In Senegal, the head of state, after having had to renounce a third
mandate, has since sought to prolong his time in power but he also seems
to have lost all credit with the Senegalese, even within his own camp
which appears divided and weakened. Whatever the outcome of this end of
reign, Macky Sall's record will be that of unequaled repression in the
political history of this country while the fundamental problems which
keep the majority of Senegalese in poverty still remain. , obscured by
the twists and turns of the electoral dispute.
Macky Sall's ultimately losing strategy since he had to give up his
third term
To face the challenge to his regime, embodied in particular by Ousmane
Sonko's PASTEF, Macky Sall had on May 31, convened a "national dialogue"
on the subject of the political crisis situation initiated in 2021 with
accusations of rape targeting the leader of PASTEF. The aim of this
"dialogue" (which was not the first he organized) was in particular to
divide the opposition grouped under his banner of Yonnu Askan Wi. Which
was an objective partly achieved with the participation of one of the
figures of this coalition, Khalifa Sall, the former socialist mayor of
Dakar having created his own party, and who, after a conviction in 2017,
had been imprisoned and prevented to be a candidate during the last
presidential elections in 2019. However, at the end of this dialogue at
the beginning of July, under pressure both from the population and from
his mentors at the international level, Macky Sall had to give up run
for a third term.
Thinking that it had isolated Sonko and his supporters, the regime then
launched an operation to eliminate them: after having been illegally
detained for weeks in his own home, without being able to communicate
with his lawyers, the leader of the opposition was then arrested as well
as hundreds of its supporters, in particular executives and local
elected officials of the party which was itself dissolved. In September,
he then designated his Prime Minister Amadou Ba as the candidate in the
presidential election for the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition, dominated by
his party, the Alliance for the Republic, but this choice was quickly
contested with the the emergence of dissident candidates within the APR
itself as well as criticism targeting Amadou Ba, from figures in the
presidential party.
Another event changed the situation. While the regime thought it had
finished with Sonko, other opposition candidacies close to the latter
were validated by the Constitutional Council on January 20, 2024,
notably that of Bassirou Diomaye Faye, number 2 of PASTEF, also
incarcerated but not yet definitively judged, which allowed him to be
declared a candidate. On the other hand, another candidate that Macky
Sall thought he could integrate into his game was invalidated by the
Constitutional Council: Karim Wade, the son of former president
Abdoulaye Wade. He was not able to obtain his decree of renunciation of
French nationality until January 16, after submitting his application.
He was therefore excluded on this basis. The PDS, unhappy with this
decision, immediately launched accusations of corruption against two of
the members of the Constitutional Council. Other failed candidates,
declaring themselves as "spoiled candidates" also put pressure on their
files to be re-examined. Incidentally, we can note that the
establishment of a system of "citizen sponsorships", supposed to limit
the number of candidates for the presidential seat, led to the opposite
result: 20 candidates were selected, an unrivaled record!
An attempted constitutional coup that does not pass...
While a few days earlier, Macky Sall had received and listened to the
grievances of the "failed-spoliated" by telling them that the decisions
of the Constitutional Council could not be appealed, on February 3, he
canceled the decree he had taken the end of November to convene the
electoral body on the grounds that there would be an institutional
crisis between the Assembly and the constitutional council targeted by
accusations of corruption. In the process, the National Assembly met to
vote on a derogatory law with a view to postponing the elections to
December 15 and prolonging Macky Sall in power in the meantime. What had
already announced this institutional coup, a few days later, was the
vote in the Assembly for a commission of inquiry into accusations of
corruption by the Constitutional Council. However, the corrupter
implicated in the accusations launched by the PDS was none other than
the Prime Minister and candidate of the ruling party, Amadou Ba!
