Emerging from the post-election crisis linked to the usual irregularities in the vote (1), Paul Biya's regime wants to return to routine business and is doing everything possible to normalize the situation. But, even according to his close associates, the eighth seven-year term will not be a smooth ride for the world's oldest leader (Prime Minister from 1975 to 1982 and President of the Republic since then; he is 92 years old). Not only is the opposition organizing to learn from the repression, but the Cameroonian government still faces several challenges.
The regime is continuing its policy of collective punishment against the demonstrators and rioters of last October. According to various opposition and human rights organizations, hundreds of people are still imprisoned. Among them, 148 are being held and prosecuted by the Yaoundé military court for "spreading false news, unlawful assembly, group rebellion, and lack of identity cards." A group of lawyers (Citizen Defense) is defending these prisoners and denouncing the legal incompetence of this "court," and therefore all the ongoing proceedings against them. Their trial has been postponed until March. Furthermore, according to this group, only the Yaoundé court is currently "operating" in the country: there are reportedly no other proceedings initiated against defendants from other cities - a sign that the government is stalling.
On the social front, revolts periodically erupt in Cameroon, on the eve of or after presidential elections, due to Biya's clinging to power through force, corruption, and systematic election rigging, but also and especially for social reasons. We saw this, for example, in 2008, when riots (violently repressed) erupted against the "constitutional revision" sought by the President to retain power and against the rising cost of living linked to oil prices.
Two recent movements are worth noting:
First, the general strike by teachers in state universities, which took place between January 7 and 14, 2026, to protest salary delays and arrears, the non-payment (for years) of research grants, and more broadly, working and living conditions.
Second, the struggle led by the Union of Seasonal Workers in the Sugarcane Industry. This union defends the interests of seasonal workers employed by Sosucam (Cameroon Sugar Company), a subsidiary majority-owned by the French company Castel, which has been operating in the center of the country since the 1960s. A strike began in late January 2025 against working conditions and for a wage increase - sugarcane cutters currently earn 85 euros per month. The initially peaceful movement quickly gained momentum, spreading to other sugar production units within the company and to other fields, with nearly 4,000 strikers. However, management then decided to recruit (some say by force) in order to break the strike, according to testimonies from strikers and the local population. The movement escalated, turning into riots and clashes with law enforcement. Seasonal workers burned 980 hectares of fields (a loss of 7 million euros for the company). Police fired live ammunition at demonstrators and strikers, killing one. A police officer also died from his injuries. After a two-week work stoppage, the company deigned to increase wages by... 1.5 euros. But, faced with the sluggish resumption of work, it was forced to launch a recruitment campaign for 600 agricultural worker positions. Even today, the tension is palpable within the company.
Dying in Ukraine
The Russian army is also recruiting in Africa to address its manpower shortage for its war in Ukraine. For several years, the Kremlin has been rebuilding ties and concluding economic and military agreements with African states.
According to the investigation "The Business of Despair" by the organization All Eyes On Wagner, hundreds of Cameroonians have ended up migrating to Russia. Of the 20,000 foreign fighters reinforcing its army, more than 1,400 are reportedly African (other sources mention 5,000). Cameroonians are said to constitute the largest contingent (after Egyptians), with 335 fighters; and they would also be the most affected, with nearly a hundred deaths in combat.
While some of these soldiers are trained military personnel volunteering to supplement their pay, there are also civilians caught in the trap. Russian employment agencies lure them with the promise of labor migration for a better life; but once they arrive, the trap snaps shut: they are forced to enlist in the army, or, in the case of women, to work in factories manufacturing combat drones.
Members of the Sugarcane Seasonal Workers' Union
The Situation in the Far North
Since 2013, the conflict between the federal government of Nigeria and the jihadist group Boko Haram has spilled over into the northernmost region of Cameroon. This region borders Borno - the state where Boko Haram originated - so it is not surprising that the group is present there. Several factors facilitated its establishment:
First, the actions of the Nigerian military forces, which, by driving Boko Haram from its base, naturally led it to retreat to this region of Cameroon.
Second, the fact that the central government in Yaoundé has little interest in this very rural and arid territory, which, along with the Northwest region (which we will discuss later), is the poorest in the country and has always been a space for trade and trafficking of all kinds (livestock, weapons, etc.), with also community tensions related to issues of land access and livestock farming.
Finally, in recent years, groups and segments of the population have organized themselves there against poverty and precarious living conditions by resorting to banditry; and, even according to the authorities, it is difficult to know whether certain actions are attributable to this form of social banditry or to Boko Haram. In any case, the number of acts of terror perpetrated by this group (kidnappings, assassinations, targeted attacks) has considerably decreased since the alliance between the military forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. However, as opponents of the regime point out, the social causes of the conflict in this region persist, and the state is not so much acting against Boko Haram as against "forgotten" populations.
The War in the Northwest and Southwest Regions (NOSO)
In 2016, a new conflict erupted in Cameroon, one that is reminiscent of the lost war of independence (1955-1971), and which stems from the partitioning of the country after the First World War.
In 1919, the French and British powers divided the possessions of defeated Germany between them. Three years later, they were mandated by the League of Nations (the precursor to the UN) to administer Cameroon. France took possession of four-fifths of its territory; the United Kingdom received only the remainder - but in fact, British Cameroons also included three states that now belong to Nigeria.
Each power then imposed its colonial model within its sphere of influence. The United Kingdom implemented indirect rule, relying on local elites to manage the Anglophone regions. However, given the size of French Cameroon, Francophones represent 80% of the country's total population. Moreover, since the reunification of Cameroon in 1961, and even more so since the end of federalism in 1972, political and administrative power has resided in Yaoundé and is therefore predominantly Francophone.
The English-speaking part of Cameroon finally rose up in 2016, outraged by the contempt and social relegation it endured. A strike movement launched by lawyers and teachers was quickly joined by unemployed youth denouncing their marginalization. The sectoral demands of a segment of the petty bourgeoisie transformed into more structural demands (for example, a return to federalism or an end to discrimination against Anglophones and their languages). There were demonstrations and riots in Bamenda and Buea, the main cities. The government, as it so often does, resorted to force. It remained inflexible and unresponsive to the demands. Ironically, the Prime Minister who led the repression was none other than Issa Tchiroma, the candidate who opposed Paul Biya in the last elections. Tchiroma had leaders of the movement arrested and convicted of terrorism. He shut down the internet for three months - this politically motivated shutdown is one of the longest in the world.
In response, a faction of Anglophone activists turned to armed struggle, and in 2017, declared the independence of the Anglophone region under the name Ambazonia. However, the Cameroonian army established a lasting presence in the region and intensified its operations against separatists or those perceived as such. Attacks were carried out against these military forces, against loyalist politicians, and even, during a sporting event (the Race of Hope), against civilian populations.
In 2019, the central government launched a "grand national dialogue" to resolve the "crisis," but nothing was accomplished. Although this conflict receives very little attention compared to the fight against Boko Haram, it is significant because it has already displaced tens of thousands of people (in Cameroon and Nigeria), and has resulted in nearly 7,000 deaths and over a thousand prisoners.
Alfano
1. See Alternating Current No. 355 (December 2025).
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4661
_________________________________________
Link: (en) France, OCL CA #358 - CAMEROON - A Regime That Holds On Despite Everything (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten