Modern wars, in addition to causing loss of human life, physical and psychological impairment, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the collapse of essential services, and the spread of poverty, have an enormous impact on natural ecosystems and, excluding "death factories," a depressive effect on economic activity. Considering this last consequence, one might consider it possible to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions responsible for the climate crisis.
This is not the case; in fact, the opposite is true. Although states are reluctant to provide official data on emissions generated by the military sector, both during peacetime and wartime, we must remember that, according to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), starting with the Paris Agreement (COP21), states must submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Since COP26 in Glasgow, a request has been made for the military sector's share to be explicitly included. This request remains a wishful thinking, given that such "accounting" depends on a voluntary commitment, which is obviously disregarded by the very states that invest the most in armaments.According to the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), wars are responsible for 5.5% of annual global greenhouse gas emissions.
If the world's armed forces were a country, this percentage would constitute the fourth-largest carbon footprint in the ranking of nations.
In the report presented at COP30 Belem, CEOBS provided some estimates that illustrate the scale of the problem. In the three years since the invasion of Ukraine, the conflict has produced 237 million tons of CO2(e) equivalent, with an estimated "climate damage" of $43 billion. Operations in the Palestinian territories after October 7 have generated over 31 million tons of CO2(e) in the first fifteen months.
Meanwhile, global military spending has continued to grow, reaching $2.7 trillion by 2024. Furthermore, according to CEOBS, countries in the Global North are investing 30 times more in their military than in international climate finance. European political choices also fit into this context.
The "ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030" plan envisages an increase in EU military spending of over EUR800 billion by 2030. CEOBS estimates that this increase could generate up to 218 million tons of additional CO2(e) annually, with associated "climate damage" of up to $298 billion.
The estimated carbon footprint of the armed forces includes two types: one is "operational" emissions, i.e., related to the fuel burned by military vehicles, aircraft, ships, and offices for heating, cooling, lighting, and so on; the other contribution is "embodied" emissions from the production of all military vehicles and equipment, including tanks, guns, missiles, and munitions. By adding together "operational" emissions, "embodied" emissions, and other emissions indirectly due to the activities of the armed forces, both in peacetime and wartime, we obtain so-called "consumed emissions": these constitute the military sector's carbon footprint.
According to a study published in Nature, if the United States military were a nation, it would be the 54th largest emitter globally, with more than 40 million metric tons of CO2(e). The emissions of the British armed forces are much smaller, but still indicative, with approximately 2.7 million metric tons of CO2e in 2018.
It has been estimated that the EU's military carbon footprint in 2019 was approximately 24.8 million metric tons of CO2e (Italy contributed 8%). The data refers to a period of so-called "peacetime."
Approximately 60% of all global greenhouse gas emissions come from just ten countries: China, the United States, India, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Japan, Iran, Canada, and Saudi Arabia; with the exception of Indonesia, the others rank among the top twenty countries in terms of military spending. A few concrete examples can provide a point of comparison: for example, fuel consumption during the Iraq war may have released more than 250 million tons of CO2(e) between 2003 and 2011, equivalent to three-quarters of Italy's CO2 emissions for 2021.
A recent study by Ukraine's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources estimates that the direct emissions from the conflict in its first 12 months amounted to 120 million tons of CO2(e), equal to those of Belgium in the same period (the carbon footprint of just one year of war). A study by the Guardian found that the long-term climate cost of the destruction, cleanup, and reconstruction of Gaza could exceed 31 million tons of CO2(e). This figure would be greater than the annual greenhouse gas emissions of Costa Rica and Estonia combined in 2023.
A comprehensive calculation, therefore, cannot be limited to the sum of the "operational" and "embodied" components, but must also include those emissions indirectly resulting from wars. For example, the need to set up a refugee camp, in addition to requiring changes in land use, certainly requires the provision of food, water, and shelter to civilians affected by the conflict, with particularly high fuel consumption, both for logistics and to power the generators that provide electricity. All this without considering that displaced persons themselves, with their cross-border movements, contribute to increased emissions. In this sense, we can argue that the humanitarian sector also has a significant carbon footprint.
The use of explosive weapons in populated areas creates enormous levels of destruction, with a significant impact on global warming because it leads to further CO2 emissions resulting from debris movement, the remediation of contaminated areas, and the reconstruction of settlements. Simply put, solid waste management is also disrupted. Waste left on the streets leads to the proliferation of informal landfills, with high emissions and open-air burning of waste.
In natural environments, war activities can trigger forest fires that increase emissions not only in the immediate context of war, but also extend their effects into the following decades, depending on the time needed for new trees to grow and perform similar carbon sequestration as in the previous period. In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the consequences of forest fires caused by kamikaze missiles and drones in the first 12 months of the war are estimated at nearly 18 million tons of CO2(e).
During conflicts, damage to the distribution network and less timely maintenance inevitably increase methane gas leaks, a factor that can be significant, as methane has a global warming potential 28 times greater than that of CO2. If we then consider acts of sabotage such as those affecting the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines, which released a staggering 14.6 million tons of CO2e into the atmosphere, the consequences are even more evident.
No less significant among the emissions indirectly attributable to the conflict are those caused by the fact that NATO airliners, no longer allowed to fly over Russia, are forced to take much longer routes between Europe and the Far East, resulting in 12 million tons of additional CO2 emissions. Similarly, the interruption of pipeline supplies in favor of transporting liquefied gas via tankers over much longer distances further increases emissions.
The list of consequences could probably be continued, considering other specific cases, but I believe there is already sufficient evidence to demonstrate that militarism, rearmament, and war also play a harmful role in the climate crisis.
MarTa
QualEnergia September-October 2023
https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SGR
CEOBS_Estimating_Global_MIlitary_GHG_Emissions.pdf
https://geobites.org/how-much-is-war-fueling-the-climate-crisis/
https://rivistapaginauno.it/stima-delle-emissioni-globali-di-gas-serra-del-comparto-militare/
https://umanitanova.org/clima-di-guerra-stiamo-freschi-il-taccuino-della-crisi-climatica/
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Link: (en) Italy, FAI, Umanita Nova #2-26 - War Climate. We're in the Cold - The Climate Crisis Notebook (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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