WORLD WORLDWIDE ARGENTINA News Journal Update - (en) Argentina, FORA, Organizacion Obrera #99: RIGHT TO EXPLODE - Anti-rights (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

 I don't know when the anti-rights expression was installed as if it were

a political category. It seems that there are those who promote rights
and those who deny them. If this were the case, "rights", as a general
thing, would be something objective and univocal towards which only one
can take a position for or against. More rights is good, less rights is
bad. ---- This Manichean vision of the issue is subsidiary to the
polarization of left and right to establish a quadrant of political
analysis. This comes from the French Revolution, when parliament was
divided between supporters of the revolution and defenders of the ancien
regime. Something as simple as the physical location (some to the left
of the president of the assembly and others to the right) ended up
representing a political position in the face of a kind of linear
evolution, a forward movement of societies. Some would move in the
direction of progress and others would react against it to preserve the
status quo.

How then to think about property rights? It is very significant that
since the time of the French Revolution there were popular sectors that
seriously questioned the right to own land as a fundamental institution
of the old economic and political order. However, this principle,
transferred to the citizen once the exclusivity of the nobility is
abolished, ends up being effectively established as the fundamental
institution of a new political order that transcends as progressive. The
universalization of the right to property, against not so much the old
regime as the communist demands of the most radicalized sectors of the
revolution, ends up being written down for history as the
progressiveness of modern society, the left expanding rights.

If you look closely, privilege is also a right. He who has a privilege
has the right to claim for himself what is not permitted for others. But
it is a somewhat restricted right: what progressivism would demand is
the expansion of that right so that it is not so restricted. In other
words, it is about universalizing that which is particularized, so that
what is a right for some becomes a right for anyone. But when one right
contradicts another right, the very idea of expansion depends on what
the focus of the matter is.

In recent campaign speeches, the question of law keeps appearing
everywhere. Following the linear outline of parliamentary geography,
let's say that from Bergman to Bulrich, each and every one made more or
less vague reference to "rights." Perhaps the exception has been Milei,
who ritually mentions only three. It may be said, with justification,
that manipulation and deception abound, but the matter is more complex.

What do we talk about when we talk about law? As a general idea, law
regulates relationships within society with some relationship with
justice. Whenever we talk about rights we talk, in one way or another,
about justice.

But law is not understood as an evaluation of society in terms of
assessing its relationship with justice, but rather as an instrument
intended for the realization of a just society, or at least as the
configuration of an act of justice. The right is claimed, promised or
simply considered in the face of current or imminent injustice. It is
reasonable: what could the evocation of a right that is actually
exercised mean? If we claim the right to housing it is because we cannot
exercise it. If we defend the right to compensation it is because we
warn of the imminent risk of losing it.

But the right to housing is not the same as the right to compensation.
Housing is a general concept, relative to a universal need, while
compensation is a specific norm for a specific sector and in a specific
context. The law has this duality: it can refer both to concepts linked
to a universal idea of justice and to norms presumably intended to
regulate social relations in accordance with that justice. And we will
see that this expresses a tension between institutionality and rebellion
that also involves a naturalization of the State.

Contemporary institutions are unthinkable without the revolutions of the
late 18th century in the United States and France. From the French
Revolution we have two fundamental signs: the invention of modern
citizenship and the declaration of the rights of man and the Citizen.
 From there we must bring up a main question: the citizen, in this
context, is an individual who has rights before a State. The existence
of the modern individual, who has become a citizen, is politically
determined by his relationship with the State.

This determination is ambivalent: on the one hand, the State would
guarantee the rights of citizens in the configuration of the rule of
law. On the other hand, the individual retains, against the State,
rights that would guarantee freedom and property. On the one hand, we
have the legitimizing sense of the State as a giver of rights, to the
extent that it appears as the source of the regulations that regulate
the social relations under its domain. On the other hand, we have the
legitimizing sense of liberal anti-statism that is expressed in the
limitation of the scope of this normativity by virtue of universal
justice. The assumption for a State of law is that the power of the
State is limited by a supreme law, which is the constitution of that State,

So these guarantees intersect. While the State is the giver of civil
rights, civil rights limit the power of the State. This contradiction
can be understood if it is understood that in modern (and postmodern)
societies the State occupies the place of the common. And it does so in
a quite specific way: by centralizing administration, monopolizing
violence, and institutionalizing social relations through law.

