Introduction: Short summary of the geopolitical context of Rojava ----
The context of Rojava, western Kurdistan, can't be understood withouttalking about Syria but also about the other parts of Kurdistan. We
won't extend too much on the past, but we need to start with European
powers reorganizing what became known as middle east after first world
war. Kurdish people, divided in 4 newly created nation states, became
the largest people without state. The French protectorate of Syria
lasted until the end of second world war, followed by short lived
governments and military coups on 1949, 1954, and 1961. On 1963 the
military committee of the Ba'ath Party that led the coup of 1961
overtook the government, and on 1970 Hafez al-Assad took the presidency
of the Syrian Arab Republic. After his dead in 2000, his son Bashar
al-Assad was brought from UK, where he studied medicine, to take over
the presidency of the country. After some hope of democratic reforms,
soon he continued the despotic and authoritarian practices of his father.
In 2011, in what became known as "Arab Spring", a wave of protests
spread from north Africa to middle east. In Syria, the Sunni Muslims
that make the majority of Syrian population lead the protests against
the government of al-Assad, who belongs to the Alawite minority aligned
with Shia Muslims. Al-Assad responded to the protests with military
repression, sparking a spiral of violence that unleashed the Syrian
civil war. The regime brutally repressed the opposition protests,
forcing a military escalation of the conflict. Democratic and liberal
protesters suffered the most, with the Muhabarat (secret police) and the
inhuman prisons of the regime ending hundreds of thousands lives. Those
that survived were forced into exile, wiping out their demands and
revolutionary aims. Militarized Islamist groups, backed by different
Arab states and even some western powers, thrived in the war scenario,
growing their ranks and becoming the main opposition to the regime on
the battle fields.
In the north, Kurdish people forced a negotiated withdraw of Assad
regime military personnel, declaring an autonomously administered
territory. The YPG (People Defense Forces) and YPJ (Women Defense
Forces) evolved from popular militias to a consistent military force,
ensuring the military defense of those regions. They limited their field
of action to military defense, making space for the social and political
Kurdish liberation movement to promote communes and councils to take
care of the civilian administration. This became the largest experiment
to put in practice the ideas of "democratic confederalism", a
compilation of ideas proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, imprisoned leader of
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The main principles that guide this
political project are women's liberation, social ecology and stateless
democracy, that are in many ways similar to what Murray Bookchin
proposed as libertarian municipalism. This is not a coincidence, since
Ocalan was partly inspired by Bookchin's ideas of "Ecology of freedom".
With the rise of ISIS in 2014 and their advance over Syria and iraq, YPG
and YPJ fought back to defend their land. After the historic resistance
of Kobane, the Kurdish fighters of northern Syria became the main
partner of the international coalition against the caliphate. Many arab
regions newly freed from the fascist theocracy of ISIS joined their
ranks, and the liberated areas got integrated in the system of the
self-administration. The confederal system expanded, with many local and
regional councils following the example of Rojava self-administration,
becoming what today is known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration
of North and East Syria (DAANES). This model has successfully integrated
Arab-majority regions from Raqqa to Deir Ezzor, making also space for
different ethnic and religious minorities like Assyrians, Armenians or
Yazidis to build their own councils.
But the most important development is the women's revolution, with
autonomous women's organizations like Kongra Star and Zenobia congress
leading an extraordinary political process. Women have also their own
military forces, with YPJ becoming not only as symbol of the war against
ISIS, but also as spearhead for women rights, reclaiming a central role
in the political and military developments of society. A system of
co-chairs, with a man and a woman leading all social and political
structures has been established. Women cooperatives are promoted to
ensure economical autonomy for women. Even a women's town has been
build, Jinwar, were widows, young women or any women who don't want to
be bound to men can find shelter. They are challenging the patriarchal
systems not only of the Kurdish an Arab societies, but of the entire world.
In 2015 Russia entered the war to support Bashar al-Assad, and together
with Iran they managed to retake control of most of the country.