This latest about-face by the head of state appeared as a new
masquerade, failing to conceal his choice to block an electoral process
in which his side was the loser. Faced with the reaction of the
population, first on Sunday February 4, then especially on the following
Friday, where demonstrations took place almost everywhere, not only in
Dakar and its suburbs, but also in other cities in the country: Saint
Louis, Thiès, Ziguinchor, Louga, Diourbel, up to Mbacké near Touba, the
religious town of the Mourides. As in the past, the regime reacted by
repressing demonstrations, cutting off mobile internet data and cutting
the signal of the Walf television channel, known to be close to the
opposition. Shortly after, the license for this channel was even
"permanently" withdrawn. But by acting in this way, it is Macky Sall who
has definitively discredited himself. Macky Sall's international
sponsors had to let him go, more openly in the case of the United States
than France, which fears more the hazards of an electoral alternation.
By wanting to cling to power, while Senegal is supposed to be the
democratic showcase of French neocolonialism, Macky Sall has become a
burden. In terms of symbols, the images of opposition deputies evacuated
from the hemicycle by the Senegalese GIGN look bad. On the economic
level, from the perspective of the interests of international
imperialism, the atmosphere of crisis for which it is mainly responsible
is not good for business and moreover, on the internal level, the
Senegalese employers have also distanced himself from the regime by
demanding respect for the electoral calendar.
Faced with this, the Macky Sall regime, which only knows the balance of
power, will go back (a little): it restarts the internet and reverses
the closure of the Walf channel, it releases some of the political
prisoners (between three and four hundred). On February 15, the
Constitutional Council repealed the presidential decree of February 3,
declared the law passed in the national assembly as unconstitutional and
ordered the president to organize elections "as soon as possible."»
However, Macky Sall continued to vacillate, to procrastinate by
announcing a new "dialogue" to agree on the date and modalities of an
"inclusive election". This umpteenth "dialogue" took place on February
26 and 27 but it was boycotted by 17 of the 19 candidates still in the
running.
Unsurprisingly, the conclusions of these "dialogueists" went in the same
direction: pushing back the date of the presidential elections to June 2
and opening the list of selected candidates to a certain number of
"spoiled" people who would see their files examined again. Once again,
the Constitutional Council, requested by the other candidates, confirmed
that the elections must be held within a short time, giving the date of
March 31. For his part, Macky Sall published a decree calling elections
for March 24, a date with which the Council ended up aligning.
The battle now seems lost for the supporters of the constitutional
putsch but everything is perhaps not over. The official candidate of the
government, Amadou Ba, is in a delicate position, so much so that we
even wondered if the government was not going to completely abandon him
in favor of someone else. Those who embody the putschist hard line are
still in government, like the Minister of Tourism, Mame Mbaye Niang, at
the origin of the defamation complaint which resulted in the
invalidation of Sonko. They know that in the event of defeat, they risk
a lot, being personally involved in repressive actions, including those
carried out on the fringes of the action of the security forces with the
establishment of militias (notably that with the evocative name of the
"Maroons"). fire") that we have seen at work against demonstrators or
opposition activists, not to mention all the cases of corruption for
which they could be prosecuted as soon as the sword of justice has
changed hands.
Another element of uncertainty which weighed on the launch of the
campaign, the release of Ousmane Sonko and Bassirou Diomaye Faye,
announced as imminent since mid-February, ended up materializing on the
evening of March 14. We will also see if the National Audiovisual
Regulatory Council will end up granting air time to Bassirou Diomaye
Faye, which was initially refused to him on the grounds that this time
would have been used by others who would speak in his name. name.
The heavy repressive record of Macky Sall's "republican" regime
During the last wave of spontaneous demonstrations against the
postponement of the election, four young people were killed by the
police (two students in Saint Louis, a high school student in Ziguinchor
and a young street trader in Dakar). Over the entire period of the
crisis since March 2021, the death toll, almost all of which are the
result of live ammunition, amounts to more than sixty deaths. This is a
sad record in contemporary Senegalese political life. Even in the period
of Senghor's party-state during the years 1968 and following, where it
was the subject of virulent protests from the youth then animated by a
revolutionary spirit, we had never known such a level of repression.
