Today's Topics:
1. wsm.ie: Hitting Tesco where it hurts: Strike sees sales fall
more than 80% leading to back down (a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)
2. France, Alternative Libertaire AL #269 - Reformism: What is
citizenism the name? (fr, it, pt) [machine translation]
(a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)
3. lasoli cnt catalunuia: Solidaridad Obrera [FEMINISM] MARCH
8. EVERY FIGHT IS A VICTORY (ca) (a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)
4. anarkismo.net - Anarchist Lens: The Green Experiment by
Kevin Doyle (a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)
5. Cherán K'eri through music and murals as tools of
resistance Ruptura Colectiva (RC) Demián Revart Translation:
Ryan Knight (ca) (a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Tesco agreed Friday to suspend its attempt to impose a worsening of pay and conditions on
its long term workers and to return to the Labour Court, leading to the suspension of the
strike. Monday's Irish Times carries a report on just how hard Tesco have been hit by the
strike action, the Finglas superstore saw a massive 80% decline in takings. These leaked
figures stand in stark contrast to the attempt by Tesco PR to suggest the strike was
ineffective and unpopular. ---- The figures reveal that even those stores which had not
yet voted to strike, and which subsequently did not have pickets, saw a decline of 30% in
sales. According to Conor Pope's report in Tesco Clearwater on the Monday before the
strike "sales were €165,901, while a week later they were under €35,000, a drop of
€130,916 or nearly 80 per cent" and "The fall between the two Mondays across 29 stores of
all sizes totalled €827,896. .. A daily loss of that scale would suggest the cumulative
impact of the 11-day strike came close to €50 million"
Losses of that scale explain why Tesco was willing to spend over €100,000 on full page
newspaper ads trying to unsuccessfully convince customers that they should not support the
strike. They also show why workers taking strike action has a power that cannot be
ignored, in the way marches and other demonstrations sometimes are. Being conservative
Tesco probably lost 2 million profits from the 11 day strike (although Tesco keeps profits
from the Ireland franchise a secret).
Tesco were attempting to impose a cut in pay and conditions for their longest serving
staff in Ireland, the pay cut was up to 20%. These pre-1996 workers could earn 14 euro an
hour, a rate close to a living wage rather than the minimum wage most workers in retail
are stuck with. As such Tesco's actions were a threat to all retail workers, the 14,500
employed by Tesco but also workers across all other retail outlets.
Minimum wages also act as a subsidy from all workers to the corporations that impose them,
because many such workers are then forced to claim various state benefits to get by. One
study of this for Tesco in the UK estimated that the British state was giving Tesco an
annual subsidy equivalent to £364 million sterling, because it's 209,000 low paid workers
needed to claim Working Tax-Credits and Housing Benefit.
We don't have figures for Ireland but it's significant that on Friday the Department of
Social Protection had to deny that Tesco workers would have Family Income Supplement cut
because they were striking, so certainly the low pay of some of the workers mean they do
have to claim it. These state subsidies to corporations come at a cost to healthcare and
education for all workers. This is why it's so important that we all support fights
against ‘race to the bottom' conditions and support fights for wage increases. No one
should have to work for a wage that they cannot live off, and these supplements amount to
a recognition that the pay is too low to survive on.
There are specific reasons in Ireland for the high level of solidarity shown and the
respect for the pickets. The 1910s on saw a situation where workers who once lived under
desperate conditions won very significant improvements, decade after decade, through
militant action. We escaped the slums of 1910s Dublin through a long, long fight that was
not easy, the 1913 Lockout being one significant defeat. But a successful fight over time
meant for all the generations up to the present each set of workers lived considerably
better than their parents. The drop in union membership over the last decades has meant
the current generation of workers have seen real declines, often in official forms where
they enter the workforce at a lower set of wages and conditions.
The collective solidarity from the 1910s, which saw a general culture of respect for
picket lines and solidarity with those on strike, was a key part of winning those
improvements. There were suggestions during the strike that this culture has weakened,
although in part this was because a lot of people seemed to be ignoring the picket at the
Baggot Street store, but that's located in the fairly affluent business district. There
was also an issue initially with students at the St Pat's teacher training college
crossing the picket at the Drumcondra store. However this was greatly reduced following
the work of a number of teacher union activists and the college student union.
Tesco themselves have played a nasty game. At its most bizarre they painted out the
pedestrian crossing at the entrance of the Ballybrack store. They forced strikers away
from the doors of the actual store to the gates of shopping centres and then cried
crocodile tears because of course this meant other businesses were affected. Their
strategy was clearly to isolate the 250 affected workers from the remaining 14,000
workers, and demoralise them into surrender.
This wasn't entirely unsuccessful. Mandate lost strike ballots in some of the stores where
there were no workers on the pre-1996 contracts. Tesco are using what Mussolini called
Salami tactics; in attacking the union, cutting off one thin slice of the workers to
attack at a time. Mandate reckons that if Tesco had succeeded with the pre-96 workers the
"3,000 workers on post-1996 contracts who are currently on a higher hourly rate of pay who
will be next."
Some 10,000 of Tesco's 14,500 workers are represented by Mandate, if that 10,000 stick
together it's very clear Tesco would be defeated. But if Tesco can cut them into chunks
isolated from each other it could pick them off one by one. When it comes to conflicts
with their bosses individual workers don't have a lot of power but when we stick together
we win.
