Before delving into the analysis of Yemen's position in the Middle Eastern landscape and defining the roles of various regional and international actors, we would like to emphasize that the presence of large tribal confederations (Hashed, Bakil, and Houthis) and the division between the two currents of Islam (Sunni and Shia), while characteristic of this country's complex past and recent history, are insufficient to explain a conflict that has less to do with religious or tribal sectarianism and more to do with the competition for supremacy between two regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran).
The Yemeni civil war, which broke out in 2015 following the 2011 Arab Spring protests, has caused over 150,000 deaths (including tens of thousands of civilians), displaced more than 4.7 million people, left 2.5 million children under five suffering from acute malnutrition, and left over 18 million people without stable access to drinking water, especially in rural areas. Despite its severity, it receives little mainstream media coverage, making it difficult to find reliable information. To facilitate understanding the dynamics and causes of the civil war, let's take a brief historical overview of Yemen.
A bit of history
From the 16th to the 20th century, Yemen was part of the Ottoman Empire, with periods of Zaydi resistance. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, northern Yemen gained independence in 1918, forming the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen; in 1962, after a coup against Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the Yemen Arab Republic was proclaimed there.
In 1839, the British Empire occupied the port city of Aden, turning it into a colony. On November 30, 1967, under pressure from Egyptian-led insurrectionary forces, the British withdrew, and in 1970, the Marxist-Leninist regime of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), modeled on the Soviet bloc countries, was established.
Ali Abdullah Saleh seized power in the North in July 1978, following the assassination of President al-Ghashmi. On May 22, 1990, the reunified state, the Republic of Yemen, was born: Saleh became president and Ali Salim al-Bayd vice president. On May 21, 1994, Marxist-inspired southern officials and politicians proclaimed the secession of the internationally unrecognized southern region (the Democratic Republic of Yemen, with its capital in Aden); the attempt was crushed in approximately two months of fighting by government forces loyal to Saleh.
The Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011 with mass protests against corruption, youth unemployment and Saleh's thirty-year rule, culminating in an uprising that left thousands dead.
The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) agreement of November 23, 2011, and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) of March 2013 and January 2014 represent the two sequential phases of the post-Saleh transition. The agreement transferred power to Abd Rabbih Mansur Hadi for a two-year transition (elections in 2012), but failed to resolve divisions, allowing the rise of the Shiite militias Ansar Allah (Houthis).
On February 21, 2012, transitional presidential elections were held. Hadi, the only candidate, was elected with 99.8% of the vote, and on February 27, 2012, Saleh formally handed over power to Hadi. On January 22, 2015, following the advance of the Zaydi Houthi minority (who had taken Sana'a in 2014), Hadi and Prime Minister Khalid Bahah resigned, creating institutional chaos: Parliament did not formally approve them, and some southern regional administrations (such as Hadramaut and Shabwa) refused orders from the central government.
On February 21, 2015, Hadi left Sana'a for Aden, his native stronghold, revoking his resignation on television, condemning the Houthi coup, and reclaiming his role as constitutional president. He soon declared Aden the transitional capital. On March 26, 2015, to stop the Houthis, Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm, with approximately one hundred aircraft and the support of a coalition of ten Arab countries (Gulf, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Jordan). The operation aimed to restore Hadi (who had taken refuge in Riyadh), destroy Houthi equipment, and control Yemeni airspace.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has raised its voice in protest, urging Saudi Arabia to immediately halt its military intervention. In October 2015, Amnesty International released a report accusing Saudi Arabia of war crimes in Yemen, specifically the use of cluster bombs and bombings of schools and civilian targets, especially in the Houthi-controlled Sa'da governorate. On October 26 and December 2, Saudi Arabia bombed two Doctors Without Borders clinics in Sa'da and al-Hudaydah. In April 2016, Human Rights Watch denounced the use of US-made cluster bombs against the town of Mastaba in March, killing 107 civilians, including 25 children: the second-deadliest attack in Yemen. Throughout 2016, it became clear in the international press that Saudi Arabia was receiving significant aid in the form of weapons and money from Western countries (primarily the United States and Great Britain, but also Italy). According to the UN, nearly 9,400 Yemenis have been killed in the year since the Saudi attack began (March 2015), including 2,230 children, with another 16,000 injured.
