WORLD WORLDWIDE ITALY News Journal Update - (en) Italy, Galatea, FAI: Normalize Bashar al-Assad's regime. Syria, the Arab League and the counter-revolutionary process (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

 Translation from the original "Normalizing Bashar al-Assad's Regime. Syria, the

Arab League, and the Counter-Revolutionary Process" ---- Article written by
Joseph Daher, Swiss-Syrian scholar and socialist. He is the author of "Hezbollah:
The Political Economy of the Lebanon 's Party of God" (2016) and "Syria after the
Uprisings: The Political Economy of State Resilience" (2019). ---- The Arab
League, after imposing the suspension and isolation of the dictatorship of Bashar
al-Assad for the past twelve years, voted to reinstate it as a member on May 7,
2023. Then, on May 19, Assad was included in the League summit in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia hosted by the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS).

MBS said he was "happy to welcome President Bashar al-Assad", hoping that
"Syria's return to the Arab League would lead to an end to the Syrian crisis" and
that he would turn the page from these "painful years of[civil war]". During his
summit speech, Assad, before meeting MBS, called for "joint Arab action for
solidarity, peace in the region, development and prosperity instead of war and
destruction."

Earlier the same day he shook hands with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi,
met his Tunisian counterpart Kaïs Saïed and UAE Vice President Sheikh Mansour ben
Zayed. While the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has supported the normalization of
Damascus since 2018 and reportedly invited Bashar al-Assad to COP28, Saudi Arabia
has played a key role in returning Syria to the League. Saudi Arabia accelerated
the process after the earthquake, opening talks with Iran - and culminating in
the official restoration of diplomatic ties, brokered by China, between Tehran
and Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states have eased Assad's isolation
in order to stabilize the region[and put it]under their collective authoritarian
rule[- whose corporate structure]is brutally unequal

No concessions from Damascus

Damascus has not made any real concessions in exchange for its return to the Arab
League. League members, while not demanding it, expected Assad to allow the
return[without jailing]of Syrian refugees, create a credible political process to
initiate elections, and take steps to stop the smuggling of narcotics from Syria
to neighboring countries.

We should be skeptical of these expectations, as they are largely cosmetic. The
Assad regime has no intention of realizing any of these expectations. Just
recently, the Access Center for Human Rights documented that his regime paid
human smugglers between $150 and $3,000 per person to bring those Syrian refugees
from Beirut back to Lebanon. .

The other Arab states will certainly not put any pressure on Damascus regarding
democratization expectations - especially since these are not "beacons of
democracy", to say the least. They have little interest in the welfare of the
popular classes in their countries, let alone in Syria. These expectations are
aimed primarily at the United States and European states.

The United States has officially denounced Assad's normalization, but has failed
to prevent states in the region from re-establishing ties with Damascus. However,
a new bill introduced in May 2023 called the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act
of 2023 seeks to expand the list of sanctions in the Caesar[Syria Civilian
Protection Act]to include all members of the Syrian parliament, prominent members
of the ruling Baath Party and those responsible for the hijacking of
international humanitarian aid.

The bill also targets a US-backed effort to send electricity from Jordan and gas
from Egypt to Lebanon via a transnational pipeline through Syria. The Syrian
government would receive compensation in kind - in the form of gas supplies -
rather than cash for its participation in the four countries' currently stalled
energy project. The bill would amend the Caesar Act, making such transactions in
kind with Damascus sanctionable.

Even in the EU, there are signs of hostility from some European states that
oppose normalization - such as the lifting of sanctions and any disbursement of
reconstruction funds before a political transition. On the other hand, several
other countries, including Italy, Greece, Romania, Cyprus and Austria, are in
favor of normalization with Damascus, thus hoping to send refugees back to Syria.

Crackdown on drug traffickers

The regime has shown intransigence on refugees and democratization and some
flexibility in cracking down on the smuggling of captagon, an addictive
stimulant. But even then,[the regime]will face some resistance from within. Much
of the production and distribution of the captagon is controlled by the Fourth
Division of the Syrian Army and its affiliated Syrian businessmen. In the last
decade, captagon operations, and especially drug smuggling abroad, have exploded,
turning into a lucrative part of the Syrian war economy - valued at an estimated
billions of dollars a year.

The Saudis, however, are intent on cracking down on all of this. Between 2016 and
2022, they thwarted attempts to smuggle more than 600 million amphetamine pills
out of Lebanon. And Assad has expressed a willingness to collaborate. Thus, at a
Jordan-hosted meeting in May 2023 with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt, Damascus
agreed to "take the necessary measures to stop smuggling across borders with
Jordan and Iraq " and to work to identify drug producers and transporters.