Islamist rebels were confined to a small territory on Idlib, were an
islamist government ruled over a small region that became densely
populated, with refugee camps hosting people from all Syria. Turkey also
got involved in the conflict, supporting different islamist forces in
opposition to al-Assad and even organizing military operations on Syrian
soil. The neo-ottoman ambitions of Erdogan, his dreams of expanding the
Turkish borders over Syria, combined together with the long term war of
th turkish state against revolutionary Kurds. With the excuse to fight
terrorism, the Turkish army invaded Afrin in 2018, a Kurdish region of
north west Syria. Another invasion followed in 2019, when a long strip
of land between Serekaniye and Gire Spi was occupied by Turkish backed
islamist groups. Today, once again, a new occupation plan is ongoing
since December 2024.
The offensive that changed Syria
At the end of November 2024 a new offensive of Hayir Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS) against the Assad regime took almost everyone by surprise. This
new branding of militant salafists in Syria presents itself with a
moderate face, trying to take distance from organizations like ISIS or
even al-Qaida, from where they all sprouted. Their renewed military
campaign started on November 27 from the front lines of Idlib, their
stronghold. They rapidly overran the regime lines with their blitzkrieg
attacks, aided by locally produced Shaheen kamikaze drones. These
attacks were done in coordination with the Turkish proxy forces
re-branded now as Syrian National Army (SNA), sometimes called Turkish
Free Syrian Army (TFSA). These are the same Turkish proxies that
occupied kurdish areas in northern Syria, a collection of islamist
groups trained, armed and supplied by Turkey, including not just
salafist organizations but also documented ex-fighters of ISIS. They
started their own offensive, but instead of targeting regime territory
as HTS was doing, they charged against regions under control of the
DAANES. Turkish army has been aiding them in every step they've made,
using artillery fire and air support not only of the (in)famous turkish
drones, but even standard NATO F-16s.
HTS moved fast towards Aleppo, the second biggest city of Syria. The
regime army, mostly young conscripts with barely enough food to survive
their long imposed military service, didn't have much will to fight.
With the Russian army swamped in Ukraine, and Iran focused on its proxy
war against Israel in Gaza and Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Army crumbled.
People in Aleppo celebrated the withdrawal of the regime, toppling down
Assad statues and symbols. HTS took control of most of the city, except
the traditional Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheik Makhsood and Ashrafiya.
These northern neighborhoods have been an important part of the Kurdish
resistance since the beginning of the revolution in 2012, when they
fought to repel attacks of salafist groups. When the regime took control
of the city in 2016, YPG and YPJ forces resisted against their advance,
affirming their autonomy and alignment with the Autonomous
Administration. After brief negotiations HTS accepted their autonomy,
promising to not attack them and to respect the historical presence of
Kurds in Aleppo. Since then, they continued resisting and defending
their neighborhood, expectant of how the situation in Syria will unfold.
While this was happening, Turkish proxies took control of the region of
Shehba and the city of Til Rifat, few kilometers north of Aleppo. In
Shehba refugee camps were a shelter for more than 150.000 people since
2018, when the Turkish invasion of Afrin forced them to leave their
homes behind. Once again, more than 100.000 people had to pack the few
things they had in a rush, escaping the Turkish bombs for second time.
This sparked a new humanitarian crisis in the cold nights of December,
with long convoys on the road to save their lives. But their escape
route was blocked by the Turkish proxies, who were conducting raids,
kidnappings and even summary executions on the field. Those who managed
to escape made their way to eastern areas of the DAANES, where local
committees and humanitarian organizations like Heyva Sor have been doing
all they can to receive them. Primary needs like shelter, food, blankets
and medical attention are organized on the spot, sharing the already
scarce resources to the region, due to the economical embargo.
Turkish proxies continued their offensive towards Manbij, an
Arab-majority city that has been part of the Autonomous Administration
since 2016, when the SDF liberated it from ISIS. After expelling the
caliphate from the city 8 years ago, the Manbij Military Council has
been defending the region as part of the SDF. But the current attacks of
SNA came with Turkish armored vehicles, drones and war planes, making
very difficult for SDF to stop their advance. After several attacks and
counter-attacks, an agreement for a ceasefire was negotiated between US
and Turkey, evoking a 2016 agreement where Kurdish forces were not to go
west of the Eufrates river. The SDF withdrew from Manbij and Turkish
proxy groups occupied the region, stealing and looting whatever they could.
