On December 8, 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad, riddled with
internal disrepute, collapsed like a house of cards after several days
of a lightning offensive coordinated by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
group, supported by Turkey. This historic turning point ended more than
fifty years of tyranny by the Assads, father and son, but it did not
usher in a very promising period for Syrian workers and the working
class. The new government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, wavered between
religious sectarianism and economic liberalism, while seeking
international support to finance the reconstruction of a Syria left in
ruins after thirteen years of civil war. This weak and divided territory
is now witnessing the contradictions of global capitalism playing out on
its own soil, while the ethno-religious and authoritarian dead ends in
which the new power seems mired only serve to reinforce the territorial
and social fault lines.
It did not take long for the Syrian uprising, which erupted in March
2011 in the context of the "Arab Spring," to become militarized in the
face of the Assad regime's relentless repression. As early as the summer
of 2011, the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) initiated this
movement, which quickly fragmented, as the civil war spread, into
numerous armed groups soon affiliated with regional or international
powers (Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States, etc.). The fall of the
Assad regime almost a year ago was thus less the result of a popular
uprising than of a military campaign led by Tshisekedi (Tshisekedi), an
Islamist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which capitalized on the
regime's exhaustion, the divisions within the opposition, and Turkish
logistical support. This victory is not that of a social revolution but
rather of an authoritarian reconfiguration, where Al-Shara and its
supporters, bolstered by their military legitimacy, are now attempting
to gradually impose an Islamist power-not jihadist, but profoundly
reactionary-that marginalizes ethnic and religious minorities and
criminalizes forms of popular autonomy.
Consolidation of the Repressive Apparatus and Authoritarian Legitimization
Since coming to power, de facto President Al-Shara has recreated a
centralized security apparatus, structured around the National Security
Council, whose structure strongly resembles the former Assad-era
National Security Directorate. Key positions are overwhelmingly held by
former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officials or Al-Shara's close
associates. Formalized in March 2025 with the adoption of the interim
constitution, this structure, to which the Ministry of the Interior
(historically weak in Syria) is subordinate, brings together the
partially purged former intelligence services (Mukhabarat), the internal
security forces, and units from allied rebel factions (the aim being to
strengthen their integration). It is directly attached to the
presidency, which reinforces Al-Shara's personal control over the levers
of coercion, while the interim constitution authorizes exceptional
measures to "preserve national stability," thus providing a legal basis
for repression. For the past year, arbitrary arrests have multiplied,
particularly in the Alawite neighborhoods of Latakia (the Alawites being
associated with the former regime), the Druze areas of Suwayda (now
largely autonomous and in direct conflict with the central government),
and the suburbs of Damascus. The pretext is always the same: the fight
against the "remnants of the old regime," a vague category encompassing
former civil servants, secular activists, critical journalists, trade
unionists, and various ethnic or religious minorities. This rhetoric
serves to criminalize any form of opposition, even non-violent, and to
justify mass surveillance, detentions without trial, and enforced
disappearances.
However, it remains difficult to pinpoint responsibility after each
outbreak of violence and to understand precisely the role played by the
presidency: after the fall of Assad, many armed groups were nominally
integrated into the national forces while retaining their command
structures. This is for example the case of the Syrian National Army
(SNA), created from scratch by Turkey after the invasion of the
territories of Afrin and Serekaniye (2018 and 2019), which were then
part of the AANES (Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria, which
became the Democratic Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria since
the promulgation of their new "social contract" serving as a
Constitution in December 2023).
Although officially integrated into the new armed forces, the Syrian
National Army (SNA) retains a degree of de facto autonomy within the
military structures of the new government. This situation sometimes
makes tracing the chain of command difficult. In March 2025, during the
massacres of Alawites on the coast, for example, it took a very long
time to establish responsibility: it was clear that fighters from the
former SNA had participated, but government responsibility (which has
since been confirmed, notably by Reuters, without being accepted by the
Syrian government) was only seriously demonstrated in July, four months
later. These are the same processes that may have been at play during
the offensive by tribal armed groups in the Druze territories of Suwayda
in July 2025. The elections of October 5, controlled by Al-Sharaa (a
third of the 210 seats were directly filled by Al-Sharaa, while all
candidates elected indirectly through local committees first had to be
validated by a commission whose members had also been chosen by the
interim president), may allow him to get rid of some of his most
troublesome allies-warlords or otherwise-while consolidating his
personal exercise of power under the guise of popular legitimacy.
