comprehensive
? in other words, that ?there is no
part of the self and its capacities
that are unownable[10]?.To
suggest otherwise would
imply that there were parts of
ourselves that could be intruded
upon or owned that would not as
a result violate our liberty and
self-ownership, a notion which
would be incompatible with this
particular form of libertarianism.
Dr Colin Bird, Associate
Professor of Politics and Director
of the Program in Political
Philosophy, Policy and Law in the
University of Virginia, remarked
on an interesting discrepancy
between self-ownership and
inviolable rights which deserves
deliberation in regards to the
minarchical state as a public
agent. Nozick?s claim that liberty
disrupts patterned and end-state
theories, leading to their resulting
need to continuously violate
liberty to maintain themselves,
comes under considerable
scrutiny in regards to the public
agent as a protector of self-
ownership and inviolable rights.
Bird, to raise this issue, asks
?in the absence of any further
normative considerations, does
the inviolability of self-ownership
rights automatically follow? Just
how far does the fact of universal
comprehensive self-ownership
automatically constrain a public
agent?s view of what it might
mean to act legitimately on
behalf of a community of...self-
owners?[11]?. The answer to the
first question of compatibility,
shared as a common destination
with the first part of this text,
is largely answerable by the
conclusions of the second.

It can be said of the public agent,
the minimal state, that it ought
to be aware that individual self-
owners are comprehensive and
their rights are inviolable. This
point already raises a problem for
the public agent, for according to
Nozick?s theory that it must exist
to protect the sanctity of these
two core libertarian values, it
is at some point brought to a
compromise that libertarians of
the propertarian tradition could
find to be significantly alarming.
What if, for example, the public
agent knows that a minor
violation ? say the confiscation
of a gun ? would prevent a more
significant violation, a mass
murder perhaps? As murder
counts as a violation of liberty
and property, following injury
or death, the public agent is
forced to violate one liberty in
the name of another, implying
that violations by the public
agent are more legitimate then
violations by non-pubic agents.
This begs the question of
whether or not it would then be
illegitimate for the public agent
to recognize a ?trade-off of a
relatively harmless violation for
the prevention of a very harmful
one[12]?. At this point, we have
reached a stage where violation
and the distribution of violation
is decided by a central authority
in a universal manner so as to
protect a community of self-
owners in a utilitarian manner,
as the avocation of non-violation
seems not to be equitable to its
prevention in itself. A pattern
of systematic and utilitarian
suppression thusly re-emerges,
in such a manner that the public
agent decides that it should,
directly or indirectly, ?coerce
citizens into respecting the self-
ownership rights of others[13]?.
The libertarian interpretation of
Nozick is therefore forced either
to negate the minimal state,
self-ownership or inviolable
liberty in order to avoid this
paradox, for under the current
paradigm some violations are
passively necessitated once all
outwith its theoretically limited
jurisdiction are regarded as a
?community of self-owners[14]? ?
a reality and compromise readily
admitted to by libertarian theorist
Lomasky[15]?.

Following the first signs
of internal contradiction in
statement (a) in regards to self-
ownership being compatible with
inviolable rights, the next logical
step is to consider whether
Nozick?s argument that ?the
state...[is] justified...only in so
far as it protects people against
force[16]? (b) can resolve this
problem. In regards to the internal
coherence of the statement
that minarchy can preserve the
conditions of (a), this position
has been called up upon from
within the self-prescribed anti-
authoritarian right in the form
of anarcho-capitalist Gerard
Cassey?s accusation that, ?states
are criminal organizations...not
just the obviously totalitarian or
repressive ones[17]?, describing
the very existence of a state as ?a
monopoly of allegedly legitimate
force over the inhabitants of a
determinate territory financed
by a compulsory levy imposed
on those inhabitants[18]?. On
this line of thought, he accuses
Nozick of being a minarchist and
not a libertarian on the grounds
that he is willing to accept a non-
voluntary state that enforces non-
violence, and that self-ownership
is incompatible with even the
most limited form of minarchy.
This perspective reflects on
the state?s potential to coerce
as being an ispo facto violation
of liberty, and holds Nozick?s
second statement that the only
legitimate state in regards to
libertarianism is a minimal one
to account. The link between
Nozick?s support of a minimal
state and the contradiction to be
found within his support of it as a
libertarian ? again, testing each
of his statements in isolation for
coherence ? can be revealed
from an existential reflection on
authoritarianism and coercion. If
we are to cogitate on the origin
of libertarianism as a negation
of oppression, exploitation and
coercion, then it must follow that
the presence of a body capable
of exercising these features be
called to scrutiny.