It's not clear what will happen in the Labour Court either - after all, it is stacked in
favour of the bosses' interests. But what is clear is that effective picketing and
solidarity aren't just for tales of labour battles in the 1910's. They are weapons for
defending and advancing our quality of life in 2017 and beyond, sadly something which will
always be under attack as long as we are split into employees and employers. Striking
works . The costs for Tesco, in terms of lost profits, obviously proved far too high and
hit Tesco in the one place where it hurts, right in the profits.
Words: Andrew Flood (follow Andrew on Twitter)
Photo collage from the Tesco Workers Together Facebook page
Author: Andrew N Flood
------------------------------
Message: 2
Everywhere in Europe, new radical left-wing movements are developing: Syriza in Greece,
Podemos in Spain, Jean-Luc Mélenchon's insubordinate France ... How are they new in
relation to the "old" social democracy or the revolutionary currents? Their common point
is to rely on "citizenship", a new fashionable ideology. Yet it is criticized and even
problematic. A short tour ... ---- To understand the current political situation, it is
necessary to make a detour by the financial crisis of 2008. The massive support to the
banks creates a debt of the States which leads to deleterious policies of austerity:
increase of unemployment, reduction of the wages, dismantling of the Social aids ... The
economic crisis, linked to a weakening of the dynamics of capitalism, is sustainable.
In political terms, it causes the acceleration of the establishment of a
technocratic-security management of the political: left social democratic and right
conservative of government now resemble like two drops of water and their program is
simple: to put in Place neoliberal measures and at the same time develop the security to
muzzle and repress any potential dispute ...
This austerity treatment created an unprecedented legitimacy crisis for the social-liberal
(PS, Labor, SPD, Democrat in the US ...) and Conservative (Republican, CDU / CSU,
conservative , American Republicans). They are discredited by the anti-social policies
they carry out while exposing their corruption.
For the moment, revolutionaries, if they exist (in France, Germany, Spain, Greece, etc.)
struggle to make their voices heard to the general public. Only two types of protest
responses can be heard in the debate.
The first is that of the extreme right: the National Front in France, AfD in Germany,
Golden Dawn in Greece, UKIP in the United Kingdom and Trump in the United States ... This
false dispute proposes nothing but national capitalism And to take immigrants as
scapegoats by racist politicians. Unfortunately, this trend is too successful ...
The other great alternative, that of the "left" is the current called "citizen", which
intends to recreate a new social democracy. In Greece and Spain, it is Syriza and Podemos.
In France, it is a series of thinkers, such as Lordon or Friot, journalists like Ruffin,
movements such as Nuit Standing and politicians such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who embody
this trend.
No class anchoring
To begin with, it must be remembered that the workers' movement and a good part of the
revolutionaries consider that the class of producers and producers, that is to say workers
and workers, is the revolutionary subject. This is the case of Alternative libertarian.
That is to say, it is on the basis of our concrete situations of exploitation that we
mobilize. It is because we are exploited in practice that we act.
This is not the case with citizens. On the contrary, they rely on an abstract "citizen"
who has no class anchor or identity as a man or woman, white or colored. Before being a
worker, a man or a woman, a resident or a resident of the inner cities, the working-class
neighborhoods or the countryside, in short, a concrete person, an individual is an
abstract "citizen", a member of the people , Regardless of social status.
It is by relying on this individual that reforms, passing through the State and the
Republic (whose constitution would be rewritten), could then be proposed ... Thus Podemos
theorized the stoppage of the reference to the proletariat and To the working class. In
ideological terms the most prominent thinkers of this current are Mouffe and Laclau who
inspired the book Construire le peuple d'Erejon, one of the theorists of Podemos. Their
bible is Hegemony and socialist strategy.
Popular within social movements
Their idea is to "radicalize democracy", in a refusal to say left or right. The reference
system is the opposition between the people and the "caste" or the 99% against the 1%. The
means of change is not so much the struggles and the social movements as the passage
through the ballot boxes to build a regenerated and progressive nation, which some call
the national-popular option.
The second common point of these thinkers is that they are very regularly put forward by
people of very good faith within the social movements. Thus, during the struggle against
the labor law, the Standing Nights were the place where the citizenists, who, at the call
of Ruffin and Lordon, would have liked to launch a process of writing a "new constitution"
For a "true democracy" or a "true Republic", or even a VI Republic for Mélenchon.
Fortunately, the Standing Nights have not reduced to this kind of ranting and have also
been a support for the struggle.
Why criticize citizenship? Jean-Luc Mélenchon makes great YouTube videos (he even talks
about his love for quinoa) and Lordon talks about France Inter. Why do they fall on them,
even if we do not agree?
It is because even if some citizens could be quite interesting, we still have fundamental
disagreements: the "old" social democracy, even if it was not revolutionary, claimed the
working class. As we have seen, this is no longer the case of citizenship: the reference
is no longer the workers and the workers, but the people and the abstract citizen ...
From the "people" to the "nation", the pace is quickly crossed
One might think that it has few implications, but that is not the case. Relying on the
exploited, allows the internationalism: the union of the exploited ones across the
borders. On the contrary, to refer to the "citizen" ultimately allows only to rely on an
interclassist "people", and above all brings us to the nation as an unsurpassable horizon ...
Thus, from the "people" to the "nation", the step is quickly crossed (read on the
following pages). Lordon praises the nation in his book Imperium, while the Melenchonians
love to sing La Marseillaise at each meeting ...