But that was not the end of their attacks. Turkish proxy forces tried to
push forward threatening to invade Kobane. The SDF repelled their
attacks on Qereqozah bridge and on the Tishreen dam, both strategic
locations that that connect Manbij and Kobane regions over the river. In
a move to deter further conflict, some US soldiers returned to Kobane,
from where they left 5 years ago before the last Turkish invasion. The
international coalition against ISIS, with US and France as currently
the most involved members, are warning Erdogan to stop their attacks on
SDF, which is the main force in the war against the resurgence of the
caliphate. The collapse of the regime army created a window of
opportunity for ISIS insurgent groups, that assaulted weapon depots from
the disbanded Syrian Army expanding once again their influence over
Syria and Iraq.
After the HTS offensive captured Aleppo they moved fast towards Hama,
the next big city. Regime soldiers were running away without much
resistance, and soon the city was under control of insurgents that
started moved towards Homs. The same pattern repeated and insurgents
started moving towards the capital. On December 8 Bashar al-Assad left
Damascus to Moscow, pressured by the offensive that started encircling
the capital city. Together with the HTS offensive in the North, armed
groups in the south also started attacks on military positions of the
Assad regime, getting dangerously close to Damascus from the south. With
Assad gone, these groups continued advancing facing no resistance, and
soon some people took control of the national television studios to read
an statement announcing the end of the Assad regime. Many people went to
the streets and celebrated such historical time, toppling down numerous
statues of Bashar al Assad and Hafez al Assad all around Syria.
Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, leader of HTS, who had a very prominent role
making videos and speeches during the offensive, made a life recorded
entering in Damascus. He went to a historical mosque of the capital with
his followers and announced the end of the regime, positioning himself
as the central figure to fill the power vacuum. Soon he stopped using
his "nom de guerre" and started using his legal name, Ahmed al-Shara,
instead in all international media. The regional government that HTS had
in Idlib, there called the Syrian Salvation Government, was transported
to Damascus and started taking control of what was left of the Syrian
State structures. They appointed ministers and promoted military
commanders of the successful insurgence to become the new generals and
colonels of what is becoming the new Syrian army. The US department of
justice removed al-Jolani from their list of wanted terrorists as
western powers visited Damascus and reopened Syrian embassies. Those
diplomatic moves were often mediated by Turkey, strong support of HTS
and key actor on legitimizing their power grab. Turkey was the first to
reopen their embassy and keeps deep and strong ties with the new
government in Damascus.
Israel started a massive air camping targeting more than 400 positions
and destroying 90% of Syrian military capabilities, as well as research
and technical infrastructure. After that, the IDF started expanding
their occupied areas in the southern Golan highs, expanding their
control of territory on Syrian ground. Those moves were criticized by
many international powers, including UN, but Israel continued their
advances and air attacks, claiming that the new provisional government
was a threat for Israel. Russia and Iran, key allies of the collapsed
regime, started withdrawing their forces while negotiating with the new
authorities to salvage what they can of their interests in Syria. ISIS
tried to take advantage of this moment of chaos, organizing raids to
capture weapons from the collapsing regime and looting what they can,
often killing even kidnapping civilians to exchange them for ransoms.
As thousand of exiled Syrian are returning to their country, partly on
their own will and the desire to return to a Syria free of Assad, and
partly pressured by the growing anti-migrant policies gaining traction
all around the globe, they are faced with a collapsed country after
almost a decade and a half of war. Their dreams of freedom and
democratization of Syria still give hope to some of them, mainly those
who kept alive the embers of the revolutionary spirits of 2011. But the
reality on the ground is far away from their revolutionary dreams. Many
Syrians struggle to safeguard the asylum status and residency
permissions that allow them to work in western countries, allowing their
children to access education that offers better perspectives than the
crumbling schools and impoverished universities of Syria. The
fundamentalist origins of the provisional government certainly don't
help to create much trust for those who found shelter in European
countries, getting more or less got assimilated by the liberal lifestyle
that is so appealing for those who witnessed the brutalities of the
Assad regime.