Likewise, the number of political prisoners during these years never
exceeded a few dozen. With this crisis, Senegal has recorded at least a
thousand political detainees. Freedom of information has also not been
spared, with repeated internet shutdowns, violence recently carried out
on journalists by the police, etc. This repressive outburst also
targeting the latter can explain why during the release of political
prisoners we could read in the press several testimonies about the
ordeal of the latter: torture and ill-treatment on the part of gendarmes
and police officers during arrests, often carried out at random; the
incarceration decided in practice because the people in question had
left likes on their cell phones on social networks in favor of Sonko or
other PASTEF figures while no investigation was subsequently carried
out; finally overcrowding, the lack of the most basic hygiene in
Senegalese prisons, etc.
This assessment is not the result of chance. This is the result of a
deliberate policy. Last year, Macky Sall was able to announce that in
twelve years, the duration of his two mandates, the number of
gendarmerie personnel reaching 35,000 men had tripled. The police also
increased their numbers during 2023 with 4,000 new recruitments. When
you drive around Dakar, you can't help but be struck by the youth of the
robocops, supposed to maintain order, permanently deployed in strategic
locations in the capital. We must also mention the collaboration with
Western regimes, supposed to defend democratic values, in this rise in
repressive power. We will not return to the delivery by France of
repressive materials first used in Yellow Vest demonstrations, such as
stun grenades. There was also the assistance of Israeli elements,
identified among the police forces who came to "pick up" Sonko to bring
him to the courthouse in February 2023. The latest development in the
matter is the identification of units special intended for the fight
against terrorism, on photos dating from the repression of
demonstrations organized in the south of the country at the end of May
of that same year. These special units, the GAR-SI, were financed by the
European Union and set up thanks to "technical cooperation" from the
Spanish Guardia Civil, which is also experienced in this area!
A self-serving amnesty
While Macky Sall was still repeating in January that there were no
political prisoners in Senegal, he had the Assembly vote on March 6 for
an amnesty law concerning "offenses or crimes linked to motivated or
political demonstrations committed between February 1, 2021 and February
25, 2024.» More than ten amnesty laws have been passed in Senegal since
independence, but for the first time it will include acts which have not
not the subject of a judgment, or even an investigation, which is the
case for the dozens of people killed during the demonstrations. This is
why this amnesty law appeared to be yet another deception, because to
free the demonstrators or opposition supporters there is no need for
amnesty in fact, as we have seen. when a few hundred of them were
released, to reduce tension after the demonstrations against the
postponement. In fact, it is a text which aims to exonerate from all
prosecution the various people responsible for repression (political
leaders, police officers, gendarmes, militiamen, etc.). That said, we
must not forget that there is also a procedure initiated at the level of
the International Criminal Court and it is not said, either, that this
amnesty law is definitively acquired as a shield against any prosecution
later even on an internal level.
The underlying problems that remain and the mirages of the "Senegalese
democratic model"
Macky Sall's government has prided itself for years on having obtained
high growth rates, of the order of 6 to 7%, and on having provided the
country with infrastructure, but since 2018, the index of human
development which takes into account criteria of health, education and
standard of living is in decline. Conversely, logically, migratory flows
are increasing. The economy remains underdeveloped, with on one side, an
informal sector which occupies the vast majority of assets and on the
other side, rent-seeking activities in the hands of multinationals
(mining, telecommunications, and in the near future: oil and gas
exploitation...) generating high profits, repatriated abroad. Fishing is
a disaster sector due to overfishing resulting in particular from
fishing agreements concluded with foreign countries. Likewise at the
land level, the authorities are selling off land in favor of
agribusiness to the detriment of village communities. Macky Sall had
promised in 2019, 100,000 housing units for low-income households, not
even 2,000 were delivered and still to families with incomes that are
rather average than modest. To finance this infrastructure, the country
went into debt at a record level. Growth has largely benefited a
minority of speculators and dealers linked to those in power but not the
mass of the population. In addition, this growth comes at the cost of
environmental degradation, which already poses public health problems in
the Cape Verde region where the capital is located, with air and soil
pollution as well. .
If Sonko and PASTEF aroused unprecedented and unforeseen popular
support, it is because people clearly perceived that Macky Sall's power
was only there to satisfy the interests of a minority of upstarts and to
keep his privileges, the ruling clan resorted more and more openly to
the manipulation of different institutions and even to brutal force
outside any legal framework.
