Over the past few decades, many countries have witnessed a rise of the far right. In France, the rise of the National Rally (RN) is attracting considerable attention as the presidential election approaches, as it has in previous elections, and its opponents (and their media supporters) frequently blame it for the rightward shift in society. However, this rightward shift is not limited to the RN's strong showing, particularly among the working class. It manifests itself in much different ways - doesn't the party's central theme, namely immigration, fuel the strengthening of security policies regardless of who is in power?
We will not delve into the more or less contentious debates surrounding the characterization of this rightward shift in society - fascism, fascization, new fascism... or not [1]? Drawing on recent studies focusing on either the RN vote or working-class communities, we will instead examine its connection to work, as the latter continues to have a significant impact on political stances and social relations [2]. Then - in the next Board meeting - we will try to draw some lessons from this with a view to real social change.Several commonly cited reasons shed light on the rightward shift of French society: with deindustrialization, "neoliberalism" has broken down work collectives and worker solidarity, destroyed the structures that fostered awareness of common interests among the proletariat, and, with the privatization of large sectors that belonged to the "public service," it has disintegrated the "welfare state"; promises of access to the "middle classes" through education have hardly diminished social reproduction; the impact that artificial intelligence will have on many professions worries the "middle classes"...
These phenomena, against a backdrop of planetary catastrophes (such as "climate change" or pandemics), contribute to establishing a climate of fear which, as always, translates into a demand for strong and repressive powers - when social anger and fear combine, they generate more resignation and submission than revolt - and into adherence to discourses that designate scapegoats (the National Rally's discourse, for example, holds immigrants or their descendants responsible for unemployment and insecurity).
Furthermore, the extreme rightward shift of many media outlets (with the formation of the Bolloré empire) and the rightward shift of the "mainstream" media produce a framing of information heavily biased in this direction and a sensationalist approach to current events that hinders in-depth reflection on the transformations of the world. and they reinforce the government's criminalization of certain opponents labeled "ultra-left" or "eco-terrorists", or the demonization of La France insoumise (LFI), described as "extreme left" and "violent".
The rightward shift in society is understood as the political dominance of ideas labeled as right-wing, but it is often measured against the extreme right - or more precisely, the National Rally (RN).
The party's catchy and all-encompassing rhetoric contributes to its success. Thomas Ménagé, its spokesperson in the National Assembly, states, for example [3]: "People tend to say that Marine Le Pen is a left-wing woman[sic!], but she is neither left nor right. Our voters want more social justice, security, democracy, and dignity for all the people"; the RN wants to "work with everyone"... against Macron and come to power through the ballot box, without violence, to "save France."
But the appeal of the National Rally (RN), with its keywords "work" and "people," has also been fueled by the ideological drift of the left. In the 1980sthe "Mitterrand years" of factory closures and relocationssocial democracy, for electoral gain, abandoned the issue of labor to focus on the "middle classes," who were more educated and open to the globalization of production and trade. The antagonism of "working class versus bourgeoisie or capitalism" thus transformed into "popular classes versus holigarchy or neoliberalism," with the argument that these classes are now heterogeneous (La France Insoumise, for its part, speaks of "the people," drawing on the adoption of this term by the "Arab Spring," the Yellow Vests, and other contemporary social movements).
Such choices were not unanimously accepted within the left: firstly, the working class has never been limited to the factory proletariat (even if the place of peasants within it, for example, was a subject of debate within the old socialist movement); secondly, it is the antagonism between classes that constitutes them as classes, not their homogeneity (the working class, or laboring class, therefore always refers to all those who live by their labor without owning the means of production or who are unemployed). Nevertheless, these choices have determined the strategies implemented by the left for several decades, particularly to dissuade the "popular classes" or the "middle classes" from protesting against the (actual or feared) deterioration of their material conditions by voting for the National Rally or by abstaining. Moreover, "left-wing people" are for the most part so socially distant from the "working classes" that they tend to ignore them, or to support only certain components of them - those that are subject to discrimination.
Are cities left-wing and rural areas right-wing?
The foregoing illustrates the complexity of the rightward shift in society: it stems from all the factors mentioned above and others besides [4]. Changes in the nature of work are one such factor, but they are primarily considered in the numerous studies devoted to the RN vote - frequently from an electoral perspective or with partisan agendas.
