This text wants to discuss the current tendencies of anarchist theories, but does
without a comprehensive historical outline of the development of these theories.---- The individual aspects of anarchist criticism of the state are subjected toa separate appraisal, as if there were the state power itself (also in the formof competition between state powers, which is expressed in nationalism,patriotism and even war), the ideology of the modern democratic constitutionalstate or the representative one Democracy and the state as a repressive form ofclass rule. Part of this examination of the formation of anarchist state theoriesis also a confrontation of these theories with modern Marxist positions on thistopic. Similarities and differences should be worked out in this context.The following questions arise:What are the "essentials" of anarchist critique of the state? And related: Whatdistinguishes the Marxist and anarchist critiques of (bourgeois-capitalist) statepower?The problems of anarchist criticism of the state, let us anticipate this, lie inits relative historical ineffectiveness and in its lack of ability to presentreally convincing social alternatives. The reason for this is also the subject ofthis discussion.MODERN MARXIST CRITICISM OF THE (CAPITALIST) STATE USING THE EXAMPLE OF ALTHUSSERIn the 1960s, the French philosopher Louis Althusser used new terminology toinnovate the Marxist critique of the capitalist state apparatus. He spoke of"ideological state apparatuses". It is quite illustrative to first contrast thisapproach with anarchist criticism of the state, in order to be able to betterwork out the special nature of anarchist criticism of the state.In Althusser's "alternative" view of "ideology" he begins with the initial thesisthat any social formation is based on a dominant mode of production "that sets inmotion existing productive forces in and under certain production conditions"(Althusser 1977: 109). Formation of society for the sake of survival thatconstantly reproduces the productive forces and relations of production. However,this does not just mean the means of production (machinery, etc., i.e. fixedcapital), but also (human) labor (variable capital), the reproduction of which,however, takes place not only within, but to a large extent also outside of thecompany. On the one hand, this is guaranteed by the wages paid, but also throughthe permanently restored (reproduced) workforce competence in the sense of"ability to work". M.a. W.: For Althusser, the reproduction of labor power in thecapitalist system does not primarily take place in the actual production process,but outside of it, e.g. B. in school, at the university and at other educationalinstitutions, where the prerequisites for the utilization of labor power arecreated in the first place (Althusser 1977: 111). In school, however, thechild/young person not only learns the necessary habitual (Bourdieu 1987: 277ff.) and technical requirements for the sale of his (future) workforce, but onealso learns the "rules of decency", so to speak,The Marxist division into "base" (mode of production) and "superstructure"(ideal, legal, political, ideological, etc. reflection of the base) divides thesocial system into different levels, which actually runs counter to the Hegelianconception of "totality" (AG Politische Theorie o .J.). Althusser is of theopinion here that the base "in the last resort" determines the superstructure;however, this overdetermination leaves the superstructure a certain amount ofleeway, a relative autonomy in relation to this basis (Althusser 1977: 113). Inaddition to the already mentioned relative autonomy of the superstructure inrelation to the base, there could also be a "feedback" from the superstructure tothe base, a reaction (Althusser 1977: 114). In order to make this "double face"of the superstructure a little more transparent or more plausible,Normally, in the Marxist tradition, the state is only thought of as an apparatusof repression and oppression (courts, police, prisons), but this is not enough(Althusser 1977: 114, 115). Following Althusser, Michel Foucault also latercriticized this reduction of the state apparatus to its mere repressive functionsand developed a "positive" concept of power, which he called "biopower" andexemplified using sexuality (Foucault 1977). Althusser himself was of the opinionthat something had to be added to the idea of the state apparatus as a puremechanism of repression, because its functioning was structured too complex forthat (Althusser 1977: 119).For Althusser, the (political) class struggle revolves around the poles of stateapparatus and state power, with the latter being about their defense or conquest(Althusser 1977: 118). The state apparatus can be further subdivided into therepressive and the ideological functions, the latter representing the ideologicalstate apparatus (ISA for short) (Althusser 