A waged war does not only bring death and destruction. To counter the internal
social-political destabilization, censorship and repression against dissidentsare fundamental for those governments directly involved in the conflict. What hasbeen happening in Russia since the beginning of the "Tragedy" represents thisstate of affairs in all respects: the closure of websites and newspapers thatreport news "not aligned with the Putin regime", control of Russian commercialsocial networks (VK ) and foreigners (Meta, Twitter etc) by the authorities andprivate companies colluded with the government, complaints, trials andconvictions for defeatism and so on. These checks by Putin's government serve topresent, on an international media level, Russia and its peoples as united inwanting to continue this war and, at the same time and in a hidden way,annihilate any form of internal political dissidence (parliamentary andextra-parliamentary ). For almost a year now, we have been giving voice tovarious platforms of Russian resistance in our blog. "Posle" (translation of"after") is a site, created by dellu compagnu as a response to the warmongeringpropaganda of Putin and his associates - and, consequently, to the currentRussian authoritarian grip on the "Tragedy" in Ukraine. With the aim ofpresenting a series of ways out of the situation created by the Putin regime, thecomrades of "Posle" have published a series of interviews, analyzes andcriticisms on what is happening in Russia and how the war in Ukraine is perceivedfrom the Russian population.How do the Russians explain their support for the war in Ukraine? Why do theycontinue to support war despite their lack of enthusiasm? Sociologists SvetlanaYerpyleva and Sasha Kappinen report the results and conclusions of their researchon how Russians support the war in a depoliticized way.When we began to examine support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine withinRussian society, we ran into a paradox. Many people we interviewed were shockedby the news of the outbreak of war. They were horrified. They could notunderstand how such an event was possible. "It was unbearably hard", "I washorrified", "It shouldn't be like this", "We are making a terrible mistake", "Ihad a fit of hysteria, I cried", "I didn't speak for three days", "The my worldcollapsed", "I never expected to see a real war in the 21st century and for mycountry to be the aggressor in this situation": this is what people interviewedsaid. A month later, all of them, in one way or another, started supporting thewar - or at least justifying it. What happened?Morally disoriented, the people interviewed tried to fit the war intoa[thoroughly]revised global vision. They have tried to find the conditions andarguments to compensate for the perceived despicableness of the Russian invasionof Ukraine; they normalized war by convincing themselves that "wars always goon"; they attributed their initial shock to their own naivety, to their failureto understand that "the world is not perfect"; finally, they embraced theirpowerlessness and irrelevance in trying to influence a situation that was beyondtheir control. Of course they referred to, as well as appropriated, propagandaclichés to defend the war. They did not do it automatically but with cognitive,rhetorical and even physical effort. These efforts have enabled them to overcomemoral conflict, resolve ethical dilemmas, recover from shock, and return toeveryday life. As a result what seemed impossible to them yesterday is now seenas inevitable.This dynamic view of how support for the war has spread in Russian society allowsus to understand the underlying rationale and mechanisms behind a significantportion of this support. Of course, among the advocates of war there areconvinced, politicized people with deeply held views who advocate the conflictvery differently. The war and its changes coincide with their aspirations, hopesand ideas about the world order. But these people are a minority among those weinterviewed and, one can say, a minority among Russians. The support for the warby most of our respondents (and by a considerable part of the Russian population)is not a consequence of their political awareness. It is passive and reactive: itdoes not serve as an action in their daily life and does not derive from theirinterests, needs or moral principles (on the contrary, it largely contradicts them).Central to this support is the depoliticization of Russian society. This is oneof the main conclusions of the forthcoming analytical report produced by ourresearch team - which describes and analyzes this particular depoliticisedsupport for war.Since the beginning of the war, our team has used qualitative methods(sociological interviews) to monitor the perception of Russians about the war.Let us try to understand what is behind the support for war and how war affectsour society. We have chosen qualitative methods to understand the rationale,mechanisms of support and condemnation of war -[arguments]invisible behind thenumbers. In the spring of 2022 we collected more than two hundred interviewsamong those who supported the war, those who opposed it and those who had doubts- and published an analytical report, which you can read here. In the fall of2022, we decided to focus on examining support for the war, collecting nearly 90interviews on those who supported the conflict While in our first report