Am 12. Juli 2025 wurde das "Bougival-Abkommen" unterzeichnet, das von Macron und einem Großteil der Medien als "historisch" gefeiert wurde: Alle politischen Gruppierungen in Neukaledonien hatten sich angeblich auf die Gründung eines "kaledonischen Staates innerhalb Frankreichs" geeinigt. Doch am 9. August lehnte die Kanakische und Sozialistische Nationale Befreiungsfront (FLNKS) den Text ab, und da er zunehmend Kritik hervorrief, musste Macron neue Verhandlungen ansetzen, um ihn zu "präzisieren". Die FLNKS verweigerte die Teilnahme und lehnte auch das daraus hervorgegangene "Élysée-Oudinot-Abkommen" vom 19. Januar 2026 ab. Die Regierung will dieses Abkommen dennoch durch verschiedene Referenden in Verfassungsrecht umwandeln, doch die Sozialistische Partei (PS) hat nun angekündigt, es nicht zu unterstützen. Weitere Überraschungen sind möglich.
Since the May 2024 riots, the political class, business leaders, and unions in New Caledonia have been clamoring for financial aid from the French state to rectify the archipelago's economic situation. On December 5, 2025, Prime Minister Lecornu dangled before them the prospect of an "economic refounding pact" that would be funded by the disbursement of 2.2 billion euros over five years... but he made this windfall conditional on the adoption by New Caledonian elected officials of an austerity budget for 2026 and a commitment to implement structural reforms in public finances (1). Therefore, the government of New Caledonia decided almost unanimously on January 7, 2026, to reduce pensions and eliminate bridges in the civil service, yet another increase in electricity, etc., as well as to have all Caledonian public spending reviewed by commissions under the aegis of the State.
The inside story of the new agreement
On December 15, Lecornu announced he was abandoning the idea of a "citizen consultation" on the "Bougival Agreement," scheduled for March 15, 2026. Since his government would not have had enough votes in Parliament to pass the law organizing this consultation (2), Macron preferred to invite the six political groups represented in the New Caledonian Congress to discuss "Bougival" again on January 16 in Paris.
On January 13, the UC-FLNKS and Nationalists group, led by the Caledonian Union (UC, a historical component of the FLNKS), declared it would not participate. The New Caledonian delegations that signed the "Elysée-Oudinot Agreement" on January 19 were therefore those of the Loyalists and the Rally-The Republicans (anti-independence), Caledonia Together and Oceanian Awakening (centrists), and UNI-Palika.
This latter group, led by Palika (the other historical component of the independence movement) and which, according to its own statements, "definitively" left the FLNKS in November 2025, has little to celebrate in having accepted the "Bougival" and "Elysée-Oudinot" agreements, as its voice was hardly heard during the negotiations. On the other hand, with the latest agreement, the anti-independence movement has undoubtedly obtained more than it hoped for: considerable sums to revive the Caledonian economy and institutions; and the reaffirmation that the Caledonian electorate would be expanded. The means for the wealthy Southern Province, with its anti-independence leadership, to dissociate itself from the "Kanak provinces" (North and Islands)...
On the eve of the negotiations, Nicolas Metzdorf, leader of the Loyalists and Caledonian MP, had threatened the French State with sedition if it did not produce "precise texts, accompanied by a clear timetable for review and adoption by Parliament": "We will radically change our strategy and turn against our own State using all the means at our disposal." He was heard: in the "Elysée-Oudinot agreement," there is no mention of "Kanaky" or "Kanaky - New Caledonia" - only "New Caledonia" is referred to. The signatories "commit themselves, along with the State, to promoting a process of reconciliation of memories, both those of the Kanak people and those of other communities, in order to heal the wounds of the past and those, more recent, stemming from the violence of May 2024." Not only is Kanak identity mentioned indirectly, by a simple reference to the Nouméa Accord (which discusses it at length in its preamble), but a "Caledonian identity" is also linked to Kanak identity (similarly, "Caledonian nationality" is accompanied by French nationality). The rest of the text follows suit (see the box "Elysée-Oudinot in brief").
