Given the doubts surrounding the CNT's current trade union model, I will
review its history to establish its contrast with the unitary
representation model (works committees), as well as the continuity or
parallels between different examples and eras. Therefore, we will review
the models from their very origins to aid understanding. ---- "Unitary"
Representation ---- We will begin by going back to the era of the First
World War. At that time, the German Second Reich needed to guarantee
industrial war production. Therefore, it required the industrial working
class to manufacture everything the army needed to fight its battles.
German trade unions were massively dominated by Social Democracy, and
the latter had agreed to go to war hand in hand with its national
bourgeoisie and aristocracy-destroying the Second International, by the
way. Since the German state did not want problems with the workers, they
guaranteed the existence of those unions.
However, in places where unions didn't exist, they had to find some
mechanism to keep the workers quiet... but still not form unions. The
answer was to appoint union representatives voted in by the factory
workforce. These representatives were tasked with negotiating working
conditions with the company. Social Democracy accepted that these
workers' delegates would be subordinated to the needs of war production
and that the organization would be top-down. Later, a radical sector
would emerge within these representatives, known as the Revolutionary
Obleute , which demanded the autonomy of the working class and was the
seed of the postwar Communist Party, but that's another story .
Let's focus on the terror that the Russian Revolution, the Soviets of
Hungary, Bavaria, the German workers' councils, and the mutinies in the
French and British navies, among other cases, represented for the
international bourgeoisie. The working class was threatened with social
revolution everywhere, and some means had to be found to calm its
cravings. The best the victors of the Great War found was to fulfill
some of their historical demands.
The 1919 Treaty of Versailles created an international body to regulate
labor relations, the International Labor Organization (ILO). Let's
remember that the fate of Europe was decided at Versailles. In its
founding declaration, the ILO spoke of ensuring future peace through
social and labor justice. In other words, everyone was very aware of
what the working class was demanding. Phrases like this still appear on
the ILO website. Today, it is a United Nations agency.
The ILO was structured as a supranational organization, made up of
delegations from the various member states. Its first declarations
coined the term "freedom of association." 2 The delegations were
tripartite and included representatives from the state, representatives
from employers' associations, and representatives from workers'
associations. This international institution was led by the
liberal-progressive bourgeoisie, social democracy, and laborism. Spain
participated in the ILO from the outset, at the Washington Conference
(the first ever). The first Spanish union representative was Francisco
Largo Caballero, leader of the UGT (Union of Workers' Unions). He was
elected to the Governing Body.
But wait a minute. The majority Spanish union in 1919 was the CNT. So,
what was the UGT doing at the ILO?
The same thing was happening with workers' delegations from other
countries, such as the Netherlands, which brought smaller (but more
docile) unions to the ILO rather than larger (but more radical) ones.
The key lies in ILO Article 389.3, which establishes that the "most
representative professional organizations" are those that appear, along
with representatives of the State and employers, from each country, at
the organization's annual Conference .
So each state invented its own system to determine which union was the
most representative. In some cases, it was based on membership, and in
others, on some kind of electoral contest to measure its strength
against other unions. But in other cases, it was a complete backroom
deal, with governments bringing in unions of their choice. Be that as it
may, the fact is that, at the behest of international organizations,
tripartite bodies were created to mediate labor relations at the time.
In line with this spirit, in the Spanish state, as early as 1919 and
1920, corporatist laws began to be passed that created joint committees
and mixed work committees based on the social interest, which was none
other than the "establishment of bodies and rules that allow for the
harmonious solution of any differences that may arise between employers
and employees[...]mercantile, before they become conflicts" 4 . In other
words: to avoid strikes, sabotage, boycotts and all that workers'
struggle that would empower the proletariat and give it the dangerous
idea of making the Social Revolution.
Following Miguel Primo de Rivera's coup d'état (1923), the UGT
participated in the dictatorship's joint or parity committees. It did so
at the urging of Largo Caballero, who favored participating in Primo de
Rivera's institutions that dealt with social issues. In fact, he himself
participated in the Council of State. The dictatorship intended to
create a "corporate parliament" in which business owners and workers
would be represented. Electing this parliament would require union
elections. However, this project was never implemented. Needless to say,
Largo Caballero's decisions provoked a political storm in the socialist
movement, which largely disagreed with the whole affair.
We can also see this type of mediating institution in the creation of
mixed juries in 1931 , during the Second Republic. The person
responsible for the law was the Republican Minister of Labor and Social
Security: again, Largo Caballero. The function of mixed juries was to
regulate labor relations. They were composed of representatives of
employers' associations and representatives of workers' associations.
The CNT called for a boycott from the outset, and as a result, mixed
juries never managed to develop sufficiently or consolidate.
Now let's see what the anarcho-syndicalism proposal was at the company
level.
Factory committees
In 1931, the CNT approved at its Third Congress the establishment of
factory and workshop committees as a necessary complement to the Single
Unions. Until then, unions were represented only by the delegate, who
was responsible for collecting dues and had the power to engage in
collective bargaining with the company. However, the CNT hoped this
implementation would be more profound and aligned with the
anarcho-syndicalism's professed goals of socializing companies. They
proposed that these committees have a dual mission: "This mission, apart
from being the practical confirmation of federalism, is a matter of
penetration, first, and of management, later . "
The factory committees served to decentralize the union and expand the
union structure to hundreds of workplaces. Thus, disputes would be
managed directly by the new committees and would no longer be the
responsibility of single unions or branches, which controlled the delegates.
In this case, when I talk about sections, I'm referring to the types of
trades into which the branch unions were subdivided. For the sake of
clarity, marble workers and plasterers formed sections of the
Construction unions. They should not be confused with today's union
sections. They were the remnants of the previous workers' societies that
had merged into single unions.
Consequently, the factory committee had to carry out a task, which they
called "penetration," in order to be admitted as a workers'
representative, gain access to statistical control of production, and
promote the training of the proletariat in the aspects of economic
organization and administration. It was expected that these factory
committees would be in charge of managing the companies once the Social
Revolution was unleashed.