1977: 119).The ISA could be listed as follows:Religious Apparatus (Churches)School apparatus (educational institutions)familyPolitical system including partiestrade unions, business associationsInformation (press, television, radio, mass media in general)Cultural institutions (literature, art, sport, etc.) (Althusser 1977: 119 f.).In contrast to the repressive state apparatus, which represented a more or lessmonolithic block, the ISA were characterized by a large plurality of practices.The state authority in the true sense belongs to the public sector, while theISAs are organized partly publicly and partly privately. But the distinction"public/private" is basically irrelevant because this differentiation is part ofcivil law. The state is basically above the law and is the basis for thisdistinction in the first place. For this reason, one can also add privatelyorganized institutions/apparatuses to the ISA, because they exercise theirfunction within this framework (Althusser 1977: 120). The difference between theISA and the repressive state functions lies in the fact that the former are basedon ideology, The latter in the last resort on sheer violence. Of course, therepressive state apparatus is not exclusively violent, but also contains elementsof ideology, which ISA accordingly reverses (Althusser 1977: 121).The unity of the ISA is guaranteed by its functioning, in the sense that itreproduces the ruling ideology, which in turn guarantees the hegemony of theruling class. Therefore the ISA are also the arena of the (ideological) classstruggle (Althusser 1977: 122).In contrast to Marxism, however, anarchism does not believe that a change for thebetter can be achieved by overthrowing the state apparatus and that thesocialist-communist revolution can be brought about in this way. Even asocialist-communist state apparatus ultimately leads to tyranny and authoritarianstructures of rule, or to the rule of a small clique of apparatchiks and arampant bureaucracy, which appropriated the means of production and are thereforehardly better than the capitalists. This is the lesson that can be drawn from thehistory and outcome of the Russian revolution from 1917 (cf. on the relationshipbetween Marxism and anarchism Loick 2017: 130-132). But we will come back to thatlater.CRITICISM OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACYIn his 2017 book "Anarchism for an Introduction", Daniel Loick also examines theelements of an anarchist critique of the state, which will now be examined andcommented on in more detail below (Loick 2017: 119-140).Loick first states, following Hannah Arendt, that the potential for destructionof human societies has never been as great as it is today. However, he links thisto the existence of the central state monopoly on the use of force. Althoughthere used to be oppression and tyranny, these were always regional or local. Itwas only the modern central state with its monopoly on the use of force and itsthoroughgoing organization and penetration of all areas of society that firstcreated the possibility of thinking of something like the total annihilation ofmankind - see the atomic bomb. Centralization and monopolization of state powerhave progressed so far that there is practically no escape from this "straitjacket".Loick comes to a sobering conclusion about the history of state power:"In view of the centuries-long bloody history of actually existing states, it iseasy for them (the anarchists, author's note) to draw a negative balance of thisform of this social organization: States represent gigantic aggregates ofviolence that are alienated from social life and opposed to it, they promoteprivilege and moral corruption, they restrict the freedom of individuals andsocial collectives through coercion and repression, they wage wars against eachother and incite patriotism and nationalism, and they show themselves unable tosolve the urgent problems due to institutional blindness and structural blockagesproblems of their time." (Loick 2017: 119)The states of the newer form, which today are called democratic states under therule of law, try to soften this impression somewhat by throwing on the cloak ofdemocracy, which represents the will of the people. The states are thuspractically only an expression of this will of the people, which z. B. ingeneral, free and secret elections. Therefore, the state authority only carriesout those decisions and resolutions that the people have expressed in theseelections. For this, the electorate sent people's representatives to parliament,who, as the legislature (legislative power), poured this popular will into laws,ordinances, etc. Therefore, a basic idea of the modern form of government is torealize the assumption that there are people who can represent the will ofothers. The key keywords here are "representation" and "compulsion". Loickemphasizes that this is what all