The question of the monopolization of violence is an important issue in
this context because it is what ultimately guarantees the coercive power
of society, which remains in the hands of the State and is the bottom,
ultimately, of any right. When a right is exercised, it is done
inexorably against another right. Without that opposition the law is
meaningless. What is the point of claiming a right to something that
cannot happen? And what is the point of claiming a right to something
that actually occurs? Having a right implies prohibiting its denial, it
implies that in the face of opposition, society recognizes the right of
one of the parties and can provide for its verification, ultimately,
coercion, public force. In a state society, the state is responsible for
enacting the law,

The question of public force goes far beyond the rule of law, liberal
democracy or any specific form of organization of public affairs. Every
society will always have to resolve the conflicts that arise in it and
there is no reason to assume that they could always be resolved
peacefully. This does not mean that the way to address the issue is
necessarily through the State. Certain interpretations of anarchism
incur the error of statism and confuse public affairs with the State,
but they assume, unlike statism, that once the State ends, all problems
end. They assume that spontaneity will bring the overcoming solutions
that the State represses and they attribute to the State an evil will.
This distortion of anarchist thought, and statism itself in its
self-justified hegemony, have sown the disastrous field from which Milei
springs. The nutrients in that field are composed of a structural
frustration that is not easily explained.

If law can be linked to the regulation of social relations, it is
because it belongs to the society it regulates as a system and set of
norms. And if it can be linked to the idea of justice, it is because it
refers to the principles that society should verify to be considered
fair. In this second aspect, the law does not belong to society but
transcends it because it refers to the universality of the social issue.

The social issue is universal because justice is an important issue for
any society. Humanity, in its collective dimension, involves issues that
do not depend on the particularities of each person and are, therefore,
universal. In this field, what is properly political appears, that is,
the question about how to make a good society. The law, in its universal
aspect, advances in the answer to that question. Thus, affirming the
right to housing implies that any society, to be fair, must guarantee
access to housing. The rules that are created within it to guarantee
that right are what we also call rights (usually in the plural).

So the question of law, within a society, is a normative, institutional
matter, and refers to what the mechanisms of that society are to
regulate its internal relations. But the law, outside of that
regulation, begins to be a political matter.

Claiming a right that current society does not recognize implies
questioning the social order, showing that this society recognizes
rights that it should not recognize. A historical and current example,
perfectly true and necessary, is the denial of the right to property.
The right to property, as the foundation of the social order, has
historically been rejected by socialism, in its different aspects. This
negation opposes either the right to the full product of labor, or the
right to existence. Seen this way, what would be the anti-rights option:
the one that denies property, the one that denies full remuneration for
the product of work, or the one that denies the guarantee of access to
goods that are considered necessary for human existence?

Let's take these three fundamental rights: right to property, right to
the full product of work and right to existence. The first is expressed
as the prohibition to use an asset whose owner does not need or own, and
that is linked to it by a transcendent relationship validated by social
institutions, that is, by the property title. The second is expressed as
the remuneration for the total contribution of the work involved in
production. It contradicts the first to the extent that remuneration
based on property rights enables a lower remuneration for work, since
there is no obligation to do otherwise without violating, precisely,
property rights. That is the origin of surplus value pointed out by
William Thompson [1]and then taken up, so to speak, by Marx. The third
right, the right to existence, is expressed in unrestricted and
unconditional access to goods considered necessary for existence. Note
that existence will not necessarily have to be identified with subsistence.

Between these three principles or universal rights there are various
contradictions. It can be noted that the right to existence also
contradicts the right to property. It does so to the extent that access
to consumer goods, which can be understood as necessary, is guaranteed
above ownership of the means with which they were produced. But it also
contradicts the principle of full remuneration because this guarantee
disregards the work contributed.