Kurdish Fighters
A Neoliberal Shock Therapy Under an Islamist Veil
Economically, the policy adopted by Al-Charaa over the past year is
based on brutal liberalization, presented as necessary for national
reconstruction, in a context where the country's infrastructure has
practically collapsed and nine out of ten people live below the poverty
line (figures from the United Nations Development Programme for 2024).
This "shock therapy" is inspired by the models applied in the 1990s in
Russia or in post-2003 Iraq: massive privatizations, deregulation,
opening up to foreign capital, and dismantling of social protections,
risking further worsening the conditions of the working classes already
devastated by thirteen years of civil war.
This represents an extension to the national territory of the policy
that HTC adopted when the group controlled only the Idlib enclave: a
crony capitalism favoring the private sector, which, as was the case in
Bashar al-Assad's Syria, allows for the enrichment of networks close to
the regime and al-Shara.
Syrian strategic sectors-energy, telecommunications, infrastructure-are
thus now entrusted to Turkish, Saudi, or Emirati consortiums, often
linked to HTC. The Caesar Act, which imposed economic sanctions on
Syria, was partially lifted under pressure from Qatar and Turkey,
allowing the influx of financial resources and the rise of a new
Islamist-comprador bourgeoisie: a religious bourgeoisie allied with
foreign interests, profiting from the war and reconstruction.
While the new government is not jihadist (its Islamism remains confined
to the national level), Sharia law has nonetheless become the legal
basis of the interim constitution, which officially establishes Syria as
a "Muslim state," even though it also recognizes freedom of religion.
While Sharia is being progressively integrated into the judicial system,
particularly for civil matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance) -
although without the stipulated corporal punishments - attempts to
impose certain Sharia-inspired restrictions, such as those concerning
alcohol or a potential dress code (mandatory hijab), are meeting with
strong opposition, especially in urban areas and among minorities.
Similarly, educational reforms (such as the elimination of courses on
evolution, replaced by courses on Sunni jurisprudence) are drawing
criticism on social media and in local media, forcing the new government
to promise an "inclusive dialogue." These internal pressures, such as
the desire for full integration into the international community, are
forcing Al-Sharaa to adopt at least a superficial moderation in order to
secure the lifting of economic sanctions and reconstruction aid. The
gradual normalization with Israel (despite Israeli interventions in
Syrian territory) and the country's potential future entry into the
Abraham Accords signal an alignment with the Western sphere of
influence-a process facilitated by Western governments, which have
rapidly forged closer ties with Al-Sharaa (for example, France gave the
interim president a lavish welcome last May, turning a blind eye to his
past involvement with the Islamic State group). This process, aimed at
opening the floodgates to Western capital, risks accelerating Syria's
transformation into an economic protectorate. A Fragmented Territory
The main territory escaping the control of the central government is
that of the Autonomous Democratic Administration of Northeast Syria
(ADANS). Initially limited to Kurdish-populated areas (Rojava) and
implementing the political project of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) -
a sister party of the PKK - the ADANS territory has, with the fight
against the Islamic State, expanded beyond its Kurdish core to include
diverse populations (particularly and especially Sunni Arabs). Operating
according to a decentralized model inspired by the "democratic
confederalism" theorized by Öcalan (whose three main pillars are the
system of communes, women's self-organization, and political ecology),
itself inspired by Bookchin's libertarian municipalism, ADANS presents
itself as the only actor truly capable of integrating the diverse
ethno-religious components of Syrian society and offering an inclusive
alternative to the Al-Shara regime. Since the fall of Assad, ties have
been forged with the Druze of Suwayda and with certain Alawite groups in
Latakia, with the aim of imposing a decentralized model on the new regime.