But not everyone is happy with the recent developments. Together with
the kurds in the north, the Druze community in the south also resisted
the authoritarian rule of al-Assad. This two communities support the
change of regime but with mistrust for the new government of Damascus,
calling for a federal Syria. Christian communities had certain
privileges during the Assad rule, partly inherited from the French
colonial rule, and are also cautious on the ongoing developments in
Syria. The Alawite minority of shia Muslims, to which the al-Assad
family belongs, suffered strong repression from the sunni Muslim forces
that ousted the regime. In March 2025 a wave of insurgency in the
western coastal province of Latakia, which was the stronghold of the
regime, ambushed and killed several fighters of HTS, triggering a heavy
escalation. Forces of the provisional government were deployed in big
numbers, conducting extensive security operations aiming to neutralize
high ranking figures of the old regime. Ethnic tensions escalated the
situation as civilians were killed in those operations. Calls for
revenge and jihad against the Alawite population from islamic
fundamentalist groups spread on social networks. After few days of
violence , with more than 2000 people killed, several regime soldiers
arrested, and thousand of Alawites escaping to Lebanon, the situation
got under relative control again, even if insurgent attacks continued at
lower scales.
Map of the present situation compiled by the Institute for Study of War
North-East Syria adapting to the changes
With those events unfolding, the SDF made some movements to take control
of the areas that the regime soldiers abandoned in southern Raqqa and in
Deir Ezzor, to prevent further expansion of ISIS. After negotiations
with the Damascus provisional government, the SDF withdrew from those
areas in coordination with the arrival of security forces connected to
the Damascus provisional government. This coordination was followed by
formal negotiation talks between al-Shara, as provisional president of
Syria, with Mazlum Abdi, commander in chief of the SDF. Agreements
between both forces have been signed in March 2025, ensuring cooperation
and rights the kurdish people and other minorities in Syria as well as
the integration of the SDF in the new Syrian army. Committees to follow
up on those agreements are now starting to work, expecting to implement
such steps before the end of 2025.
Turkish proxies continued their attacks against the regions of northern
Syria, aided by the Turkish air force that continued their drone strikes
and bombing all along this time. Turkey hurried to strike a deal with
the provisional government after they took control of the capital,
promising to integrate SNA, turkish proxies, in the new Syrian army.
This gave Turkey more leverage and they managed to install several SNA
commanders on important military positions. This made the negotiations
to integrate the SDF in the new Syrian army more difficult, since heavy
clashes between these two forces were ongoing. The druze community, who
played a relevant role in challenging the regime power in the south,
also entered negotiations with the provisional government with similar
aims as the SDF, accepting integration on the new Syrian state
structures in exchange for a certain degree of autonomy.
The provisional government, securing their position with Turkish
unconditional support and with western powers accepting their position
as new rulers of Syria, focused on a campaign to lift the economical
sanctions that still loom over Syria. The US and EU made steps in that
direction, with big numbers (billions of dollars and euros) flowing to
Syria as aid relief. Arab countries also made big efforts to support the
provisional government, with Qatar and other Arab states formalizing
their support in economic aid. The tensions in the coastal regions
raised concerns about the capacity of the provisional government to
handle Syria, but western powers are willing to overlook some bloodshed
if it comes with an acceptable degree of stability that enables them to
further their interests. The new image of moderate Islamist that
al-Shara is projecting won't hide his fundamentalist past, but for now
he is able to navigate the situation. He soon changed his military green
shirt for a black suit and a tie, imitating the powerful men he wants to
be accepted by, playing the role that they want him to play to integrate
Syria in the global capitalist system and in the current regional order
of middle east. How long he will be able to do that, how much he will
manage to establish himself as the new ruler of Syria, is something that
only time will tell.
The newly presented provisional constitution, even if calling for Islam
as a base for the rule of law in the new Syria, is written with well
adapted language to the current times. The document drafts a centralized
presidential model, conceding nearly total power to head of the state.
