Let's get back down to earth: the text signed on July 12 is in fact only
a draft agreement. It still needs to be accepted by the archipelago'spolitical parties and population; some of its wording remains very
vague, and its implementation depends largely on the Caledonian
Congress. This text speaks of a "State of New Caledonia" within the
national entity, which would be enshrined in the Constitution of the
French Republic." The question of independence is thus sidelined for the
time being: there is no mention of either a "Kanaky" or a "Kanaky-New
Caledonia." It is only written that it will be possible to change the
name of the Congress and the identifying symbols of New Caledonia...
On July 2, 2025, at Macron's initiative, new negotiations opened between
the six Caledonian delegations and representatives of the French
government (the previous ones, led by Valls in the archipelago, had
failed a few months earlier). These six delegations represented the
pro-independence FLNKS-UC and UNI-Palika, the anti-independence
Loyalists, the centrists of Oceanian Awakening and Caledonia Together,
and Les Républicains.
The two Caledonian MPs were present: Emmanuel Tjibaou, president of the
Caledonian Union, for the pro-independence camp (Christian Tein,
president of the FLNKS, was released but his presence was refused by the
Élysée); Nicolas Metzdorf, leader of the Loyalists party, for the
anti-independence camp.
At the opening of these negotiations, Macron had raised the possibility
of an "associated state" within fifteen to twenty years-Tjibaou retained
the phrase "associated state," which had outraged Metzdorf.
Everything, in fact, seems to depend on the assessment of the Caledonian
Congress. For example, the sovereign powers that New Caledonia could
obtain depend on it: it is the Congress itself that can decide to
request them from the French state; then a "working committee" including
representatives of the French state will work on the matter, and then
the opinion of the Caledonian population will be sought.
The anti-independence camp no doubt believes that it has gained serious
leverage against independence: their camp will work to ensure that the
Caledonian Congress does not make decisions of this kind. The same goes
for the upcoming "fundamental law of New Caledonia" on identity symbols
and other symbols (so far, no agreement has been reached between the
various political parties regarding the archipelago's flag). The
pro-independence camp recently lost both presidencies of the Caledonian
institutions (the Congress and the government), and the
anti-independence camp will ensure that it does not regain them.
Furthermore, a "special organic law" will change the composition of the
provincial assemblies. However, a large proportion of their members make
up the Caledonian Congress, and the number of members representing the
three provinces (the pro-independence North and Islands, the
anti-independence South) in the Congress has previously favored the
pro-independence camp, much to the dismay of the Loyalists. The text of
the agreement mentions "taking into account demographic realities and
the objective of rebalancing"...
The anti-independence movement also secured the right for the provinces
to have their own resources (notably through taxes) and their own police
force, and we can count on the leaders of "their" wealthy Southern
Province not to forget this. The text of the agreement does indeed state
that the "special organic law" will guarantee the "maintenance of a
financial solidarity mechanism between the various institutions and
communities of New Caledonia," but we'll see what that actually means,
given that the Southern Province wanted to secede. (The same goes for
the transfer of powers from New Caledonia to its provinces, which this
"special organic law" is supposed to establish.)
The independence movement has made some concessions on the issue of the
electorate: ten years of presence in the territory will be sufficient to
obtain Caledonian nationality and to participate in the February 2026
vote on the signed agreement; Fifteen years will be required to
participate in the June 2026 provincial elections.
It was very likely that the Kanak delegation (led by Tjibaou, but not
far behind) would sign the draft agreement, clinging to the promise of
an "associated state" (even within the "fifteen or twenty years"
announced by Macron at the start of the negotiations, but which are not
mentioned in the text).
It is also not so surprising that the Loyalist delegation also ended up
signing the draft agreement, because these "ultras" do not represent the
Caledonian employers, and the latter could not allow the economic
situation to deteriorate any longer. The right, or Les Républicains, is
represented in the French government by Retailleau, who recently
appointed Alcide Ponga (a Kanak mining entrepreneur) as one of his
advisors. He leads the Rassemblement-LR party in the archipelago and is
currently head of the New Caledonian government. The proposed agreement
is thus supported by Macron's supporters and the right.
