This coming September, we will hear a lot about Moldova, as an important
deadline awaits the government of Mrs. Maja Sandù, currently Presidentof the country on behalf of the European Union, on the 28th of that
month. It was not the voters who nominated the President, but the
support of Brussels, which mobilized the Western Moldovan diaspora,
using their votes to overturn the election results of the resident
population. It should be remembered that the country has a total
population of three and a half million, but only two are residents. The
remaining one and a half million are distributed between the West and
Russia, where 80% of the Moldovan diaspora resides while maintaining
dual citizenship. The electoral system allows all Moldovans to vote, but
to do so, polling stations must be set up abroad and the necessary
ballots must be sent out. While Western countries had numerous polling
stations, spread widely across the country and equipped with the
necessary ballots, in Russia only two were set up in Moscow, with only
4,000 ballots available. This ploy was sufficient to influence and
manipulate the outcome of the vote.
On September 28, Moldovans will vote to elect the new Parliament, which
will prepare the conditions for the country's accession to the European
Union. This will involve initiating the necessary anti-corruption
reforms, modifying the judicial system, and overhauling the country's
economic structure, redirecting its economy toward the West, while also
convincing undecided voters that EU membership is a realistic and
short-term prospect.
The issues to be resolved
It must be considered that, as in many Eastern European countries,
corruption is widespread and pervasive in the West as well. A case in
point is an incident at the country's customs office, involving a
passenger leaving the country whose laptop was confiscated for security,
risking him missing his flight.
The situation was resolved thanks to the advice of another experienced
passenger, who suggested providing the splendid customs officer with his
passport containing a EUR100 "alms," which was then surreptitiously
withheld. The justification for this was the fact that the salaries
earned by customs officers are extremely low. It's quite clear that
these practices hinder the country's economic development, especially
given that they are accompanied by scant protection from the judicial
system. Economically, the country is experiencing a highly complex
situation. The effects of the decentralization of production by Western
countries, which have relocated many of their businesses to the country
due to the extremely low cost of labor, the new production activities
established by Ukrainians fleeing their war-torn country, and the
profits from lucrative war-related activities, exploiting the country's
proximity to the war front, are insufficient to economically offset the
damage resulting from the politically motivated interruption of Russian
gas and oil supplies, which were once made available to the country at a
very affordable price.
This preferential treatment stems from numerous factors: the country has
a Russian-speaking population of more than 50%, so much so that it is
officially bilingual, with Romanian and Russian spoken interchangeably.
The Russian-speaking population adheres to an autonomous Orthodox
Church, but one linked to the Moscow Patriarchate. Part of the country's
territory is autonomous and has established a de facto independent
republic, Transnistria, which covers the entire border between Moldova
and Ukraine. Its autonomy is guaranteed by the forty-year presence of a
contingent of Russian troops who guard a vast depot of rusting weapons,
remnants of the USSR, and still display the USSR coat of arms and use
its anthem. Bordering this autonomous territory is the region of
Gagauzia, whose population is predominantly Russian-speaking.
With the upcoming elections, the attention of Mrs. Sandù and the
European Union has turned specifically to politicians from this region,
and the Governor of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutul, was complicit in the
illegal financing of the Shor party, a political group that was
subsequently declared unconstitutional and banned from participating in
the elections. The charges focus on the period from 2019 to 2022, a
period in which Gutul held the position of secretary of the party's
Monitoring, Planning and Control Department. The governor allegedly
played an active role in importing large sums of undeclared money into
Moldova, originating from an organized crime group linked to the Russian
Federation, to finance the party.
Furthermore, between October and November 2022, Gutul allegedly
coordinated the party's local branches, knowingly accepting illicit
funding of approximately 42.5 million lei. This money, also coming from
the same criminal group, was allegedly used for the party's political
activities. These are the reasons for the seven-year prison sentence.
Despite these preventative measures, it is highly likely that the
election outcome will reduce the number of seats held by the
pro-European ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). The result
will determine the pace of Moldova's reforms, its energy security
strategy, and will impact its alignment with EU foreign policy at a
particularly delicate time in the war in neighboring Ukraine.