A sham good governance pact
That said, the mobilization against such a project of monopolization of
power was largely carried out on the basis of institutional demands, or
sometimes in the name of an idealized conception of the Senegalese
political system which would be a "model" of democracy to be preserved.
This institutional protest perspective was born from the disappointments
of the first alternation. In 2008, opponents of Abdoulaye Wade, who were
largely former supporters of the latter when he came to power - notably
those from the left who paradoxically had brought a "liberal" candidate
to power in 2000 -, began to realize that he was setting up a system of
personal power after having manipulated the appetites for power of
everyone within the political class. This took the form of the National
Conferences held in 2008, which made proposals to put in place
mechanisms limiting presidential power. Macky Sall supported these
meetings when it came to getting elected in 2012. But subsequently, when
he came to power, he was careful not to implement what they recommended.
For this 2024 election, we saw the resurgence of a Good Governance Pact
initiative claiming this heritage from the National Conference, which
was proposed for signature by the candidates. Obviously signing is one
thing, applying it later once in power is another... Another question,
even more political: will the opposition with Bassirou Diomaye Faye of
PASTEF, if it wins the elections - or rather if we let him win these
elections! - will be ready to assume a break with French neocolonialism.
This candidate announced in his program the establishment of a national
currency, but on this point, will there really be a break with the CFA
franc, if by chance he is elected, that remains to be seen!
A mythical vision
The other illusion which permeates certain speeches is the reference to
a political system which has embodied democracy for decades, even
centuries, in Senegal. The name of the "civil society" coalition (Aar
sunu election: Protect our election) created in reaction to the
postponement of the presidential election, implicitly refers to this
mythical vision of a Senegalese democratic electoral system which would
contrast with the situation of neighboring countries. To celebrate this
"democratic tradition", some sometimes go so far as to refer to the
registers of grievances of the colony of Senegal during the meeting of
the Estates General of 1789, forgetting that these were demands in favor
of the interests of colonial commerce. , especially those of the
slave-owning settlers! In the contemporary period since independence, it
must be remembered that elections have been the occasion for crises and
violence, as in 1963 with the Allées du Centenaire massacre where dozens
of demonstrators were killed by bullets or later, the state of emergency
after the 1988 elections, with the imprisonment of opposition leaders,
including Abdoulaye Wade. More generally, the elections were either
organized without opposition during the era of the de facto single
party, or were the subject of massive fraud, with ballot stuffing as a
result, whether in the early 1960s under Senghor, or later under Abdou
Diouf in the 1980s.
Nowadays, it's a little more sophisticated but there are also different
ways to rig or at least bias the results of the election. A recent work
(F. Pigeaud & NS Sylla, De la Démocratie en Françafrique) highlighted a
proven tactic that these authors called "electoral eugenics". In fact,
it is a question of favoring geographical areas or categories of
population where the party in power is in a position of strength. For
example, between 2012 and 2019, the Fouta region which is the
"stronghold" of the ruling party saw the number of voters increase by
63,000, who voted overwhelmingly for Macky Sall. Conversely, over the
same period the department of Dakar, where the ruling party is in the
minority, saw its number of voters decrease by 19,000, which does not
correspond to demographic reality. In terms of age, a similar phenomenon
is happening: the youngest age groups are clearly under-represented in
the electoral register because young people are those who vote the least
for the party in power. This file is subject to periodic revisions but
over very limited periods. Furthermore, it is the administration which
has control over this file. Another recent study has raised an issue
which deserves a closer look when we celebrate the democratic model in
Senegal: by comparing different sources of the administration, we
identify, among other things, the existence of "826 offices fictitious
votes in which 469,291 voters are attached. (
https://www.seneplus.com/opinions/u...;»)
At the time when these lines are written, it is difficult to predict
what will happen after the first round of the election, on March 24.
However, it cannot be ruled out that after a pre-electoral crisis which
has developed for three years, Senegal will also experience a
post-electoral crisis.