While negotiations (driven in particular by the United States and the
European Union) have begun between the Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab
Nationalist Movement (SANMAM), aiming for a gradual integration of
civilian and military institutions into the structures of the Syrian
state-while maintaining an autonomy whose contours have never been
clarified-the events in Suwayda, as well as the recent tensions between
these two actors (clashes near Tel Tamer, attempted blockade of the
Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo), make the continuation of this already
tentative process highly uncertain. This is without taking into account
Turkey's opposition, whose main objective-besides ensuring the return of
Syrian refugees on its soil and taking advantage of the economic
opportunities opened up since its allies came to power-remains to
prevent any Kurdish self-determination project, whether a peace process
is underway or not, on its own territory.
In Suwayda, clashes between Druze and Bedouins and the regime's military
intervention alongside Bedouin militias last July led to an Israeli
intervention (which thus positioned itself as a "defender of minorities"
in order to secure its own interests, namely the regime's fragility).
Since then, part of the region has been de facto independent, and ties
with the regime appear to be permanently severed.
In addition to these two territories, there are the areas previously
held, both in the north and south, by various militias. While these
militias have been formally integrated and are therefore accountable to
the central government, they remain liable to secede if they feel
threatened. This is currently the risk posed by the jihadist forces,
long allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) but who now feel abandoned
by the government, which sees these forces as an obstacle to Syria's
integration into the international community.
Conclusion: The future of the Syrian state appears more uncertain than
ever. For the past year, the new government has done far more to fuel
resentment than to heal the divisions left by decades of Baath Party
dictatorship. Syria now appears politically divided, and its sovereignty
is precarious due to the constant intervention of third-party countries.
The establishment of a personal power structure, the maintenance and
intensification of the neoliberal policies initiated by Bashar al-Assad
in the 2000s, and the continuation of the same clientelist dynamics can
only lead to the same consequences: impoverishment, repression, and a
rise in opposition. Perhaps AANES will have a role to play at that point.
F.M., October 23, 2025
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4559
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
internal disrepute, collapsed like a house of cards after several days
of a lightning offensive coordinated by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
group, supported by Turkey. This historic turning point ended more than
fifty years of tyranny by the Assads, father and son, but it did not
usher in a very promising period for Syrian workers and the working
class. The new government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, wavered between
religious sectarianism and economic liberalism, while seeking
international support to finance the reconstruction of a Syria left in
ruins after thirteen years of civil war. This weak and divided territory
is now witnessing the contradictions of global capitalism playing out on
its own soil, while the ethno-religious and authoritarian dead ends in
which the new power seems mired only serve to reinforce the territorial
and social fault lines.
It did not take long for the Syrian uprising, which erupted in March
2011 in the context of the "Arab Spring," to become militarized in the
face of the Assad regime's relentless repression. As early as the summer
of 2011, the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) initiated this
movement, which quickly fragmented, as the civil war spread, into
numerous armed groups soon affiliated with regional or international
powers (Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States, etc.). The fall of the
Assad regime almost a year ago was thus less the result of a popular
uprising than of a military campaign led by Tshisekedi (Tshisekedi), an
Islamist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which capitalized on the
regime's exhaustion, the divisions within the opposition, and Turkish
logistical support. This victory is not that of a social revolution but
rather of an authoritarian reconfiguration, where Al-Shara and its
supporters, bolstered by their military legitimacy, are now attempting
to gradually impose an Islamist power-not jihadist, but profoundly
reactionary-that marginalizes ethnic and religious minorities and
criminalizes forms of popular autonomy.