In May, two airstrikes, possibly ordered by Jordan, targeted drug trafficking
operations in Syria - one of which assassinated notorious Syrian drug lord Merhi
al-Ramthan and his family. In addition, Damascus has carried out a series of
arrests of drug traffickers in southern Syria. Furthermore, according to some
sources, Saudi Arabia has promised Syria financial aid of up to 4 billion dollars
in exchange for the reduction and control of the production and smuggling of
captagon.

The change in Saudi foreign policy strategy

The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Syria has been developing for several
years. In May 2021, Syrian Tourism Minister Rami Martini paid the regime's first
official visit to the Saudi kingdom after the uprising more than a decade ago.
Saudi Arabia's reasons to rehabilitate Damascus are related to its national
interests and regional dynamics.

The normalization process is a product of the evolution of Saudi political
strategy within the region. MBS's confrontational foreign policy, exemplified by
the[Saudi]kingdom's deadly war in Yemen and its policy of hostility against Iran
and its regional allies, has been a failure.

This strategy has become a political complication for Riyadh's plans to reform
the economy, attract foreign investors and open up the country to tourists.[The
Saudi government], therefore, has been trying to establish warmer relations with
its neighbors. It has begun to move in this direction, ending hostilities with
Qatar and favoring Erdogan's Turkey. In March 2023 he deposited 5 billion dollars
in the Turkish central bank to revive the country's economy. Saudi Arabia's
strategic reorientation culminated last April with the establishment of
diplomatic relations with Iran - thanks to the mediation of China.

Since then, the two states have affirmed their willingness to work together for
"security, stability and prosperity" in the Middle East. This pact is especially
important for Saudi Arabia in stabilizing Yemen and preventing security threats
from its southern border. The rapprochement will allow the two countries to
reopen their embassies and to implement the economic and security cooperation
agreements signed more than 20 years ago.

Economic reform as a fundamental goal

These foreign policy changes are motivated by the Saudi Kingdom's need to focus
on economic reforms and the goals set out in the "Vision 2030" - the goal of
which is to end dependence on fossil fuels and ensure $100 billion in annual
Direct Investment Abroad (IDE) by the end of the decade.

Saudi Arabia had faced some major challenges before recently changing its foreign
policy. FDI flows fell from 200% between 2018 and 2019 to 20% between 2019 and
2020. The ruling regime hopes to reverse this decline, attracting more investors
by normalizing regional relations and stabilizing crises.

The main objective of economic diversification is the development of the tourism
sector. Riyadh intends to reach 100 million visitors a year in 2030 and open
315,000 new hotel rooms to welcome them. In March 2023, it launched a new
airline, Riyadh Air, which aims to serve 100 international destinations.

The kingdom hopes to channel investment into megacities such as NEOM, the Red Sea
project, and Qiddiya, which is expected to become an international entertainment
center complete with a Six Flags theme park. The Saudi monarchy promises to
invest 1,000 billion dollars in the tourism sector over the next
decade.[Meanwhile,]he has invested money in the archaeological site of al-Ula,
which has been abandoned for decades, to attract visitors. It is creating other
tourist destinations from scratch, such as the luxurious Red Sea Project, which
stretches 17,400 miles along the west coast, and the Trojena ski resort in the
heart of the futuristic NEOM metropolis, which will host the 2029 Winter Asian Games.

By developing its economy in this way, the monarchy hopes to compete with other
Gulf countries that are building huge tourism industries. Qatar hosted the 2022
World Cup for the first time in the Arab world, while Expo 2020 was held in Dubai
- welcoming more than 12 million international tourists.

Riyadh is carrying out all this development in the classic neoliberal way. He
announced public-private partnerships (PPPs) for many government services,
including traditionally state-run sectors such as education, housing and
healthcare. The Financial Times described the[kingdom's]plans as "Saudi Thatcherism".

In April 2023, MBS launched four new "Special Economic Zones" (SEZs) in order to
establish non-traditional industries, especially related to tourism, information
technology, renewable energy and logistics, offering businesses competitive tax
rates and the exemption from customs duties on imports, production equipment and
raw materials. The new economic strategy places private capital at the heart of
the future Saudi economy.

Multipolarity and regional authoritarian stability

The ultimate reason for Saudi Arabia to normalize regional relations is that
Washington can no longer be trusted to provide regional security. The kingdom
does not see the United States as a reliable hegemonic entity, especially after
the defeat in Iraq, the inability to protect its allies from popular uprisings
and its increasingly critical stance towards Riyadh.

With the relative decline of US power in the region, other imperialist forces
such as China and Russia have asserted their interests. Regional powers such as
Iran, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have done the same, pursuing their own
goals, balancing between rival imperialist powers and sometimes openly
challenging the United States. The Saudi leadership's decision to cut oil
production and keep oil prices high - even at the cost of raising inflation -
sums up its new independence from Washington. In this new scenario, all the
regional powers are determined to consolidate a form of authoritarian stability.
Despite their lingering rivalries, states want to reduce their open conflicts,
improve their economies and thereby strengthen their dominance - avoiding a
repeat of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings.