What decision would progressivism have to make? Which of these rights is
most linked to the supposed linear progress of society? Which of these
rights would be broader? Undoubtedly, anyone who opposes any of them, or
seeks to limit and restrict them, could justly be designated as anti-rights.

This is enough to solidly establish that the rights/anti-rights
dialectic is fallacious. The social issue is not debated in magnitudes
nor does it correspond to a linear evolution. The notion of progress is
very useful for technology and for the trades, but it is not at all
useful for the social issue, because the debate between the principles
from which to think about a good society, and the debates about how to
transform society society from them, are not at all linear. Politics has
a starting point: we are the same or we are different. But it doesn't
have a horizon. It is not possible to draw a straight line that will
save us from the abyss of making the decision.

Totalitarianisms

In the troupe contest of the electoral campaign everyone pretends to be
the ones who defend rights and accuse freely. From the marketing slogan
that warns against the "right without rights" to the pagan prayer of the
right to life, liberty and property, the demand for rights is a fairly
effective resource when it comes to selling tickets to the government show.

In this context, one of the most emblematic phrases in this regard
reappeared on the scene: where there is a need, there is a right. It is
an empty phrase that tries to express that the task of the State is the
protection of the people and the coverage of their needs. What would
have happened in a pandemic without the Ministry of Health?, they tell
us a thousand times. The denial of the State seems to open a horrifying,
unthinkable void. But this does not explain the virtues of the State nor
does it open an analysis of other ways of organizing life in common, but
rather it attacks with terror, terrifies with the idea of death and
devastation.

Progressive fallacies regarding the virtues of the State in the general
context of a frustrating life are music to the ears of the stale
liberalism that has become fashionable. This has spread in the West hand
in hand with an institutional decline coextensive with the profound
crisis of political representation. For the first time in a long time,
fundamental issues of the social order are being debated. The problem is
that this debate is of the worst kind, and is expressed in pathetic
terms that pitifully promise a social disaster.

In our case, that rancid liberalism is expressed by Javier Milei and an
entourage of marginals brought together based on a macabre illusion. To
question the empty phrase about needs and rights, Milei says that
"someone has to pay" those rights [2]. In this opposition the underlying
conflict between the property-owning sector and the defenders of the
State can be seen, not so much in the sense of conflicting interests,
but rather in the substance of the matter, the conception of the social
issue and the law.

On the one hand, for the radical liberalism that Milei represents, it is
a moral issue that is expressed in the vindication of three fundamental
rights: freedom, life and property. On the other hand, the conception
that law is the justice tool of the State which is, in turn, its only
creator.

These three fundamental rights of liberal rhetoric do not seem to
require definition. This is how empty signifiers function politically:
they are vectors of agglutination, vehicles for capturing passions
behind empty notions on which a multitude can be built. It is a resource
typical of what has been called populism, claimed by those who claim it
but used by everyone. Before it would have been called demagogy. But if
one looks at the general context of liberal discourse, those three
signifiers, freedom, life and property, are intertwined and have a
considerably specific significance.

For liberalism, freedom takes on an individual character and refers to a
physical matrix. It is conceived as the denial of any limitation or
dependence that operates on the individual. It is conceived in the way
that physics describes the dynamics of a mechanical part that moves
freely when it is not limited by anything. Thus, freedom is the
individual capacity to do what one's own will commands, and its degree
increases in accordance with the absence of limits. For this there are
two requirements: life and property.

For liberalism the individual is the quintessence of humanity. Society
is a more or less broad or general interrelation of individuals with
each other. There is no space for the common. Social interaction is
identical to psychological interaction, and this appears clearly in the
economistic perspective of human action expressed in the book of the
same name by the Austrian Von Mises.

When a thought ignores the common dimension of social life, it
transforms politics into ethics, and the universals intended for the
thought of a good society are replaced by the particular or individual
appreciations that make up an identity projected as a mandate for social
life. This is a totalitarianism in which one part is identified with the
whole and prevails hegemonically over the others. We will see later,
however, that it is not the only way of thinking about totalitarianisms.