Economic and social situation
With a population estimated at around 24 million people in 2011, Yemen is a young country: 46% of Yemenis are under the age of 15, while only 2.7% are over 65.
Yemen faces one of the world's most severe socioeconomic crises, exacerbated by more than a decade of civil war, political fragmentation, and external shocks such as droughts and floods due to climate change (Yemen is the third country most affected by the climate crisis in the world).
The impact of the economic crisis, exacerbated by rising prices, is depriving millions of people of access to food, clean water, and essential health services.
Eighty-two percent of the population lives in multidimensional poverty; 72.5% suffer from moderate or severe food insecurity (compared to 46% pre-2021), with 17-19.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 55% of children under five are chronically malnourished.
Forty percent of health facilities are either non-functioning or only partially functioning due to a lack of staff, funding, electricity, medicines, and adequate equipment and infrastructure. Millions of people do not receive adequate care, and Yemen has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the region due to severely limited reproductive health services, in addition to persistent cholera outbreaks.
Yemen's sources of income are fragmented by area of control. In the north, the Houthis dominate taxation on ports like Hodeidah and the trade in qat (a psychotropic plant). In the southeast, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist movement, controls 80% of Hadramaut's oil resources, exporting them to the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Asian markets; other revenues come from fishing. The recognized government draws resources from the Marib oil fields, but production has collapsed due to the war.
Agriculture remains the main source of income in Yemen, contributing 20-25% of GDP and employing over 50% of the workforce, with qat being the dominant crop (up to 10% of GDP, but causing water scarcity).
Unemployment in Yemen exceeds 40% (youth unemployment exceeds 50%), while the gross domestic product per capita in Yemen was recorded at 821.46 US dollars in 2024. GDP per capita in Yemen is equivalent to 7% of the world average.
In Yemen, employment is predominantly informal or subsistence-based. The forms of labor exploitation are diverse (forced sharecropping, debts for seeds and water, extortion for licenses, etc.) and pervasive. The exploiting class is dominated by local elites and armed militias (Houthis, STC, and tribes) who impose taxes on farmers, fishermen, and traders; they control ports and the distribution of humanitarian aid. Added to this are remittance and import intermediaries, known as kandaka (foreign exchange brokers), and brokers who retain 20% to 50% of remittances from the diaspora and food imports. Finally, landowners and urban elites monopolize water and land for the cultivation of qat, forcing farmers into sharecropping (a 70/30 split to their detriment) and often resort to child labor.
Women's employment in Yemen is dramatically limited by the civil war, patriarchal norms, and Houthi restrictions (a ban on movement without a mahram, a close relative, or husband), with a formal participation rate of less than 10% (compared to 30% pre-war) and female unemployment over 60%. Women are confined to subsistence agriculture (qat harvesting), informal textile production, and humanitarian aid roles, with wages of $10-30 per month; exclusion and propaganda prevail in Houthi areas, while in the South (STC/government), limited opportunities emerge in NGOs and fishing, but domestic violence and early marriage (a third of girls under 18) exacerbate the withdrawal from the labor market.
In Yemen, workers' struggles have historically been fragmented and repressed, with weak organization due to the lack of independent unions, intertwined with tribal and warlike dynamics. In South Yemen (1970-1986), the YCLU (Yemen Confederation of Labour Unions) coordinated strikes for wage increases against the "socialist" regime, obtaining welfare benefits but repressed after 1986; in 2011-2015, public employees (teachers, health workers) protested unpaid salaries with sit-ins in Sana'a and Aden under the JMP (Joint Meeting Parties). These protests were also repressed by the Houthis and Saleh. In the period 2020-2025, several spontaneous uprisings by workers and peasants spread, challenging the sheikhs (traditional leaders of a Yemeni tribe or tribal confederation), the Houthi militias, and the STC through informal committees, without national coordination.
The Arab Spring and the Civil War
The popular uprisings in Yemen in 2011 are part of the so-called Arab Spring that broke out in several countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East between late 2010 and early 2011 to protest against autocratic regimes in power, rampant corruption, and rising prices of basic goods.
Demonstrations against the Yemeni regime began on January 18 and spread across the country. The protests were marked by slogans against widespread poverty and for a change of government, represented by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been in power for twenty-two years.