In this way, Qatar set aside its objections and allowed Damascus to return to the
Arab League, thus avoiding irritating the leadership in Riyadh and other Arab
capitals. Qatar has also mended ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain.

Syria, Türkiye and Kurdish self-determination

Similarly, Turkey has started a normalization process with the Syrian regime. In
May, the foreign ministers of Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iran met in Moscow for
high-level talks on rebuilding ties between Ankara and Damascus.

Ankara's change is motivated by two main objectives. First, Erdogan has been
trying to win votes ahead of the 2023 presidential election by accelerating the
forced return of Syrian refugees to Syria. Over the past two years, there has
been an increase in racist and xenophobic attacks against Syrians in Turkey, and
Erdogan has expelled thousands of them.

During the election campaign, opposition candidate Kilicdaroglu took an even
tougher stance, promising to expel more of them. In contrast, Erdogan and his
foreign minister Çavusoglu said they had drafted and developed a roadmap together
with the Syrian regime after their meeting in Moscow; the goal is to get refugees
back to Syria.

The other reason for the rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad is their shared
determination to deny Kurdish autonomist aspirations. In 2022, Erdogan declared
that " it is necessary to finish what has been started "; he has intensified the
deployment of the Turkish army and Syrian militiamen against the Kurdish forces
in Syria.

Their joint operations in the Afrin region in 2018 led to massive human rights
violations and the forcible displacement of some 137,000 people, mostly Kurds.
Erdogan, to foment Turkish nationalism and defeat his opponent on the runoff, has
successfully used these threats of new military operations against the Kurds in
Syria.

But it is not yet clear whether Syria will support Turkey. For its part, the
Assad regime has declared that there will be no progress in relations between the
two countries as long as Turkey maintains its military presence in Syria.

Turkey is frustrated by Damascus' inability to meet its demands regarding the
return of Syrian refugees and an end to Kurdish rule in northeastern Syria, also
known as "Rojava". The Syrian regime is politically, economically and militarily
too weak to intervene in the north and sees the return of millions of refugees as
a political and security threat, as well as an unsustainable economic burden.

No hope for Syrian reconstruction through normalization

Assad's reinstatement in the Arab League will not facilitate reconstruction and
economic recovery in Syria. Sanctions are a significant obstacle in attracting
foreign investment. Nonetheless, there are other impediments blocking the
country's economic development.

First, Syria lacks a secure and stable economic condition, making it too risky
for local and foreign companies to invest in the country. Second, Damascus has
proved unable to prevent the steady depreciation of the Syrian pound - further
undermining the willingness of investors to launch economic deals. Thirdly, the
country lacks functioning infrastructure and Damascus has not invested funds to
rebuild it, diverting most of the expenditure towards the war effort, public
sector wages and subsidies - but the latter are also declining.

Fourth, the country simply lacks the funds to invest. Deposits in private banks
fell from $13.87 billion in 2010 to $1.9 billion in 2022. Finally, the country
suffers from a shortage of skilled labor, exacerbated by high emigration rates of
young college graduates.

In this situation, Damascus will try to use the normalization process to secure
aid and investment. But any reconstruction under the Assad regime will not serve
the country's popular classes.

His policies are not designed to remedy the country's economic problems and
social inequalities. On the contrary, the priority is to consolidate one's
despotic power, guarantee one's security and use the funds disbursed to curry
favor with one's patronage supporters.

Inequality and injustice are at the heart of the Syrian regime's policies and no
amount of funds raised will change the spots on this leopard. 1 It will limit
itself, if anything, to using these cash supplies to reinforce the manipulation
of state assets, carry out client privatizations and complete the neoliberal
deregulation of the economy.

All of this will happen to the detriment of the country's popular classes. A
country where 90% of the population lives below the poverty line; few refugees
and internally displaced persons will willingly return to the country, while
those who are forced to return will find themselves in desperate conditions and
absolute poverty.

The normalization of Syria therefore serves the interests of Bashar al-Assad and
his despotic regime rather than those of the country's population. It also serves
the interests of the region's authoritarian leaders who are determined to defend
their power and crush the last remnants of the grassroots waves of struggle for
social transformation that began in 2011.

Note from the Galatea Anarchist Group

1 "A leopard cannot change its spots" is an English saying; equivalent to the
Italian "the wolf loses its hair but not its vice".

https://gruppoanarchicogalatea.noblogs.org/post/2023/06/15/normalizzare-il-regime-di-bashar-al-assad-la-siria-la-lega-araba-e-il-processo-controrivoluzionario/
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