Ethical positions tend to be inalienable. The ethics of negotiators is
the negotiation itself, and for every negotiator, negotiation is
essential. It is the paradox of democracy when it is conceived as a
value and not as an administrative resource. When democracy is a value,
the political dimension gives way to an ethical dimension that denies,
prohibits and cancels any discourse contrary to democracy itself. This
is the procedure of Milei's intolerance that represents the rejection of
any social order that does not correspond to the ethical determination
of the liberal mantra.

When something out of the ordinary appears in the few off-script
questions, Milei throws a tantrum and begins to rant against the state.
And it is not that Milei does it, it is done by the entire current of
thought in which he is a member, which is an economistic configuration
of social thought based on the now famous Austrian school. The
dialectical opposition between statism and individual freedom is the
ruin of our time to the extent that it is the food for the rabid
foolishness of both. We are inside a cowboy movie in which there are
only good guys against bad guys, and each one is sure that he is the
good guy.

Milei and his friends coincide inch by inch with the corporate statism
of the organized community with regard to the identification of the
common with the State. What one fights the other claims: anti-state
liberalism flatly rejects the virtues of the State that statism elevates
to the zenith. And in both cases the intolerance is the same because the
position is no longer intended to be so much political as ethical.

For statism, the State is the quintessence of humanity. The common is
not a dimension but rather a thing that appears in all cases, a
sameness, in the sense that, according to statism, we would all share
the same thing. Statist totalitarianism is of a different type compared
to liberal one: the nation is superior to the sectors that compose it as
the whole is superior to the parts, and the common is that which
identifies these sectors as parts of the whole. That is why statism is
not egalitarian, but equalizing. Its operation is the capture of
everything that exists, within an order capable of representing it. The
State fulfills the function of distributing the specific places for each
sector and thus establishing a criterion of justice in which everyone
receives what corresponds to them. This correspondence is determined by
the interests of the whole, understood as common interests because we
are all fellow nationals, compatriots. Citizenship in this context is
closely related to nationality. Foreigners who inhabit the national
territory may be almost compatriots through the assignment of
citizenship that is normally second class.

Statism consecrates political rights to compatriots and enables, to a
greater or lesser extent, depending on the case, foreign citizens. The
political is an internal matter, typical of a community linked by
identity traits. The famous fragment of the Argentine constitution that
declares "to ensure the benefits of freedom for all men in the world who
want to live on Argentine soil" seems more like a slip or imprecision
than a real egalitarian inspiration. But, in any case, it is an aspect
that deserves to be considered liberal to the extent that it tends to
weaken the common identity in a humanist evocation of universal brotherhood.

Both statism and liberalism lose their egalitarian character the moment
they renounce the common dimension of social life. Statism does so by
identifying the common with an identity totality represented by the
State; Liberalism does so by denying any identity trait beyond the
individual, and conceiving the social bond as an exchange, thus assuming
an economicist conception of society.

 From the economic point of view, society is neither good nor bad, but
efficient or inefficient. All human existence is explained univocally
from the cost-benefit relationship. This, perhaps, would not be
completely wrong if common issues, transcendent with respect to the
individual, were considered as values to be considered in that
calculation. Thus justice, that is, the materialization of social
relations linked to the egalitarian principle, would be one of the
values whose violation would imply an infinite cost and would,
therefore, ruin any balance.

But for liberalism the common does not exist: there is only exchange.
The liberal scale is a Roman that everyone carries with them. Society,
being the multiplication of individualities, does not have a properly
political dimension. The political appears as a reflection of a state
institutionality that is also reduced, ultimately, to a group of
individuals whose desire is to get rich by stealing. Theft, a crime
against property, is analogous to homicide or subjugation, to the extent
that they are crimes that violate the three basic principles of its
doctrine.

In this context, the idea of justice as verification of the egalitarian
principle is nonsense because, according to liberalism, we are
different. There is no equality because no two individuals are
identical. If the individual is the quintessence of humanity, equality
is absurd.

Difference, equality and sameness

For both liberalism and statism, equality is understood as the result of
a hegemonic process. Some claim it, others reject it, but there is no
difference in the underlying issue. For statism we are also all
different, and that difference must be represented in the social order
through the State. The State, beyond or through its institutions,
fulfills the function of grouping material existences into groups whose
common characteristics can be recognized and managed. This is the
representative operation of the State: it re-presents social relations
in a way that can be administered.