According to the left-leaning geographer Christophe Guilluy, this vote is a reaction from "working-class whites" who, faced with globalization and "cultural insecurity," have left the major cities where professionals and immigrants live side by side to settle in a "peripheral France" comprised of suburban and rural areas far removed from major employment centers [5].
This idea was taken up by Marine Le Pen with her "France of the Forgotten," in order to praise the "traditional" way of life in the countryside and criticize the supposedly "globalized" and "bourgeois bohemian" urban model. It is contested, notably by sociologist Benoît Coquard, who spent about ten years studying people aged 25-35 living in rural cantons of the Grand Est region, where he is from. Admittedly, the traditionally right-wing vote in these cantons has shifted towards the far right since 1995; but their working-class populations, largely immigrants, have been established there since the first two industrial revolutions and do not feel threatened by the "great replacement" predicted by far-right conspiracy theorists.
In his book Those Who Remain - Making a Life in Declining Rural Areas [6]and in articles and broadcasts [7], Coquard thus takes issue with the conflation of cities (left) and rural areas (right). First, social inequalities exist in rural areas as elsewhere. Second, the French countryside is heterogeneous: the wealthy, who live near large urban areas, tourist coastlines, or vineyards, tend to be "left-leaning" and dynamic; in the poor, on the other hand, people only protest when there is an attempt to prevent them from living as they choose in their own territory - for example, the 80 km/h speed limit imposed by the government in 2018 mobilized the groups of La France en colère (Angry France), which gave rise to the Yellow Vests (with their desire for self-organization, their rejection of any leader and any negotiation...).
The declining cantons of the Grand Est region are now predominantly inhabited by the "working class" - precisely those who are either idealized as the "real" people or dismissed as racist and ignorant "rednecks." This is why we will focus on the words of those interviewed by Coquard (or on his analyses) to identify certain characteristics in their ways of thinking and operating.
Limited solidarity as a mode of survival
These areas of eastern France were highly industrialized and densely populated at the end of the 19th century. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, factory closures or relocations triggered a significant exodus, which continues to this day; unions declined; and, apart from fishing and hunting clubs or the local football club, places for socializing (bistros, dances, associations, etc.) disappeared. Nevertheless, informal get-togethers at each other's homes have become more common.
The emergence of these informal bars, frequented by groups of friends, is due to changes in the job market and lifestyles. Whereas previously one could build a career from generation to generation within the same company and eventually become a foreman, the few remaining jobs now pit people with similar qualifications against each other. The idea that "we, the working class, have an interest in uniting to get a pay raise," for example, has thus transformed into "we, our families, need to organize ourselves to share tips about work." Furthermore, the hours spent in the car (all family activities necessitate it) hardly make one want to venture far out again at the end of the day...
In these "groups of friends," the men work as skilled laborers, either self-employed or in small construction companies. Many rejected school (for them, it was a place of social humiliation [8]), hence their attachment to their territory: defending it is vital for them, as it is where they have resources, and the same is true for their way of life. The measure of success in their eyes is a detached house (which they were able to build themselves thanks to the low price of land and help from their "friends") and a car (essential for daily life, but also a mark of respectability).
The women in these groups, for their part, work in places that render their activity "invisible" (retirement homes, homes of retirees, etc.), or they are employed on short-term contracts in large retail stores, call centers, or in parcel preparation or delivery. Their precarious situation makes them more dependent on their partnerswhere male dominance remains structurally pronounced, both in the division of domestic tasks and in conversations (men talk amongst themselves about cars or sports, women amongst themselves about health or children's education). While in these rural areas female employment was once widespread and fairly well-paid (but, as usual, less so than male employment), female unemployment among those under 35 is very high (up to twice the rate of male unemployment). Hence the strong presence of women in yellow vests at the roundabouts.
"Profiteers" who are no longer the proponents of capitalism,
but the "welfare recipients"
In a bar, it is formally possible to confront points of view and worldviews [9]. This is much less obvious in drinks between "mates" who are of the same opinion on various subjects (politics, family, taxes...); their homogeneity has favoured the racist discourse on immigration put forward by the RN, notes Coquard.