Revolutionary militants of the time were able to explain the function of
these committees and how they fit into the revolutionary plans of the
libertarian movement. For example, Buenaventura Durruti, at a rally
prior to the November 1933 elections, for which the CNT and FAI
advocated abstention, expressed himself in these words:
«The FAI advises the CNT workers, since the CNT controls the factories
and production sites, not to abandon their posts; to remain at the
forefront of the machinery; and that in the event of an attempted
dictatorship or military coup, they must respond in every way,
energetically, as is appropriate. Keep a watchful eye on the Technical
and Factory Committees. A piece of advice to the FAI members, too: Your
place is beyond the factory. Let us remember Italy. Complementary action
is indispensable. Against Gil Robles' fascism, against any attempt,
military or other, the workers must immediately take over the factories.
The men of the FAI will go to other places to complete the revolution
begun with the seizure of the means of production .» 7
That is to say, in a proletarian insurrection, the workers must seize
the factories, and the factory committees will be in charge of managing
them. Meanwhile, the "street" revolutionaries will launch an offensive
to control all strategic points in the city or region. This is the same
scheme that was followed after July 19, 1936, and is the prelude to the
industrial collectivizations that proliferated throughout the Republican
territory.
The vertical union
During the early years of Franco's regime, Franco withdrew Spain from
the ILO (1941), believing the Nazis would win the war. This was partly
to use slave labor to rebuild the country and partly to continue the
unprecedented criminal accumulation of capital by the war's victors.
Most of the IBEX 35 companies trace their origins to this plunder.
However, by 1944, it was already clear that the Allies would win the
war. The regime decided to make a 180-degree turn in order to project a
more open image. Thus, it created a single, vertical union to which
everyone would be obligated to belong. Obviously, all previous business,
agricultural, and trade union groups were dissolved. The regime was not
going to re-legalize the UGT and CNT, which had waged war against them
in 1936 and were already organizing clandestinely at that time.
So, in that year, the Spanish Trade Union Organization (OSE) was
launched as an instrument of the totalitarian state and charged with
implementing economic policy. The OSE was led by the Falange and
represented in many state institutions (municipal councils, provincial
councils, the Cortes, etc.). It promoted harmony and collaboration
between social classes in a corporatist and fascist sense, typical of
the early Franco era. But the aspect that interested the working class
was that one of the OSE's functions would be to convey the aspirations
of producers to the highest echelons .
Beginning in 1944, union elections began to be held to elect delegates,
who were called shop stewards, and company juries. These resolved labor
disputes in the Labor Court. It can be seen that this was a mediating
body in line with ILO practice.
At that time, numerous trade unionists, formerly members of the UGT or
the CNT, were elected as shop stewards by their colleagues. This wasn't
a political issue, but a practical one, since they were the ones best
able to defend workers' interests and most familiar with the
legislation. In the case of the CNT militants, when one of them was
elected as a shop stewards, he was expelled from the Confederal
Organization for collaborating with the regime. At that time (1944-47),
the guerrillas were at their peak, and it was even common to think that
the Allies would intervene in Spain once the World War was over.
In 1948, Stalin called the Communist Party to a meeting in Moscow. This
was the moment when they abandoned guerrilla warfare and encouraged
their cadres to enter the channels of participation provided by the
Franco dictatorship. Therefore, the PCE created the Workers' Trade Union
Opposition in the 1950s, following instructions from the USSR, and its
mission was to participate in the electoral processes of the vertical
union. At first, they did not achieve positive results, but little by
little, they gained experience and were able to take advantage of
specific laws such as the regulation of company juries (1953) and the
collective bargaining agreements (1958). Ultimately, they would achieve
great importance within the labor movement and even within the vertical
union itself. One of those cadres, trained at that time, was Marcelino
Camacho.
It was during these years that Spain once again became European-friendly
in several respects, including labor. This is why it returned to the ILO
in 1956. Before the international community, Franco's regime presented
union elections as a justification for its social liberalization. From
this moment on, Franco's Spain began to align itself with the economic
powers of the Western bloc during the Cold War. As a result, the United
States raised concerns about the power the communists were gaining in
union elections. Thus, in the 1960s, they strengthened social democracy
alongside Germany. Socialist and UGT cadres were trained to compete
against the communists in business.
For their part, in the early 1960s, PCE union cadres organized
themselves into workers' committees within companies to negotiate
collectively. This initiative was a resounding success in the 1966 union
elections, and from then on, the Franco regime lost some control over
the labor movement, which became more radical in the following years,
especially from 1969 until the dictator's death.
The Transition
The decisive intervention of the United States and Germany succeeded in
establishing a powerful social democracy in Spain, which had been
residual during the Franco regime. Regarding labor relations, after the
approval of the Constitution in 1978, the Workers' Statute was approved
in 1980. While its approval was underway, the union elections of 1978
arrived. The state found itself faced with the need to balance the
expectations of the communists, who saw themselves as clear winners of
these elections, with the need to strengthen the new UGT (General
Workers' Union). Therefore, it maintained the previous model, only
opening it up to union candidates, who would be present on the works
councils, as the socialists had intended. These councils would be
elected by suffrage among the workers of a company or workplace.
We can understand this as a Solomonic solution: on the one hand, they
satisfied the communists, who were already specialized in winning these
elections, and on the other, they created a counterweight to the UGT
(Union of Workers' Unions), which at the time was demanding union
representation. It's a very typical agreement from the Cold War period
in Western Europe. Under the new system, things worked the same as they
did under Franco, but with the freedom to join any union.
But to summarize the Transition period, we must understand other things
about the context:
First, the enormous combativeness of this era, which had begun in the
previous period. The number of strikes had soared to unprecedented
levels. Assemblies proliferated in companies and neighborhoods. There
were numerous demonstrations and, above all, there was hope for
substantial change. Furthermore, the desire for freedom created a whole
new, highly open and demanding political and social climate that
fostered associational movement in all spheres of life.
Secondly, the CNT had been reconstituted quite late, in 1976, attracting
sectors of workers dissatisfied with the CC.OO. and people more
emotionally aligned with the historical CNT. At that time, the
Confederation was very heterogeneous and varied greatly from place to
place. It should be added that it was never as large in union terms as
the anarcho-syndicalist propaganda of the time claimed, although it had
considerable social strength, partly thanks to the working-class youth
and, in some cases, the counterculture.
Third, with the signing of the Moncloa Pacts (1977), the politicians and
military personnel of the post-Franco "bunker" intended to leave
everything "tied up and well tied up." They agreed with left-wing
politicians and unions on a lasting social peace to establish an era of
development and the entry into a consumer society. One of the key
aspects of the pacts was the approval of union elections, which would be
held the following year. As we have seen before, the main intention was
to please the two major union federations in exchange for their
renunciation of major strikes.