Corporatism is possibly one of the most extreme forms of statism. In the
corporate order, each sector of society occupies its place in the State
through a corporation that represents it. They are parts, they are
organs of a body. Outside of these corporations there is nothing, and
each corporation is unique in its kind because it represents objective
positions within the social order. This is the conceptual basis of the
promoted unity of Argentine unionism.

For statism, the political subjectivity of a sector is determined by the
material interests of that sector. This is equivalent to saying that
subjectivity does not exist for the State because nothing can be
administered from that. The regulation of divergent, or even
conflicting, interests is the main function of the State. So the
positioning of a corporation expresses the determination of its
objective interests and any divergence in this regard that cannot be
assimilated must be omitted, repressed or denied. If a divergent
position tried to make a place for itself outside of its representation,
it would enable the use of public force for its repression, because it
would imply a violation of the representative social order. In the
Argentine constitution this is expressed in the famous article 22 which
says: «The people do not deliberate nor govern, but through their
representatives and authorities created by this Constitution. "Any armed
force or assembly of people that claims the rights of the people and
petitions in their name commits the crime of sedition."

Statism does not share the individualist hypothesis, but rather
conceives individualities as cases of a collection. What matters to the
State is to manage the conflicts of interest of these collections in a
fair manner. In this case, justice is giving everyone theirs, precisely
because there is something for everyone. To have a place means to be
represented, to be part of the totality that the State administers and
represents. Each collective identity corresponds to something of the
common, depending on the place it occupies and according to what it
needs. Hence, where there is a need there is a right. The right is the
validation by the State of a sectoral claim. But this need is not a
simple demand, but a demand validated and legitimized by the
representative mechanisms of the State.

In this it is seen that the basis of legitimation of the State is an
ontological difference of humanity according to the place that each
sector occupies in society. That difference is adjectived as ontological
means that it is related to being. What each one is, for the State,
depends on how he represents himself. You are a worker, a teacher,
unemployed, a citizen, a foreigner, etc. Each collection determines what
you are before the State. Before the State we can be identical or
different, but never equal. Society is a set of sets that requires an
entity to organize and contain it. Without the State there would only be
a terrifying indifferentiation.

We see then that the statist discourse and the liberal discourse
coincide in two fundamental pillars: the ontological difference (we are
different [3]) and the identification of the common with the state.

When Milei rejects the idea that where there is a need there is a right,
he does so by saying that "someone has to pay for it." Like all
primitive ideas, it tries to make sense through eloquence, but what
seems obvious hides a very specific concept of human society. What can
it mean to pay a fee? Does every right imply a cost?

Let's put it this way: if a thief steals a car and is caught, the
legitimate owner of the car would claim it for himself by virtue of the
right of ownership. Naturally the court would enshrine that right and
return the vehicle to the victim of the theft, taking it away from the
thief. Could it be said that the thief is paying the victim's right?
What I try to illustrate, and I think I succeed clearly, is that the
idea that a right implies a payment is a fallacy that reduces debates
about the distribution of wealth to the incorrect imaginary of social
plans caricatured as money that is taken away. compulsively to workers
to give them to those who do not work. What does fit quite closely with
that caricature is not the social plans, but the income on capital.

But there is an even more important aspect of that comment from Milei.
He says, just like Fernández de Kirchner, Massa, Larreta, Bulrrich or
whoever: When you give a right... Who gives rights?

 From the point of view of the representatives of the people, rights are
always understood as a donation from the rulers that may be more or less
fair, but always arbitrary and discretionary. The rulers give rights
because they are the administrators of the State. They don't even make
an effort to say that they recognize the rights, which would also be
questionable but less rude. The State is the one that gives rights
because the only thing that is being discussed is the administration of
the world as it is, because "it is what it is."

"It is what it is" is a philosophical phrase. It says that the being of
all that is is before us as we see it. What there is is what it is.