France, for its part, will be spending a significant amount of money
because the underlying idea is to revive the New Caledonian economy:
It promises the pro-independence movement to boost the nickel
industry-particularly the processing of this ore in New Caledonian
factories (if conditions permit, it is nevertheless specified:
otherwise, "it will be exported"). There is also a promise to support
the factory in the Northern Province. The government therefore seems to
be backtracking on the nickel issue (it wanted to stop its processing on
site). It remains to be seen whether it will follow through on this
commitment (among other things because the Court of Auditors has a say
in the matter).
- It promises to transform some of its loans into grants (at the
insistent request of various New Caledonian delegations)... under
certain conditions, to reduce the enormous debt of New Caledonian
institutions. It remains to be seen what it will agree to do on this issue.
But the French state will retain control in many New Caledonian sectors:
nickel, foreign trade, international and defense issues, "security and
public order" (notably through the "creation of a High Caledonian
Security Council" which will include various New Caledonian
authorities-including traditional authorities).
In short, France is keeping the archipelago within its fold: it remains
"in close contact" with it to "preserve the New Caledonian 'terrestrial
and marine environment'"; It is under its "protection" at the
international level and under its economic supervision, particularly
with regard to nickel.
The services of the High Commission will also be strengthened...
The role of the Customary Senate is also being strengthened, at least on
paper (as are the powers of the communes and customary areas).
Previously, the Customary Senate was primarily a consultative body. Now,
it is expected to become involved in "crime prevention," and a
"customary police force" will be created.
It is easy to see, in these types of measures, the State's desire to
"involve" the separatists in maintaining order: they are responsible for
better controlling "their" youth. But in reality, a strengthening of
repressive forces at all levels is planned-and the creation of a new
prison to "relieve" the one in Camp-Est.
Youth, designated as "the strength of New Caledonia," has been declared
a priority: policies concerning health, education, training, employment,
culture, as well as "the fight against alcohol and drug addiction" and
"civic engagement" will be dedicated to them by the French government;
they will be offered voluntary military service and other military
attractions...
We will see, if the agreement is accepted, how the "desire to build a
people" it affirms will materialize.
In any case, without falling into conspiracy theories, it can be said
that the French government has done everything in recent years to
"break" the pro-independence movement (particularly Kanak youth) by its
decision to hold the third referendum during the Covid pandemic, and
then to "unfreeze" the electoral body. The third referendum would
undoubtedly have led to independence if it had been held at a different
time. The riots of May 2024, by ruining the archipelago's economy, had
the perverse effect of allowing the French state to tighten its grip
(economic and military) over the archipelago. Not only are New
Caledonian employers now calling on the state for help, and a large
portion of the New Caledonian population (largely Kanak) finds itself in
extreme precariousness or outright poverty (the "special riots"
unemployment benefit, which had been extended, saw its pay drop, then
ended; a new scheme is expected to replace it, but at what cost?), but
New Caledonian leaders of all stripes (elected politicians and business
leaders) are at the mercy of the French state, whether to revive the
economy or to ensure the payment of pensions and other social benefits.
The French state is therefore, of course, working towards a "return to
stability and the opening of new perspectives", for "the essential
cleaning up of local public finances and the recovery of social
accounts" (including through a tax reform that anti-independence
activists do not want). Alongside dual nationality, Caledonians will
retain their European citizenship. The Caledonian currency will be
retained, but the French government will allow New Caledonia to put
whatever it wants on its banknotes-a small symbolic gift to the
pro-independence movement, although it's uncertain whether the
"anti-independence" supporters will let them do so, again. Caledonian
civil and military supervision will also be strengthened-including for
the Kanaks, through the existing "Cadres Avenir" program. The Rural
Development and Land Use Planning Agency (ADRAF) will be able to assist
in the development of economic activities or allow for the expansion of
customary lands. Etc.
There are many unknowns in the draft agreement, as its implementation
largely depends on several upcoming elections: in the fall, the
parliamentary vote on the inclusion of a change in status for New
Caledonia in the French Constitution; in February 2026, the vote in the
archipelago on the signed draft agreement; In March-April 2026, the
adoption of the "special organic law" on New Caledonia; in June 2026,
the provincial elections, which have been postponed twice. (And there
will also be municipal elections in France and the archipelago in March
2026.)
In the meantime, the FLNKS and Loyalist delegations seem-according to
the press-to be quite apprehensive about the reception they will receive
upon their return to the archipelago for having signed this text.
Vanina
Note: By typing the keyword "kanaky" in the search box at the top right,
you can find our articles, analyses, and online radio broadcasts on the
anti-colonial struggle on the rock.
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4488
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