anarchist criticisms of the state have incommon, from Stirner to Kropotkin (Loick 2017: 121 f.).For anarchists, coercion is just the other medal of representation. If the statereally has the interests of all citizens in mind, coercive measures would not benecessary to enforce this collective will against the resistance of others. As aresult, certain interests always fall by the wayside. Loick puts it this way:"Even if A and B are democratically elected, A and B are not authorized to speakfor X, Y and Z because, firstly, the minority does not authorize representativeselected by the majority, and secondly, the opinion of the majority can alsochange over time . Anarchism is therefore a logical continuation of theEnlightenment idea of maturity..." (Loick 2017: 122).M.a. W.: Even in the most democratic electoral process, certain voices are alwaysignored, preferably those of social minorities (be they of ethnic, religious orsexual origin) or socially underprivileged "fringe groups". The crux of anydemocracy is that it always tends to be a "majority dictatorship" against thewill of minorities (Loick 2017: 122).The assumption that the citizens of a country give their approval for governmentaction and thus for the legitimacy of state authority through democraticelections is therefore always a fiction to a certain extent (Loick 2017: 123).Here anarchism puts its fingers in the wounds of the theory of the democraticconstitutional state. If necessary, the state is always forced to use directcoercion so that the relationships of domination are preserved. If, for materialreasons, people do not have the opportunity to simply leave the state to go wherethey like it better, that does not mean that they (have to) accept the actions ofthe state in which they live placet (Loick 2017: 123).THE MISUNDERSTANDINGto the growing power of multinational corporations) can no longer be the startingpoint for political processes of self-understanding because the common basis forthis is increasingly disappearing. There is no longer even a common language. Hetherefore assumes what he calls "misunderstanding": "Under misunderstanding onewill understand a certain type of speech situation: one in which one of theinterlocutors hears and does not hear what the other is saying at the same time."(Rancière 2002: 9 ).For Rancière, it is important to show that this disagreement represents a"misunderstanding" between rich and poor or between different social classes,which is about the "fair" distribution of the socially generated surplus product,but both sides are not willing to accept the rules of the game to accept theother side. In reality, then, the "disagreement" reflects a power strugglebetween different social classes, or, to put it in "old Marxist" terms, a "classstruggle". The classes no longer sit at the common table of social discourse -the poor are no longer heard, but increasingly excluded from the discourse andmarginalized. Your voice will no longer be heard, not least because the commonpolitical language has been lost, as it was at least partially still given at thetime of the labor movement. And because the voice of the poor is no longer heard,it is no longer heard in the democratic forum of representation (Doerr 2013: 3).Of course, one can argue about who the "poor" are - whether social fringe groups,migrants, "educationally disadvantaged" classes, the materially poor. All thesegroups often have little in common and are often even hostile to one another, orare simply an amorphous and atomized mass. The fringe group theorem was alreadyin demand during the 1960s - Herbert Marcuse propagated it in his works "TheOne-Dimensional Man" (Marcuse 1967) and in "The Essay on Liberation" (Marcuse1969). But nowadays this theory seems to be outdated. These atomized masses areoften perceived more as a threat than as a potentially "revolutionary subject" -also and especially by people who still identify themselves as politically "left".According to Rancière, the "misunderstanding" is based on the fact that inHabermas' consensus-oriented model - typically bourgeois, so to speak - the"misunderstanding" is not considered; it is the "blind spot" ofdiscourse-theoretical argumentation (cf. Habermas 1996, pp. 11-64) in theliberal-democratic context (Rancière 2002: 12, 59). However, thismisunderstanding is not simply talking past one another or one that is based onthe imprecision of words or the diversity of languages. In reality, according toRancière, it goes back to power differences "which constitute a conflictregarding the speech situation itself and the relationship between the speakers"(Doerr 2013: 4). To put it more bluntly, the class struggle already takes place,so to speak, at the level of speech acts. Rancière literally:"Disagreement is not the conflict between the one who knows and the one who saysblack. It is the conflict between the one who says 'white' and the one who alsosays 'white' but who by no means mean the same thing.