*The interview was conducted by zyg in September 2025 and published in
French in «Courant Alternatif» in October and November. ---- We metAssareh Assa, an Iranian comrade exiled in France, for an interview that
retraces the 2022 Iranian uprising, which followed the assassination of
Mahsa Jina Amini. In the last issue of Cantiere (39, November 2025), we
published the first part, dedicated to the achievements of that movement
in terms of women's freedom, its limits with respect to social issues,
repression, and nationalism in Iran. In this second part, Assareh talks
to us about the Israel-Iran war, the situation of the working classes,
and the "fascist" nature of the regime.
Let's return to the war between Israel and Iran. You said that Iranian
nationalism ended up helping the Islamic Republic. Can you explain this
idea?
Indeed, any attack against a country tends to reawaken nationalist
sentiment among its population. In the case of the Iranians, the
situation was particularly ambiguous during what was called the
Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel.
The vast majority of Iranians deeply hate the current regime, for the
violence and brutality with which it represses its opponents. They feel
incapable of liberating themselves, and therefore derive a certain
satisfaction from seeing their oppressors severely retaliated against.
Undoubtedly, Israel's reprisals against the Islamic Republic's
commanders have rejoiced among the majority of the Iranian population.
Although the Israeli bombings have hurt national sentiment, a large
segment of the population passively awaits Israel's next attack as an
opportunity to finally rid itself of the Islamic Republic, and therefore
views Israeli military action as a positive thing. It must be said:
unfortunately, the idea of being "liberated" from a state like
Netanyahu's, whose fascist nature has long been known, does not bother a
segment of the Iranian population.
This indifference is partly explained by the fact that liberals strive
to present Israel as the only true democracy in the Middle East: a
functioning state that guarantees freedom of expression and the economic
security of its population, etc. We know this isn't the case, but
Iranian society now seems far from seeking the truth about the nature of
the Israeli regime. This is due to the narrative the Islamic Republic
has maintained throughout its existence.
I'd like to dwell on this point for a moment. Iran, long before the
birth of the Islamic Republic, was culturally opposed to the Israeli
occupation of Palestine. But in recent years, a segment of Iranians has
sided with Israel precisely because of the Islamic Republic. By
transforming the Palestinian cause into a state issue, the regime has
changed Iranians' perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Indeed, by using the Palestinian cause as a tool of internal repression,
the regime has made it detestable in the eyes of many Iranians. For
example, some time ago the regime organized a parade of bassidji , young
pro-government women charged with attacking women who dared to go out
into the streets without a veil; these bassidji marched holding the
Palestinian flag.
However, it's not just the use of the Palestinian emblem that pushes
Iranians to equate pro-Palestinian discourse with their oppression.
Throughout its existence, the Islamic Republic has pursued a foreign
policy that has directly resulted in Iranians' unrestrained impoverishment.
Of course, the cause of this devastating policy can and must be sought
in the economic interests of the leaders. But to the average Iranian,
things look like this: the regime spends the country's money on the
people of the countries it considers its allies in the "axis of
resistance," particularly the Palestinians.
This is why in recent years, and even today, the slogan "Forget
Palestine, find a solution to our misery" is often heard shouted at
demonstrations.
It's clear that the regime uses oil revenues to finance the armaments of
various military and paramilitary forces in the region, part of the
"axis of resistance." But claiming that this money will improve the lot
of the people of countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or Palestine is a
pure and simple lie.
In any case, the widespread belief in Iranian society is that if the
regime worships the Palestinian cause, then Iranians hate the
Palestinians and their cause, and love their enemy, Israel; the same
Israel that massacres them.
In my opinion, applauding Israel-psychologically, morally, and
ideologically-for what it is doing in Gaza reveals only a fascist
mindset. It is a profoundly sad attitude, induced by the Iranian regime.
Iranian society, which before the 1979 revolution supported the
Palestinian cause, has become, if not openly supportive of the genocide
underway in Gaza, at least indifferent. Out of pure opportunism,
according to the principle "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," or out
of that reformist logic according to which bad is preferable to worse:
Israel is bad, but the Islamic Republic is worse. Once again, simple
minds refuse to see the bond that unites these two fascist regimes, and
the way they fuel each other through their antagonism.
You've repeatedly called the Islamic Republic "fascist," which isn't a
minor point. Everyone knows that Iran is a theocratic dictatorship. But
should we really call it fascist?
I realize that the term "fascist" is highly charged: it has a very
specific historical meaning, and therefore should be avoided. However,
it allows me to adequately describe the political and social situation
in Iran. The Islamic Republic is, in fact, the result of
counterrevolutionary forces seizing power; it was born from a failed
popular revolution. Its first steps consisted of eliminating radical
elements from society, which it did very well. It then launched a war
against Iraq, thanks to which it was able to mobilize the masses around
its supremacist ideology, an Iranian version of Islam: Shi'ism. In this
way, it succeeded in stifling any voice of opposition during the war and
for the entire following decade. For all these reasons, it seems unfair
to strip the regime of its fascist label!
