WORLD WORLDWID EUROPE ITALY - news journal UPDATE - (en) Italy, FAI, Umanita Nova #21-25 - Suspicious vices. The ancient art of infiltrators (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

The Italian translation of the "Manual for unmasking an infiltrated
policeman" has recently been made available online; the work edited and
adapted by "progettometi.org" can be downloaded freely from their
website. The original document was written following the discovery in
Spain of the presence of a certain number of people infiltrated within
some grassroots groups involved in social struggles. This has caused
quite a stir within the Spanish movements also due to the similarities
with similar precedents in the United Kingdom, some of which date back a
long time. In Italy, at the end of May, "Potere al Popolo" publicly
denounced the infiltration of a policeman into the Party that lasted 10
months and was discovered almost by chance.

You don't have to be an expert to remember that state apparatuses have
always been accustomed to infiltrating parties, groups, collectives,
movements both to acquire information on their functioning and their
activities and to set up some provocation. The Italian history of the
last 50-60 years contains a good number of examples and it is no
coincidence that the law recently approved by Parliament provides for a
series of changes to the regulations in force (art.31 "Provisions for
the strengthening of the information activity for security", Decree 11
April 2025, n. 48) that specifically concern the activities in question.
In practice, a certain number of crimes committed by infiltrated people
are made non-punishable. It is superfluous to remember that there are no
lists or statistics (public) regarding the number of infiltrated people
(and where), so it is not possible to know whether these are tens or
hundreds and any hypothesis made in this regard is certainly unfounded.
However, it is certainly an activity that today is accompanied by that
of the control carried out through spy software installed on cell
phones, as clearly demonstrated recently by the discovery that the
"Graphite" program (produced by the company "Paragon") was used to
control some people whose communications are evidently considered
interesting by the repressive apparatus.

Given that the problem of infiltration exists and that it is not the
result of a banal conspiracy theory, at least three questions arise
spontaneously: 1. is it possible to discover an infiltration? How? 2. if
they are discovered is it appropriate to publicly report these cases? 3.
is it possible to prevent an infiltration? How?

The "Manual" cited at the beginning tries to answer above all the first
two questions but raises some doubts regarding the answer to the third
question. Below we try to summarize the content of the document and
refer the people most interested to the full text. The literal
quotations, placed in quotation marks, will be followed by the page
number (enclosed in square brackets) from which they come.

The first thing that is clarified is that the text was written by people
who have directly suffered the infiltration activity and that the
purposes of the document are: "Transmit the experience and
knowledge"[3]acquired; "Increase the culture of protection in
organizations and collectives."[4]and highlight the cracks in the
infiltration system and the fact that the police and the State are not
infallible. Ultimately, it is believed that it is "essential to make
public all the information and elements obtained"[4]and that it is
necessary for certain information to be shared because "it would be
dangerous and discouraging to leave this possibility only to our
discretion and arbitrariness, as this could produce hierarchies and
imbalances of power."[5]. The decision to make certain information
public is then motivated; it is probably the synthesis of a debate in
which the pros and cons of this decision were evaluated.

The question is then answered: "Why is it important that there is a
group that controls the process?"[8]which is followed by answers that
concern "discretion", the need to avoid unnecessary alarmism but also
that of preventing the infiltrated person from knowing that he is in the
sights of an "initial investigation group."[9].

Throughout the text, reference will be made continuously to the activity
of this "group" formed by a group of people who have strong bonds of
trust among themselves, who have found themselves sharing some
"suspicions" and who have decided to investigate them further. The aim
is to provide "information, common models, guidelines and
recommendations on the possible problems that can be encountered when
starting an investigation, as well as on the possible security measures
to prevent infiltrations."[10]

And the main part of the document is dedicated precisely to the
"suspicions".  According to the author, "Most suspicions can arise by
observing clothing[sic!], political ideas, social networks, lack of
roots, something that does not fit in a life story or simply the fact
that there are people who do not fit in well with the context."[11]to
these must be added "the sudden, unexpected and inexplicable distancing
of the partner (infiltrator) from militancy"[12]a fact that has occurred
in many cases and also in the context of infiltrations that occurred in
the United Kingdom.

If the "suspicions" are only a starting point, it must always be kept in
mind that these, by themselves, do not constitute proof and that, it
will be repeated on several occasions, it is much better to be wrong
than to follow some kind of prejudice. It is starting from these
collective "suspicions" "that we can form an affinity group to carry on
the investigation."[14]This must also include a person who is trusted
but who has no ties to the suspected person, in order to have a point of
view not directly involved in the problem that can serve to avoid errors
of assessment and/or judgment and that can function as a sort of
"psychological support".

In the "Manual" it is recommended to keep a written record of what comes
to mind and the information collected from the beginning and to evaluate
the suspected person according to a series of basic questions that will
then be listed later in the text. At a certain point it may be necessary
to acquire information by contacting other people and the document
advises how to behave in such cases.

In the end, one way or another, the "investigations" will be closed.