[...]The extreme situationof misunderstanding is that in which X does not see the common object presentedto him by Y, because he does not perceive that the sounds emitted by Y form wordsand combinations of words similar to his" (Rancière 2002: 9, 11)Even what is "common" is different in this context. If you perceive the samething, that doesn't mean that you mean the same thing and have the same names forit. To put it even more bluntly, the "misunderstanding" is based on the refusalof the (non-)interlocutor: Inside to recognize the other as an interlocutor atall. It is, so to speak, a dialogue between the deaf and dumb (really deaf anddumb, on the other hand, have a common language): it is a struggle forrecognition, ultimately for the existence or non-existence of the other. Humancharacteristics are denied to the other, he is not a "subhuman", but it is almosteven worse: he is "air", he does not exist as a counterpart at all (Doerr 2013: 4).CRITICISM OF THE "EFFICIENCY" OF STATE POWERIn addition, from an anarchist point of view, criticism of the "efficient" actionof the state authority can be registered: Are the means and ends of theapplication of the state monopoly of the use of force in an appropriaterelationship to each other? If you see this under the keyword "compulsion",obviously not. One can use the example of criminal justice: are prison sentencesan efficient means of deterring criminals or helping to rehabilitate them?Apparently not, considering the recidivism rates. Ultimately, the prison sentenceonly serves to discriminate against and stigmatize socially deviant behavior,with the latter - who would be surprised - being perpetrated primarily by thelower classes.Above all, the socially underprivileged classes are "criminal". When alower-class person commits a theft, the damage he or she causes is usuallymarginal; he or she usually only does this because he/she cannot "afford" acertain product or commodity, ie he/she doesn't have enough money. Hardly anyrich or wealthy person should get into this "embarrassment". The latter also hasmany more opportunities to commit specific crimes that mostly go unnoticed, e.g.B. Tax Evasion. A self-employed entrepreneur with not inconsiderable assets canuse "creative bookkeeping" and highly paid tax consultants or commercial lawyersto "fudge" his tax return or "bunker" his assets in tax havens. where no onenotices; Normal employees, on the other hand, cannot do this because all taxdeductions and social security contributions for the state are deducted directlyfrom the wages in a very transparent manner, with this being done by the employer.This is just one example among many that the law is applied very differently bythe state, depending on the social position in which a citizen is. This takesplace under the motto: "If two do the same thing, it is far from being the same".In addition, numerous violations of the law can be found in the name of the law,especially with regard to social minorities, e.g. B. People of color or ethnicminorities: The number of black people incarcerated in the US is disproportionateto their percentage of the total population. The state obviously also fails innumerous cases where it is allegedly trying to establish "equality before thelaw" (Loick 2017: 124).Another criticism is that the bourgeois state is organized into nations that arein competition or hostile to one another. This promotes not only irrationalpatriotism/nationalism, but also a latent permanent state of war between nationsor groups of nations (as was the case in the Cold War between NATO and the WarsawPact). Even if there is a UN, the "normal state" between the nations is alwayslatently hostile and warlike (Loick 2017: 125 f.). This is so obvious that evenbourgeois international relations theorists recognize it, the so-called"Neorealist school" (Grieco 1988: 485-502). "Patriotism leads the exploited of acountry to see the enemy not in their exploiters, but to see in the exploited ofanother country." (Loick 2017: 6) Nationalism/patriotism thus serves as a kind ofdiversionary tactic to prevent solidarity among the exploited and to play themoff against each other. Nationalism/patriotism thus distracts from the classstruggle.However, more modern anarchism no longer sees "the" state as a monolithic block,but as a kind of "web of relationships", as a power conglomerate that ranges fromthe "microphysics of power" (Foucault 1978) at the lowest level to largeinternational organizations ( e.g., NATO, EU etc. as "macrophysics of power"(Wilk 1999: 17 ff.).CONFRONTATION WITH THE REGULATION THEORYAnarchist critique of the state has different emphases than Marxist critique ofthe state. Indeed, the focus of anarchist critique tends to be more on thecritique of the state, while Marxism tends to conceive of the state as an'epiphenomenon' of