This article is a revised translation of a text by Jade Saab, a Lebanese-Canadian researcher and activist. It examines the contradictions and difficulties surrounding the question of money in the Spanish Revolution (1936-1937), through the strategic choices of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). It analyzes the attempt to abolish money, the limitations encountered in maintaining financial institutions under the state, and emphasizes the need for a more coherent revolutionary approach to this issue.
Socialists have long considered money a central tool of capital. Regulating not only exchanges and social relations, it also reinforces the domination, alienation, and fragmentation of workers. Its abolition has therefore become a major objective for revolutionaries. Karl Marx warned trade unions against focusing too much on daily struggles, urging them instead to aim for the abolition of the wage system, an idea taken up by the American Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Piotr Kropotkin, a major theorist of anarcho-communism, clarifies that this implies not a new currency, but an organization based on the needs and capabilities of each individual.
Despite this theoretical agreement, historical examples are rare. The Paris Commune did not abolish money, and the Russian Revolution maintained and even complicated the wage system. Revolutionary theories often treat this abolition as secondary or subsequent to the overthrow of the state. Here, we propose to revisit notable events of the Spanish Revolution, textbook cases where money and financial institutions were allegedly insufficiently considered strategically by the CNT.
The CNT emerges as leader
The Spanish Revolution should be understood as the culmination of a long " protest spiral " [1]in which opposing camps (the Church, the army, and large landowners on one side, and the trade unions on the other) set in motion a process of mutual radicalization, ending in a final struggle for dominance. This final struggle took the form of a failed coup d'état, instigated by General Francisco Franco in July 1936, which degenerated into civil war. While the coup is seen as the trigger for the revolution, its foundations lie in a series of armed uprisings, notably those of January 1933 (led by the CNT) and August 1934 (initiated by the Socialist Party and supported by the CNT).
In May 1936, the CNT synthesized its theoretical position on the revolution and the type of society it envisioned in the confederal concept of libertarian communism [2]. The proposal summarized its stance on money and supported the paradoxical idea that even though the rules of production and exchange would be governed by the concept of " from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs ," " production cards " demonstrating " the value of the work performed by the cardholder " would be necessary. This conflictual position stemmed from the pluralistic nature of the CNT and reflected the divergences between its rural and urban sections. These divergences became tangible after the coup.
CNT poster: " Comrades ! Work and fight for the revolution ."
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Franco's coup d'état began in Spanish Morocco on July 17, 1936. Multiple garrisons across Spain participated in the rebellion, and some succeeded in capturing towns. Others remained loyal to the Republic. Some garrisons were also stormed by armed workers, who redistributed weapons and formed union militias. As a result of this failed coup, the central state lost control of its coercive apparatus, paving the way for the domination of Spain by armed workers, led by the CNT [3].
In the aftermath, workers seized a third of the rural territory of Republican Spain, representing two-thirds of the arable land. Organizing themselves into agricultural collectives [4], they also took control of all types of factories and services in heavy industry, energy, water, and commercial activities. In Catalonia, 80% of businesses were worker-controlled [5]. These agricultural collectives were governed by revolutionary committees, which were vested with legislative and executive powers [6].
In rural agricultural communities, money was replaced by ration cards, allowing workers free access to food based on family size [7]. In urban communities, a producer card system was implemented. The distribution of goods was based on the worker's output. In some communities, however, the existing wages and monetary system were maintained due to opposition from workers not affiliated with the CNT [8]. Wages were increased, and a range of previously unavailable benefits were introduced, such as paid leave and free healthcare.
To facilitate the organization of work on a national scale, the CNT established National Industrial Federations (FIN) [9]. Rural agricultural communities engaged in exchanges and bartering with neighboring towns and established local and regional federations [10]. " Libertarian communism " seemed to be taking root.
Poster from the CNT AIT FAI: " To arms to conquer the land that belongs to us, freedom and to open the furrows of the future society ."
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Financial institutions have been neglected.
While the workers at the front quickly reorganized the economy according to libertarian principles, the leaders of the CNT abandoned the revolution to its logical conclusion. Instead, they chose to join the central government. The CNT justified this choice by arguing that the State, understood as a tool of suppression serving Capital, no longer existed. This reasoning would prove flawed.
The CNT was given minor ministries within what they called a " revolutionary government ," finding itself without any real influence. Dominated by the Socialist Party, the central government was primarily concerned with maintaining good relations with France, England, and Belgium by protecting their economic interests [11]. This was necessary to secure arms deliveries, which were desperately needed in the war against Franco. But this approach toward the democracies of Europe put the central government in direct opposition to the autonomous agricultural workers' collectives. To demonstrate its control over the republican territories, the government launched a campaign that attempted to impose order on the agricultural collectives through a dual process of legalization and economic isolation.
This task was facilitated by the CNT's disinterest in financial institutions. The CNT's belief in the abolition of money (and its replacement by free trade) meant that it neglected to organize workers in financial institutions, and when the CNT decided to join the government, no effort was made to take control of them. The only exception was a plan, devised by a CNT militia in Madrid but quickly abandoned, to steal the government's gold reserves [12].
In the wave of factory and land appropriations, the banks remained untouched. The CNT believed they would no longer play any role in post-revolutionary society. Thus, although agricultural communities organized themselves into FINs (Farmers' Unions), they did not integrate into the networks of non-nationalized factories or those controlled by other political parties or communities. Their economic sustainability was therefore not guaranteed. Moreover, the central government quickly regained control over foreign trade. Agricultural communities could no longer bypass the central government regarding economic exchanges or securing materials and equipment.