As demonstrated in the
deliberations above upon the
public agent as a violator, it
becomes apparent that this
source of authority is already
taking a moral stance[19] ?
albeit of its own interpretation
? as to how to best protect
the community of self-owners
through a series of continuous
trade-offs between violations
of various scales and their
prevention or punishment.
Following the exercise of validity
and negation, proposal (b) can
be tested for external cohesion
in regards to the consequential
negative externality its existence
has on (a) by considering the
counter-proposal that ?what
will happen to the threatened
individual, should he not
comply...[is also that] which
renders him unfree when
the threat is made?, provided
the implementation of the
threat[20]. This line of thought
was extensively articulated by
professor emeritus Michael
Taylor, who defined coercion by
the inclusion of the threat of it.
In this case, political power, and
thus oppression and coercion,
are defined by the ability to
make the deviation from an
individual?s primary choice of
action to a secondary one a
rational choice in the face of
punishment[21]. The argument
that such a presence protects
liberty as Nozick and advocates
of his school of thought envision
it has already been repealed by
the incompatibility between self-
ownership and inviolable liberty,
as the state ends up in its own
end-state form, permanently
enforcing the protection of
liberty. Yet the contradiction of a
minarchy with libertarian values
extends in regards to the notion
of self-ownership, as the threat
of punishment in itself provides
an external limitation to the
private sphere of liberty, where
a moral abstention from violating
others? liberty does not suffice
in this respect. The possession
of the ability to, directly through
enforcement or indirectly
through the ability to enforce,
affect individual?s actions in
such a manner becomes the
embodiment of the oppression
libertarians theoretically struggle
to abolish[22].Taylor points
to the fact that any ?rational
individual would prefer not to
be the recipient of a threat, and
after a threat had been made,
he would prefer to be back in
the pre-threat situation[23]?,
and that it follows that only the
absence of coercion? active
or potential ? can articulate
a libertarian society. In this
case, the existence of a public
agent or minimal state de facto
infringes upon the jurisdiction of
self-ownership, as part of one?s
actions or disposition towards
them is restricted through the
monopolised right to punish
them by the public agent[24].
The surrendering of self-
ownership in the name of self-
ownership thus, according to
this line of argument, becomes
an inevitable result of Nozick?s
second clause. We are therefore
left with the consequences
of statement (b) having an
externally contradictory effect
to the validity of (a), negating
the possibility of inviolable rights
and self-ownership.

If Nozick?s first statement
is threatened by an internal
contradiction between self-
ownership and inviolable rights,
and his second statement
negates the validity of the
first regardless of whether the
former argument can stand in
isolation, deductive logic points
to Nozick?s third clause (c) ? that
if humans are self-owners, they
are also owners of their income,
property and labour ? as a final
point of scrutiny in regards to
this particular validity-exercise.
In regards to this statement,
Nozick argues that statement
(a) is validated and protected
through his interpretation of
justice, materialized by the
entitlement theory. If it is to be the
case that justice in acquisition
be defined by non-violation[25]?,
this claim appears to be refuted
by his own rejection of the unjust
accumulation of property and
wealth through inheritance, that
leads to ?continuing inequalities
of wealth and position...[making]
the resulting inequalities
seem unfair[26]?. This would
be an internal contradiction in
statement (c), resolvable only
by the possible interference
of the state[27]. In regards to
justice in transfer, Nozick?s
additional belief that ?seizing the
results of someone?s labour is
equivalent to seizing hours from
him...making them a part-time
owner of you[28]? would seem to
excerpt an external contradiction
on clause (a), as surplus value
would assume the same violation
as imposed tax in regards to the
labour-capital relationship, given
that the tax-related months per
year of unpaid labour would be
equated to the unfavourable ratio
of labour hours and wage value.
In this sense, alienationwould
completely negate the Nozickian
claim that self-ownership
encompassed ownership of
one?s own labour, product, and
property[29]. The externalities
of the principle of rectification of
justice upon claims (a) and (b),
finally, would be those of the re-
emerging end-state and violator
of liberty mentioned previously.

Having tested and examined
each of Nozick?s three
statements in separation and
in relation to one another, the
following observations can be
made. In regards to his first
clause, the implied equitability
of inviolable rights and self-
ownership is subject to internal
contradiction, insofar that if
self-ownership were to be
considered and inviolable right,
it would have to be enforced,
thus giving rise to a contradiction
in the context of libertarianism
and its propertarian tradition. In
regards to the second statement
on the existence of a minimal
state, this clause causes the
active demise of statement (a)
given the state, regardless of
how minimal in form, becomes
existential violation of ownership
and liberty, given the arising
need of a moral trade-off of
utilitarian violations. It exceeds
the so-called jurisdiction of its
minimalistic purpose, becoming
yet another end-state of
systematic violation in the name
of the self-owned community.
Finally, in reference to the third
claim that self-ownership is to
encompass ownership of labour,
property, and product, the justice
in acquisition fails to persevere
when faced with inheritable
tradition, surplus-
value exploitation and
alienation, and a regression
towards the state
to yet again act
as a moderating,
distributive benefactor of
justice and wealth, creating
both an internal contradiction
in values as well as a violation
of all that is represented by
the terms self-ownership and
inviolable rights.