Indeed, since these "buddies" highly value work (it's associated with courage and competence, and therefore self-esteem and the esteem of others stem from it), the unemployed person is not, in their eyes, a victim of deindustrialization, but a "welfare recipient" or a "lazybones" who is "worthless"or even a "loser" (social case). There's no question of showing solidarity with such a "loser" or being associated with them by associating with them, because having a good reputation is a prerequisite for finding work and starting a family. However, on another level, this rejection has become "France first!" or "No to welfare!" Because the National Rally (RN) presented immigrants or residents of housing projects as the "losers" of the citiesthis "bad France" to which it contrasted the "real France," whose rural "gangs of friends" supposedly constituted the youth (although this includes descendants of North African immigrants, as long as they consume alcohol and cannabis and do not openly display their Muslim identity). By asserting such claims in the media, the RN leaders lent them legitimacy.
The National Rally's political hegemony in these rural areas was thus built on the rejection of those on welfare (see box). Voting for the party is perceived by its members as a way to promote themselves, with the guarantee that others will remain lower in social standing. It doesn't imply an improvement in their own situation, but rather a transfer of social shame onto those who have less access to respectability (the local "losers") or onto other segments of the population (without these groups even being labeled "undocumented" or "foreign").
For Coquard, these young rural people adopted the conflict-ridden picture of society painted by the National Rally because it resonated with their own experiences... and because there was no alternative. After the Second World War, left-wing parties used a conflict-based vocabulary: by contrasting the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, they provided a framework for understanding the social world. But when, in 1995, the National Front (FN, renamed RN in 2018) came in second place behind the right in Haute-Marne, the left had already abandoned the "us versus them" narrativesocial conflictand was adopting a moralistic stance: stigmatizing certain groups (foreigners, homosexuals, etc.) was wrong. Following this, the RN began to talk about social conflict, urging people to stop seeing employers as the enemy and instead ally with them against a "welfare recipient" who was inevitably an immigrant and therefore not respectable, asserting: "It's because of them that you have lower wages, and that soon you might pay even more taxes or lose your job..." And adhering to the RN's rhetoric became the easiest political position to claim publicly (without necessarily voting for them, as abstention is also high).
A small, well-liked business.
a state that is not really contested
Coquard also emphasizes the role played by social circles in both voting patterns and worldviews.
In the suburbs of large cities, the "working class" (many of whom are precarious and employed in the gig economy) may be in contact with more educated circles who generally vote for left-wing parties and encourage others to do the same.
In the rural cantons of the Grand Est region, opinion leaders were once union members (outside of the factory, they interacted with young people, for example, by coaching them in soccer), and the Communist Party held sway among the workers - even though "a good third were on the side of the bosses." People voted for the Party and joined a union "without giving it much thought: it was simply a given." Now, opinion leaders are small business owners and tradespeople whom his "friends" interact with daily and who relay the National Rally's message in their own way. They are considered to have "made it" in life: they have a certain economic stability and, above all, they are "hard-working." Their tastes, consumption habits, and aspirations are very close to those of the "working class" (to which they often belonged), and they hold jobs quite similar to theirs (and considered "useful"). They were at the Yellow Vest roundabouts until local discussions turned it into a "movement of lazy people."
The "groups of friends" don't see local employers as exploiters since they don't run multinationals and aren't "proud" (you can have drinks with them); and, above all, they are likely to provide work and accept "arrangements" (using a truck for personal use, for example, in exchange for unpaid overtime).
The state, on the other hand, is criticized, but mainly for the taxes it levies and for the unequal access to rights resulting from the closure of public services. With digital technology, not only is social control tighter, but the dematerialization of administrative procedures makes people who aren't computer literate feel incompetent. Going to the sub-prefecture was already difficult for the poorest; the disappearance of all direct human contact makes it even harder.
Furthermore, "doing without" the state is a way of demonstrating resourcefulness: repairing a machine, renovating a house, growing one's own vegetables... or working off the books, and thus cheating the taxman, constitutes (as with small farmers) a source of both savings and pride. Similarly, distrusting politicians or journalists demonstrates independent judgment and an awareness that they are "all corrupt."
Social proximity
populations of the cities and working-class districts
The values and behaviors of young rural workers are those of working-class suburbs, Coquard points out. Contrary to the discourse on the supposed "territorial divide" between the urban and rural "working classes," they share many commonalities: they live in areas shaped by industrialization; they are characterized by strong interconnectedness, significant issues of respectability, and a fairly pronounced gender divide in their social interactions; for them, social success is linked to economic capital, self-reliance (often through manual labor), or at least getting by through autonomy and resourcefulness; both groups include those who work and those who rely on assistance... but everything is done to pit them against each other. Coquard concludes that to combat racism and rebuild solidarity among these divided populations, it is necessary to emphasize their commonalities rather than their differences. But he adds: "It's very complicated" - and we believe him without difficulty.