theycompared three groups of people with different attitudes towards the war, in thesecond report, which will be published shortly, we have managed to capture anddescribe the general patterns of depoliticized support for war in Russianauthoritarian society. Such support is not only based on supporting Russia'sinvasion of Ukraine as such. In some ways it is a special case of many Russianswho support government decisions that are contrary to their interests, especiallyif the causes and consequences of these decisions go beyond the immediateexperience of their private life. When such decisions concerned domesticpolitics, their negative effects mainly affected people in Russia, remaininginvisible to the rest of the world. This time, unfortunately for Ukraine, theburden of their consequences fell entirely on the citizens of the neighboringcountry.How does this support work?First, people who support the war have no positive feelings about the conflict,despite justifying and generally "supporting" the government's actions - in thiscase, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine. Indeed, most of the people interviewedfeel fear and anxiety in the face of the continuation of the military conflict."The anxiety is intense, it doesn't end anywhere, it's terrible, people die onboth sides," explains one of them (male, 50 years old, circus administrator,October 2022). Fear became exceptionally high when military mobilization began inSeptember 2022; a few weeks later this fear faded into the background, turninginto a nagging anxiety without a cause. Also, many people cannot imagineoptimistic scenarios. The main wish of the people interviewed who are not opposedto the war is, paradoxically, to want to stop it (preferably in favor of Russia).But even Russia's victory is desired not because there is a belief in positivechange after the war, but because losing would seem like an even greater disaster.Secondly, the main arguments in defense of the government's actions do not comefrom the propaganda of these acts. It is exactly the opposite: most of the peopleinterviewed try to demonstrate that they have a negative attitude towards thephenomenon of military aggression. Thus, their support is based on the idea thatthere is no room for alternatives ("I am against war, but there was no otherway", "War is bad, but it is a forced measure"). For these people, the invasionof Ukraine does not appear to be an optimal solution but, rather,[comes from]theresult of a lack of choice and the impossibility of resolving the situation in abetter way. By the same logic, many Russians responded to the announcement ofmilitary mobilization: it is scary and horrible, but there is no way to dowithout it. "I don't feel euphoric about having to go to war, to kill someone.No, absolutely not" (man, 28 years old, computer graphics artist, October 2022),"I have no desire to go to war" (man, 60 years old, entrepreneur, October 2022) -admit the people interviewed, adding that if they will receive a summons, theywill be "forced" to go to war. "Where else can we go?", "Well, if it'snecessary," they conclude with a heavy sigh. Both war and mobilization areextremely unpleasant, but forced and inevitable steps which most of the peopleinterviewed, by their own admission, would prefer to avoid but which they findnecessary to endure.Third, people support some elements of government decisions and condemn others.We have already written here about the contradictory support for the "specialoperation". The people participating in our study consider Russia's actionsjustified and necessary and, at the same time, they want an early end to the wardue to its prolongation. They may deplore the mobilization but believe that goodcitizens should not turn their backs on their country - even if it[does]wrong.They may wish for a Russian victory, but see no reason for starting the war orits positive consequences. "I side with those who are left and are willing to goto war if necessary," says one person interviewed. "If our country is at war, itis very serious. But if we lose this conflict it will be even worse. We didn'tstart it but we have to finish it." In another part of the interview, however, headmits: "I don't understand. What does NATO want from Russia? I am afraid thatUkraine and the Donbass area may disintegrate into small entities beyond anyone'scontrol, such as Somalia. There will be little satisfaction from this state ofaffairs, because territories that no one controls represent serious economic andpolitical problems" (female, 21, student, November 2022). In this sense, it isnot easy to define each individual as a "supporter" of the war or an "opponent".They are supporters and opponents at the same time. To support this conflict inan authoritarian and depoliticized society that wages war and asks itsinhabitants for support, it is enough to remain silent, come to terms withreality and continue to live one's life. To oppose it, however, one must overcomethe inertia of depoliticization, formulate a position and speak (even in ananonymous interview with a sociologist). Consequently, even contradictoryacceptance, approval that coexists with condemnation, continues to produce tacitsupport for war.Finally, people often justify government decisions without looking at theirreasons but only at their consequences (even the geopolitical arguments preparedby Russian propaganda still seem too abstract and