The UGT, up until this point, had positioned itself against union
elections, as they sought to restore the framework of the historical
unions, just as the CNT had done. For their part, the workers'
commissions would formally structure themselves as a trade union center
in 1976, as they had planned to participate in the 1978 union elections,
which were intended for legally constituted unions, not for
self-organized worker groups. They elected Marcelino Camacho as General
Secretary.
Fourth, around 1978, a severe crisis spread. This led to a drop in union
membership, and many people abandoned union membership because
unemployment soared and many businesses closed. This was the beginning
of the so-called "disenchantment." It also provoked severe crises in all
the organizations of the revolutionary left, which saw the window of
opportunity opened by Franco's death closing. The new situation could be
explained by the combination of international problems, geopolitical
movements, the actions of the state and its infiltrators on the left,
the beginnings of the consumer society, heroin, police violence,
terrorism, fascists on the streets, etc. All of this contributed to the
disenchantment, to one extent or another.
The cycle ended with Tejero's coup, the 1982 World Cup, and the PSOE's
landslide victory in the elections. Now let's look at the path of
anarcho-syndicalism after the boom of 1975-78.
The CNT stood alone in its outright rejection of union elections. Even
so, some within the CNT participated in the 1978 union elections. Under
the acronym CNT, 413 delegates were elected, despite the Confederation's
formal refusal to participate in these electoral processes. This refusal
would be endorsed at the Confederation Congress in December 1979. The
arguments the CNT offered for not participating were that these
elections broke the effective unity of the workforce in the workplaces
by having to participate in electoral contests. The CNT also advocated,
as we saw earlier, a return to the framework of the historical unions.
Furthermore, at that time, the CNT placed great emphasis on
self-management. Although not equated with libertarian communism, this
self-management served to frame an era in which companies were closing
and could be converted into cooperatives by their workers, an aspiration
shared by anarcho-syndicalism.
Shortly afterwards, in mid-1980, a group of unions that had challenged
the Fifth Congress met in Valencia to create a new organization. It
became known as the "CNT Congress of Valencia." Over the following
years, the CNT expelled other unions, continuing the bitter climate of
division and confrontation that had existed since the spring of 1978.
In 1983, for its Sixth Congress, the CNT published its agreements in
force until then . 9 The factory and workshop committees were still
listed as a fundamental element. The text was a simple adaptation of the
1931 agreements, although it is clear that they were referring to the
union section.
It is relevant to see in that same newspaper their assessment of how
they had carried out their collective bargaining up to that point. In
their self-criticism, they highlighted the following factors: the
organization's agreements were excessively theoretical and ideological
and removed from the country's labor market reality; the membership was
young and inexperienced and lacked preparation for collective
bargaining; internal disputes had prevented healthy criticism, and there
was much suspicion among members that prevented them from finding
practical solutions for fear of being called "reformists"; they had
given too much importance to union elections, ignoring the fact that
many people did not participate in them; their union sections lacked
sufficient support, resorting to protesting in front of the other major
unions; they had not been able to communicate the CNT's program to their
members; and finally, they recognized the defenselessness of many
sections, which were left adrift, isolated, without the support of their
own unions .
At that time (1983), the CNT agreed to demand the dissolution of the
works councils and the strengthening of union branches as a form of
worker representation in companies. They accepted the holding of
elections, but only to measure the degree of union representation in
companies without resorting to constant mobilization, and not to
establish an intermediary body between the company and the workers . 11
However, at the time, there were quite a few CNT unions that supported
participation in union elections. Their proposal was to strip the
committees of their meaning from within and promote worker participation
in the assemblies promoted by the committees. This option ultimately
garnered considerable support in 1983, eventually winning the congress.
But the agreement was quickly amended and the page was turned as if
nothing had happened, amid outrage among its proponents.
Thus, the Confederal Unification Congress was held in 1984. At this
time, a significant number of CNT-AIT unions, in favor of participating
in union elections, joined the new organization, which was called
CNT-Unificado. That is, they joined the unions that had previously left
and been expelled from the CNT. Within a few years, this organization
had to change its name, becoming the current CGT.
The CNT union model
It took the CNT several years to implement its model. Although it had
one in place in 1983, the Confederation was so weakened by internal
problems and by failing to clearly understand that having a union model
also implied having a consistent union action, that it took a long time
to react, remaining theoretical. Therefore, at various CNT congresses,
proposals to participate in union elections sometimes arose, which
demonstrated uncertainty about its own model.
In 1985, the government approved the Organic Law on Freedom of
Association. This law recognized the rights of trade union branches. In
fact, it copied the ILO's guidelines on freedom of association.
From then on, the CNT focused on fine-tuning its own model, despite its
small size. During this period, given the existing weakness, many union
branches were reduced to a minimum, including single-person branches, in
order to defend jobs against company retaliation. This practice
coexisted with the existence of some important branches.
In general, the sections grew during periods of conflict and disappeared
during periods of tranquility, as during the shipyard strikes of the
1980s. But the outlook changed radically in the early 2000s with the
Tomares and Mercadona strikes, and the subsequent Caprabo strike, where
lessons were learned from the mistakes of the previous strike and new
sections were strengthened in the workplaces.
Although some semblance of it began to emerge at the 1990 Bilbao
Congress, the other model was actually discussed more at that congress.
At the 1995 Granada Congress, a specific union model was theorized, but
it was not put into practice. It was from 2008-09 onward that a specific
union model would be more clearly discussed, and it was definitively
incorporated into the CNT's trade union action agreements at the 2010
Córdoba Congress. Its development would take a further step at the 2015
Zaragoza Congress and would finally mature at the 2022 Canovellas Congress.
The model is based on what is known as union representation, which we
have already seen described previously. Positions and tasks are
distributed within the union branches. It is union action that protects
you from union repression by companies and dismissals, not positions, so
all members of the branch must perform union duties. The more
demonstrable union work, the greater the protection.
All positions (delegate, prevention secretary, organization secretary,
treasurer, equality secretary, etc.) are revocable at any time by the
assembly. This allows for democratic control of the section, which will
appoint whomever it deems appropriate to perform the tasks it needs.
They can distribute labor information outside of working hours, receive
information sent by their union, collect membership dues, and so on.