capitalist socialization. The focus in Marxism is consequentlyalso increasingly on the area of the "Critique of Political Economy" (Marx)(Anarchismus.at n.d.). There were and still are differences between Marxism andanarchism in the area of the "organizational question", especially with regard tothe organization of the struggle against the capitalist system:"Thus the Marxists, who led the authoritarian camp, advocated the establishmentof strong, central parties, entry into unions, participation in elections, and apolitical struggle that would gradually improve the conditions of the workingclass. The anarchists countered this program: organization on the basis of freeand decentrally organized federations, which should only come together tocoordinate their actions." (Anarchismus.at n.d.)Of course, these fronts have softened somewhat since "1968", the so-called "NewLeft" - in contrast to the rigid real socialism - was able to make friends withthe "petty-bourgeois individualism" of the anarchists, their central principles,more than earlier Marxist representatives: inside Workers' self-government andcouncil democracy are (Anarchismus.at o. J.). The libertarian elements of theso-called "social movements" (anti-nuclear, ecological, women's movements, etc.)especially in the 1970s and 1980s - in addition to the "event of 1968" itself,the Paris May etc. - gave the decisive impetus ( Wilk 1999: 13).The fundamental questioning of the bourgeois understanding of representation isof course not shared by contemporary Marxism - probably because from the point ofview of these theorists there are more important things. The latest view of thestate from the point of view of Marxism assumes that the influence of the nationstate is dwindling anyway, and is not completely replaced by "more anonymous"organizational structures, but is nevertheless reduced to the status of a"transmission belt". M.a. W.: The nation-state is now merely an accomplice totransnational constellations of interests and organizational principles thatcannot be traced back to it and of which it is more and more a mere"sub-division". The distinction between state, semi-state, purely private andso-called "civil society" actors: obsolete anyway; the boundaries become blurred(Valdivia 1997; Strange 1998; Kurz 1997: 51-105; Hirsch 1995; Becker et al.(eds.) 1997; Wenig (eds.) 2000: 151 ff.; etc.).Of course, there are still differences in the understanding of the state, withcontemporary Marxists seeing the state not only as an instance of repression, butalso increasingly as an instance of regulation, as will now be explained in moredetail using the example of the so-called regulation theory."This reveals the core of the epistemological interest of traditional regulationtheory: it lies in the social-hegemonic prerequisites for stable conditions ofcapitalist reproduction. Hegemony is the form in which the periodization ofhistorical capitalism takes place." (Röttger 1997: 95)Bernd Röttger very aptly summarizes the original intention of conventionalregulation theory. The regulation theory is very closely related to the criticalaccompaniment of the Fordist mode of production; For this reason, it had tochange its paradigmatic approach when interpreting neoliberalism, although in itsmore recent forms it had to borrow from an equally renewed political economy(Röttger 1997: 95).The regulation theory has its origins in France in the 1970s, when French socialscientists became interested in the reasons for the hegemony of the US economy inthe western capitalist hemisphere (Aglietta n.d.: 5-41; 1975: 260-285; 1979). Theregulation theory is interested in the social reproduction conditions of thecapitalist system, which are regarded as fundamentally unstable and can only betemporarily brought to a certain stability through the institutional flanking ofthe state and large social groups; the organizational structure of capitalism isalways dependent on the status of class struggles or class compromises."In the perspective of regulation theory, social and political institutions aswell as normative networks, in which competing and conflicting interests of thesocial classes are integrated into a mode of regulation, were understood asnecessary prerequisites for stable reproduction. As an attempt to explain phasesof relative stability in capital accumulation, the interest in knowledge wasoriented towards how the structural contradictions of capitalism are processedthrough social and political forms and brought into a stable social context."