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4128
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A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
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mandate, has since sought to prolong his time in power but he also seems
to have lost all credit with the Senegalese, even within his own camp
which appears divided and weakened. Whatever the outcome of this end of
reign, Macky Sall's record will be that of unequaled repression in the
political history of this country while the fundamental problems which
keep the majority of Senegalese in poverty still remain. , obscured by
the twists and turns of the electoral dispute.
Macky Sall's ultimately losing strategy since he had to give up his
third term
To face the challenge to his regime, embodied in particular by Ousmane
Sonko's PASTEF, Macky Sall had on May 31, convened a "national dialogue"
on the subject of the political crisis situation initiated in 2021 with
accusations of rape targeting the leader of PASTEF. The aim of this
"dialogue" (which was not the first he organized) was in particular to
divide the opposition grouped under his banner of Yonnu Askan Wi. Which
was an objective partly achieved with the participation of one of the
figures of this coalition, Khalifa Sall, the former socialist mayor of
Dakar having created his own party, and who, after a conviction in 2017,
had been imprisoned and prevented to be a candidate during the last
presidential elections in 2019. However, at the end of this dialogue at
the beginning of July, under pressure both from the population and from
his mentors at the international level, Macky Sall had to give up run
for a third term.
Thinking that it had isolated Sonko and his supporters, the regime then
launched an operation to eliminate them: after having been illegally
detained for weeks in his own home, without being able to communicate
with his lawyers, the leader of the opposition was then arrested as well
as hundreds of its supporters, in particular executives and local
elected officials of the party which was itself dissolved. In September,
he then designated his Prime Minister Amadou Ba as the candidate in the
presidential election for the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition, dominated by
his party, the Alliance for the Republic, but this choice was quickly
contested with the the emergence of dissident candidates within the APR
itself as well as criticism targeting Amadou Ba, from figures in the
presidential party.
Another event changed the situation. While the regime thought it had
finished with Sonko, other opposition candidacies close to the latter
were validated by the Constitutional Council on January 20, 2024,
notably that of Bassirou Diomaye Faye, number 2 of PASTEF, also
incarcerated but not yet definitively judged, which allowed him to be
declared a candidate. On the other hand, another candidate that Macky
Sall thought he could integrate into his game was invalidated by the
Constitutional Council: Karim Wade, the son of former president
Abdoulaye Wade. He was not able to obtain his decree of renunciation of
French nationality until January 16, after submitting his application.
He was therefore excluded on this basis. The PDS, unhappy with this
decision, immediately launched accusations of corruption against two of
the members of the Constitutional Council. Other failed candidates,
declaring themselves as "spoiled candidates" also put pressure on their
files to be re-examined. Incidentally, we can note that the
establishment of a system of "citizen sponsorships", supposed to limit
the number of candidates for the presidential seat, led to the opposite
result: 20 candidates were selected, an unrivaled record!
An attempted constitutional coup that does not pass...
While a few days earlier, Macky Sall had received and listened to the
grievances of the "failed-spoliated" by telling them that the decisions
of the Constitutional Council could not be appealed, on February 3, he
canceled the decree he had taken the end of November to convene the
electoral body on the grounds that there would be an institutional
crisis between the Assembly and the constitutional council targeted by
accusations of corruption. In the process, the National Assembly met to
vote on a derogatory law with a view to postponing the elections to
December 15 and prolonging Macky Sall in power in the meantime. What had
already announced this institutional coup, a few days later, was the
vote in the Assembly for a commission of inquiry into accusations of
corruption by the Constitutional Council. However, the corrupter
implicated in the accusations launched by the PDS was none other than
the Prime Minister and candidate of the ruling party, Amadou Ba!