In the best of cases, no evidence is found on the suspected person and
this information must be shared with all the people who were aware of
the "investigations" in order to avoid "rumours continuing to
circulate."[21]In this case, the question arises as to whether the
suspected person should be among those informed, a decision that is
obviously quite delicate. No precise indication is given on this, while
it is explicitly written that "Some groups have simply decided not to
mention the investigation, which can have the disadvantage of never
definitively closing the matter."[21]

In the case where, although there are "suspicions" and "evidence" these
are not considered sufficient or incontrovertible, it is recommended to
be cautious and "not to publish anything until definitive evidence is
available."[23]

In the worst case, when there is no doubt about the infiltration, it is
suggested that it is "almost always a good idea to make the news
public"[23]taking care to warn in advance the people who have had the
most contact with the infiltrated person and making sure to have
"support tools available for those who will be most affected by the
consequences."[25]

The "Manual" barely mentions the problem that could arise when an
infiltrated person enters into a relationship with an activist, which
complicates the whole matter considerably. The issue is taken up again,
in part, in a documentary (on the same story) produced by a Catalan
digital platform and visible here
https://www.3cat.cat/3cat/infiltrats/video/6319194/

The "Manual" then lists the "lessons" learned by the people involved in
nine cases of infiltration that have been made public; later in the
text, links to the web pages where the stories of these individuals are
published will be provided. The lessons do not only concern infiltration
techniques but also the effects that discoveries of this kind have on
the level of the people who are part of groups, collectives, movements.
Effects that are above all negative and that could, if not well managed,
lead to damage both the people and their relationships: "Be aware that
any investigation, regardless of its outcome, can damage the networks of
trust within the group."[26]Some pages of the "Manual" are dedicated to
psychological and relational damage and it is recommended to choose
adequate "safety protocols" that make people feel at ease.

The 17 "questions" are then listed on which the "investigations" should
be based and which should constitute a sort of working grid useful for
unmasking an infiltration. Each of these questions is accompanied by
explanations and examples taken from real cases.
Here is the list: 1. Past history and lack of roots; 2. Are their
political ideas almost non-existent or poorly developed?; 3. Has anyone
met their family?; 4. Does their work or "personal" life lead them to be
absent for long periods of time or for many short periods?; 5. Does
their home seem little lived in?; 6. How did they become involved?; 7.
Do they have extraordinary driving skills or do they have a driving
license for almost all vehicle categories?; 8. What is their attitude or
personality?; 9. Do they have money problems?; 10. Do relationships
focus on key people or those around them?; 11. Oddities and
contradictions; 12. Have there been strange court cases or little
interest from the police?; 13. Have they suddenly disappeared and
avoided any contact?; 14. Social; 15. Photos; 16. COVID; 17. Cell
phones.[33-]

It would take too long to analyze in detail each of these that we could
call "clues" and that should help to discover an infiltrated person. But
even just scrolling through the list you can see that these are models
and/or behavior patterns that have no specificity whatsoever and can
therefore mean anything but also the opposite of everything. This
applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to almost all the points listed,
something that is also noted (fortunately!) in some of the notes written
by the person who wrote the text.

Towards the end of the document it is written: "we must always be clear,
however, that getting to know new people should be aimed at basic
socialization and not so much (or not only) at security"[51-52].
Therefore, the person who wrote the text does not seem to exclude the
need for "investigations" to be carried out on any new person who comes
into contact with a group, a collective, a movement. This seems to be
confirmed by the fact that the immediately following paragraph has this
title: "Possible useful precautions (but not infallible) for integrating
people into the group"[52]and is followed by a series of suggestions for
obtaining some basic information on a person. However, it is not
specified who should collect this "information" and by what "suspicions"
the collection would be justified.

In the "Conclusions"[55]many of the warnings written on several
occasions in the previous pages of the "Manual" are reiterated with the
aim of avoiding "false positives" and negative side effects for the
communities in struggle, unfortunately it ends up also writing: "The
fact that someone does not fit into the schemes does not mean that every
suspicion must be discarded."[57]

Overall, it can be considered that, apart from some unintentional
naivety, the document addresses a theme that, as we mentioned at the
beginning, is still current and not only in Spain. From a political
point of view, the fact that groups, collectives, movements that act in
broad daylight have been infiltrated says a lot about the fact that this
type of practice certainly does not serve to combat international
terrorism but rather the grassroots social struggle. What is evident,
however, is that in many cases the infiltration was discovered by one or
more errors, some truly gross, committed by the infiltrated person.

What is less convincing about the proposals made in the "Manual" is the
need to create a secret structure that "investigates" "suspicious"
people, an entity that - as presented in the text - is born on the basis
of an "instinct" and that ultimately answers almost only to itself. This
certainly does not mean that it would be preferable to have a sort of
institutionalized internal police force but rather that the problem of
security should be directly taken care of by all the people who are part
of a group, collective, movement. If one of the goals that should be
pursued is to throw out (rather than discover) unwelcome people, an open
collective discussion on these topics would cause quite a few problems
for an infiltrated person.

In addition, it would be good if human relationships within a fighting
community were not based on the control - even for good purposes - that
a group (more or less small) exercises over the entire community. The
need to defend communities is certainly something important but this
should be carefully balanced: even the person who wrote the "Manual" has
underlined on several occasions the collateral damage caused by an
"investigation", unfortunately one has the impression that these have
not been adequately evaluated and certainly have not been compared with
the damage that an infiltration could cause. And we are talking about
damage that is produced whatever the final result of an "investigation".
Obviously this is valid (especially) for groups, collectives, movements
that operate in the light of day and for which illegality is not the
main or only form of struggle.

Ultimately it is one thing to live with and manage a pinch of paranoia,
especially on certain occasions, it is another to get carried away by
mechanisms that could become commonly used practices. In most cases, it
is probably enough to share even a minimum amount of attention to
internal security issues to try to address the problem collectively
rather than delegating it, moreover without even being aware of it, to a
small group.

This system will probably not be the most efficient, from a security
point of view, but it will certainly allow all people to participate in
a certain type of problem and this will reduce the inevitable impact of
the negative effects that are caused by an infiltration.

Pepsy

 From https://pepsy.noblogs.org/

https://umanitanova.org/vizietti-sospetti-lantica-arte-degli-infiltrati/
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