Of course it is a "left" nationalism that is put forward, but it remains problematic. As
libertarians, we know that it is often the reference to the nation that brings out the
worst horrors: security laws, migratory politics to gerber, far right fascisante,
colonialism and wars. For us, the nation must be criticized and not put forward.
It is also the question of the class struggle which leads us to criticize citizenship. The
most frequent citizen thinkers like Friot and Lordon or the journalist Ruffin recognize
the existence of social classes, they are not totally inconsistent ... On the other hand
they do not consider that it is as an exploit.es , Proletarians, precarious workers and
workers that we must act. The classroom is not a political tool for them. To this they
oppose the abstract "citizen" who as a member of the democratic community must act as a
people, disconnected from social classes.
From the moment they arise in this context, and not from a concrete classical framework,
it seems that the only perspective of political action is a neoreformism with a good
complexion, which explains why Lordon, for example, despite an apparent radicalization,
Proposes only to rewrite a constitution as the political outlet of the movement against
the labor law.
Among the latest analyzes of Lordon, there are sometimes interesting things, close to the
revolutionaries ... But for all that, the unimaginable horizon of these thinkers is to
rewrite the constitution by a "constituent process". That is why, according to the good
word of a comrade, "Frédéric Lordon, it is like the Parisian demonstrations, it leaves to
Republic and ends up at Nation".
More generally, we criticize the current citizenship for the inability to break out of the
formal republican framework: the reforms are part of the democracy and the action comes
from "citizens".
But the question of the social transformation that arises. How to change society?
Citizenship seems to reveal two ways, which for us are as many sidings. The first is
simply the electoral option, borrowed from social democracy (which is not a compliment):
to vote for a party or a charismatic citizen like Mélenchon would be enough to change
society ... We do not share this Enthusiasm, we believe that economic and political power
is on the side of the employers, which is the only one that the elected representatives
represent, for it leaves them no choice, and that therefore the revolution of the ballot
boxes is doomed to failure; The employers will not allow themselves to be made. The sad
failure of Syriza in Greece against the European Union is a cruel reminder.
Agora citizen, friendly but ineffective
The second model would be essentially the establishment of a large citizen assembly that
would be the source of institutional reform. It is somewhat the model of the Indignants,
the Occupy, the 15-M Movement in Spain ("Indignados") or the "constituent process" ... If
this idea with a multiplication of assemblies seems more sympathetic than the electoral
way, It is none the less incomplete. Indeed, an assembly that politely occupies a place,
but is not on strike, is not in struggle, does not block the economy, and flows,
eventually does not go beyond the citizen agora stage, Formative, but little in a position
to concretize his ideas.
On the contrary, we believe that it is the struggles, the struggles, those of the workers,
the exploited, the precarious, that will be the source of our emancipation ... And this
struggle will not be against a caste or the establishment , But indeed against the ruling
class and its apparatus of domination (State, law enforcement, media ...). It may be less
sexy than a podcast by Frédéric Lordon on France Culture, but it is nevertheless necessary
... To change the world, there is no other way but the struggle, the blockages, The
strikes and the revolution!
Matt (AL Montpellier)
http://www.alternativelibertaire.org/?Reformisme-De-quoi-le-citoyennisme
------------------------------
Message: 3
Wage gap, glass ceiling and horizontal segregation, more difficult access to training and
employment, greater job insecurity and unemployment, domestic exploitation, inability to
balance, normalized violence, daily harassment, invisibility, poverty, discrimination,
childishness, denial, abuse, control of our sexuality and our reproductive rights ... ----
They are so numerous, are as varied, are so overwhelming struggles in which women have to
face every day simply because they are women, one can say that until the very existence in
this society heteropatriarcal that explodes and we repress it now a victory. But for us
this is not enough. We do not have enough to stay alive, we live in a society of equals.
---- Working-class women have to face every day in a double struggle of emancipation
against capital to be working; and against patriarchy, because they are women. Compared
with men, charge less, work in precarious conditions, are listed less and work longer
hours, we are required more to be hired to get home ... But we do ourselves by our
husbands, sons, fathers and brothers .
This situation has historically maintained through a system of control that the more we
exploded, creating further submission. But the submission and fear them down because they
are women's attitudes. Today, from today and always, we want to be in all the struggles
and why we fight on all fronts.
Women are the engine of social change. Every woman who rebels against oppression in their
home win is a step towards a more humane world. Each woman who decides to live their
sexuality openly gained a step towards a freer world. Every woman who stands up to the
landlord in the workplace is a step towards a just world won.
The women we erase the past and the present, but today we reaffirm today as we claim
subject fighting, of course assume that fear has turned into anger and that our fight is
unique, central, necessary and revolutionary. And we do it in unity in community. The
invisibility of our struggles, social normalization of operations, the limited
availability of our time, it makes it difficult to participate in unions, which often do
not even take into account, we lowered our struggles or move .
However, historically women have been present in all social and class struggles that have
taken place on many occasions in the front row by paying with our lives our rebellion, our
exercise dignity, our desire for freedom.
It is necessary to collect our heritage of fighting to win our present. Knowing who we
are. Knowing what we want to be. Making an important moment of our struggle, fundamental
and collective history of class struggle. Claiming that the syndicalist organization of
which we are an essential part is ready to reverse that suffer double exploitation.
Building our space equally among folks willing to deal with patriarchy fundamental actor
of our operation as workers. Get up and cry invulnerable, like a single fist. Fight fight
to win victory.
Long live the eight March!