incomprehensible for manypeople). We define this kind of justification of the war in Ukraine as "reversejustification", an apologetic argument that reverses the course of the argument.In these justifications, the inevitable consequences and "effects" of the war,such as the aggressive behavior of the Ukrainians and the AFU towards theRussians, begin to be seen as causes of the conflict and become arguments defenseof the latter.Simply put: since Ukrainian bombs fall on our border territories and the Westsupports the AFU, the "special operation" was indeed necessary. "Listen, youasked me: do you believe in the threat of Ukraine? Yes I believe]. Kill me[if Idon't believe it]. I didn't believe it on the 24th. And now I believe it. When itall[started to happen,]I saw, I understood that they weren't joking," admits oneof the interviewees (male, 60 years old, entrepreneur, October 2022). Anotherperson interviewed expands on this thought:"The kids who went there, at first, didn't want to go. And now they want to goall the way. No one knew there was real fascism - we thought it was allover.[...]Many people were not in the mood to fight. They thought it was[amove]to scare them. But when we dug deeper, there was something even grown mendidn't expect. So I think Russia had to cut that bubo. I don't think it woulddisappear. Because judging by how things are going, the conflict would havehappened (female, 52 years old, university professor, November 2022).Furthermore, with time, war itself is becoming more tangible and real, becomingpart of the world around us (albeit still mediated, for most Russians, bysmartphones and television screens). Many begin to perceive it as bad weatheroutside the windows or as a natural catastrophe - a manifestation of global worldprocesses and crises, the power of which, like bad weather, cannot be resisted."It's cloudy now," says one of our interviewees in response to a question abouthis attitude to the war. "This is what happens. In the field, in general, thereis always shooting, killing, somewhere" (man, 42 years old, IT professional,October 2022). Moreover, during the long months of the war, some Russians are incontact with Ukrainian relatives and acquaintances and see their attitude towardsRussian citizens worsening. These episodes confirm the inevitability and, at thesame time, the validity of war, as if it were an experience in retrospect. Thus,many Russian people no longer need to actively seek arguments in defense of thewar - which they did in the first months of the Russian invasion. It is as if thewar is starting to justify itself, and the Russians are coming to terms with whatseemed impossible six months ago.Indeed, forced, impulsive and ideologically indifferent support for war is notharmless either. This support ultimately helps to normalize warfare and maintainthe status quo. Our research, however, shows that massive support for the war inRussia stems mainly from the structure of the state and society, which has takenshape in recent decades. To support war in a situation where it is of fundamentalimportance for the official doctrine of the state - and[above all]is at thecenter of the ideology of the political regime -, it is not necessary to abandondepoliticization, but the opposite. To oppose the war, however, politicizationproves essential. Since the depoliticization of Russian society has been broughtabout in part by the consistent efforts of the authorities over the past twodecades, an anti-war stance would require people to overcome their inertia andmake an effort to abandon their apolitical stance. The Russians, who lived in adepoliticized authoritarian state where social institutions had been destroyedfor so long, became hostages of this system from the very beginning of the warand could not condemn the state's decision. Even if this decision was againsttheir interests."Isn't the number of deaths, destruction and suffering that the war has caused areason to condemn it?" anti-war Russians ask their compatriots. "Isn't it enoughto say that war is a crime?" Our research shows that's not enough. What appearsto opponents of the war as an individual (and ethically colored) human reaction,a moral choice of an individual is, in reality, the[overall]result of the actionsof social forces. In a sense, we can distinguish two levels of those whopassively support the war and, at the same time, judge what is happening: thesocio-political (used by the callous and the cynics) and the personal (where theyremain human to their own eyes).This knowledge is essential in the discussion of collective responsibility whichforms the basis for political decisions at the international level. Under adifferent socio-political system, many of the supporters of the war, insecure andforced, would have opposed it. This situation demonstrates once again theenormous power that the social order and society has over the individual.[At thesame time]it also gives some hope: if the socio-political situation were tochange, some people who support the war could quickly start condemning it.https://gruppoanarchicogalatea.noblogs.org/post/2023/05/27/accettare-linevitabile/_________________________________________A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C EBy, For, and About AnarchistsSend news reports to A-infos-en mailing listA-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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