At the end of 2025, New Caledonia nearly fell under state control because it had borrowed heavily from the state to finance part of its operations-which is generally prohibited-and it had a huge deficit. But an arrangement was reached: the New Caledonian government used the debt rescheduling mechanism (over ten years), with the state assuring it that it would not have to repay any loans in 2026 and 2027, and that its loans would gradually be converted into subsidies. This is what the "Elysée-Oudinot" agreement allows.
"ELYSEE-OUDINOT" IN BRIEF
The referendums on self-determination provided for in the Nouméa Accord having "deeply divided New Caledonia," the new agreement states, the focus will now be on "the permanent possibility of transferring the powers still held by the State within a framework organized with it, according to procedures guaranteeing a spirit of consensus, the requirement of reinforced majorities, and the approval of a majority of Caledonians." If the State were to one day transfer all sovereign powers to New Caledonia, the latter would not automatically attain "full sovereignty" (as stipulated in the Nouméa Accord): "The partners would meet to draw the consequences for the relationship between the State of New Caledonia and France."
The text provides no information on the question of the electorate. Therefore, the "Bougival" agreement still applies on this point - namely, extending voting rights to native-born citizens and voters with ten years of residency in New Caledonia (fifteen years for the 2026 provincial elections).
The territory's "economic attractiveness" is the main focus of the new agreement, both for the French state and for New Caledonian business leaders, and this task largely falls to the provinces: an organic law will establish "the implementation of an effective mechanism for transferring powers from New Caledonia to the provinces, at their initiative," to provide them with "resources tailored to their responsibilities[such as water, the road network, or maritime transport], guaranteeing their financial autonomy"; similarly, they will be able to levy taxes.
Finally, the economic and social component that completes the agreement includes Lecornu's "refounding pact": creation of free trade zones, corporate tax exemptions for SMEs, public investments in sectors such as tourism, etc. Regarding the nickel sector (4,000 jobs), whose structural crisis has been exacerbated by the closure of sites since 2024, the government will grant new loans to the three main operators, and it will try to convince the European Union to buy the Caledonian ore - on the condition that this sector is transformed according to its instructions.
Down with the FLNKS!
On January 8, 2026, the UC-FLNKS and Nationalists group submitted a proposed resolution to the Caledonian Congress calling for the immediate development of a social emergency plan based on a broad partnership between the State, Caledonian institutions, local authorities, civil society, and economic stakeholders. In addition to measures aimed at strengthening food aid and access to healthcare, the plan proposed converting the "Covid and riot loans" granted by the State to New Caledonia into grants and rebuilding the territory's economy with international donors and the French Development Agency. This was enough to satisfy employers, unions, and political parties, yet the Congress adopted the resolution by only one vote - 20 in favor (UC-FLNKS, Caledonia Together, and Oceanian Awakening), 19 against (The Loyalists and The Rally), and 8 abstentions (UNI-Palika). Because the debates quickly veered towards an explosive topic: the political responsibility for the May 2024 riots, which anti-independence groups attribute to the UC (which has never explicitly acknowledged or condemned the "abuses") and to the CCAT, partly composed of members from its ranks (3).
In order to appease the FLNKS, the State first ensured that the CCAT members imprisoned in mainland France in the aftermath of the riots on serious charges were released with somewhat lighter charges. This is how the current president of the FLNKS, Christian Tein (a member of the CCAT and the UC), returned to the archipelago (4).
Demonstration in Nouméa, on November 24, 2023, for the arrival of Darmanin.
But the FLNKS persisted in its opposition to Macron's plans: on January 21, it published a statement entitled "A pseudo-agreement imposed without the Kanak people cannot commit the future of our country or establish democracy." It reads: "Elysée-Oudinot" is endorsing "a power grab by the State (...) by blocking the so-called Bougival project," and is "contradictory to the Nouméa Accord and United Nations resolutions." "To claim to resolve a colonial conflict without the indigenous people concerned, without their customary authorities, without their national liberation movement (...) is a charade." The FLNKS also points to a "hyper-provincialization that is dangerous for all inhabitants, (...) particularly in the North and Islands provinces, because it will introduce a breach of equity between citizens (...) and reinforce the already excessive inequalities." "Depending on the province where one lives, one would no longer benefit from the same rights or the same services: schools, roads, social assistance, employment." He denounces "potential serious security risks" linked to the creation of provincial police forces. This new agreement is "clear economic blackmail," "an attempt at political buying," and-with the "unfreezing" of the electoral roll-"the end of any prospect of independence."