If one takes this expression seriously, as we should, one soon realizes
that nothing can be different from what it is. Being is conservative, at
least if we follow the indications of Parmenides, who seems to have been
the first to say that something cannot come from nothing, that what is
cannot not be and what is not cannot be. He said it with a sentence that
seems crazy and is the statement of the principle of non-contradiction:
"What exists is and what does not exist is not." It is one of the
pillars of Western philosophy, or has been during its first two
millennia of history, approximately.

What is implied, beyond the logical consequences, is that being does not
change, but rather what we see is the manifestation of what is, which
explains the change, the mutability.

In social terms, if we had to accept that "it is what it is" we should
say: we are different, the world is as it is and cannot change in its
fundamentals. We can only expect superficial changes and expect in all
fairness that the administration of the divergent interests of
difference will be accommodated more or less in the way that best suits
us. Depending on which we are, society will take on one physiognomy or
another. Nothing is universal. Justice is only a power relationship.

On the contrary, when we say that we are equal we are saying that it is
not what there is, but that there is a world that fails because it does
not verify what is. Our society is badly ordered because its order does
not conform to equality. And we can say this because humanity is not a
sameness, a uniform and unique thing whose characteristics are
determined by the elementary properties that give it material existence,
but by the capacity to articulate social relations in the dimension of
the common, where the properties Materials that give existence to human
individuals are not important except as a subsequent condition of the
social bond. Always, to all effects, we are equal in principle.

This equality collides with the idea of equality before the law.
Equality is not a consequence of the law but, at best, its cause.
Equality before the law is, as they say, the identical prohibition that
neither a rich nor a poor person can sleep under a bridge.

Equality before the law is the mechanism that aims to verify the
principle that we are different, ontologically different, because we are
always, ultimately, individuals. It is the equalizing mechanism of
liberalism. This mechanism is analogous to state hegemony that stands
responsible for compensating original injustices. The State manages
particular interests for the benefit of the nation, understood in turn
as a common benefit because what is common is that of the ontological
difference that is present in each of us. We are different but we have
something in common, like the children of the same father, the natives
of the same country or the citizens who, carriers of another blood, have
adopted our identity by living on Argentine soil.

The egalitarian principle indicates otherwise. The commonality of
equality is not the fragment of sameness that persists in the
ontological difference nor the juxtaposition of reciprocal actions in
the context of the market: the commonality is the dimension of human
existence in which the social fact is possible, it is the condition of
the possibility of solidarity and empathy, and the willingness of common
effort for the benefit of all. In this sense the common is empty of all
identity. It is, strictly speaking, completely empty. There is no factor
present in all of us that determines a communion, but rather a universal
void that enables community.

If we focus on this aspect we clearly see why communism never existed.
The famous "actually existing communism" exists, but it is not
communism. It is a system of state hegemony that submits social
relations to an equalization based on the sameness that subsists in the
members of an imagined society based on an ontological difference. The
horrors of these experiences are contrasted with the horrors of the
others, and each one inflates his chest by transferring his political
conceptions to the field of ethics. In this way, the consequences become
principles and intolerance emerges as an expression of a bureaucracy
that confuses means, principles and ends.

Right to burst

Claiming rights can mean two things. Either administrative acts are
claimed, and we are then in the order of the management of public
affairs, or consequences relative to the principles from which the
conditions of a good society must be thought are claimed, and we are
then in the order of politics.

What we recognize daily as politics is a set of tricks. Tricks aimed at
managing power and capturing public forces for one's own benefit, or for
the benefit of a specific sector of society. Politics, in these terms,
is war by other means, it is the more or less civilized way of
deceiving, manipulating and extorting one another to obtain a particular
benefit from the social fact. It is the most concrete expression of
corruption.

We must understand corruption as the use of public resources for private
gain, which is the most concise way to define capitalism. Policy is, in
ordinary terms, the set of resources, techniques and procedures to
achieve that goal.

If we stayed only with that perception we would lose sight of a much
more important issue, which is politics understood in depth: the thought
of a good society. That the thought of a good society is masked by the
tricks to obtain a sectoral benefit from the management of public
affairs is a clear sign of the ruinous precariousness of the society in
which we live.