This latest about-face by the head of state appeared as a new
masquerade, failing to conceal his choice to block an electoral process
in which his side was the loser. Faced with the reaction of the
population, first on Sunday February 4, then especially on the following
Friday, where demonstrations took place almost everywhere, not only in
Dakar and its suburbs, but also in other cities in the country: Saint
Louis, Thiès, Ziguinchor, Louga, Diourbel, up to Mbacké near Touba, the
religious town of the Mourides. As in the past, the regime reacted by
repressing demonstrations, cutting off mobile internet data and cutting
the signal of the Walf television channel, known to be close to the
opposition. Shortly after, the license for this channel was even
"permanently" withdrawn. But by acting in this way, it is Macky Sall who
has definitively discredited himself. Macky Sall's international
sponsors had to let him go, more openly in the case of the United States
than France, which fears more the hazards of an electoral alternation.
By wanting to cling to power, while Senegal is supposed to be the
democratic showcase of French neocolonialism, Macky Sall has become a
burden. In terms of symbols, the images of opposition deputies evacuated
from the hemicycle by the Senegalese GIGN look bad. On the economic
level, from the perspective of the interests of international
imperialism, the atmosphere of crisis for which it is mainly responsible
is not good for business and moreover, on the internal level, the
Senegalese employers have also distanced himself from the regime by
demanding respect for the electoral calendar.
Faced with this, the Macky Sall regime, which only knows the balance of
power, will go back (a little): it restarts the internet and reverses
the closure of the Walf channel, it releases some of the political
prisoners (between three and four hundred). On February 15, the
Constitutional Council repealed the presidential decree of February 3,
declared the law passed in the national assembly as unconstitutional and
ordered the president to organize elections "as soon as possible."»
However, Macky Sall continued to vacillate, to procrastinate by
announcing a new "dialogue" to agree on the date and modalities of an
"inclusive election". This umpteenth "dialogue" took place on February
26 and 27 but it was boycotted by 17 of the 19 candidates still in the
running.
Unsurprisingly, the conclusions of these "dialogueists" went in the same
direction: pushing back the date of the presidential elections to June 2
and opening the list of selected candidates to a certain number of
"spoiled" people who would see their files examined again. Once again,
the Constitutional Council, requested by the other candidates, confirmed
that the elections must be held within a short time, giving the date of
March 31. For his part, Macky Sall published a decree calling elections
for March 24, a date with which the Council ended up aligning.
The battle now seems lost for the supporters of the constitutional
putsch but everything is perhaps not over. The official candidate of the
government, Amadou Ba, is in a delicate position, so much so that we
even wondered if the government was not going to completely abandon him
in favor of someone else. Those who embody the putschist hard line are
still in government, like the Minister of Tourism, Mame Mbaye Niang, at
the origin of the defamation complaint which resulted in the
invalidation of Sonko. They know that in the event of defeat, they risk
a lot, being personally involved in repressive actions, including those
carried out on the fringes of the action of the security forces with the
establishment of militias (notably that with the evocative name of the
"Maroons"). fire") that we have seen at work against demonstrators or
opposition activists, not to mention all the cases of corruption for
which they could be prosecuted as soon as the sword of justice has
changed hands.
Another element of uncertainty which weighed on the launch of the
campaign, the release of Ousmane Sonko and Bassirou Diomaye Faye,
announced as imminent since mid-February, ended up materializing on the
evening of March 14. We will also see if the National Audiovisual
Regulatory Council will end up granting air time to Bassirou Diomaye
Faye, which was initially refused to him on the grounds that this time
would have been used by others who would speak in his name. name.
The heavy repressive record of Macky Sall's "republican" regime
During the last wave of spontaneous demonstrations against the
postponement of the election, four young people were killed by the
police (two students in Saint Louis, a high school student in Ziguinchor
and a young street trader in Dakar). Over the entire period of the
crisis since March 2021, the death toll, almost all of which are the
result of live ammunition, amounts to more than sixty deaths. This is a
sad record in contemporary Senegalese political life. Even in the period
of Senghor's party-state during the years 1968 and following, where it
was the subject of virulent protests from the youth then animated by a
revolutionary spirit, we had never known such a level of repression.