In 1937, the CNT began to lose influence, and some committees transformed into councils with administrative functions. These councils, composed of representatives from all the political parties of the Popular Front, weakened the unions. Consequently, the municipal council was tasked with issuing the local republican currency.
Arxiu Ismael Latorre Mendoza
Thus, the agricultural communities quickly found themselves deprived of financial resources by the central state. The revolutionary councils managing these agricultural communities were gradually replaced by conventional municipalities, dependent on Madrid. This process of legalization and integration became a common feature throughout the revolution and extended to the trade union militias and the people's courts. The central government's interference in finances and resources led to uncontrollable inflation in the territories held by the Republicans [13], a deterioration in the quality of weapons [14], and, ultimately, defeat at the hands of Franco's troops.
The lessons of this Revolution
What can we learn from the Spanish case ? The CNT's choice to join the central government and the abandonment of the transition to a moneyless society are both linked to a gap in their revolutionary theory.
As developed in the " concept of a confederal libertarian communism ," the CNT ignored the fact that in a revolution, power is polycentric, with several centers of power vying for dominance. The transfer of power does not occur from one camp to another (even if power is decentralized). The parallel emergence of agricultural collectives within the central state plunged the CNT into a complex situation where pursuing revolutionary goals meant direct confrontation with other centers of power, allied against Franco. Once the CNT joined the government, its lack of union representation within financial institutions ensured the central government an advantage in financial resources over the collectives. The CNT found itself without the necessary influence to maintain the gains achieved during the early phases of the revolution.
Some authors [15]argue that the CNT's main mistake was not pushing its revolution to its logical conclusion. However, a potential CNT victory would not necessarily have resulted in a moneyless society either. Their disdain for financial institutions would have worked against them.
While revolutions are primarily local events, they must nevertheless take into account the international political dimension. Even if an anarchist Spain had emerged, it could not have functioned on its own without money, which is necessary for operation and exchange in a capitalist world. Moreover, in the CNT's conception of libertarian communism, forcing people to use money or compelling them to join agricultural collectives is condemned. In the CNT's post-revolutionary society, individuals can remain independent of the collectivist system, as the CNT did during the war, allowing individuals who did not wish to join the collectives to keep their own plots of land [16].
Is it therefore impossible to establish a moneyless society immediately after a revolution ? Should we instead adopt an incremental approach ? Not at all. In any revolutionary theory seeking to abolish the use of money, it is highly worthwhile to consider a dual post-revolutionary system, where internal affairs do not use money, but where a parallel monetized system is maintained to sustain interstate relations and relations with individuals outside the system of collectives. Both systems, however, remain faithful to the values of the revolution, such as the abolition of exploitation.
Integrating this parallel approach into revolutionary theory means that pre-revolutionary organizations must not ignore financial institutions as arenas of struggle (including all institutions presumed to disappear in a post-revolutionary system). This may seem counterintuitive. Why would a revolutionary organization involve itself in institutions that, in any case, would no longer exist after the revolution ? Because, on the one hand, a parallel system would mean that these institutions do not become obsolete. On the other hand, while power during a revolution is polycentric-and sometimes competitive-organizing within these institutions can deprive competing powers of a valuable resource. Developing revolutionary theories that more fully integrate these parallel systems would therefore help avoid the same mistakes made by the CNT.
Jade SAAB (translated by Niels Zwarteveen)
To validate
[1] George Lawson, Anatomies of Revolution , Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 184.
[2] The full text can be found on Theanarchistlibrary.org in English.
[3] Jose Peirats, The CNT in the Spanish Revolution , Volume 1, The Meltzer Press, 2001, p. 131.
[4] Robert Alexander, The Anarchists in the Spanish Civil War , Janus Publishing Company Limited, 1999, p. 326.
[5] Ibid, p. 463.
[6] Ibid, p. 332 ; Stuart Christie, We, the Anarchists! , AK Press, 2002, p. 186; Hugh Thomas, " Anarchist agrarian collectives in the Spanish civil war ", The Republic and the Civil War in Spain , R. Carr, 1971, p. 240; Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and counterrevolution , University of North Carolina Press, 1991, p. 65-66.
[7] Alexander, op. cit., p. 329 ; Thomas, op. cit., p. 250.
[8] Alexander, op. cit., p. 533.
[9] Jose Peirats, The CNT in the Spanish Revolution , Volume 2, Christie Books, 2005, p. 32.
[10] Alexander, op. cit., p. 329.
[11] Bolloten, op. cit., p. 227.
[12] Alexander, op. cit., p. 175.
[13] Martín-Aceña, Pablo, Elena Martinez Ruiz and María A. Pons., " War and economics: Spanish civil war finances revisited ", European Review of Economic History 16 no 2, 2012, p. 158.
[14] Kowalsky, Daniel. " Operation X: Soviet Russia and the Spanish Civil War ", Bulletin of Spanish Studies 91 no 1-2, 2014, p. 168-169.
[15] See for example the work of Vernon Richard Lessons of the Spanish Revolution .
[16] Alexander, op. cit., p. 372.
https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?1936-La-CNT-l-argent-et-la-revolution-espagnole
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