With the "liberation" of Sicily by the Anglo-Americans (July 1943), agreat movement of people was set in motion who no longer wanted war andmisery, but peace, work, land. As we have seen, different organizationstried to insert themselves into this irrepressible need for freedom andjustice, which broke out in the towns and districts with riots,protests, strikes, attacks, revolts: on the one hand the left -communists and socialists, chambers of work, anarchists -, and theCatholics, on the other the separatist archipelago which had found asynthesis in the Movement for the Independence of Sicily (MIS) (1) whoseleader Andrea Finocchiaro Aprile, was an ambiguous figure but of acertain prestige. On the sidelines, the neo-fascist groups werereorganizing themselves in view of a clandestine "resistance", soonabsorbed by the plans of the US Intelligence and used in ananti-communist function.Within the MIS, social-communist and libertarian minority sectorscoexisted (from Antonio Varvaro to Anselmo Crisafulli, from AntonioCanepa to the "Germinal" area of Nino Pino Balotta (2)), with liberal,republican, monarchist forces (the Duke of Carcaci, the Prince Alliata,Baron Cammarata) and Catholics. In the late autumn of '44, at the firstcongress in Taormina, it was decided, not without disagreement, to adoptthe practice of armed struggle to counter the strong repression of thearmy against the Movement and the Sicilian people. The Volunteer Armyfor the Independence of Sicily (EVIS) was born, headed by Prof. Canepa,an intellectual with revolutionary and libertarian positions (3);formation which worried the government quite a bit, especially since inthe meantime the "We are not leaving" riots broke out on the island,making the situation explosive.The role of the MIS in the riots was limited and contradictory, howeverin that incandescent climate its popularity increased and gave the ideaof an imminent possible separatist fracture, which led the government totake drastic decisions, both in the field of military response than theinstitutional one.On 17 June 1945 near Randazzo, in a firefight with the carabinieri,Canepa and two militants, Rosano and Lo Giudice, were killed. Thedecapitation of the armed group was followed by the nomination ofConcetto Gallo and the subsequent enlistment of Giuliano and his band,the latter with the rank of colonel (4). Meanwhile, many things hadchanged, and the mafia, which had openly supported the MIS, began tonegotiate with the Services and moderate parties such as the DC, achange of front, weakening separatism in the areas of greatest influence(5). The infiltrations and the active role of the military and secretservices transformed the Giuliano-EVIS gang into a weapon against theleft-wing parties and unions, implementing a strategy of tension thatwill sow countless deaths on the island; the Portella delle Ginestremassacre of 1 May 1947 can be considered the first state massacre, dueto the now more than clear role of characters and strategiesattributable to the Italian and American armed forces and services.As the institutional solution, also supported by the "fathers" of theConstituent Assembly, it had to serve to definitively clip the wings ofindependence, marginalizing it from Sicilian political life; thereforeit could not fail to be based, in this phase, on an autonomistimplementation that would have placed Sicily and the Italian Statealmost on the same level in the definition of their institutionalrelations. If the future structure of the State had been of a federalisttype (the debate on the Constituent Assembly was still ongoing),autonomous (but not independent) Sicily could have had some chancesgiven the actual opportunities that the Statute of Autonomy, launched on15 May 1946 (6), predicted. The choice of a centralized state divided byregions (still pure administrative expressions) ended up sterilizing theStatute and making it a mere instrument for neutralizing the aspirationsfor self-determination of a large part of the Sicilian people.The Statute was born before the Constitution and will become an integralpart of it.Article 14 defines the exclusive legislation of the Sicilian Regionregarding agriculture and forests, land reclamation, civic uses,industry and commerce, agricultural and industrial production andcommercial activities, urban planning, public works (except large worksof national interest), mines , quarries, peat bogs and salt marshes,public waters, fishing and hunting, public charities and charitableworks, tourism, landscape protection, conservation of antiquities, localauthority regime, legal and economic status of employees and officialsof the region, primary education, museums, libraries, academies,expropriation for public use. For the art.5 the organization of Local Authorities is based on the Region, on theMunicipalities and on the Free Municipal Consortia. The art. 17specifies that "within the limits of general interests", the Assemblycan enact laws on communication and transport, hygiene and publichealth, health care, middle and university education, regulation ofcredit, insurance and savings, social legislation, annona , assumptionof public services, provided that they involve a prevailing regionalinterest. The art. 21 establishes that the President of the Regionparticipates "with the rank of minister" in the Council of Ministers,with a deliberative vote in matters that concern the Region. For theart. 