[1] Nozick, Robert, ?Anarchy, State and Utopia?, Basic Books 1974, p. ix

[2] Ibid

[3] Graham, Robert, ? Anarchism. A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas. Volume One: 
From Anarchy to Anarchism
(300CE to 1939)?, Black Rose Books 2006, p. 60

[4] Ibid, pg. 61

[5] Murray N., Rothbard, ?The Betrayal of the American Right?, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
2007, p. 83

[6] Ibid

[7] Avineri, Shlomo; de-Shalit, Avner, ?Communitarianism and Individualism?, Oxford 
University Press 1992, p. 137

[8] Rothbard, M. ?Power and Market?, Institute of Human Studies 1970, p. 76

[9] Wolff, Jonathan, ?Robert Nozick. Property, Justice and the Minimal State?, Polity 
Press 1991, p.4

[10] Bird, Collin. ?The Myth of Liberal Individualism?, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
p. 143

[11] Ibid, pg. 148

[12] Ibid, p. 151

[13] Ibid, p. 149

[14] Ibid, p. 152

[15] Lomasky, L, ?Persons, Rights and the Moral Community?, Oxford University Press, 1987, 
p. 151

[16] Wolff, Jonathan, ?Robert Nozick. Property, Justice and the Minimal State?, Polity 
Press 1991, p. 30

[17] Casey, Gerard, (2013) ?Libertarian Anarchy: Against the State?, Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews. An Electronic
Journal?, available at 
(http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40697-libertarian-anarchy-against-the-state/), [accessed: 03/10/13]

[18] Ibid

[19] a prospect which is antagonistic to right and individualist libertarians as found in 
Nozick?s statement (b)

[20] Taylor, Michael, ?Community, Anarchy and Liberty?, Cambridge University Press 1985, 
p. 144

[21] Ibid, p. 11

[22] Ibid, p.11

[23] Ibid, p. 146

[24] Norman, Richard, ?Free and Equal. A Philosophical Examination of Political Values?, 
Oxford University Press 1987, p. 36

[25] Barry, Norman P., ?On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism?, Macmillan Press 1989, 
p. 151

[26] Nozick, Robert, ?The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations?, Simon and Schuster, 
1989, p. 30

[27] Ibid

[28] Nozick, Robert, ?Anarchy, State and Utopia?, Basic Books, 1974, p. 172



[29] Meszaros, Istvan, ?Marx?s Theory of Alienation?, Merlin Press 1970, p. 154

Bibliography

Books:
Avineri, Shlomo; de-Shalit, Avner, ?Communitarianism and Individualism?, Oxford University 
Press, 1992

Bird, Collin. ?The Myth of Liberal Individualism?, Cambridge University Press, 1999

Cohen, G. A, ?Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality?, Cambridge University Press, 1995

Godwin, William, ?Enquiry Concerning Political Justice?, Penguin Books, 1985

Graham, Robert, ? Anarchism. A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas. Volume One: From 
Anarchy to Anarchism (300CE
to 1939)?, Black Rose Books, 2006

Lomasky, ?Persons, Rights and the Moral Community?, Oxford University Press, 1987

Meszaros, Istvan, ?Marx?s Theory of Alienation?, Merlin Press, 1970

Norman, Richard, ?Free and Equal. A Philosophical Examination of Political Values?, Oxford 
University Press, 1987

Nozick, Robert, ?Anarchy, State and Utopia?, Basic Books, 1974

Nozick, Robert, ?The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations?, Simon and Schuster, 1989

Rothbard, M., ?Power and Market?, Institute of Human Studies, 1970

Rothbard, M., ?The Betrayal of the American Right?, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007

Taylor, Michael, ?Community, Anarchy and Liberty?, Cambridge University Press, 1985

Wolff, Jonathan, ?Robert Nozick. Property, Justice and the Minimal State?, Polity Press, 1991

Electronic journals:
Casey, Gerard, (2013) ?Libertarian Anarchy: Against the State?, Notre Dame Philosophical 
Reviews. An Electronic Journal?,
available at (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40697-libertarian-anarchy-against-the-state/), 
[accessed: 03/10/13]