The CNT's union model is based on membership, that is, having enough
members. This is what will give the section legitimacy. To achieve
improvements through collective bargaining, you need strength. Sections
can negotiate decent agreements, wage increases, or oppose collective
dismissals.
For many years, a comprehensive framework of legal protection was put in
place for these sections thanks to numerous court rulings that the CNT
patiently won. The organization gradually adapted to this system and
created its own resources to support the sections in conflict, such as
the Confederal Technical Cabinet and the Confederal Resistance Fund.
For comparison, in the 1990s, the CNT's dynamic was to complain about
the unfair discrimination suffered by the Confederation, whose sections
were denied access to the notice board, to working hours, to union
halls, etc.
In the case of works councils, the CNT understands them as bodies over
which the unions do not truly have control and through which the
autonomy of the working class is denied. Having autonomy would imply
having organizational formulas that are not mediated by the state or
employers. The important thing is to know who is appointing our
representatives in the companies and which body is responsible for
implementing union action.
Let's not forget that a works council is a collegiate body in which
decisions are made by simple majority. Therefore, it depends on the
balance of power between the various unions that comprise it. In other
words, what matters is not having a presence, but actually having a
majority on the committee.
We encounter many candidates for union elections composed of people who
aren't even members of the union they will represent on the committee.
We encounter representatives over whom their own unions have no control
and union branches of other unions with no power to act, since all
concrete capacity to act is vested in the unitary body, the works
council. Therefore, there is no way we can speak of anything resembling
direct action here. What kind of mobilization are they going to promote
like this?
A committee of this type, without real support (although some do exist),
is considered to pose no serious threat to the company. Companies have
no trouble putting together a candidate list with family members or
workers subservient to the employers' interests. After all, it's the
company that sets the ballot boxes and is perfectly capable of
influencing the results. These pro-company candidates compete with those
sponsored by the workforce. And this doesn't take into account that
union elections are held every four years, and most unions don't take
advantage of the time to achieve immediate improvements, but instead
present them within their platform to see if they'll be voted in... "and
then, if that's the case," those improvements will be negotiated.
That's why the CNT believes it's better to organize as a bloc within the
same union through a union branch, which can also act immediately. And
this will be done without subsidies or union hours granted by the
company, which may seem like an ideological excuse, but it's a very real
form of pressure used by companies. Anarcho-syndicalism is more
practical than ideological, despite what it may seem, and rejecting
these privileges serves to guarantee our class autonomy. All this is
done so that control rests with the union, the branch, and the workers
who comprise them. Ultimately, it's based on building an associative
network within companies-people's power, workers' power, or whatever you
want to call it.
To be more specific, within the current CNT agreements, the sections
should present specific demands. These include those related to gender
equality and respect for LGBTI+ diversity, which must be guaranteed by
the section both within the company and in the section's internal
relations. Likewise, the section can immediately begin to demand issues
related to the eco-social transition, such as transport bonuses, waste
reduction, improved safety, hygiene, and recycling, reducing pollution
and environmental impact, and anything else they can think of. In a
context of degrowth, the sections can propose changes in the functioning
of the productive sectors and transform production. In this case,
everything depends on the strength and also the degree of politicization
of each section, a responsibility that falls on the unions and their
training capacity.
Another noteworthy aspect is that the current CNT has a revolutionary
program adapted to the 21st century. While this is a process that takes
many years to develop, it is understood that the union sections must
also be prepared. For example, if one day they wanted to control access
to work, the union sections should collaborate with labor exchanges and
assemblies of the unemployed, facilitating successful interviews during
the selection process. Or if they wanted to conduct a sectoral analysis,
the union sections in a specific field could collaborate for this. And
with this, we close the circle of this article, once again considering
the union section as the seed of the socialization of companies within
the implementation of libertarian communism.
Finishing
Today, the Confederation has surpassed the membership it had in 1983 and
is established in hundreds of companies. We can say that fatigue with
the works council model after four decades, or that the current business
structure is increasingly composed of smaller companies, also plays a
role in our benefit. In any case, given the current unionization rates,
all unions have a lot of ground to cover, and we shouldn't look for
excuses, since in Spain there are 20 million salaried employees without
a union and, therefore, without any union model.
The CNT must fine-tune its machinery, as there are many people who
aren't moving at the same pace, nor are there unions that have the same
capabilities. We must continue to take stock of what has worked in
recent years and what hasn't, in order to improve the model and make a
definitive leap forward.
And finally, I'll repeat the two key ideas from the debate on union
models: a) it's important how unions appoint their representatives
within companies; and b) it's important to know where we place the
weight of our union action.
By Miguel G. Gómez @blackspartak
1. To learn about the history of these revolutionary representatives,
see Alejandro Andeasi Cieri (2019). "Revolutionary Company
Delegates[Revolutionäre Obleute]and the Council Movement in the Great
War and the German Revolution of 1918-1919." UAB Nuestra Historia, vol.
8, 2019, pp. 67-90.
https://www.aacademica.org/alejandro.andreassi.cieri/25.pdf
2. It is the right of workers to establish or join unions of their
choice. It is enshrined in the Spanish Constitution, Article 28.
Therefore, it is a fundamental right in accordance with international
law. This right derives from Human Rights. The first time this right was
achieved was in England in 1824. In other words, unionism existed first,
and basic civil and political rights were later achieved, and it has
never been the other way around .
3. Carlos Molero Manglano. The most representative unions .
https://vlex.es/vid/sindicatos-representativos-205924505
4. Daniel Vallès Muiño (2020). "The Ministry of Labor 1920-1923:
Relevant Regulatory Initiatives.
Corporatism, Affordable Housing, and Labor Inspection." IUSLabor 2/2020
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.raco.cat/index.php/
IUSLabor/article/download/370078/466109/
5. The text of the law can be read here:
https://www.boe.es/gazeta/dias/1931/11/28/pdfs/GMD-1931-332.pdf
6. Minutes of the CNT Congress. Madrid, 1931 .
7. Workers' Solidarity, 11/17/1933, p. 3
8. Glicerio Sánchez Recio. The Vertical Union as a Political and
Economic Instrument of the Francoist Revolution . University of Alicante .