22 the Region can participate with one of its representatives inthe formation of the State railway tariffs and in the establishment andregulation of national communication and land, maritime and airtransport services of its interest. The art. 23 states that the centraljudicial bodies will have respective sections in Sicily for affairsconcerning the region. The art. 24 establishes a High Court in Rome withthe task of judging the constitutionality of the laws of the State withrespect to the Statute and for the purposes of their effectiveness inthe regional territory; its president can challenge state laws andregulations. For the art. 31 the police depends on the regionalgovernment. The art. 32 assigns state property and water assets to theRegion. Art. 37: companies based outside Sicily but active on the islandpay the relevant taxes to the Region. Art. 38: the State must payannually, by way of "national solidarity", a sum to be used in theexecution of public works, a sort of compensation for the incomedisparities between Sicily and the average of the other regions. Theart. 40 establishes a clearing house at the Banco di Sicilia with theaim of allocating foreign currencies from Sicilian exports, remittancesfrom emigrants, tourism and the revenue from the rental of shipsregistered in the Sicilian compartments to the needs of the region. Theart. 41 gives power to the Regional Government to issue internal loans.As can be seen, these regulations granted (and still grant) many marginsof initiative to the regional institution which, knowing how to takeadvantage of them, could have enjoyed ample economic, political andlegal opportunities which would have benefited the condition of thepopulation. But in the space of just a few years, the insidiousobjective of the institutional solution was achieved: the independenceand autonomist forces recycled themselves in the various nationalparties, the DC in the lead, concerned only with safeguarding their ownprivileges and those of the hegemonic classes, including the mafia. TheStatute instrument became increasingly functional for this purpose, andfor the rest, a piece of paper not applied in its fundamentalprerogatives, such as the aforementioned art. 37, or art. 38 accordingto which the Italian State owes Sicily hundreds of billions of euros.The High Court referred to in art. 24, the one that best defined thetreaty and federalist nature of the Statute, was effectively repealedand made illegitimate, replaced by the Constitutional Court. TheClearing House died long before the Banco di Sicilia died. While manypoints still remain unapplied but applicable, the substance of theStatute has been emptied, with the complicity of the Sicilian politicalclass. The redemption for which the people once again fought has beencrushed by military violence and political cunning. Sicily has beennormalized. But it won't last long.Pippo Gurrieri15 - continueNoteFor an inside knowledge of the MIS you can see: Attilio Castrogiovanni,Duke of Carcaci, The Movement for the Independence of Sicily, Flaccovio,Palermo 1977; Andrea Finocchiaro Aprile, The Sicilian IndependenceMovement, Sicilian Books, Palermo 1966. For the historical analysis:Carmelo Cimino, An investigation into Sicilian separatism, SicilianGramsci Institute, Palermo 1988; Giuseppe Carlo Marino, History ofSicilian separatism, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1979On Pino see: Giuseppe Alibrandi, Nino Pino, the man and his time,Pungitopo, Marina di Patti 1982 and Antonio Catalfamo, Nino Pino, the"heroic furies", Life of a libertarian, Sicilia Punto L, Ragusa 1996Totò Gliozzo, Antonio Canepa and the army for the independence of Sicily- The EVIS in Cesarò and the Randazzo massacre (1944-1945), Boemi,Catania 1998; Mario Di Mauro, The showdown of the partisan Canepa,TerraeLiberazione, Catania 2019; Salvo Barbagallo, A failed revolution,Bonanno, Catania 1974Carlo Ruta, The Giuliano-Scelba duo, a mystery of the Republic?,Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 1995; Carlo Ruta (edited), The Giulianoaffair, AccadeinSicilia, Ragusa 2013; Giuseppe Casarrubea, Secrethistory of Sicily, From the allied landing to Portella della Ginestra,Bompiani, Milan 2007;Salvatore Lupo, The myth of the great conspiracy. The Americans, themafia and the landing in Sicily in 1943, Donzelli, Rome, 2023Department of Cultural and Environmental Heritage and Public Educationof the Sicilian Region, Statute of the Sicilian Region, Palermo 1978.https://www.sicilialibertaria.it/_________________________________________A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C EBy, For, and About AnarchistsSend news reports to A-infos-en mailing listA-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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