Likewise, the number of political prisoners during these years never
exceeded a few dozen. With this crisis, Senegal has recorded at least a
thousand political detainees. Freedom of information has also not been
spared, with repeated internet shutdowns, violence recently carried out
on journalists by the police, etc. This repressive outburst also
targeting the latter can explain why during the release of political
prisoners we could read in the press several testimonies about the
ordeal of the latter: torture and ill-treatment on the part of gendarmes
and police officers during arrests, often carried out at random; the
incarceration decided in practice because the people in question had
left likes on their cell phones on social networks in favor of Sonko or
other PASTEF figures while no investigation was subsequently carried
out; finally overcrowding, the lack of the most basic hygiene in
Senegalese prisons, etc.
This assessment is not the result of chance. This is the result of a
deliberate policy. Last year, Macky Sall was able to announce that in
twelve years, the duration of his two mandates, the number of
gendarmerie personnel reaching 35,000 men had tripled. The police also
increased their numbers during 2023 with 4,000 new recruitments. When
you drive around Dakar, you can't help but be struck by the youth of the
robocops, supposed to maintain order, permanently deployed in strategic
locations in the capital. We must also mention the collaboration with
Western regimes, supposed to defend democratic values, in this rise in
repressive power. We will not return to the delivery by France of
repressive materials first used in Yellow Vest demonstrations, such as
stun grenades. There was also the assistance of Israeli elements,
identified among the police forces who came to "pick up" Sonko to bring
him to the courthouse in February 2023. The latest development in the
matter is the identification of units special intended for the fight
against terrorism, on photos dating from the repression of
demonstrations organized in the south of the country at the end of May
of that same year. These special units, the GAR-SI, were financed by the
European Union and set up thanks to "technical cooperation" from the
Spanish Guardia Civil, which is also experienced in this area!
A self-serving amnesty
While Macky Sall was still repeating in January that there were no
political prisoners in Senegal, he had the Assembly vote on March 6 for
an amnesty law concerning "offenses or crimes linked to motivated or
political demonstrations committed between February 1, 2021 and February
25, 2024.» More than ten amnesty laws have been passed in Senegal since
independence, but for the first time it will include acts which have not
not the subject of a judgment, or even an investigation, which is the
case for the dozens of people killed during the demonstrations. This is
why this amnesty law appeared to be yet another deception, because to
free the demonstrators or opposition supporters there is no need for
amnesty in fact, as we have seen. when a few hundred of them were
released, to reduce tension after the demonstrations against the
postponement. In fact, it is a text which aims to exonerate from all
prosecution the various people responsible for repression (political
leaders, police officers, gendarmes, militiamen, etc.). That said, we
must not forget that there is also a procedure initiated at the level of
the International Criminal Court and it is not said, either, that this
amnesty law is definitively acquired as a shield against any prosecution
later even on an internal level.
The underlying problems that remain and the mirages of the "Senegalese
democratic model"
Macky Sall's government has prided itself for years on having obtained
high growth rates, of the order of 6 to 7%, and on having provided the
country with infrastructure, but since 2018, the index of human
development which takes into account criteria of health, education and
standard of living is in decline. Conversely, logically, migratory flows
are increasing. The economy remains underdeveloped, with on one side, an
informal sector which occupies the vast majority of assets and on the
other side, rent-seeking activities in the hands of multinationals
(mining, telecommunications, and in the near future: oil and gas
exploitation...) generating high profits, repatriated abroad. Fishing is
a disaster sector due to overfishing resulting in particular from
fishing agreements concluded with foreign countries. Likewise at the
land level, the authorities are selling off land in favor of
agribusiness to the detriment of village communities. Macky Sall had
promised in 2019, 100,000 housing units for low-income households, not
even 2,000 were delivered and still to families with incomes that are
rather average than modest. To finance this infrastructure, the country
went into debt at a record level. Growth has largely benefited a
minority of speculators and dealers linked to those in power but not the
mass of the population. In addition, this growth comes at the cost of
environmental degradation, which already poses public health problems in
the Cape Verde region where the capital is located, with air and soil
pollution as well. .
If Sonko and PASTEF aroused unprecedented and unforeseen popular
support, it is because people clearly perceived that Macky Sall's power
was only there to satisfy the interests of a minority of upstarts and to
keep his privileges, the ruling clan resorted more and more openly to
the manipulation of different institutions and even to brutal force
outside any legal framework.