To return to the question of work, its valorization by the "groups of friends" described by Benoît Coquard is actually nothing exceptional: work retains a significant place in society in general, both because it is a means of subsistence and because it is a tool for social recognition. Despite the degradation and precariousness of jobs in most sectors, it remains valued in education and healthcare, culture and the liberal professions... and in manual labor in industry, agriculture, crafts, and fishing.
The "groups of friends" Coquard mentions are not a new phenomenon either: in the era of large factories, they already existed and functioned in this way in working-class circles in general. The novelty that deindustrialization has brought everywhereaside from the precariousness that has replaced a certain job securityis what disappeared with the factories. They were places of exploitation and alienation, but also places where it was possible to organize the struggle and wage it together (through strikes, occupations, the holding of bosses hostage, etc.). It was therefore there that a class carrying a project of social change could assert itself as such and that class solidarity could exist.
(To be continued in the next issue.)
Vanina
Work, racism and electoral choice
In *Ordinary Voters* (published by Seuil in 2024), sociologist Félicien Faury observed that the National Rally (RN) electorate in southeastern France shared a common trait: racism. He conducted research among "stable" blue-collar workers (neither poor nor precariously employed), tradespeople, and small business owners. These individuals, most of whom have limited formal education and short educational paths, are categorized by their incomes as "lower middle class" and fear downward mobility, Faury notes. Racism is linked to the continuous rise in inequality, the concentration of wealth and assets, and the weakening and competition among public services. It stems from "common dynamics": an uncertain and precarious economic and social experience, or one perceived as such, which generates dissatisfaction with the system of distributing collective resources; an attachment to their place of residence and anxiety about its future; strong Islamophobia; a desire to assert their belonging to the majority group; and a negative view of politicians (including Marine Le Pen).
In the article "How Work Influences Our Political Convictions," published by Frustration Magazine on March 19, 2026, sociologist and farmer Nicolas Framont cites two studies demonstrating the effects of work (through its content or modalities) on voting for the National Rally (RN):
* "The Long Arm of Work - Working Conditions and Electoral Behavior" (IRES, February 2024), by economist Thomas Coutrot, highlights the strong link between autonomy at work and electoral behavior. By comparing working conditions and voting attitudes in the 2017 presidential and 2019 European elections, it appears that a lack of autonomy at work significantly increases abstention, and that atypical working hours and physically demanding jobs encourage voting for the RN and adherence to its interpretation of the social world (particularly the association of welfare dependency with immigration).
* "Politics at Work - Experiences in the Workplace and Political Divides Among Employees in France," by Yann Algan, Antonin Bergeaud, and Camille Frouard (HEC Paris, March 2026), also highlights the strong link between negative experiences at work and voting for the far right. Of the 3,900 private-sector employees surveyed in 2024 and 2025, 33% stated they had no partisan preference; those who voted for the National Rally (RN) and La France Insoumise (LFI) were angry, but did not express it in the same way: RN voters felt rejected by their colleagues and distrusted them; LFI voters worked well with their colleagues, and their distrust was directed at company management. The major divide between the two groups was on the issue of immigration.
Notes
[1] See our positions on this subject on the website oclibertaire.lautre.net (for example, in the Board meetings of November and December 2025).
[2] The photos of the yellow vest movement that illustrate this article were taken in various locations in France.
[3] "Political questions" on France Inter, March 29, 2026.
[4] In "The new clothes of fascism", Réfractions no. 54 (January 2026) points out, on a global scale, the empowerment of rulers in relation to the rules of law, the decline of Western neo-colonial hegemony or the reactionary configuration of cyberspace.
[5] See, among others, La France périphérique - Comment on a sacrifié les classes populaires (Flammarion, 2014)
[6] La Découverte, 2019; published in paperback in 2022.
[7] See in particular, on LVSL: "Benoît Coquard: "The rural working classes and left-wing sympathizers tend to drift away"" (January 14, 2025); and, on Mediapart, "The social anchoring of the RN vote" (February 26, 2026).
[8] Women on average perform better in their studies than men and are more likely than men to leave rural areas
[9] According to the note "When bars and tobacconists close - The erosion of local social ties and the rise of the far-right vote in France" (Cepremap, February 2026), the closure of bars and tobacconists leads to an increase in the far-right vote, and vice versa.
https://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4714
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