It is far away from the revolutionary proposal of the social contract
that guide the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East
Syria (DAANES), a living document that until today is still being
updated every year to incorporate new lessons learned. But the calls for
a federal Syria from Kurds and Druze among other minorities are not
being accounted, with the provisional government making some concessions
with public speeches of inclusivity and plurality of Syria, but also
finding support in narratives that frame minorities as "traitors that
want to divide Syria". "A strong man to rule a strong nation" seems the
mantra that European states imposed in their reorganization of middle
east after the first world war, making easier for western powers to
control the highly centralized systems, and of course to exploit their
abundant energetic resources of gas and oil…
The DAANES navigates the situation as best as they can. Harvesting the
diplomatic connections with the International coalition on one hand, and
highlighting the efforts and support from many Arab-majority areas that
joined the self-administration as they were liberated from ISIS on the
other, the stability and strength of the democratic confederal system
provides a strong argument to negotiate with Damascus. With a
conciliatory tone and openness to integrate in the new Syria, together
with the diplomatic experience the self-administration acquired during
more than a decade of existence in very harsh conditions, important
agreements and negotiations are being hammered out today. Even when
pressured by the threats of the Turkish government, eager to annihilate
any trace of the kurdish liberation movement, The revolutionary
structures of north-east Syria are able to hold their ground in the
negotiation tables. Those agreements are for now nothing more than
statements of good will, formal expression of the intentions to
cooperate to rebuild a new Syria together, without legal mechanisms or
clearly defined terms on how to bring those agreements into practice.
Diplomacy is an important tool to overcome war situations, but military
force social organization are the main element that guides the political
negotiations.
Of course, all this is always encompassed by the most important
development of this social system: The women's revolution. Women in
north-east Syria are leading this process with autonomously organized
structures that act at all levels of society. Women's liberation as
foundation for social liberation is the pillar on which this revolution
is built. From women's cooperatives and women's co-chairs in all
political structures, to the autonomous military structure of the YPJ.
The revolutionary ideas of the kurdish womens movement are the
foundation on which the social and political system is built. Their
anti-patriarchal values and lessons are put in practice, not just in the
harsh guerrilla lifestyle of the kurdish mountains, but also in the arid
lands of north-east Syria. This also means that it is not anymore a
kurdish women movement. As Arab women develop and lead their own
organizations, as well as Ezidi, Assyrian and Armenian women, together
with many internationalists that came from abroad to join the
revolution, a world-wide wave of anti-patriarchal and revolutionary new
generations make even more clear that the revolution will be feminist or
won't be.
The role of anarchists in North-East Syria?
All this is just a glimpse of the incredibly complex network of events
and forces unfolding in Syria. The collapse of the al-Assad regime
closed a cycle opened in 2011 with the Arab spring, but more than a
decade of war left new conflicts and old wounds that are still open, and
won't heal easily. We are witnessing a new Syria, with incredible
challenges and difficulties, but also with exciting developments and
revolutionary potential. Hegemonic power, regional and global ones, are
trying to take advantage of the chaotic situations that unfolds during
transitional periods. Local groups and communities were forced to
organize and fight for their survival, with hope and dreams of a better
future. The revolutionary process of North-East Syria is an
extraordinary example of social transformation, with principles of
libertarian socialism put into practice on a big scale.
Talking about an anarchist revolution won't do justice to their claims
for democratic confederalism, but it is important to notice how, on an
ideological level, there are so many things we have in common. Their
criticism on Marxism and state socialism, their focus on social ecology
and the communalist ideas of Murray Bookchin, their focus on
anti-patriarchal struggle beyond liberal feminism, focusing on the
relation between male dominance and the inherent logic of domination of
nation-states, their efforts to develop people's self defense capacity
as the only way to build autonomy. All those are point that we, as
anarchists, can clearly find ourselves in.
Anarchists have played a critical role in solidarity with Rojava,
joining internationalist committees, organizing campaigns and even
traveling to defend the revolution. The kurdish movement welcomed us,
sharing their bread and their guns with us as we took part of the
resistance on the frontlines. We became a part of this revolution,
allowing us to see how much we have to learn from it. We came to support
this revolution, but we also came to learn, hoping that the experience
from here will allow us to strengthen our movements and organizations.
In doing that we found friends, we found comrades, and we experienced
extraordinary glimpses of what a free society and a free life can be.
This is something that will influence ourselves and our movements not
just for this revolution, but also for the many revolutions that are yet
to come.
Têkosîna Anarsîst
TA is a revolutionary anarchist organization working in NE Syria (Rojava).
tekosinaanarsist.noblogs.org/
https://tekosinaanarsist.noblogs.org/situation-rojava-theory-and-analysis/
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