In mid-February, the riots intensified with episodes of violence that caused the first victims, often due to the clash between pro-government protesters and pro-democracy activists, who were repressed by the former.
Two of Yemen's most powerful tribal confederations, the Hashed and the Bakil, have announced their support for the anti-government protesters, while the Zaydis are the most significant component of the protest movement.
Following the events in many Middle Eastern countries, March 1st is also the "Day of Rage" in Yemen, in memory of the twenty-four people killed in the demonstrations.
The demonstrations continued throughout the months of March, April and May with firefights and clashes between rioters and the army that caused 1,586 deaths, other estimates speak of 2-3 thousand deaths.
The first agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which envisaged Saleh's departure, the formation of a national unity government, and presidential elections after two months, was not reached.
On June 3, President Saleh was the victim of an assassination attempt and fled to Saudi Arabia. On June 27, still hospitalized in Saudi Arabia, he announced his return to Yemen, promising early elections, a coalition government, and institutional reform to strengthen parliamentary powers.
But, as is happening in other countries affected by the Arab Spring, in Yemen too the protests are being diverted by the economic and geopolitical interests of regional and international powers and are turning into a proxy war.
Civil war breaks out
Observers widely identify the beginning of the conflict as March 26, 2015, the day the Saudi-led Arab Coalition began bombing territories occupied by the Houthis, who, backed by Iran, had seized power in Sana'a in January 2015.
The 2015 conflict represents only the culmination of previous crises in Yemen, the poorest country in the MENA region, dating back to the North-South unification of 1990, perceived by southerners as an annexation by Ali Abdullah Saleh (YAR president since 1978), who imposed a "northern" system of power, marginalizing the "southerners" from public jobs, army and energy revenues (80% of the deposits were located in the South). The 1994 civil war consolidated Saleh, but suburbs such as Sa'da (Houthi) rebelled with six battles (2004-2010), while in the South al-Hirak was born (2007) for autonomy against the exclusion of the South. Saleh maintained tribal balances with tribal chiefs and tribal militias who guaranteed local governance and services, informally replacing the State.
The war, which continues with varying degrees of intensity, pits the Shiite Ansar Allah militia, backed by Iran, against the legitimate government, backed by the United States, Europe, and Saudi Arabia, on the other. This war is focused on territorial issues, but it is also part of the region's geopolitical balance.
The Houthis have also conquered significant areas of Yemeni territory from an economic standpoint. In 2023, thanks to a brief truce, it seemed that a partial resolution to the conflict would be achieved. However, after the Hamas pogrom of October 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent attack on the Gaza Strip, the Houthis changed strategy, resuming military operations against Western ships transiting the Red Sea (Bab el-Mandeb) and attacking the State of Israel.
These attacks were followed by reactions from the United States and Israel. American sanctions to contain the Houthis are worsening the humanitarian crisis, where the first victims are civilians, women, and children.
The Yemeni conflict in 2025 accentuated the process of denationalization, and in place of a unified state, three irreconcilable centers of power emerged: North Yemen (Houthis), South Yemen (Al-Islah/STC), and Hadhramaut. The political situation in Hadhramaut is highly unstable and fragmented, marked by growing competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for regional influence, manifested in direct clashes between local forces (such as the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, backed by Riyadh) and militias aligned with the Emirates, particularly over control of oil resources (PetroMasila). The region is experiencing strong political tension, with the fragmentation reflecting the broader Yemeni crisis, divided between the Houthis in the north and the recognized government supported by the Arab coalition in the south, creating a power vacuum into which external actors and jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda can insert themselves.
The Yemeni chessboard in 2025: a fragmented country
The conflict that began in 2015 has acted as a powerful catalyst for disintegration, transforming Yemen into a mosaic of local micro-powers and foreign influences. As 2025 draws to a close, the national framework appears pulverized, replaced by a system where political legitimacy derives not from the ballot box, but from territorial control and the support of regional partners.
The crisis of traditional institutions has reached its peak. The Presidential Guidance Government (PLC), successor to the Hadi presidency, is in a state of almost total paralysis. Delegitimized in the eyes of the population due to its inability to guarantee basic services and salaries, the government resides symbolically in Riyadh, while on the ground, the regular army struggles to maintain even its historic strongholds. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement has consolidated a veritable "Northern State" centered in Sana'a. While officially awaiting negotiations for national unity, the Houthis maintain an aggressive posture: with over 20,000 Saudi soldiers still massed at the border, the group continues to threaten Marib's energy areas, using anti-Saudi sentiment as a social glue.