Consolidation of the Repressive Apparatus and Authoritarian Legitimization
Since coming to power, de facto President Al-Shara has recreated a
centralized security apparatus, structured around the National Security
Council, whose structure strongly resembles the former Assad-era
National Security Directorate. Key positions are overwhelmingly held by
former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officials or Al-Shara's close
associates. Formalized in March 2025 with the adoption of the interim
constitution, this structure, to which the Ministry of the Interior
(historically weak in Syria) is subordinate, brings together the
partially purged former intelligence services (Mukhabarat), the internal
security forces, and units from allied rebel factions (the aim being to
strengthen their integration). It is directly attached to the
presidency, which reinforces Al-Shara's personal control over the levers
of coercion, while the interim constitution authorizes exceptional
measures to "preserve national stability," thus providing a legal basis
for repression. For the past year, arbitrary arrests have multiplied,
particularly in the Alawite neighborhoods of Latakia (the Alawites being
associated with the former regime), the Druze areas of Suwayda (now
largely autonomous and in direct conflict with the central government),
and the suburbs of Damascus. The pretext is always the same: the fight
against the "remnants of the old regime," a vague category encompassing
former civil servants, secular activists, critical journalists, trade
unionists, and various ethnic or religious minorities. This rhetoric
serves to criminalize any form of opposition, even non-violent, and to
justify mass surveillance, detentions without trial, and enforced
disappearances.
However, it remains difficult to pinpoint responsibility after each
outbreak of violence and to understand precisely the role played by the
presidency: after the fall of Assad, many armed groups were nominally
integrated into the national forces while retaining their command
structures. This is for example the case of the Syrian National Army
(SNA), created from scratch by Turkey after the invasion of the
territories of Afrin and Serekaniye (2018 and 2019), which were then
part of the AANES (Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria, which
became the Democratic Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria since
the promulgation of their new "social contract" serving as a
Constitution in December 2023).
Although officially integrated into the new armed forces, the Syrian
National Army (SNA) retains a degree of de facto autonomy within the
military structures of the new government. This situation sometimes
makes tracing the chain of command difficult. In March 2025, during the
massacres of Alawites on the coast, for example, it took a very long
time to establish responsibility: it was clear that fighters from the
former SNA had participated, but government responsibility (which has
since been confirmed, notably by Reuters, without being accepted by the
Syrian government) was only seriously demonstrated in July, four months
later. These are the same processes that may have been at play during
the offensive by tribal armed groups in the Druze territories of Suwayda
in July 2025. The elections of October 5, controlled by Al-Sharaa (a
third of the 210 seats were directly filled by Al-Sharaa, while all
candidates elected indirectly through local committees first had to be
validated by a commission whose members had also been chosen by the
interim president), may allow him to get rid of some of his most
troublesome allies-warlords or otherwise-while consolidating his
personal exercise of power under the guise of popular legitimacy.
Kurdish Fighters
A Neoliberal Shock Therapy Under an Islamist Veil
Economically, the policy adopted by Al-Charaa over the past year is
based on brutal liberalization, presented as necessary for national
reconstruction, in a context where the country's infrastructure has
practically collapsed and nine out of ten people live below the poverty
line (figures from the United Nations Development Programme for 2024).
This "shock therapy" is inspired by the models applied in the 1990s in
Russia or in post-2003 Iraq: massive privatizations, deregulation,
opening up to foreign capital, and dismantling of social protections,
risking further worsening the conditions of the working classes already
devastated by thirteen years of civil war.
This represents an extension to the national territory of the policy
that HTC adopted when the group controlled only the Idlib enclave: a
crony capitalism favoring the private sector, which, as was the case in
Bashar al-Assad's Syria, allows for the enrichment of networks close to
the regime and al-Shara.
Syrian strategic sectors-energy, telecommunications, infrastructure-are
thus now entrusted to Turkish, Saudi, or Emirati consortiums, often
linked to HTC. The Caesar Act, which imposed economic sanctions on
Syria, was partially lifted under pressure from Qatar and Turkey,
allowing the influx of financial resources and the rise of a new
Islamist-comprador bourgeoisie: a religious bourgeoisie allied with
foreign interests, profiting from the war and reconstruction.
While the new government is not jihadist (its Islamism remains confined
to the national level), Sharia law has nonetheless become the legal
basis of the interim constitution, which officially establishes Syria as
a "Muslim state," even though it also recognizes freedom of religion.