Long live the struggle of working women!
http://lasoli.cnt.cat/03/03/2017/feminisme-8-marc-lluita-victoria/
------------------------------
Message: 4
Parliamentary politics and the demolilisation of struggle ... ---- In this post, Anarchist
Lens returns to the subject of electoral politics and how it demobilises the struggle for
change. The example of the German Greens is examined. In the late 70s, Die Grünen (The
Greens) emerged as a new force on the German and European left. Radical and activist led,
they claimed to be aware of the pitfalls of the electoral process and were, in their own
words, an ‘anti-party party'. Yet, in less than twenty years, they had capitulated on all
their key principles: tolerating nuclear power, rubber-stamping German participation in
NATO and even agreeing to capitalist-friendly market reforms. How did this transformation
come about? ---- The town of Wyhl is located in south-west Germany in the state of
Baden-Württemberg, not far from the Alps. Wyhl and its hinterland is largely agricultural
and is also rich in terms of natural beauty. Even so, in the early 70s, Wyhl was chosen as
the preferred location for a nuclear power plant. The technology had been under
development in West Germany since the 1950s but it was really only in the late 60s and
early 70s that the German state moved to make nuclear power the cornerstone of its future
energy needs.
There was immediate opposition to the proposal in Wyhl and over a number of years planners
and politicians were lobbied to oppose the project - all to no avail. In February 1975,
building contractors moved onto land near the town to prepare for construction. A few days
later local activists and farmers occupied the site and prevented preparatory work from
progressing. The police intervened and removed the protesters but the subsequent publicity
- which exposed heavy-handed police tactics - drew attention to the struggle in Wyhl. A
short while after nearly 30,000 people - including large numbers of students from nearby
Freiberg University - converged on the site and all work was halted on the construction of
the power station. Less than a month after, faced with ongoing protests and occupations,
the grand plan to make Wyhl nuclear was abandoned. In an ironic twist the site for the
power plant was later turned into a nature reserve. (1)
The victory at Wyhl is considered to be one of the first major successes of West Germany's
impressive anti-nuclear movement which held sway mainly in the 1970s and 80s. Other
significant confrontations were to follow - such as that at Grohnde (2) and Brokdorff (3)
- but Wyhl is noteworthy for the decisiveness of the victory. How did this happen? A key
factor was local involvement and resistance. A second feature was the willingness to
commit to direct action - such as the site occupations. A third and vital factor was the
movement's ability to win practical support in large numbers when the West German state
opted to use its repressive hand. This wider support and solidarity was vital to what was
eventually achieved.
The German green movement was an important component of the broad anti-nuclear
mobilisation in that country. They played a role in building that struggle and were, at
the same time, fundamentally influenced by it. Local activity, which focused on local
issues and which utilised local action, was a key ingredient in growth. Grass roots
participation was also highly valued as was consciousness-raising around the issues and
concerns of the day. In other words before the greens ever became Die Grünen, the
political party, they were a coalition of all sorts of practical activists - citizens
action groups, campaigners against nuclear power, anti-militarists and pacifists as well
as anti-capitalists. (4) Politically speaking they drew their membership largely from the
radical left - anarchist, New Left and Maoist ideas were all part of the mix - but no one
ideology wielded a decisive influence. (5)
Two factors were important to the political challenge that the green movement came to
represent. The first was the emerging importance of "environmentalism" and "ecologism" as
political issues. Seen from the perspective of today, environmentalism and concern about
the earth's resources appear to be a mainstream issues, but back in the early 70s, concern
about the impact of human development on the earth's ecology was decidedly new. (6)
Central to this was the green perception that capitalism itself was a key part of problem
that the environmental movement faced. Capitalism's unrelenting demand for growth, its
voracious search for new markets and cheaper raw materials were core to its dynamism. Yet
these same elements were directly at odds with the earth's environment and green
movement's contention that the planet had exhaustible, finite resources that needed to be
carefully managed and minded. For this reason significant sections of the Green movement
held that social and economic transformation away from the dictates of the ‘free market'
would have to take place if the environment was to be saved. (7)
A second factor was that the early green movement was also about a different way of doing
things. Its evolution - as indicated by protests such as that at Wyhl - emphasised
grassroots involvement and participative democracy. But in practice too there was a
commitment to doing things ‘a different way'. This translated into an anti-professional,
participatory and decentralised attitude to party organisation. Horizontal organisational
forms were favoured over traditional ‘top-down' arrangements, as were internal
organisational practices that promoted and maintained grassroots empowerment and
participation.
The overall praxis then - maintaining a radical organisational form that encouraged and
facilitated participation as part of the process of building a movement for change - was
seen as core to the green perspective.
Key protests such as that at Wyhl had been successful because such actions were locally
based and relied heavily on the active participation of grassroots members. However this
‘local' nature of the early green movement also meant that from early days and in some
regional areas, sections of the greens also openly intervened at city and regional level
elections. These initiatives were initially tactical and relied heavily on the emerging
movement's ability to exploit the rivalries that existed between the dominant political
parties in West German politics - the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. (8)
Broadly speaking these electoral initiatives fared well (winning modest, locally valued
concessions) with the result that there was increasing openness to using such methods if
the opportunities presented themselves. In the early days these electoral tactics were
used in conjunction with (or parallel to) tactics involving direct action. (9) This
parallel approach - using extra-parliamentary action alongside a visible parliamentary
presence - was an old strategy of the Left's and quite viable.