9. CNT , February 1983
10. Same here
11. Another interesting resolution was the unions' request for control
of Social Security, which was never implemented .
https://www.regeneracionlibertaria.org/2025/03/18/explicando-el-modelo-sindical-de-la-cnt/
_________________________________________
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review its history to establish its contrast with the unitary
representation model (works committees), as well as the continuity or
parallels between different examples and eras. Therefore, we will review
the models from their very origins to aid understanding. ---- "Unitary"
Representation ---- We will begin by going back to the era of the First
World War. At that time, the German Second Reich needed to guarantee
industrial war production. Therefore, it required the industrial working
class to manufacture everything the army needed to fight its battles.
German trade unions were massively dominated by Social Democracy, and
the latter had agreed to go to war hand in hand with its national
bourgeoisie and aristocracy-destroying the Second International, by the
way. Since the German state did not want problems with the workers, they
guaranteed the existence of those unions.
However, in places where unions didn't exist, they had to find some
mechanism to keep the workers quiet... but still not form unions. The
answer was to appoint union representatives voted in by the factory
workforce. These representatives were tasked with negotiating working
conditions with the company. Social Democracy accepted that these
workers' delegates would be subordinated to the needs of war production
and that the organization would be top-down. Later, a radical sector
would emerge within these representatives, known as the Revolutionary
Obleute , which demanded the autonomy of the working class and was the
seed of the postwar Communist Party, but that's another story .
Let's focus on the terror that the Russian Revolution, the Soviets of
Hungary, Bavaria, the German workers' councils, and the mutinies in the
French and British navies, among other cases, represented for the
international bourgeoisie. The working class was threatened with social
revolution everywhere, and some means had to be found to calm its
cravings. The best the victors of the Great War found was to fulfill
some of their historical demands.
The 1919 Treaty of Versailles created an international body to regulate
labor relations, the International Labor Organization (ILO). Let's
remember that the fate of Europe was decided at Versailles. In its
founding declaration, the ILO spoke of ensuring future peace through
social and labor justice. In other words, everyone was very aware of
what the working class was demanding. Phrases like this still appear on
the ILO website. Today, it is a United Nations agency.
The ILO was structured as a supranational organization, made up of
delegations from the various member states. Its first declarations
coined the term "freedom of association." 2 The delegations were
tripartite and included representatives from the state, representatives
from employers' associations, and representatives from workers'
associations. This international institution was led by the
liberal-progressive bourgeoisie, social democracy, and laborism. Spain
participated in the ILO from the outset, at the Washington Conference
(the first ever). The first Spanish union representative was Francisco
Largo Caballero, leader of the UGT (Union of Workers' Unions). He was
elected to the Governing Body.
But wait a minute. The majority Spanish union in 1919 was the CNT. So,
what was the UGT doing at the ILO?
The same thing was happening with workers' delegations from other
countries, such as the Netherlands, which brought smaller (but more
docile) unions to the ILO rather than larger (but more radical) ones.
The key lies in ILO Article 389.3, which establishes that the "most
representative professional organizations" are those that appear, along
with representatives of the State and employers, from each country, at
the organization's annual Conference .
So each state invented its own system to determine which union was the
most representative. In some cases, it was based on membership, and in
others, on some kind of electoral contest to measure its strength
against other unions. But in other cases, it was a complete backroom
deal, with governments bringing in unions of their choice. Be that as it
may, the fact is that, at the behest of international organizations,
tripartite bodies were created to mediate labor relations at the time.
In line with this spirit, in the Spanish state, as early as 1919 and
1920, corporatist laws began to be passed that created joint committees
and mixed work committees based on the social interest, which was none
other than the "establishment of bodies and rules that allow for the
harmonious solution of any differences that may arise between employers
and employees[...]mercantile, before they become conflicts" 4 . In other
words: to avoid strikes, sabotage, boycotts and all that workers'
struggle that would empower the proletariat and give it the dangerous
idea of making the Social Revolution.
Following Miguel Primo de Rivera's coup d'état (1923), the UGT
participated in the dictatorship's joint or parity committees. It did so
at the urging of Largo Caballero, who favored participating in Primo de
Rivera's institutions that dealt with social issues. In fact, he himself
participated in the Council of State. The dictatorship intended to
create a "corporate parliament" in which business owners and workers
would be represented. Electing this parliament would require union
elections. However, this project was never implemented. Needless to say,
Largo Caballero's decisions provoked a political storm in the socialist
movement, which largely disagreed with the whole affair.
We can also see this type of mediating institution in the creation of
mixed juries in 1931 , during the Second Republic. The person
responsible for the law was the Republican Minister of Labor and Social
Security: again, Largo Caballero. The function of mixed juries was to
regulate labor relations. They were composed of representatives of
employers' associations and representatives of workers' associations.
The CNT called for a boycott from the outset, and as a result, mixed
juries never managed to develop sufficiently or consolidate.
Now let's see what the anarcho-syndicalism proposal was at the company
level.
Factory committees
In 1931, the CNT approved at its Third Congress the establishment of
factory and workshop committees as a necessary complement to the Single
Unions. Until then, unions were represented only by the delegate, who
was responsible for collecting dues and had the power to engage in
collective bargaining with the company. However, the CNT hoped this
implementation would be more profound and aligned with the
anarcho-syndicalism's professed goals of socializing companies. They
proposed that these committees have a dual mission: "This mission, apart
from being the practical confirmation of federalism, is a matter of
penetration, first, and of management, later . "
The factory committees served to decentralize the union and expand the
union structure to hundreds of workplaces. Thus, disputes would be
managed directly by the new committees and would no longer be the
responsibility of single unions or branches, which controlled the delegates.
In this case, when I talk about sections, I'm referring to the types of
trades into which the branch unions were subdivided. For the sake of
clarity, marble workers and plasterers formed sections of the
Construction unions. They should not be confused with today's union
sections. They were the remnants of the previous workers' societies that
had merged into single unions.
Consequently, the factory committee had to carry out a task, which they
called "penetration," in order to be admitted as a workers'
representative, gain access to statistical control of production, and
promote the training of the proletariat in the aspects of economic
organization and administration. It was expected that these factory
committees would be in charge of managing the companies once the Social
Revolution was unleashed.