(Röttger 1997: 97)In Aglietta's words: "To speak of the regulation of a mode of production is totry to formulate in general laws the way in which the determinant structure of asociety is reproduced." (Aglietta 1979: 13) Based on a remark by Röttger (1997:93) one could speak of the "classical" regulation theory as a functionalisttheory of capitalist regulation that describes the processes such as thecontradictions of capitalist accumulation through institutionalpolitical-administrative and para-state regulation mechanisms (e.g. "socialpartnership", Collective bargaining autonomy, state labor market and employmentpolicy, etc.) are dampened in their impact and the centrifugal forces of thesystem are defused by balancing the diverging interests of the social classes. From this point of view, the basis of the stability of capitalism is always theclass compromise, which does not eliminate inequalities and contradictions, butreduces them to a tolerable level. A prime example of such a relatively stableregime of socio-political balancing of interests for this form of regulationtheory is the Fordist-Keynesian state, as it existed in western metropolisesafter World War II until around the mid-1970s and produced a class compromisecushioned by the welfare state, who accepted the hegemony of the US economy andwas thus "dependent on the political regulation of global economic constraints."(Röttger 1997: 95)As is well known, this form of social regulation of capitalist accumulation hasmeanwhile (since the late 1970s at the latest) fallen into a serious crisis.Under the onslaught of neoliberal criticism, goals such as full employment andstate redistribution policies have not been completely, but to a large extent,lost sight of and have been replaced by other "regulative ideas" (Kant) andmaxims of action (Hickel 1998: 33 ff.). As a result, the regulation theory alsogot into a legitimation crisis and a research-strategic dilemma, which Röttgeroutlines as follows:But with this, a fundamental contradiction in the regulation theory had to breakout: in the mid-1970s, as a critique of neoclassicism and as a claim for thefurther development of neo-Marxist analyzes of social formations, by formulatinga new explanatory model for the phase of stable reproduction conditions ofcapitalism, it was immediately forced to expand its analysis categories to directthe dissolution of the overall social conditions that they actually claimed tounderstand." (Röttger 1997: 96)In order to overcome its nation-state fixation and the increasingly obsoletereconstruction work on the "class body" (its compromises, its struggles, itsvictories and defeats ...) in view of the global economic development, or atleast to adapt it to the new capitalist production relations, the regulationtheory tries to catch up with the To win global political economy, a neo-Marxistcurrent that - based on the political theory of the Italian communist leaderAntonio Gramsci, who was imprisoned under Mussolini - seeks to analyze the globalchanges in the capitalist world economy from a transnational point of view(Röttger 1997: 106 ff .; Gramsci 1967, 1980, 1983, 1991 ff.). Robert W. Cox(1983: 162-175) defines the concept of hegemony,"Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. Itis an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production whichpenetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes ofproduction. It is also a complex of international social relationships whichconnect the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony isdescribable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a politicalstructure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three."(Cox 1983: 172 f.)The social, political and economic each have their own logic and can thereforenot - as happened in vulgar Marxism - be applied to flat economicbasic-superstructure schemes. The rule of the world economy thus goes throughnumerous mediation processes at different levels and cannot be "purely" passed onto the national-regional level; however, in this perspective, the nation-statebecomes just one "agent" of capitalist rule among others, and sometimes not eventhe most important. At best, it is still an "intermediary organ" or a"transmission belt" of the global capitalist structural logic. There is a"diffusion of power in the global system" (Röttger 1997: 108), the rule ofcapital tends to take the form of "structural power" (Susan Strange; cf. Strange1988) can therefore, if necessary, completely dispense with non-economic means ofviolence by the state. "Structural power refers to the ability to set frameworkconditions and thus determine the way others act by setting structuralmargins..." (Röttger 1997: 108 f.)Within the world (market) society, which is asserting itself through the effectsof globalization, there is a hierarchy of states which, following the worldmarket theorist Immanuel Wallerstein (1979: 31-67), can be divided intometropolitan countries, semi-periphery and peripheral states. The leadingcountries of the world market system can impose their political-economicguidelines on the "rest of the world" by means of hegemonic agreements andalliances, sophisticated legal regulations (e.g. GATT or WTO), but also withsimple economic pressure (e.g. via IMF and World Bank):"On the basis of hegemonic-mediated dissolutions of internal and externalfactors, a combination of internal and external compulsion prevails, which setspractical limits to the scope for action of national governments and acts as aforce for global economic standardization." (Röttger 1997: 110)SUMMARYThe state criticism of anarchism was essentially hung here on the terms"representation" and "coercion". Anarchism is fundamentally "state-phobic" (Loick2017: 137), Loick borrowing this term from Foucault. It is not for nothing thatone calls e.g. For example, Stirner's criticism of the state is "individualanarchist" (Laska 1994), although Stirner did not describe himself as an"anarchist". In any case, it is evident that the critique of the state ofanarchism - despite all internal differences and differentiations - is mainlybased on defending or attacking the individual against large collective,anonymous organizations, with the state being the most hierarchical andthoroughly organized form of these collective formations is to be considered.The state tends to form oligarchic to monopolistic elites, as it were its"natural" tendency, whereby this elite tends to seize everything from materialresources to the means of violence and bases its power/domination on it. This(not just anarchist) interpretation is not wrong in itself, but one mustcritically object that there have also been numerous more or less successfulattempts in history to rein in the power of the state with its monopoly on theuse of force and to give it legal and constitutional ( constitutional) chains,whereby defensive rights of the individual against the state not least form abasic idea of bourgeois liberalism (Sasse 2011). Basically, anarchism has onlyradicalized this basic idea,As far as the "question of representation" is concerned: In highly complexsocieties that are extensively networked on all sides, with their enormously highdegree of division of labor in the most diverse fields of economic, social andpolitical life, it will probably be difficult to apply the anarchist principlesof council democracy, self-government and decentralization (anarchism .at o. J.)into practice, even if capitalism as an economic form were to be overcome. First,there is already a tendency towards decentralization and "learning organizations"(Agyris/Schön 2008) in the private sector, where, in other words, these anarchist"network" principles were implemented within the framework of the capitalistparadigm, on the other hand, the Marxist regulation theory,In the age of global agendas and organizations, in which transnationalcorporations and supranational institutions play the decisive role, the nationstate may not have become obsolete, but its importance has been greatly reduced.As we know from the European Union, lobbyists and the Brussels bureaucracy havelong been determining the direction of neoliberal economic and social policy. Thenation states either have to adapt to this or face enormous problems if they wantto resist it (the example of Greece speaks for itself; subject matter 2015). Theregulation theory states that the nation states still have a certain amount ofleeway, but have to reckon with increasing structural barriers (constraints),which e.g. B. set strict limits on their fiscal policy. In addition, there is nowan almost unmanageable jumble of private, civil society, semi-governmental andstate actors who are involved at various levels and have a say in the actualdesign of EU policy, for example. These are all developments that are not evengrasped by anarchist theorizing or are even diametrically opposed to it - not inthe sense that they are opposed to it, but in that they do not even come into thefocus of attention of anarchist criticism of the state. who get involved at themost diverse levels and have a say in the actual design of EU policy, forexample. These are all developments that are not even grasped by anarchisttheorizing or are even diametrically opposed to it - not in the sense that theyare opposed to it, but in that they do not even come into the focus of attentionof anarchist criticism of the state. who get involved at the most diverse levelsand have a say in the actual design of EU policy, for example. These are alldevelopments that are not even grasped by anarchist theorizing or are evendiametrically opposed to it - not in the sense that they are opposed to it, butin that they do not even come into the focus of attention of anarchist criticismof the state.https://direkteaktion.org/anarchistische-staatskritik-und-ihre-konfrontation-mit-marxistischen-ansaetzen__trashed/_________________________________________A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C EBy, For, and About AnarchistsSend news reports to A-infos-en mailing listA-infos-en@ainfos.caSPREAD THE INFORMATION
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