A sham good governance pact
That said, the mobilization against such a project of monopolization of
power was largely carried out on the basis of institutional demands, or
sometimes in the name of an idealized conception of the Senegalese
political system which would be a "model" of democracy to be preserved.
This institutional protest perspective was born from the disappointments
of the first alternation. In 2008, opponents of Abdoulaye Wade, who were
largely former supporters of the latter when he came to power - notably
those from the left who paradoxically had brought a "liberal" candidate
to power in 2000 -, began to realize that he was setting up a system of
personal power after having manipulated the appetites for power of
everyone within the political class. This took the form of the National
Conferences held in 2008, which made proposals to put in place
mechanisms limiting presidential power. Macky Sall supported these
meetings when it came to getting elected in 2012. But subsequently, when
he came to power, he was careful not to implement what they recommended.
For this 2024 election, we saw the resurgence of a Good Governance Pact
initiative claiming this heritage from the National Conference, which
was proposed for signature by the candidates. Obviously signing is one
thing, applying it later once in power is another... Another question,
even more political: will the opposition with Bassirou Diomaye Faye of
PASTEF, if it wins the elections - or rather if we let him win these
elections! - will be ready to assume a break with French neocolonialism.
This candidate announced in his program the establishment of a national
currency, but on this point, will there really be a break with the CFA
franc, if by chance he is elected, that remains to be seen!
A mythical vision
The other illusion which permeates certain speeches is the reference to
a political system which has embodied democracy for decades, even
centuries, in Senegal. The name of the "civil society" coalition (Aar
sunu election: Protect our election) created in reaction to the
postponement of the presidential election, implicitly refers to this
mythical vision of a Senegalese democratic electoral system which would
contrast with the situation of neighboring countries. To celebrate this
"democratic tradition", some sometimes go so far as to refer to the
registers of grievances of the colony of Senegal during the meeting of
the Estates General of 1789, forgetting that these were demands in favor
of the interests of colonial commerce. , especially those of the
slave-owning settlers! In the contemporary period since independence, it
must be remembered that elections have been the occasion for crises and
violence, as in 1963 with the Allées du Centenaire massacre where dozens
of demonstrators were killed by bullets or later, the state of emergency
after the 1988 elections, with the imprisonment of opposition leaders,
including Abdoulaye Wade. More generally, the elections were either
organized without opposition during the era of the de facto single
party, or were the subject of massive fraud, with ballot stuffing as a
result, whether in the early 1960s under Senghor, or later under Abdou
Diouf in the 1980s.
Nowadays, it's a little more sophisticated but there are also different
ways to rig or at least bias the results of the election. A recent work
(F. Pigeaud & NS Sylla, De la Démocratie en Françafrique) highlighted a
proven tactic that these authors called "electoral eugenics". In fact,
it is a question of favoring geographical areas or categories of
population where the party in power is in a position of strength. For
example, between 2012 and 2019, the Fouta region which is the
"stronghold" of the ruling party saw the number of voters increase by
63,000, who voted overwhelmingly for Macky Sall. Conversely, over the
same period the department of Dakar, where the ruling party is in the
minority, saw its number of voters decrease by 19,000, which does not
correspond to demographic reality. In terms of age, a similar phenomenon
is happening: the youngest age groups are clearly under-represented in
the electoral register because young people are those who vote the least
for the party in power. This file is subject to periodic revisions but
over very limited periods. Furthermore, it is the administration which
has control over this file. Another recent study has raised an issue
which deserves a closer look when we celebrate the democratic model in
Senegal: by comparing different sources of the administration, we
identify, among other things, the existence of "826 offices fictitious
votes in which 469,291 voters are attached. (
https://www.seneplus.com/opinions/u...;»)
At the time when these lines are written, it is difficult to predict
what will happen after the first round of the election, on March 24.
However, it cannot be ruled out that after a pre-electoral crisis which
has developed for three years, Senegal will also experience a
post-electoral crisis.
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4128
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