That said, if anyone offers me another term or concept that would allow
me to place it on the same level as the Israeli regime, I will gladly
accept it. Indeed, I believe that insisting, rightly, on the fascist
nature of Israel's practices, particularly the genocide it is committing
in Gaza, while simultaneously viewing the Iranian regime as a simple
dictatorship, constitutes a grave error of analysis. This approach leads
to practices that ultimately support the Islamic Republic in its
militaristic policies and in strengthening its repression against
Iranians, under the pretext of confronting Israel.
The political discourse that defines Israel as fascist but not Iran is
often supported by the left's "axis of resistance." Supporters of the
so-called "campist" or "anti-imperialist" left emphasize the destruction
and deaths caused by the two warring regimes.
They ignore, or prefer to ignore, that the Islamic Republic, by its very
existence as a permanent threat to Israel, has aggravated the life and
struggle of the Palestinians.
They also ignore that Israel sold weapons to Iran during the Iran-Iraq
war, which decisively contributed to consolidating the regime's power
through the war itself. They also ignore Iran's openly anti-Semitic
discourse, which allows the Israeli state to conflate anti-Semitism with
anti-Zionism.
Faced with this simplistic comparison coming from a certain left, I like
to recall Otto Rühle's phrase "to talk about black fascism, you must
also talk about red fascism," and adapt it to the current situation: to
talk about Israeli fascism, you must also talk about Iranian fascism,
and vice versa.
But to avoid remaining merely rhetorical and limiting ourselves to
justifying the political use of the fascist label to designate the
Iranian regime, let's look at the issue from the perspective of Afghan
immigrant workers. Indeed, unlike a simple dictatorship, a fascist state
requires the support of its population to pursue its fascist policies.
And it seems to me that this, unfortunately, was precisely the case
during the Iranian regime's latest attack on the Afghans.
Are you talking about the recent expulsion of Afghan immigrants from Iran?
Yes. I'd like to take this opportunity to address the situation of these
immigrants in Iran. It also allows me to complete my answer to your
first question, namely how Iranian nationalism supports the regime. To
do so, I must return to the end of the uprising that followed Jina's
death. Indeed, as I said at the beginning of this interview, the failure
of that uprising resulted in a clash between the various political
forces over the issue of territorial integrity.
This conflict assumed significant proportions, to the point that Turkish
sovereignist forces aligned themselves against the Kurdish nationalists,
the latter against the Persians, and the Persians against everyone else,
and so on. To control the national conflict after that failure, the
regime needed to unite all the actors under a national slogan.
But this slogan could no longer be directed against the so-called
external enemy, that is, the Western countries, since the Iranians had
long since ceased to believe in it.
Having lost confidence in its identity discourse against the external
enemy, the regime sought to create an internal one: immigrant workers.
While most Iranians no longer side with the regime in its opposition to
Israel or the United States, they instead side with it against the
Afghans, who have come to Iran, according to them, to steal their bread
or destroy their beautiful country.
In recent years, Afghan immigrants and their descendants have suffered
atrocities not only at the hands of the state, but also at the hands of
some Iranian citizens. Despite sharing the same culture, language, and
religion as Iranians, Afghans have never been welcome in Iran.
They are victims of all kinds of state discrimination:
they cannot settle where they want;
they cannot frequent certain neighborhoods;
access to certain public spaces, such as gardens, is prohibited to them;
They cannot even have a SIM card in their own name nor move freely
within the country.
They encounter enormous difficulties in enrolling their children in
school, and in some cases it is completely impossible.
In recent times, the regime has even been seen banning the sale of bread
and medicines to Afghans.
It is clear that the state could not carry out all this systematic
discrimination if racism did not exist in Iran.
But even before the Jinna uprising, an Afghan, or even an
Iranian-Afghan, was not immune from racist acts: incidents of violence
against Afghans are countless, especially when it comes to Hazaras,
easily recognizable by their Asian features.
It starts with a simple insult on the street, it progresses to beatings
and ends up with the burning of their neighborhood.
For as long as I can remember, most Iranians have always felt a sense of
superiority toward Afghans. I won't dwell on the historical, cultural,
or economic reasons for this here; I'll simply say that a narrative
circulates in Iran that Iranians are descendants of Aryans, bearers of
"pure blood," etc.; a myth that legitimizes their supposed "racial"
superiority over non-Aryans. This narrative, of course, has taken on
even greater relevance today; but acts of racism against Afghans,
especially against Hazaras, are by no means recent. In a context of
political, economic, and social crisis, this racism leads to acts that
can only be described as fascist.