Meanwhile, the traditional forces have split into factions: the GPC (General People's Congress), Saleh's historic party, is now divided into four branches (Sana'a, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi), but its most operational wing is led by Tareq Saleh, who controls the coast of Taiz through the Joint Western Command; Al-Islah, the branch linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, while remaining the official government's main ally, is in retreat after losing ground in Shabwa and Marib, squeezed between the Houthi advance and the ambitions of the southern separatists.
The real disruption occurred in December 2025 with the Southern Transitional Council's (STC) "Promising Future" offensive. Militarily supported by the United Arab Emirates, the STC consolidated control over Aden, Socotra, and, above all, Hadhramaut. This movement no longer seeks merely autonomy, but also direct management of resources: control of PetroMasila and 80% of the oil reserves has given the secessionists the financial leverage to refuse any withdrawal order from the central government, pushing hard for the restoration of the Southern State.
Yemen has become an open-air laboratory for Middle Eastern ambitions.
Saudi Arabia is desperately seeking an honorable exit from Operation Decisive Storm, while maintaining a strong defensive military presence on the border to prevent Houthi infiltration.
Iran has achieved maximum results with minimum effort: through technological support (drones and missiles) to the Houthis, it has projected its influence as far as the Red Sea, disrupting global sea lanes.
The United Arab Emirates are the true "architects" of the South, exercising de facto power over strategic coasts and ports, ensuring control of maritime trade routes.
Oman and Qatar, on the other hand, play a balancing role, with Muscat engaged in diplomatic mediation and Doha continuing to financially support the Islah network.
Beyond regional borders, Yemen's stability remains a global priority for one reason: the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which 12% of global trade passes. The United States, while maintaining its focus on counterterrorism against the remnants of AQAP and the Islamic State (now marginalized in the mountainous areas), is committed to containing Iranian influence. The UN, hampered by the reciprocal vetoes of Russia and China (interested in port access and arms sales), is limited to managing a humanitarian emergency affecting 18 million people. Meanwhile, European powers like the United Kingdom and France maintain a difficult balance between condemning humanitarian disasters and remaining loyal to lucrative defense contracts with the Gulf monarchies.
By the end of 2025, Yemen is no longer a single conflict, but a juxtaposition of crises: a struggle for independence in the South, a theocratic resistance in the North, and a global chess game over oil routes. The national framework has vanished; what remains is a territory divided between warlords and regional protectorates.
Conclusions
And it is with this sad and severe final consideration that we are about to conclude our worrying analysis of the situation in question.
In any case, however, it is better to remember a few things first.
The opening words of this text should not be interpreted as a diminution of the role and weight the superstructure exerts in the country. It goes without saying that when determining who and what (i.e., what their ownership) are the fighters vying for supremacy in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran on the other), it is difficult to ignore the fact that we are referring to Sunnis and Shiites, respectively. To conclude, therefore, that this has absolutely no impact (to use a euphemism) on production relations, social relations, trade relations, geostrategic aims and interests represents the triumph of axe analysis, political confusionism, and the crudest conceivable vision.
The brief observations made above regarding the "trade union sphere" and workers' struggles, especially in the context of the Arab Spring, leave no doubt about the context in which the exploited Yemenis move, operate, and mobilize (at a very high price!) And even what is happening these days-a renewed (though not unprecedented) tension between the "masters of the ironworks," the opulent states of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (compared to the careful silence of their powerful neighbors Qatar and Oman)-does not bode well for all the exploited in the region.
We conclude, firmly and proudly, by recalling the formula that only those who cultivate laziness, superficiality, and perfect bad faith can attempt to dismiss, mock, or label as lyrical on the one hand and banal on the other, it does not matter: the Class, in the absence of Class Consciousness, ignores the Class Struggle.
This is precisely where the core of the discussion lies.
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https://alternativalibertaria.fdca.it/wpAL/
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Link: (en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #41 - Yemen: A Fragmented Country - Lino Roveredo and Virgilio Caletti (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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