Revolutionary militants of the time were able to explain the function of
these committees and how they fit into the revolutionary plans of the
libertarian movement. For example, Buenaventura Durruti, at a rally
prior to the November 1933 elections, for which the CNT and FAI
advocated abstention, expressed himself in these words:
«The FAI advises the CNT workers, since the CNT controls the factories
and production sites, not to abandon their posts; to remain at the
forefront of the machinery; and that in the event of an attempted
dictatorship or military coup, they must respond in every way,
energetically, as is appropriate. Keep a watchful eye on the Technical
and Factory Committees. A piece of advice to the FAI members, too: Your
place is beyond the factory. Let us remember Italy. Complementary action
is indispensable. Against Gil Robles' fascism, against any attempt,
military or other, the workers must immediately take over the factories.
The men of the FAI will go to other places to complete the revolution
begun with the seizure of the means of production .» 7
That is to say, in a proletarian insurrection, the workers must seize
the factories, and the factory committees will be in charge of managing
them. Meanwhile, the "street" revolutionaries will launch an offensive
to control all strategic points in the city or region. This is the same
scheme that was followed after July 19, 1936, and is the prelude to the
industrial collectivizations that proliferated throughout the Republican
territory.
The vertical union
During the early years of Franco's regime, Franco withdrew Spain from
the ILO (1941), believing the Nazis would win the war. This was partly
to use slave labor to rebuild the country and partly to continue the
unprecedented criminal accumulation of capital by the war's victors.
Most of the IBEX 35 companies trace their origins to this plunder.
However, by 1944, it was already clear that the Allies would win the
war. The regime decided to make a 180-degree turn in order to project a
more open image. Thus, it created a single, vertical union to which
everyone would be obligated to belong. Obviously, all previous business,
agricultural, and trade union groups were dissolved. The regime was not
going to re-legalize the UGT and CNT, which had waged war against them
in 1936 and were already organizing clandestinely at that time.
So, in that year, the Spanish Trade Union Organization (OSE) was
launched as an instrument of the totalitarian state and charged with
implementing economic policy. The OSE was led by the Falange and
represented in many state institutions (municipal councils, provincial
councils, the Cortes, etc.). It promoted harmony and collaboration
between social classes in a corporatist and fascist sense, typical of
the early Franco era. But the aspect that interested the working class
was that one of the OSE's functions would be to convey the aspirations
of producers to the highest echelons .
Beginning in 1944, union elections began to be held to elect delegates,
who were called shop stewards, and company juries. These resolved labor
disputes in the Labor Court. It can be seen that this was a mediating
body in line with ILO practice.
At that time, numerous trade unionists, formerly members of the UGT or
the CNT, were elected as shop stewards by their colleagues. This wasn't
a political issue, but a practical one, since they were the ones best
able to defend workers' interests and most familiar with the
legislation. In the case of the CNT militants, when one of them was
elected as a shop stewards, he was expelled from the Confederal
Organization for collaborating with the regime. At that time (1944-47),
the guerrillas were at their peak, and it was even common to think that
the Allies would intervene in Spain once the World War was over.
In 1948, Stalin called the Communist Party to a meeting in Moscow. This
was the moment when they abandoned guerrilla warfare and encouraged
their cadres to enter the channels of participation provided by the
Franco dictatorship. Therefore, the PCE created the Workers' Trade Union
Opposition in the 1950s, following instructions from the USSR, and its
mission was to participate in the electoral processes of the vertical
union. At first, they did not achieve positive results, but little by
little, they gained experience and were able to take advantage of
specific laws such as the regulation of company juries (1953) and the
collective bargaining agreements (1958). Ultimately, they would achieve
great importance within the labor movement and even within the vertical
union itself. One of those cadres, trained at that time, was Marcelino
Camacho.
It was during these years that Spain once again became European-friendly
in several respects, including labor. This is why it returned to the ILO
in 1956. Before the international community, Franco's regime presented
union elections as a justification for its social liberalization. From
this moment on, Franco's Spain began to align itself with the economic
powers of the Western bloc during the Cold War. As a result, the United
States raised concerns about the power the communists were gaining in
union elections. Thus, in the 1960s, they strengthened social democracy
alongside Germany. Socialist and UGT cadres were trained to compete
against the communists in business.
For their part, in the early 1960s, PCE union cadres organized
themselves into workers' committees within companies to negotiate
collectively. This initiative was a resounding success in the 1966 union
elections, and from then on, the Franco regime lost some control over
the labor movement, which became more radical in the following years,
especially from 1969 until the dictator's death.
The Transition
The decisive intervention of the United States and Germany succeeded in
establishing a powerful social democracy in Spain, which had been
residual during the Franco regime. Regarding labor relations, after the
approval of the Constitution in 1978, the Workers' Statute was approved
in 1980. While its approval was underway, the union elections of 1978
arrived. The state found itself faced with the need to balance the
expectations of the communists, who saw themselves as clear winners of
these elections, with the need to strengthen the new UGT (General
Workers' Union). Therefore, it maintained the previous model, only
opening it up to union candidates, who would be present on the works
councils, as the socialists had intended. These councils would be
elected by suffrage among the workers of a company or workplace.
We can understand this as a Solomonic solution: on the one hand, they
satisfied the communists, who were already specialized in winning these
elections, and on the other, they created a counterweight to the UGT
(Union of Workers' Unions), which at the time was demanding union
representation. It's a very typical agreement from the Cold War period
in Western Europe. Under the new system, things worked the same as they
did under Franco, but with the freedom to join any union.
But to summarize the Transition period, we must understand other things
about the context:
First, the enormous combativeness of this era, which had begun in the
previous period. The number of strikes had soared to unprecedented
levels. Assemblies proliferated in companies and neighborhoods. There
were numerous demonstrations and, above all, there was hope for
substantial change. Furthermore, the desire for freedom created a whole
new, highly open and demanding political and social climate that
fostered associational movement in all spheres of life.
Secondly, the CNT had been reconstituted quite late, in 1976, attracting
sectors of workers dissatisfied with the CC.OO. and people more
emotionally aligned with the historical CNT. At that time, the
Confederation was very heterogeneous and varied greatly from place to
place. It should be added that it was never as large in union terms as
the anarcho-syndicalist propaganda of the time claimed, although it had
considerable social strength, partly thanks to the working-class youth
and, in some cases, the counterculture.
Third, with the signing of the Moncloa Pacts (1977), the politicians and
military personnel of the post-Franco "bunker" intended to leave
everything "tied up and well tied up." They agreed with left-wing
politicians and unions on a lasting social peace to establish an era of
development and the entry into a consumer society. One of the key
aspects of the pacts was the approval of union elections, which would be
held the following year. As we have seen before, the main intention was
to please the two major union federations in exchange for their
renunciation of major strikes.