While Sharia is being progressively integrated into the judicial system,
particularly for civil matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance) -
although without the stipulated corporal punishments - attempts to
impose certain Sharia-inspired restrictions, such as those concerning
alcohol or a potential dress code (mandatory hijab), are meeting with
strong opposition, especially in urban areas and among minorities.
Similarly, educational reforms (such as the elimination of courses on
evolution, replaced by courses on Sunni jurisprudence) are drawing
criticism on social media and in local media, forcing the new government
to promise an "inclusive dialogue." These internal pressures, such as
the desire for full integration into the international community, are
forcing Al-Sharaa to adopt at least a superficial moderation in order to
secure the lifting of economic sanctions and reconstruction aid. The
gradual normalization with Israel (despite Israeli interventions in
Syrian territory) and the country's potential future entry into the
Abraham Accords signal an alignment with the Western sphere of
influence-a process facilitated by Western governments, which have
rapidly forged closer ties with Al-Sharaa (for example, France gave the
interim president a lavish welcome last May, turning a blind eye to his
past involvement with the Islamic State group). This process, aimed at
opening the floodgates to Western capital, risks accelerating Syria's
transformation into an economic protectorate. A Fragmented Territory
The main territory escaping the control of the central government is
that of the Autonomous Democratic Administration of Northeast Syria
(ADANS). Initially limited to Kurdish-populated areas (Rojava) and
implementing the political project of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) -
a sister party of the PKK - the ADANS territory has, with the fight
against the Islamic State, expanded beyond its Kurdish core to include
diverse populations (particularly and especially Sunni Arabs). Operating
according to a decentralized model inspired by the "democratic
confederalism" theorized by Öcalan (whose three main pillars are the
system of communes, women's self-organization, and political ecology),
itself inspired by Bookchin's libertarian municipalism, ADANS presents
itself as the only actor truly capable of integrating the diverse
ethno-religious components of Syrian society and offering an inclusive
alternative to the Al-Shara regime. Since the fall of Assad, ties have
been forged with the Druze of Suwayda and with certain Alawite groups in
Latakia, with the aim of imposing a decentralized model on the new regime.
While negotiations (driven in particular by the United States and the
European Union) have begun between the Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab
Nationalist Movement (SANMAM), aiming for a gradual integration of
civilian and military institutions into the structures of the Syrian
state-while maintaining an autonomy whose contours have never been
clarified-the events in Suwayda, as well as the recent tensions between
these two actors (clashes near Tel Tamer, attempted blockade of the
Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo), make the continuation of this already
tentative process highly uncertain. This is without taking into account
Turkey's opposition, whose main objective-besides ensuring the return of
Syrian refugees on its soil and taking advantage of the economic
opportunities opened up since its allies came to power-remains to
prevent any Kurdish self-determination project, whether a peace process
is underway or not, on its own territory.
In Suwayda, clashes between Druze and Bedouins and the regime's military
intervention alongside Bedouin militias last July led to an Israeli
intervention (which thus positioned itself as a "defender of minorities"
in order to secure its own interests, namely the regime's fragility).
Since then, part of the region has been de facto independent, and ties
with the regime appear to be permanently severed.
In addition to these two territories, there are the areas previously
held, both in the north and south, by various militias. While these
militias have been formally integrated and are therefore accountable to
the central government, they remain liable to secede if they feel
threatened. This is currently the risk posed by the jihadist forces,
long allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) but who now feel abandoned
by the government, which sees these forces as an obstacle to Syria's
integration into the international community.
Conclusion: The future of the Syrian state appears more uncertain than
ever. For the past year, the new government has done far more to fuel
resentment than to heal the divisions left by decades of Baath Party
dictatorship. Syria now appears politically divided, and its sovereignty
is precarious due to the constant intervention of third-party countries.
The establishment of a personal power structure, the maintenance and
intensification of the neoliberal policies initiated by Bashar al-Assad
in the 2000s, and the continuation of the same clientelist dynamics can
only lead to the same consequences: impoverishment, repression, and a
rise in opposition. Perhaps AANES will have a role to play at that point.
F.M., October 23, 2025
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4559
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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