Inevitably, however, the greens moved to consolidate this base of operations and this
culminated in the formation of the German Green Party (Die Grünen or The Greens) in 1980
at Karlsruhe. (11) The central tenets of this new organisation were environmental concern
and action, social justice,(12) grassroots democracy and non-violence. (13)
METEORIC RISE
Die Grünen had negligible impact in the Federal elections of 1980 but this was not
surprising given that it had only just formed. (14) The situation, however, changed
radically just three years later when the new party burst onto the Federal and European
political scene capturing 27 seats or 5.7% of the vote. Further significant growth
followed, fortuitously accelerated by a series of high profile controversies. The first,
involving the deployment of Pershing II (15) missiles on German soil, further underscored
the precarious position that West German society found itself in at this time i.e. at the
epicentre of any future East-West nuclear war. The other equal worrying issue was
radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl (16) nuclear accident (1986) which underlined
further the dubious safety record of nuclear power plants as well as the silent danger
that nuclear radiation posed. Not surprisingly when Die Grünen marshalled their forces for
the 1987 Federal elections they achieved another high vote, this time of 8.3%.
The meteoric rise in support, however, papered over a serious internal crisis. This
schism, which revolved around the extent to which The Greens were remaining true to their
original principles and aims, was sharpened considerably by the reality of German
unification. The ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s and, with that, the uniting of
East and West Germany, precipitated a new round of Federal elections. Die Grünen however
was unable to agree a unity programme with their counterparts from the former East
Germany, Alliance 90, with the result that its vote actually shrunk to 4.8 percent and -
crucially - came in under the politically decisive 5% threshold mark - reserved within
German parliamentary politics as minimum level of support needed to establish a
parliamentary presence. (17)
A decisive and bitter period of internal conflict, often termed the ‘Realos' versus
‘Fundis' debate, now broke out within Die Grünen. This was a conflict over the movement's
political soul and future direction and it resolved itself decisively in favour of the
‘Realos' faction in the early 90s. Consequently, in 1993, The Greens (in a new alliance
with Alliance 90) re-emerged as a serious electoral force, capturing 7.3% of the popular
vote in the Federal election. (18)
With the issue of internal party wrangling more or less finished with, and the Realos
faction in the ascendency, Die Grünen as a political party moved closer to the centre of
German politics and went on to emerge as the third largest party in the country in the
1998 elections. In effect they now displaced the right-of-centre Free Democrats from their
sitting role as coalition king-maker. (19) Soon after this Die Grünen entered into their
first Federal level coalition with their old rivals, the SPD and the ‘red-green' coalition
emerged.
On the one hand it could be said that The Greens had achieved success but the nature of
this was tempered by the knowledge that the organisation had abandoned its core
principles. This became glaringly clear when Die Grünen backed the decision to allow
German participation in the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the early 90s. Not only did
Joschka Fischer (Green leader and Foreign Minister in the ‘red-green' coalition) actively
defended participation in the aerial bombings of Serbia, he was supported by one time '68
hero Daniel Cohn-Bendit. (20) The controversy provoked a massive crisis inside Die Grünen
and nearly a full third of its membership resigned in the immediate aftermath of Germany's
bombing of Serbia. In any case just as significant was the party's endorsement and
participation in the implementation of a raft of neo-liberal economic ‘reforms' (the
Agenda 2010 programme) which sought to revitalise the flagging Germany economy via
‘workplace' reforms. As one commentator noted, ‘this led to[the]plundering of the public
assets, social insurance and pension funds, while repressing wages and granting tax cuts
to business worth billions of euros - effectively a redistribution of wealth from poor to
rich'. In a sense so much for social justice. (21)
IRON LAW
It could be argued The Greens were naive and ultimately unprepared for the process they
engaged in, but this is far from being the full story. As is obvious from some of the
early, formative debates in the movement there was a good deal of discussion about what
the road ahead involved. In part this reflected the influence of New Left (22) ideas
inside Green party ranks, but in part it also reflected an acute awareness of the past
compromises and capitulations - particularly poignant in terms of Germany's own tragic
history.
To recap the socialist movement in Europe, during the early 20th century, was numerically
strong and hugely popular. In many countries this translated into electoral success and
many socialist parties had actually entered into government. Yet sell-outs and betrayals
were the order of the day - an outcome that was particularly true in the case of Germany
where the once powerful Social Democratic Party (the GSPD) (23) had not only voted for war
in the prelude to WW1 but had also played a pivotal part in the suppression of the workers
uprisings in 1919 - a course of action that did, in time, pave the way for the rise of Nazism.
Another factor was the influence of anarchist ideas and in particular that movement's
critique of the parliamentary process. As a political theory anarchism had warned about
(and predicted) a good deal of what had come to pass in the mainstream socialist movement
in Europe in the 20th century i.e. dilution and abandonment of political principles as
part of full engagement with the parliamentary process. These predictions had been made
during various debates with Marxists and other reform oriented socialists in the late 19th
century and in the early 20th century period. (24) But, for the most part, these concerns
and criticism were swept aside.
Many socialist leaders believed that they understood the project of reforming capitalism
and that all that was required was that they be handed the levers of power and the working
masses would see the benefit. In addition these same socialist leaders held a superficial
(even innocent) appreciation of how the State (as a structure) operated on the political
front. Many regarded the ‘state' benignly: a ‘bad' thing in the wrong hands, a force for
‘good' once steered in the correct direction by enlightened vision. (25) How the State was
actually structured - its hierarchical core - and how this affected decision-making as
well the means for the mobilisation of resources - was largely ignored.