The UGT, up until this point, had positioned itself against union
elections, as they sought to restore the framework of the historical
unions, just as the CNT had done. For their part, the workers'
commissions would formally structure themselves as a trade union center
in 1976, as they had planned to participate in the 1978 union elections,
which were intended for legally constituted unions, not for
self-organized worker groups. They elected Marcelino Camacho as General
Secretary.
Fourth, around 1978, a severe crisis spread. This led to a drop in union
membership, and many people abandoned union membership because
unemployment soared and many businesses closed. This was the beginning
of the so-called "disenchantment." It also provoked severe crises in all
the organizations of the revolutionary left, which saw the window of
opportunity opened by Franco's death closing. The new situation could be
explained by the combination of international problems, geopolitical
movements, the actions of the state and its infiltrators on the left,
the beginnings of the consumer society, heroin, police violence,
terrorism, fascists on the streets, etc. All of this contributed to the
disenchantment, to one extent or another.
The cycle ended with Tejero's coup, the 1982 World Cup, and the PSOE's
landslide victory in the elections. Now let's look at the path of
anarcho-syndicalism after the boom of 1975-78.
The CNT stood alone in its outright rejection of union elections. Even
so, some within the CNT participated in the 1978 union elections. Under
the acronym CNT, 413 delegates were elected, despite the Confederation's
formal refusal to participate in these electoral processes. This refusal
would be endorsed at the Confederation Congress in December 1979. The
arguments the CNT offered for not participating were that these
elections broke the effective unity of the workforce in the workplaces
by having to participate in electoral contests. The CNT also advocated,
as we saw earlier, a return to the framework of the historical unions.
Furthermore, at that time, the CNT placed great emphasis on
self-management. Although not equated with libertarian communism, this
self-management served to frame an era in which companies were closing
and could be converted into cooperatives by their workers, an aspiration
shared by anarcho-syndicalism.
Shortly afterwards, in mid-1980, a group of unions that had challenged
the Fifth Congress met in Valencia to create a new organization. It
became known as the "CNT Congress of Valencia." Over the following
years, the CNT expelled other unions, continuing the bitter climate of
division and confrontation that had existed since the spring of 1978.
In 1983, for its Sixth Congress, the CNT published its agreements in
force until then . 9 The factory and workshop committees were still
listed as a fundamental element. The text was a simple adaptation of the
1931 agreements, although it is clear that they were referring to the
union section.
It is relevant to see in that same newspaper their assessment of how
they had carried out their collective bargaining up to that point. In
their self-criticism, they highlighted the following factors: the
organization's agreements were excessively theoretical and ideological
and removed from the country's labor market reality; the membership was
young and inexperienced and lacked preparation for collective
bargaining; internal disputes had prevented healthy criticism, and there
was much suspicion among members that prevented them from finding
practical solutions for fear of being called "reformists"; they had
given too much importance to union elections, ignoring the fact that
many people did not participate in them; their union sections lacked
sufficient support, resorting to protesting in front of the other major
unions; they had not been able to communicate the CNT's program to their
members; and finally, they recognized the defenselessness of many
sections, which were left adrift, isolated, without the support of their
own unions .
At that time (1983), the CNT agreed to demand the dissolution of the
works councils and the strengthening of union branches as a form of
worker representation in companies. They accepted the holding of
elections, but only to measure the degree of union representation in
companies without resorting to constant mobilization, and not to
establish an intermediary body between the company and the workers . 11
However, at the time, there were quite a few CNT unions that supported
participation in union elections. Their proposal was to strip the
committees of their meaning from within and promote worker participation
in the assemblies promoted by the committees. This option ultimately
garnered considerable support in 1983, eventually winning the congress.
But the agreement was quickly amended and the page was turned as if
nothing had happened, amid outrage among its proponents.
Thus, the Confederal Unification Congress was held in 1984. At this
time, a significant number of CNT-AIT unions, in favor of participating
in union elections, joined the new organization, which was called
CNT-Unificado. That is, they joined the unions that had previously left
and been expelled from the CNT. Within a few years, this organization
had to change its name, becoming the current CGT.
The CNT union model
It took the CNT several years to implement its model. Although it had
one in place in 1983, the Confederation was so weakened by internal
problems and by failing to clearly understand that having a union model
also implied having a consistent union action, that it took a long time
to react, remaining theoretical. Therefore, at various CNT congresses,
proposals to participate in union elections sometimes arose, which
demonstrated uncertainty about its own model.
In 1985, the government approved the Organic Law on Freedom of
Association. This law recognized the rights of trade union branches. In
fact, it copied the ILO's guidelines on freedom of association.
From then on, the CNT focused on fine-tuning its own model, despite its
small size. During this period, given the existing weakness, many union
branches were reduced to a minimum, including single-person branches, in
order to defend jobs against company retaliation. This practice
coexisted with the existence of some important branches.
In general, the sections grew during periods of conflict and disappeared
during periods of tranquility, as during the shipyard strikes of the
1980s. But the outlook changed radically in the early 2000s with the
Tomares and Mercadona strikes, and the subsequent Caprabo strike, where
lessons were learned from the mistakes of the previous strike and new
sections were strengthened in the workplaces.
Although some semblance of it began to emerge at the 1990 Bilbao
Congress, the other model was actually discussed more at that congress.
At the 1995 Granada Congress, a specific union model was theorized, but
it was not put into practice. It was from 2008-09 onward that a specific
union model would be more clearly discussed, and it was definitively
incorporated into the CNT's trade union action agreements at the 2010
Córdoba Congress. Its development would take a further step at the 2015
Zaragoza Congress and would finally mature at the 2022 Canovellas Congress.
The model is based on what is known as union representation, which we
have already seen described previously. Positions and tasks are
distributed within the union branches. It is union action that protects
you from union repression by companies and dismissals, not positions, so
all members of the branch must perform union duties. The more
demonstrable union work, the greater the protection.
All positions (delegate, prevention secretary, organization secretary,
treasurer, equality secretary, etc.) are revocable at any time by the
assembly. This allows for democratic control of the section, which will
appoint whomever it deems appropriate to perform the tasks it needs.
They can distribute labor information outside of working hours, receive
information sent by their union, collect membership dues, and so on.