It should also be noted that the issue of Afghan workers and the racism
they face is slowly beginning to be raised in society, especially in
left-wing intellectual circles.
The regime, long incapable of guaranteeing the population a basic living
standard, has sought to ease the burden of the state. It has found a
solution by expelling Afghan immigrant families.
To do this, however, he needed the cooperation of society: the war
provided him with the ideal nationalist pretext.
During the Twelve-Day War, Iranians of all political persuasions were
shocked. They saw the myth of the regime's military might dissolve, and
the regime revealed itself to be extremely vulnerable to its enemy. They
hoped the situation could evolve in their favor, but they also worried
about their own safety. Thus, once the bombing of cities ended, they
began to show solidarity with the regime.
How? The regime sought scapegoats to justify its failure, and found them
among the poorest in Iranian society: Afghan workers. It hunted them
down in their workplaces, in their homes, and even in hospitals. Most
Iranians don't believe the regime's completely fabricated story about
the Afghans, but they nonetheless effectively helped it by supporting
their mass expulsion.
An estimated five to six million Afghan workers labor in Iran for
starvation wages. The regime has managed to expel between one and two
million of them, in appalling conditions.
There were also some deaths in detention camps, where Afghan workers
were held for days without food or water before being sent back to
Afghanistan.
Iran's entrepreneurial middle class is well aware of the economic value
of this cheap labor. However, the regime is so concerned about its own
future that it cannot assess the damage this bourgeois productive sector
will suffer in the medium term.
Furthermore, the economic situation of the Iranian working class is so
dire that the regime is convinced that, sooner or later, they will
accept replacing it with immigrant labor, settling for miserable wages
in hard, low-paying jobs.
In addition to the alarming material situation of Iranians, there are
also water and energy shortages, right?
Yes, but before answering this question, I'd like to provide some
figures to better understand the economic desperation of the working
class. A working-class family of four needs about 48 million tomans to
survive in an expensive city like Tehran, while the current salary of a
worker doesn't exceed 14 million tomans, or less than $100 a month.
The threat of war and embargo further aggravates the condition of this
class, but also increasingly impoverishes the middle class, to the point
that some of its strata are no longer able to reproduce themselves as such.
Regarding the electricity shortage, experts believe it's due to the
regime's failure to invest in renovating production facilities. There
are numerous leaks in the networks, whether water, gas, electricity,
etc. I don't have figures, but apparently a lot of bitcoin is being
produced in Iran, a sort of cryptocurrency-based gimmick to circumvent
embargoes. The result: daily power outages.
It's important to note, however, that these outages don't affect all
Iranians equally: residents of smaller towns and villages are even more
deprived of electricity than those in larger cities or wealthy
neighborhoods. By implementing this measure, the regime is attempting to
reduce the risk of uprisings in major cities.
Regarding water shortages, it's important to note that Iran has been
suffering from a drought for about five years, but this isn't the only
cause: poor water resource management is also a factor. And when it
comes to water scarcity, it's not a temporary phenomenon. Iran's major
historic cities are now threatened by this problem. In Isfahan, for
example, the groundwater is subsiding. Why? Because groundwater has been
tapped for agriculture, in order to realize one of the regime's great
dreams: achieving food independence. On the other side of the country,
in the northwest, Lake Orumia, Iran's largest, has been drained by dams.
The consequence is that in a few years, major cities will be directly
affected by the salt carried by the wind, drying out everything in its
path (this phenomenon is already underway). It is difficult to imagine
the number of rivers and ponds drained, directly or indirectly, for
direct material interests taken advantage of by the economic mafia of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: draining a pond to exploit the
oil or minerals found nearby, for example.
A few years ago, during a protest movement, a mullah declared: " We will
not leave. But if we leave, we will leave you scorched earth ."[Editor's
note:]I personally fear that they may carry out this plan!
And what could prevent the mullahs from realizing that plan?
Ah, what a sacred question! Truly, the fight will not end until we find
the answer to this question: what to do?
In a climate of war, where the regime arrests hundreds of people under
the pretext of being Israeli spies, and several have been hanged for
this reason, there are still protests here and there. There was one
recently in Baluchistan, which was immediately and bloodily repressed.
Pensioners gather every week to demand a pension increase, even though
they are not immune to the violence of the repressive forces, despite
their age. In Shiraz, people took to the streets to protest water and
electricity shortages; they were dispersed and immediately arrested. In
some villages, residents are blocking roads to protest the water shortage.
In the labor movement, we can cite the struggle of the workers at the
Arak aluminum plant, who have been on strike for over fifty days.
Something unprecedented, as far as I know, also happened: after a few
weeks, instead of receiving a response to their demands, those workers
found themselves threatened with dismissal and arrest by the political
police, VEVAK[the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic
Republic of Iran; editor's note]. Some of them then went on hunger
strike, refusing even to drink water.
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