Far from validating this precariousness with an apparently pragmatic
interpretation that tells us that "it is what it is," what is truly
pragmatic is the folly of persevering in transforming the world to
obtain from it an increasingly advanced verification of the principle of
equality. And this pragmatism is expressed in the fact that the only
path that takes us towards something similar to justice is perseverance
in transformation. The other path, that of resignation, is anything but
pragmatic because it takes us to another place and forces us to resign
the egalitarian principle in accepting ontological difference.

This transformation implies recomposing the concept of the common (and
therefore of the public thing) at a distance from the State, that is,
separating it from it. It is about breaking the identity between the
public, the common and the State. They are three different things.

If the common is the dimension to which the social fact belongs, without
any positive data that belongs to it in the way of a common factor, the
public is the order in which the social fact unfolds and is made up of
the regulations that we are capable of. to produce. The public is
currently captured by the State to the point where it often becomes
indiscernible to us, and in that confusion the common tends to disappear.

We can illustrate this idea with public health. Is talking about public
health and state health the same thing? Does abandoning state health
regulation necessarily imply giving up public health? The true
contemporary challenge of the working class is the projection of a
communist society, that is, a society in which the prioritization of the
common enables an administration of public affairs capable of doing
without the hegemonic centrality of the State. It is not worth dropping
the automatic reference to the federative principle, much less to
popular spontaneism after the rebellion. It is necessary to go further
in ideas and facts. And this is the project of the working class because
it is the only one that has the power to ruin income on capital, which
is what properly constitutes class society.

A first step is to assume that the political dimension of law implies
the affirmation of some rights (and therefore the denial of others) by
virtue of the principle of equality and outside the administration of
real interests. These are political statements that will begin with the
abolition of property and the consequent claim of the right to exist.

We are not here claiming the right to housing, to health or any other
right that can be expressed as an administrative demand, as a demand
against the State, or as an empty cry incapable of being materially
expressed in any concrete form, but rather establishing that the project
Social society of the working class must enshrine the right to
existence, which is contrary to the retributive economy of exchange,
based in turn on the right of property. It is about establishing what
kind of organization of public affairs has the capacity to overcome
contemporary injustices and venture from the egalitarian principle
towards new social experiences.

A demand of these characteristics does not expect an elegant and
restraining concession from the administrators of the State and the
owners of capital, but rather a violent and repressive reaction. In
turn, it is not a claim that can be made as a demand. The State grants
administrative rights as a result of a tension in which the most
economical form of resolution is the minimum concession of sectoral
benefits in exchange for "social pacification". That pacification is
nothing more than sweeping the conflict under the rug in defense of the
status quo. A demand of these characteristics implies the direct action
of the organizations of the working class in the reorganization of the
social structure and not a petition before the State.

The function of the State is conservation, it is to prevent profound
changes in the structure of the society it regulates. That is why its
institutions are at the service of the ruling class. Not because the
people who carry out functions necessarily have that will, or are
directly committed to this or that social and economic project, but
because the very structure of the institutional framework that
characterizes it is aimed at harm reduction. If the effect of state
administration is some kind of synthesis of conflicting interests, it is
because those interests already exist, are part of the social situation,
and carry forward a tension that the state must manage.

The rights that the State grants are administrative devices of a society
in self-defense. There may be better or worse circumstances. These
circumstantial transformations always benefit one party, and it may
happen that that party is occasionally the weaker. But the underlying
result will always be the conservation of the material and symbolic
bases of society. The State can only manage transformations that are
already operating in society and whose resistance would have worse
consequences.

Political rights never have their source in the State, and on the
contrary, they find in it one of the main obstacles. Given this, an
emancipatory policy that promotes a radical transformation consistent
with the egalitarian principle can never renounce massiveness.
Transformations always begin as a rupture of the social order and end up
being imposed by force on the institutional order that resists them.
This rupture may take the form of the hegemonic imposition of a minority
sector of society, or the form of a consolidation of new practices.
linked to new ideas of the social order installed in the vast majority
of a society that in one way or another has decided to modify its own
texture. This is a revolutionary social outbreak.