The CNT's union model is based on membership, that is, having enough
members. This is what will give the section legitimacy. To achieve
improvements through collective bargaining, you need strength. Sections
can negotiate decent agreements, wage increases, or oppose collective
dismissals.
For many years, a comprehensive framework of legal protection was put in
place for these sections thanks to numerous court rulings that the CNT
patiently won. The organization gradually adapted to this system and
created its own resources to support the sections in conflict, such as
the Confederal Technical Cabinet and the Confederal Resistance Fund.
For comparison, in the 1990s, the CNT's dynamic was to complain about
the unfair discrimination suffered by the Confederation, whose sections
were denied access to the notice board, to working hours, to union
halls, etc.
In the case of works councils, the CNT understands them as bodies over
which the unions do not truly have control and through which the
autonomy of the working class is denied. Having autonomy would imply
having organizational formulas that are not mediated by the state or
employers. The important thing is to know who is appointing our
representatives in the companies and which body is responsible for
implementing union action.
Let's not forget that a works council is a collegiate body in which
decisions are made by simple majority. Therefore, it depends on the
balance of power between the various unions that comprise it. In other
words, what matters is not having a presence, but actually having a
majority on the committee.
We encounter many candidates for union elections composed of people who
aren't even members of the union they will represent on the committee.
We encounter representatives over whom their own unions have no control
and union branches of other unions with no power to act, since all
concrete capacity to act is vested in the unitary body, the works
council. Therefore, there is no way we can speak of anything resembling
direct action here. What kind of mobilization are they going to promote
like this?
A committee of this type, without real support (although some do exist),
is considered to pose no serious threat to the company. Companies have
no trouble putting together a candidate list with family members or
workers subservient to the employers' interests. After all, it's the
company that sets the ballot boxes and is perfectly capable of
influencing the results. These pro-company candidates compete with those
sponsored by the workforce. And this doesn't take into account that
union elections are held every four years, and most unions don't take
advantage of the time to achieve immediate improvements, but instead
present them within their platform to see if they'll be voted in... "and
then, if that's the case," those improvements will be negotiated.
That's why the CNT believes it's better to organize as a bloc within the
same union through a union branch, which can also act immediately. And
this will be done without subsidies or union hours granted by the
company, which may seem like an ideological excuse, but it's a very real
form of pressure used by companies. Anarcho-syndicalism is more
practical than ideological, despite what it may seem, and rejecting
these privileges serves to guarantee our class autonomy. All this is
done so that control rests with the union, the branch, and the workers
who comprise them. Ultimately, it's based on building an associative
network within companies-people's power, workers' power, or whatever you
want to call it.
To be more specific, within the current CNT agreements, the sections
should present specific demands. These include those related to gender
equality and respect for LGBTI+ diversity, which must be guaranteed by
the section both within the company and in the section's internal
relations. Likewise, the section can immediately begin to demand issues
related to the eco-social transition, such as transport bonuses, waste
reduction, improved safety, hygiene, and recycling, reducing pollution
and environmental impact, and anything else they can think of. In a
context of degrowth, the sections can propose changes in the functioning
of the productive sectors and transform production. In this case,
everything depends on the strength and also the degree of politicization
of each section, a responsibility that falls on the unions and their
training capacity.
Another noteworthy aspect is that the current CNT has a revolutionary
program adapted to the 21st century. While this is a process that takes
many years to develop, it is understood that the union sections must
also be prepared. For example, if one day they wanted to control access
to work, the union sections should collaborate with labor exchanges and
assemblies of the unemployed, facilitating successful interviews during
the selection process. Or if they wanted to conduct a sectoral analysis,
the union sections in a specific field could collaborate for this. And
with this, we close the circle of this article, once again considering
the union section as the seed of the socialization of companies within
the implementation of libertarian communism.
Finishing
Today, the Confederation has surpassed the membership it had in 1983 and
is established in hundreds of companies. We can say that fatigue with
the works council model after four decades, or that the current business
structure is increasingly composed of smaller companies, also plays a
role in our benefit. In any case, given the current unionization rates,
all unions have a lot of ground to cover, and we shouldn't look for
excuses, since in Spain there are 20 million salaried employees without
a union and, therefore, without any union model.
The CNT must fine-tune its machinery, as there are many people who
aren't moving at the same pace, nor are there unions that have the same
capabilities. We must continue to take stock of what has worked in
recent years and what hasn't, in order to improve the model and make a
definitive leap forward.
And finally, I'll repeat the two key ideas from the debate on union
models: a) it's important how unions appoint their representatives
within companies; and b) it's important to know where we place the
weight of our union action.
By Miguel G. Gómez @blackspartak
1. To learn about the history of these revolutionary representatives,
see Alejandro Andeasi Cieri (2019). "Revolutionary Company
Delegates[Revolutionäre Obleute]and the Council Movement in the Great
War and the German Revolution of 1918-1919." UAB Nuestra Historia, vol.
8, 2019, pp. 67-90.
https://www.aacademica.org/alejandro.andreassi.cieri/25.pdf
2. It is the right of workers to establish or join unions of their
choice. It is enshrined in the Spanish Constitution, Article 28.
Therefore, it is a fundamental right in accordance with international
law. This right derives from Human Rights. The first time this right was
achieved was in England in 1824. In other words, unionism existed first,
and basic civil and political rights were later achieved, and it has
never been the other way around .
3. Carlos Molero Manglano. The most representative unions .
https://vlex.es/vid/sindicatos-representativos-205924505
4. Daniel Vallès Muiño (2020). "The Ministry of Labor 1920-1923:
Relevant Regulatory Initiatives.
Corporatism, Affordable Housing, and Labor Inspection." IUSLabor 2/2020
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.raco.cat/index.php/
IUSLabor/article/download/370078/466109/
5. The text of the law can be read here:
https://www.boe.es/gazeta/dias/1931/11/28/pdfs/GMD-1931-332.pdf
6. Minutes of the CNT Congress. Madrid, 1931 .
7. Workers' Solidarity, 11/17/1933, p. 3
8. Glicerio Sánchez Recio. The Vertical Union as a Political and
Economic Instrument of the Francoist Revolution . University of Alicante .
9. CNT , February 1983
10. Same here
11. Another interesting resolution was the unions' request for control
of Social Security, which was never implemented .
https://www.regeneracionlibertaria.org/2025/03/18/explicando-el-modelo-sindical-de-la-cnt/
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