The outcome of the war on the battlefield is prompting the EU and NATO
to closely monitor the situation in Moldova, a country poised to
constitute a new front against Russia's presence in the region and to
replace Ukraine in the extremely likely event of a defeat on the ground.
The growing difficulties experienced by the West stem from the effects
the Ukrainian war is having on its neighbor, where it has grown
enormously due to the presence of Ukrainians, often viewed with
displeasure by the population due to the subsidies they enjoy from the
European Union due to their refugee status and the capital they possess,
having accumulated thanks to bribes received from European and American
war funding.
The Opposition's Response
To counter this plan, a "leftist"/pro-Russian bloc has been formed: in
July, four opposition parties (PSRM, PCRM, "The Future of Moldova,"
"Heart of Moldova") announced the formation of a united electoral bloc,
led by former President Igor Dodon. Their Platform focuses on "strategic
ties with Russia," calls for the country's neutrality in foreign policy
and the reduction of basic commodities and energy prices, while
reestablishing supply relations with Russia.
To counter their propaganda, NATO and the European Union are taking
action in the media, blocking Russian-language broadcasts and making
every effort to thwart advertising on social media. They are preparing
street protests, while the opposition is attempting to turn the
conviction of Yevgeniya Gutsul, who enjoys significant popular support,
against the ruling party.
In an effort to maintain control of the country, the European Union and
NATO authorities are relentlessly deploying all available resources and
have provided substantial financial support to the Democratic Party,
whose public image they are attempting to clean up with the arrest in
Greece of Vladimir Plahotniuc-the central figure in the 2014 "robbery of
the century"-who reportedly expressed his intention to return to the
country. To give an idea of the level of institutional corruption, it's
worth remembering that in 2014, a group of ministers were hosted at a
resort in the Maldives, in exchange for the Moon Church (a schismatic
evangelical sect) allowing its catechism to be taught in public schools
in Moldova, a notoriously Orthodox country.
In this situation, Maia Sandù's cries of alarm are incessant, denouncing
alleged Russian interference of an "unprecedented" intensity. She
denounces the country as an active testing ground for Russian
narratives, conflating complaints about the deteriorating economic
situation with claims of Western "control," amplifying tensions between
the center and the periphery (Gagauzia, Transnistria), sowing doubts
about the fairness of the elections and EU membership and the timeframe
required for implementation, even though Moldova has reportedly made
progress in 31 of 33 negotiation chapters since its candidate status,
albeit from a low starting point.
Possible scenarios
Given all this, the likely deterioration of the Democratic Party means
it will not achieve a majority; it will seek allies among centrists and
supporters of a civic platform. This will allow for a steady path toward
the EU, a push for justice reforms, and continued enforcement of media
and party financing laws to counter attempts at Russian interference,
providing a more decisive institutional response to reform demands. The
prevalence of a PSRM-led alliance could block or reverse some parts of
the EU agenda, slowing the opening of new chapters and reformulating
foreign policy in a more "balanced" direction. This will lead to
friction with Brussels, a shift toward Gazprom's "energy pragmatism,"
and renewed pressure on oversight institutions. This situation will be
accompanied by a fragmented Parliament, with influential figures who
will make the country's politics unstable. Smaller groups, or remnants
around banned networks and parties, become crucial in determining the
election outcome. Coalition bargaining will extend until October;
external financing and information operations will intensify. The risk
of political paralysis is evident, just as EU decisions on the
timetables for opening chapters are expected.
Meanwhile, the cost of living and energy will rise, despite EU aid and
diversification; energy prices and wage pressures will remain high.
Those aligned with the The Kremlin will have a field day arguing that
Moscow can supply gas at lower prices; the PAS will respond with
medium-term security measures and EU-funded infrastructure. Regarding
the rule of law/fight against corruption, we note that the high-profile
cases (Sor, Gutsul, Plahotniuc) have a two-way effect: they galvanize
reformists and fuel the opposition's claims of "selective justice."
Regarding the unresolved institutional issue of relations between
Moldova and Transnistria, the evolving conflict is once again drawing
international attention to Chisinau's de-escalation stance, while
pro-Russian forces are warning against "dragging Moldova into war."
Gianni Cimbalo
https://www.ucadi.org/2025/09/04/la-moldavia-al-bivio/
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