An emancipatory project that aims to transform society can never give up
becoming the majority. This does not mean that majorities by themselves
have some degree of relationship with justice. If this were so, it would
have to be assumed that contemporary society is just because it is in
fact sustained by the aspirations and behaviors of the majority of the
population. Those of us who permanently oppose property rights as the
main regulator of social and economic relations are clearly a minority
in today's society. But this minority condition, precisely because it is
consistent with the egalitarian principle, cannot be imposed as a moral
imperative on the rest of society. And this impossibility has two
causes: it cannot be done because the imposition would be contrary to
its principle,

There is only one possible path: persevere in the organization and
dissemination of ideas aimed at social transformation. The ideological
challenge in times of crisis is to give efficient explanations to the
problems of the world and compose projects destined to transform it. But
we must quicken our pace because bombs explode when they explode, and if
we are not clear about where to go, we will go where everything is
going. If a decision is not made, the destination is defined
conservatively by inertia.

Today we are on a straight path towards an explosion that can be
virtuous or disastrous. There is no excess optimism. Social frustration
is completely focused on the demands on the State, even in the liberal
model that seeks to install a new government. There is a crisis of
political representation that is expressed in an identity representation
without any kind of political project. Rights are claimed left and right
without questioning the bases of the social order that generates
injustice, and the individualist vision of a radical liberalism is
installed with the naturalness of a cosmogony that explains everything
in terms of benefit, scarcity and exchange. Progressivism, installed as
a universal ethic, enhances the totalitarian rebellion of an
antagonistic ethic. Political thought has been completely subordinated
to litigious morals and encrypted in technicalities brought from the
capitalist economy. The working class seems to no longer exist, or to
have been reduced to a bunch of unions governed by the most rancid union
corporatism. The few times that he looks up, he does it trying to obtain
a sectoral benefit and repeats the bad practices of government
politicking. All the options offered lead to dead ends, and there is not
the slightest spirit of initiative that enables the illusion of opening
new, autonomous paths, linked to a transcendent thought of the social
order connected with something similar to justice. or have been reduced
to a bunch of unions governed by the most rancid union corporatism. The
few times that he looks up, he does it trying to obtain a sectoral
benefit and repeats the bad practices of government politicking. All the
options offered lead to dead ends, and there is not the slightest spirit
of initiative that enables the illusion of opening new, autonomous
paths, linked to a transcendent thought of the social order connected
with something similar to justice. or have been reduced to a bunch of
unions governed by the most rancid union corporatism. The few times that
he looks up, he does it trying to obtain a sectoral benefit and repeats
the bad practices of government politicking. All the options offered
lead to dead ends, and there is not the slightest spirit of initiative
that enables the illusion of opening new, autonomous paths, linked to a
transcendent thought of the social order connected with something
similar to justice.

The right to exist has been pitifully retained for now in the old pages
of socialist historicism. We workers accept that the classic ideas of
our movement are blurred in the functional prejudices of political
leadership and journalism that is mostly repulsive because it is
functional, devious, inconsistent and rude. The only aspiration of the
working class seems to be to magically prosper in a world that shows us
more and more clearly that it can almost completely do without our
well-being.

The cards are cast. Injustice completely justifies popular rebellion.
Someone could say that we have the right to explode, but it seems that
the explosion that appears on the horizon will be of another kind. And
everything indicates that we are going directly to him.

[1] "An Inquiry into the principles of the distribution of wealth most
conducive to human happiness", or An investigation of the principles of
the distribution of wealth most conducive to human happiness , is the
brief title of the work of William Thompson in which this question is
expressed. It is from 1850.
[2] "We have systematized the origin of decadence as what we define as
the caste model: they say that 'where there is a need a right is born',
the problem lies in the fact that the needs are infinite and if there is
a right someone has to pay it and the resources are finite" Javier Milei
in the speech of August 24, 2023 at the " 20th Council of the Americas "
[3] Identity is the other side of difference. If we are different it is
because we can identify that difference.

https://organizacion-obrera.fora.com.ar/2023/09/04/derecho-al-estallido/
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