This stance by the FLNKS has unleashed hatred from the New Caledonian media, which are largely anti-independence (see the following article). La Dépêche de Nouméa, for example, described it as "a militant elite that claims to speak on behalf of a people without bothering to listen to them," and that "does not represent the entirety of the indigenous population" since other pro-independence movements exist, in particular UNI-Palika. As proof, according to this media outlet: in a poll commissioned in June 2025 from the Quid Novi institute, 52% of New Caledonians placed daily life (health, purchasing power, employment, security) at the top of their priorities, far ahead of the institutional future (29%); and, "among people of customary civil status, this trend is even more pronounced" (56% and 17%) because Kanaks constitute the majority of the poor on the archipelago (see the box "Kanak youth..."). Also according to this poll, "immediate independence[is]a minority position" among pro-independence supporters: "47% of voters who voted 'yes' to independence in 2020 say they are opposed to immediate independence - 57% among people of customary civil status."
The same media outlets highlight the isolation of the FLNKS, supported only by LFI in France and by the UN internationally, while the "Elysée-Oudinot" agreement was signed by "approximately 75%" of elected officials in New Caledonia. They attribute Tjibaou's re-election as president of the UC (5), at its 56th congress in Maré (January 23-25), either to a harsher rhetoric he adopted "to get re-elected," or to a weakness of character - he allowed himself to be "radicalized by the extremist groups that call the shots" within the FLNKS.
Kanak youth
in the crosshairs of New Caledonian media
While sometimes feigning a certain "empathy" for young Kanaks, La Dépêche de Nouméa, La Voix du Caillou, and other anti-independence websites implicitly blame them for both the riots and acts of delinquency "linked to various addictions." They seize upon the slightest news item to highlight the rise of this delinquency "even" in the pro-independence provinces: "Insecurity no longer spares any territory (...). In Lifou, as elsewhere, republican order rests on vigilance, cooperation, and firmness, far removed from rhetoric of denial."
It is fortunate, then, that 2,600 gendarmes and police officers are still stationed in this archipelago of 264,000 inhabitants-a ratio of 10 per 1,000, compared to 3.4 per 1,000 for mainland France, according to INSEE (the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).
The game is not over yet.
The Lecornian "economic refounding pact" is already being implemented in the archipelago. A "housing and urban renewal mission," composed of "three national experts," was launched at the High Commission on January 26th to rethink a social housing model that is "on its last legs," explains La Dépêche de Nouméa, "undermined by high vacancy rates, a surge in rent arrears, evictions, and dilapidated housing stock." The objective is "to restore public authority in areas where the State has withdrawn for too long" and where "trafficking and insecurity" prevail.
Those opposed to independence should not rejoice too soon, however, because the government's maneuvers to stifle the independence movement are already encountering obstacles.
Certainly, in order to obtain a fourth postponement of the provincial elections (which would allow the Caledonian electorate to "unfreeze" before the vote), Lecornu found a way to circumvent the Constitutional Council, which, on December 6, 2025, had set a deadline of "June 28[2026]at the latest": he included this postponement in the draft constitutional law on "Elysée-Oudinot," so that the Council's opinion would no longer be required. Certainly also, across all political affiliations except the FLNKS, Caledonian elected officials sent a joint letter to all members of parliament to convince them to approve this draft constitutional law. But a delegation from the FLNKS (including Tjibaou, Tein, and Senator Robert Xowie) met with the Assembly's political groups to achieve the opposite result (6)... And the Socialist Party (PS) has, in any case, just made the implementation of the "Elysée-Oudinot" agreement unlikely by deciding to vote against it in both chambers (if the government persists in wanting to postpone the provincial elections until the end of December) or to abstain (if it leaves them in June). In an opinion piece published by Le Monde on February 17, PS leaders deemed this text "fraught with threats and dangers"-particularly for its lack of precision regarding the new Caledonian state and how it might acquire its sovereign powers; for the further postponement of the provincial elections it provides for (the PS had, however, voted for this postponement in November 2025...); and because it "is not possible to leave the UC-FLNKS out" of the discussions to reach a "consensual and inclusive agreement."