Yet the evidence of the 20th century history had done much to vindicate the anarchist
critique. So much so that the critique and the debate itself - centring on whether the
parliamentary process was fatal to ideals - was to the fore in Die Grünen in its early
days. Thus Frieder Otto Wolf, a former Green European MEP, noted about the organisation:
"One key debate was about how far social emancipation could be a matter of party politics
as they had been in the 1920s. This debate involved addressing questions of internal party
democracy and challenging political scientist Robert Michels' ‘iron law of oligarchy'.
Michels argued that parties are always doomed to degenerate into apparatuses by which the
leadership dominates the mass membership. To counter this effect, the Greens devised the
principle of ‘grassroots democracy'. The party developed a strong set of institutional
rules to prevent the development of a permanent party elite and to ensure that power
spread constantly out to the membership. This would renew the leadership with fresh
energies and experience." (26)
To an important extent then the parliamentary process was viewed by Die Grünen as
treacherous. What was devised to protect the organisation and its aims was the
construction of an organisational bulwark known as basisdemokratie. It was inevitable that
the party would taste electoral success and popularity, the point was to prepare for it.
Basisdemokratie was essentially a set of ‘institutional rules' designed to protect the new
party and organisation from the corrupting aspects of the parliamentary success. (27) Its
key features were:
* Any party member could attend any party meeting at any time. Although this might seem
like a basic matter in a democratic party, in reality the majority of political parties
don't allow this; for example an ordinary member is not allowed attend a meeting of, say,
the parliamentary party.
* Consensus would be sought in important debates and was to be preferred over outright
majority rule. However majority vote decisions were acceptable after an appropriate amount
of debate.
* Important items of policy were subject to a collective decision making process -
involving the grassroots. This was considered to be particularly important and was to act
as brake on the scenario whereby key party policy decision could come to be seen as
decision that should be the preserve of the elected parliamentarians.
* There would be strict limitations on the holding of party officer-ships while also
holding a parliamentary seat.
* Green deputies were to be mandated and bound by the party conference and the agreed
party programme if they took up elected ‘member of parliament' status. Note that this was
an effort to introduce a modicum of ‘direct-democracy' practice over representational
parliamentary democracy.
* Members elected to state and Federal assemblies would step down halfway through their
terms of office - to be replaced by the next Green on the electoral list.
* Party roles and officer positions were rotated to as to avoid the development of career
politicians.
* The party was committed to gender balance in officership roles.
* Finally The Greens were committed to basisanbingdung or "tied up with the grassroots".
This concept stressed the ‘importance of ensuring that members in senior offices within
the federal party maintained a direct link with those active at local and regional
levels'. (28) This was to be achieved by attending meetings or activities organised by
local branches.
Underpinning the idea of basisdemokratie was a specific concern about
‘professionalisation'. This was not just the issue of career politicians and the
deformities that could arise from the influence of a particular ‘shining light' or
‘leader'. It was also about confronting the process of change that occurred within a party
through prolonged exposure to the electioneering process and the media limelight. In
traditional parties, the Federal MPs often became ‘the face' of those parties.
Consequently they accrued power, linked to their media profile that was outside the
grassroots mandate. It was a development that distorted the internal culture of the party
unless specifically countered; basisdemokratie was an attempt to provide that. (29)
TOP DOWN
Early electoral success meant Die Grünen was flooded with offers to participate in
coalition arrangements. These had to be acted upon. In favour of forming coalitions was
the age old desire to achieve a certain number of real reforms. If well chosen, these
could then be further used to underline the party's future potential. The downside was
that Die Grünen might have to support unsavoury measures that clearly weren't in the
party's manifesto. Such measures were capable of damaging the party's prized image of
being ‘new' and ‘different. They also risked antagonising the party's activist base -
which was a corner stone of Die Grünen's organisational achievements.
It proved impossible to resist the lure of office. In Hesse in 1984, Die Grünen formally
agreed to enter into a full coalition arrangement when they agreed to support a minority
SPD government. Interestingly this arrangement was opposed by the Federal Die Grünen
organisation but local autonomy was highly prized and, in this case, triumphed. As a
result, and with time, other local Green organisations in Berlin (1989) and Lower Saxony
(1990) also entered into State coalition arrangements. (30) Moreover, in an early sign of
the seismic shift underway in the party, in Brandenburg and Bremen, the Greens entered
into three-way coalitions with the SPDs and their ideological adversaries the right-wing
Free Democrats (FDP). In the state of Hesse the coalition lasted until the Greens pulled
out following the decision by Hesse state parliament to grant a new licence for a nuclear
power station! (31) This case highlighted the challenging situation that Die Grünen was
now finding itself in on the policy front.
What was happening internally? As the opportunities for coalition proliferated, the
practices of basisdemokratie moved more centre stage - as might be expected. However, the
manner in which happened was not fully anticipated. The nub of the matter was that at some
level basisdemokratie actually worked. It stipulated certain ways of acting and this was
given legal effect by Die Grünen's rule book. In effect a brake was put on the headlong
rush to reconfigure Die Grünen into a traditional ‘professional' party.
