#WORLD #WORLDWIDE #ITALY #IRAN #ANARCHISM #LIBRARY #News #Journal #Update - (en) #Italy, UCADI #165 - DOWN THE TURBAN (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

 In recent weeks the boys in Iran are putting themselves to the test by chasing

isolated imams and taking a run up they come up behind them and with a quick blow
they roll the turban (amama) of Islamic religious to the ground . Very often they
are Muslim scholars and theologians who wear white turbans as a badge of office,
while Shiite clerics and ayatollahs wear black turbans who are called Sayed, or
dignitaries, because they descend from the prophet or from the prophet's tribe:
they are therefore the prey more coveted. This attire distinguishes them from
other Shia men who wear a black turban wrapped around a white cap, while others
choose green as homage to the traditional color of Paradise. This, which
apparently seems only a game, is instead the sign of contempt and irreverence
towards those belonging to the clergy and towards those who show a close link
with tradition.
The protest against the regime is full of symbolic gestures: cutting hair by
women, for example, is not only an act of mourning and participation in the pain
of the victims but also a disfigurement of female beauty which is hidden by the
veil and shapeless clothes is meant to be enjoyed only by the men to whom these
women belong.
But the struggle of women is not expressed only through symbolic gestures however
effective and powerful but also fielding one's body in demonstrations, acting
with an uncovered face, celebrating mourning according to tradition. Thus the
commemoration of the deceased on the fortieth day of death becomes an occasion
for mass participation in grief, for gatherings around tombs and in cemeteries.
These powerful messages are penetrating Iranian society and the clearest proof
comes from the fact that despite the hundreds of deaths, the beatings, the
arrests, the trials being prepared, the constant growth of the inmates beaten and
often tortured, the threats to resort to death penalty, the protest and
mobilization continues and expands, involving not only workers and students but
also the bazaar, the beating heart of the country's economy.
Hence, therefore, the rebellion against the regime consolidates and becomes
chronic and uses the fragmentation of the country into numerous ethnic groups and
in particular the growing resistance of the Kurdish component to the central
power of Tehran, in solidarity and in synchrony with the Iraqi Kurds and those
Syrians, breaking the ethnic unity that until now had characterized the ruling
class of the country. The greatest damage that the ongoing protests have produced
is precisely the duration of the protest movement over time, a clear sign that
the country's social cohesion is irreversibly breaking down. It is this aspect of
the protests that worries the regime which, however, cannot and is unable to
imagine anything else response that repression fueling the spiral of endemic and
incurable protest.
Up until yesterday, what seemed to worry the regime was the pressure of political
emigration which has reached the remarkable figure of about six million, above
all young people who have emigrated from the country partly for political and
partly economic reasons and who in many cases have lost their bond with the
country due to the many years of exile. This opposition is much more dangerous
because it undermines consensus and because it involves the placement of young
people in the labor market and their own future.

Young people in Iran

Out of 86 million inhabitants, this is the distribution of the population by age
group:
0-14 years: 24.23% (10,291,493 males / 9,823,838 females)
15-24 years: 14.05% (5,973,320 males /females 5,689,501)
25-54 years: 48.86% (males 20,698,748 /females 19,863,223)
55-64 years: 7.39% (males 3,022,134 /females 3,113,443)
65 years and over: 5.48% (males 2,111,390 / females 2,437,655) (2018 est.)

This means that about 60% are of working age or in any case looking for
employment in a society in which bonyads play a central role (that is, the Shiite
version of the waqf or hubus, typical of Sunni countries - managed by people from
area of the pasdaran, effectively appointed by the clergy who control about 20%
of Iran's GDP and manage the employment of large masses of male and female
workers according to clientelistic criteria of affiliation.Exempt from taxes,
they receive huge subsidies from the government, and have been nationalized after
the 1979 revolution by confiscating without compensation the assets of many
Iranians whose ideas or social positions were contrary to the new Islamic
government without compensation.
Today there are more than 100 Bonyads who answer directly (and only) to the
Supreme Leader of Iran. The Bonyads produce everything: they manage soybean and
cotton crops, they produce cars, they manage hotels, shipping companies, they are
involved in everything. The Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan, (Foundation for the
oppressed and the disabled), "controls 20% of the national production of fabrics,
40% of soft drinks, two thirds of all glass products and also owns a dominant
share of the production of tiles, chemicals, tyres, food products. In addition to
the very large national Bonyads, "almost every Iranian city has its own Bonyad",
affiliated with and controlled by local mullahs.
Through these structures the clergy manages the labor market, proof of which is
that it is estimated that more than 6 million are those who work for them.
Bonyads also play a very important role in enhancing and spreading Iranian
influence through extensive transnational and international activities, including
philanthropy and trade.
This form of protected and state-financed entrepreneurship has given rise to a
highly clientelistic labor market in clear competition with the private
entrepreneurial sector which, however, provides the social base for the
government and the clergy, strongly connected by a network of clientelistic
relationships which, above all, new generations try to despise.
In other words, the Bonyads instead of being - as they originally were -
charitable organizations, are "patronage-oriented financial companies that ensure
the channeling of revenues to groups and circles that support the regime", but do
not help the poor as a class and they have increasingly abandoned their social
welfare functions to devote themselves to commercial activities. Corruption
reigns supreme at all levels and to get a job it is often necessary to resort to
the "bribe" to be given to a clergy and a class of corrupt officials.
At the end of August, coinciding with the start of the protests, a parliamentary
report disclosed a embezzlement of three billion dollars within the management of
the largest Iranian steel producer, the Moharakeh Steel Company, evidence of
which is that the title of the steel company has been suspended from the Tehran
stock exchange and this despite nothing being done to prosecute the responsibles.

The deep reasons for anger

While the standard of living of the popular classes drops as a result of the
austerity measures introduced, against inflation that reaches 40%, which means
that 45% of Iranians live below the poverty line and the 10% are absolute poor,
i.e. have nothing to eat, the living conditions of those who are "better off" are
lowered to the point that the consumption of meat, milk and eggs has decreased by
50%.
In this situation, the protest feeds on symbolic gestures that are more than
normal in other parts of the world: listening to music (something forbidden by
fundamentalist Islam), publicly, on the street, giving each other a kiss in
public which isphotographed and posted on social media, challenging the moral
police and the strict Islamic code imposed by the regime. Thus the revolt, the
insubordination becomes widespread, capillary, endemic, driving the religious and
the squadristi of the moral police mad with rage, increasingly criminal and
increasingly hated. This explains why the protest seems to spread more and more
and, made public by the media, overcoming all censorship and restrictions,
involves 80 cities and is particularly strong in Iranian Kurdistan and
Balochistan, especially in the city of Zehedan where ethnic and separatist
tensions are strong .
The struggle of young people is therefore certainly aimed at obtaining the most
basic freedoms, but it is strong and rooted because it seeks to question the very
roots on which the Islamic Republic bases its power and the rotten and corrupt
social structure of the patronage systems with which economic and social
relations are managed. This especially since the vast majority of young people
have a medium-high school education and therefore claim rights and autonomy, they
ask for a life worthy of being lived.
It may happen that the protest movement decreases in intensity, but what is
certain is that it will have a karst trend because it is motivated by profound
reasons of a structural nature and therefore is destined to last over time. To
break through it needs to involve the bazaar economy which is a structural
element of the Iranian economy. This can do it by increasing the social
instability that damages trade.
Success largely depends on the perseverance and determination of the fighting
protesters .

Gianni Cimbalo

http://www.ucadi.org/2022/11/21/giu-il-turbante/
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