Thus, the Socialist Party (PS) has derailed the very tight electoral calendar that the government had established for New Caledonia: the Senate will indeed examine the draft constitutional reform concerning this territory starting February 24 (7), and the text will likely reach the National Assembly on March 30... but the Assembly will not adopt it (LFI, the RN, and the PS are opposed). Therefore, on April 13, Parliament will not convene in Congress to confirm the adoption of the constitutional reform, and the people of New Caledonia will not be consulted on it in June or July. Finally, the economic component of the organic law may be discussed between September and November, but the date and the electoral roll for the provincial elections remain unknown at this time...
Furthermore, while the pro-independence movement's representation in New Caledonian institutions has weakened over the past two years (it successively lost the presidency of the government and that of the Congress[8]), it cannot be asserted, as the anti-independence movement does, that a portion of its electorate will abandon it in the municipal and provincial elections, and it remains to be seen to what extent its internal divisions will harm it. Over its four decades of existence, the FLNKS has experienced numerous internal crises and splits, notably due to the competition between an increasingly reformist Palika and an increasingly "radical" UC. For years, it lacked leadership, and it was difficult to determine which parties it truly encompassed... and yet it retained its image as "representative of the Kanak people" (9).
The UC has announced its intention to present lists in every municipality of the archipelago for the municipal elections. Tjibaou, invoking the "community of destiny" championed by the Nouméa Accord, proposed alliances with Palika or with the two other components of UNI (10). For its part, Palika seems keen to run joint lists with the UC or other pro-independence groups, depending on local circumstances. It remains to be seen whether these various forces will be able to reach an agreement despite their disagreements over the last two accords.
The UC's refusal to sign them could also cost it votes among its traditional electorate; but two recent events show that even the UNI-Palika alliance did not achieve unanimous support within its own ranks by signing them. On January 28, Paul Néaoutyine - a prominent figure in the Palika party and the long-serving leader of the Northern Province - publicly criticized the "hyper-provincialization" sought by the "Bougival Agreement" and its consequences ("It's going to be partition"), adding: "I'm not about to swallow the talk of continuity[with the Nouméa Accord]when there isn't any." Meanwhile, activists calling for the "neutralization of the Bougival Agreement" and the unification of pro-independence groups left UNI-Palika to create the "association" Unity of the People in Kanaky (UPK), which, on February 7, brought together 70 people in Koné and which may join the FLNKS.
Vanina, February 23, 2026
Notes
1. The future of this "pact" also depended on the 2026 state budget. This was adopted on February 2nd after Lecornu invoked Article 49.3 for the third time. However, the Socialist Party (PS) appealed to the Constitutional Council, which is due to issue its opinion on the text on March 6th.
2. The New Caledonian Congress had also adopted the principle of this consultation with very little enthusiasm: 19 votes in favor (the anti-independence parties), 14 against (the FLNKS), and 19 abstentions (the pro-independence parties UNI-Palika, and the centrist parties Calédonie Ensemble and Eveil Océanien).
3. This coordination unit for field actions was created in November 2023 by pro-independence activists from various parties to mobilize against the "unfreezing" of the electoral roll. See in particular the articles published in CA (no. 342 and following).
4. He remains under investigation for armed robbery as part of an organized gang, destruction of property as part of an organized gang, and conspiracy to commit crimes and offenses.
5. In the second round, he obtained 139 votes out of 200. Christian Tein also remained the UC's general commissioner.
6. At the same time, rallies were held, including in front of the High Commission in Nouméa, to support his initiative.
7. He is also expected to examine a draft constitutional law on Corsican autonomy in March or April.
8. He retains one member of parliament, Tjibaou.
9. This is also why, while careful not to upset Palika and deploring the "empty chair policy" adopted by the FLNKS, the Socialist Party is aligning itself with the latter's position.
10. The Progressive Union in Melanesia (UPM) and the National Union for Independence in Diversity (UNID).
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4655
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Link: (en) France, OCL CA #358 - NEUKALEDONIEN - Bedeutet das neue Abkommen das Ende der Unabhängigkeit? Wohl kaum... (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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