In particular basisdemokratie was effective in the decision-making arena. Die Grünen's
rule book instructed its politicians, if involved, to refer back to the party's membership
before signing off on important decisions. (32) However this style of ‘horizontal'
consultation jarred with the ‘top-down' operation of the State. If Die Grünen had been the
sole political party in an administrative structure, it might have had some means to
insist on an accommodation (from the State) but instead, in those early days, it was often
working in coalition partnerships. These partners were also antagonistic to the practices
ordained by basisdemokratie. Thus Die Grünen discovered quickly that its consensus
decision-making stipulations were the source of considerable friction.
‘Top-down' decision-making, of course, has a logic all of its own. State power rests on a
number of pillars, but one of those is the State's ‘right' to make decisions on behalf of
the rest of us. Most of officialdom accepts and supports top-down decision making. This is
a product of the elite mindset, but there is also an element of ‘custom and practice':
this is how things are done and have always been done. To up-scuttle the ‘top-down' way of
doing things is, in and of itself, not easy and this is precisely what the Die Grünen
discovered. The Greens found themselves battling a conservative civil structure, sceptical
coalition partners and, in time, a section inside its own ranks that did itself support
basisdemokratie - because it was causing too much friction with the various coalition
partners.
This internal faction, elements of which became the Realos wing of the Die Grünen, had
existed from the party's foundation. Recall that Die Grünen was a heterogeneous
organisation in terms of its constituent identities. This was widely viewed as a positive
aspect, as Petra Kelly explained: "The variety of currents enrich our party, even in the
absence of a common consensus in the analysis of society. I don't want to exclude
communists and conservatives and I don't have to. One current learns from the other. There
is not mutual destruction, but a convergence of views. That what is new about our
movement." (33)
However Die Grünen was not operating in a political vacuum. It faced, as does any radical
movement, strong political headwinds; these were forces that wanted to steer policy and
The Greens away from change and towards an accommodation with the status quo. It is worth
noting that Die Grünen's anti-capitalist tendencies were seriously resented by privileged
interest in Germany, not to say opposed by Germany's formidable industrial sector.
As happened then with the socialist movements of the past, Die Grünen found that it
contained within itself the seeds of its demise. A pragmatic wing that was content to
compromise on long-term aspirations if it meant leveraging any immediate gains came to the
fore. (34) In time this wing grew stronger and larger. Election successes accelerated its
rise. The balance of forces within the party shifted (35) and as they did the electoral
road took on an even more important role. A middle ground in the party - swelled in
numbers by electoral successes - moved towards seeing further success in the electoral
arena as the sure way to move forward in terms of the party's prime objectives. It was
still worthwhile to have an occasional large protest or mobilisation, but within the
movement itself the real fight, as they saw it, had now moved decisively from the street
arena to winning elections and, eventually, a majority in the parliament.
Naturally the newer members of Die Grünen were also less likely to see the value in
basisdemokratie - and many indeed considered it to be outdated. Additionally a further
problem appeared. Basisdemokratie supporters - drawn heavily from the grassroots base -
became disenchanted as they were forced to work with traditional professionalised parties
that were sceptical of (or even antagonistic to) their ‘alternative' ways. Many didn't
even stay to fight the swing to pragmatism seeing the battle, from early on, as unwinnable.
The conflict inside The Greens intensified. However continued electoral success now became
a defining factor in deciding the outcome. As De Grünen continued to poll well it became
easier for the ‘Realos' to argue that those who supported basisdemokratie were ‘out of
touch' and ‘hung up on principles' and ‘old ways'. Realos supporters could argue that even
though the party was operating in mixed coalitions and adopting ‘professional' ways, it
was still winning public support. If the electorate was with Die Grünen and trusted its
promise, what was the need of basisdemokratie and its cumbersome rules?
The logic of the ‘Realos' faction was further buttressed by a conservative media and
political establishment which desperately wanted Die Grünen to ‘behave normally' and play
the game. In their logic Die Grünen needed to be more like the other parties; this was the
perquisite for success but also the price to be paid.
The organisational strictures at the core of basisdemokratie became the target. Consensus
decision took too long and was unwieldy. For example too much consultation was cited as
key reason why the Green were unable to strike an arrangement with Alliance 90 ahead of
the first ‘unified' German elections in 1990 - the poor performance at this juncture
becoming as it did a major bone of contention between the Fundis and Realos wings.
Also under threat was the rotation of officer-ship positions. It was argued that it took a
party member a long time to gain experience of how a governmental role functioned. But due
to the party rules, just as she did, she had to be moved on anyway - in order to minimise
the ill-effects of ‘professionalism'. So this rotation concept was also deemed to be quite
problematic; best to get rid of that too. And so on. The ‘separation of role from mandate
principle' insisted that Die Grünen parliamentarians did not necessarily sit on party
councils at local, Lund/State or Federal level. But this was discredited as the
parliamentary arm of the party grew numerically and politically more powerful. The party
council - containing ordinary members - was deemed to be ‘removed' from the reality of the
parliamentary arm. Now instead of the dog wagging its tail, the opposite made sense. The
parliamentarians moreover were at the cutting edge of where decisions and policy was being
implemented: they needed to be able to direct Die Grünen's resources accordingly. And so -
in a way that we've come to know only too well - a complete upturning of common sense came
to make more sense.
At the Neumunster Conference (1991) Die Grünen took the controversial decisions that
gutted basisdemokratie. From that point on, the party moved quickly from its activist
origins towards the professionalised party model. Symbolic elements of ‘rotation' and
‘participation' were retained and occasionally paraded to the public to insist that Die
Grünen were still ‘new and different', but these were largely for show. Basisdemokratie
and, more importantly, the thinking that lay behind its development and inclusion, was
abandoned so that in time a leadership could come to the fore which was able to sell to
the membership the twists, turns and compromises of high office.
If any one person was to typify the scale of the transformation that Die Grünen had now
undergone it had to the Green leader of that era, Joschka Fischer. A one-time squatter
activist in the 1970s, Fischer was a key proponent of the ‘red-green' coalition which saw
Die Grünen abandon all its main principles for the trappings of power. Later on Fischer
would take up a number of lucrative private sector roles as a lobbyist and handler for
corporate business interests. (36) His own personal wealth benefited accordingly.
The fate of the German Greens had a significant impact outside Germany. Die Grünen, to an
important extent, was seen as the flagship party of the broad electoral Green movement
that emerged in the 80s and 90s in Europe. Organisationally and intellectually it led the
way, with the result that the fight for its political soul was intense. But, once the
battle inside Die Grünen was lost, it appeared to catalyse a generalised wave of
compromise across a range of other similar political parties internationally. In other
words, key principles were compromised upon, aims were moderated and organisational
structures were modified in favour of the traditional professional party model. (37)
However, the fact that various Green parties succumbed to reformism and moderation in a
variety of conditions can also be interpreted in another way. The multi-country experience
underlines the fact that the experience of Die Grünen was not a ‘German' event or
something intrinsic to the character of German politics. Rather, instead, the
multi-country experience upholds the anarchist analysis that a fundamental process of
political corruption is at work when radical organisations - seeking egalitarian
objectives - enter into the parliamentary process. The concerted manner in which that
process happened to the Green parties at this time in a multitude of scenarios is surely
proof that the anarchists are onto something.
CONCLUSION
The transformation of Die Grünen from radical movement into conventional political party
was repeated in a number of other countries in Europe in the same time period. This was no
accident. Anarchists then are right to argue, as they have in the past, that electoralist
strategies are corrupting and destructive to movement that wish to overthrow capitalism.
The rise and fall of Die Grünen is one of the best, recent examples of the anarchist
argument that radical democratic movements are undermined and demobilised when they
involve themselves in electoral (or parliamentary) strategies.
First published on Kevin Doyle Blog at https://kfdoyle.wordpress.com on 16/2/15
All references listed at https://kfdoyle.wordpress.com/2015/02/16/anarchism-germ...eens/
Petra Kelly
http://www.anarkismo.net/article/30043
------------------------------
Message: 5
April 15th (of 2016) marks the first five years of the uprising of the Pur'hépecha town of
Cherán K'eri, located in the state of Michoacán. On that day, during the early morning, a
group of women decided to stand up against the system of violence and barbarism
perpetrated by municipal authorities, local police, and various illegal logging groups. In
addition to exploiting 80% of the 115 square kilometers of the pine, oak and fir forests,
the loggers were linked to criminal narco groups, who after beatings, threats and
assassinations, have been challenged by community members trying to confront the natural
devastation and a climate of insecurity. These brave women blocked various logging trucks
from passing on certain streets. The response by the criminals was to repel the group with
bullets and beatings. Some inhabitants of the community responded by ringing the bells of
"El Calvario" to alert the entire community to take to the street in their defense. With
sticks, rocks, machetes, and firecrackers, they chased away the illegal loggers
apprehending five of them. Unlike the community members of Cherán, the illegal loggers
weren't beaten nor humiliated, but were treated and fed according to a humanitarian ethic.
After this spontaneous insurrection, the people organized bonfires as spaces of gathering,
development and communication at the corners of various streets of the four neighborhoods
that make up the municipality. This self-organized process culminated in the unanimous
decision to expel the entire representative and political party system, which since 2007
facilitated the entrance of narco-trafficking and illegal loggers, who in turn negotiated
with the PRI and PRD.
This model of communal self-government has been witnessed by social movements of the
country and the world, strengthening networks of solidarity and spreading tools of
resistance to avoid the return of the political parties and organized violence. Among the
examples of support have been various investigative documentaries, brigades, spaces of
virtual diffusion, and visual art in the streets of Cherán (from murals to sporadic
paintings), which today I am gathering in this article.
For 20 years, those in charge of the municipality's house of culture have carried out
cultural, musical and artistic activities. In the house, classes take place of
traditional orchestra music, violin, guitar, and painting with different techniques. In
the communal and religious festivals, it is common that the folkloric music speaks to
everyday life. For example, it speaks to the "Festivals of Resurrection" where through
community dance, the elder Council of Communal Government celebrate the New Cherán which
is being built amongst smiles and music.
To make visible the talent of the youth of Cherán, a massive forum of expression
"Ex-Joven" was organized the 28-30 of December 2015, by the youth council and the house of
culture, in which they painted more than 35 murals by local artists and those from other
cities. The conceptual content of this artistic project resides in the original phrase
"Xarhatakuarhikuarhu", that in English means "I am here, I am present", referring always
to the community values that from the pur'hépecha philosophy challnge the false dichotomy
between the individual and the collective.
Without further ado, I share some of the works of art that give life to the fresh
community air that is being breathed in Cherán K'eri.
* In 2012, children of the municipality painted various mural-histories in which they
narrated their feelings of the new Cherán. The murals are found in the streets of the four
neighborhoods, the House of Communal Government, and in the House of Communal Property.
Most of the murals were produced by the artists Marco Hugo Guardián Lemus and Luis
Giovanni Fabián Guerrero.
------------------------------
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten