In 2005, 400 working-class neighborhoods across France erupted in
protests for three weeks, becoming a political issue in its own right.
Seventeen years later, new revolts erupted following Nahel's death, in a
context where both the struggles and their repression have intensified.
Caught between internal contradictions within the working class, the
left, and immigrant movements, this article revisits the difficult
strategies for building a mass movement. The youth described as "of
immigrant origin" and from working-class neighborhoods have experienced
numerous political awakenings, bringing a new generation of activists to
the forefront. The first was the 1983 March for Equality, which followed
the first so-called urban revolts, the "Minguettes rodeos" of 1981.
Co-opted by SOS Racisme and municipal patronage, new waves of revolts
took place between 1990 and 2005. Numerous mobilizations of populations
with colonial origins occurred (on colonial memory, against double
punishment, for Palestine, intellectual and artistic productions, etc.).
Politically, autonomous organizations emerged, such as the Immigration
and Suburbs Movement (MIB), which raised the question of the colonial
continuum, a theme taken up again in 2005 by the Indigenous of the
Republic movement. This latter movement was itself a response to the
ideological reactions that accompanied these upheavals in the symbolic
colonial order: the 2004 law on headscarves, which deeply divided the
left, and the law on the "positive role" of colonization.
The course of the revolts and their political consequences
The security reaction, however, began in 2002 with Nicolas Sarkozy's
first appointment to the Ministry of the Interior, who established "
zero tolerance ".
Reappointed Minister of the Interior in 2005 and motivated by his
presidential ambitions, several of his contemptuous public remarks
heightened tensions, such as his suggestion to "clean up" the Cité des
4000 housing project with a pressure washer in July 2005[1]. His visit
to the Argenteuil housing project, where he was booed by residents and
declared , " You're fed up with this gang of thugs, we're going to get
rid of them ," took place the day before the deaths of Zyed and Bouna
in Clichy-sous-Bois. Electrocuted in an EDF transformer while trying to
flee the police, Sarkozy accused them of burglary at a construction site.
Images from October 2006 of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré in Clichy-Sous-Bois
Three days of rioting ensued, followed by a peaceful march that seemed
to calm things down. But everything was reignited by a police grenade
thrown into a mosque during prayer, reigniting the unrest and causing
the revolts to spread to neighboring districts, from Montfermeil and
Chelles in the Seine-et-Marne department (77), and in the following days
to the entire Seine-Saint-Denis department (93). The following week, the
entire Île-de-France region was ablaze, and then the riots spread
throughout France, expressing the recognition of a shared condition.
Among the targets, in addition to the police and state or municipal
institutions, were businesses and schools, places that crystallized
humiliation and rejection. Alongside the riots, a voice was forged
through a flurry of community meetings and public statements by young
people and residents, often through the media, which only showed up when
things were at their worst. They exposed the problems of their
relationship with the police, the burden of discrimination, the feeling
of not being considered French (several young people showed their
identity cards on television), and more generally, the social conditions
of life and poverty in the neighborhood. But in order to circumvent the
social explanations for the revolt, culturalist explanations abounded,
placing the blame on families, rap music, Islamists, drug dealers,
and... polygamy! De Villepin, then Prime Minister, declared a state of
emergency on November 7th, a colonial measure dating back to the
Algerian War. Until this announcement, the entire left wing and the
unions remained silent.
15 years of political transformation on the left
The revolt occurred between the large high school mobilization against
the Fillon law, and the opposition movement to what would be Dominique
De Villepin's response to the revolt, the first employment contract
(CPE) and the equal opportunities law.
Collective work, Universities under pressure. Reflections on the
mobilization against the law for equal opportunities and the CPE ,
Syllepse, 2011, 190 pages, 10 euros.
The anti-CPE movement revealed divisions among young people and the
difficult convergence of various protests, divisions exploited by the
State[2], and led to discriminatory practices by the security services
(SO) of major student organizations like the UNEF, reflecting the
exclusion of young people from the housing projects, who were lumped
together and associated with violent gangs[3]. From this overall phase
of youth revolt, however, a new generation of activists emerged in the
following years, drawn from both groups and committed to overcoming
these divisions by addressing the issue of colonial racism. Numerous
movements and themes would shake up the left for 15 years (mobilizations
against Islamophobia, against police violence with the Adama Committee,
and the use of social media to discuss racist, sexist, and historical
issues, etc.). Through attempts to forge alliances with the Yellow Vests
and the mobilization for George Floyd, the issue of police violence will
become unavoidable, even if, in parallel, a segment of the left joins
demonstrations in support of the police, in a movement contrary to
reactionary sentiment. Indeed, since the Sarkozy years and the process
of fascization he initiated, the criminalization of residents of
working-class neighborhoods has been a relentless campaign, from Zemmour
to the Republican Spring. A large part of the left, susceptible to this
rhetoric, will not mobilize in 2021 against the Separatism Law.
The revolts for Nahel in 2023
The death of Nahel, which sparked another wave of youth protests across
the country, brought working-class neighborhoods back into the spotlight
as a political issue. The fruits of the political battles waged in
previous years became evident when La France Insoumise (LFI) and the CGT
(General Confederation of Labour) publicly supported the uprising,
calling not for calm, but for justice. Unlike in 2005, the rebellious
youth did not find themselves completely isolated politically[4]. The
issue of police violence could no longer be ignored, and mobilizations
took place in Nanterre, then throughout France in the following weeks. A
day of action was called by numerous social movement organizations on
September 23, bringing together 30,000 people nationwide, with, for the
first time, a broad platform of demands[5]and the convergence of many
movements, associations, and unions. But after a day of mobilization,
nothing happens afterward, no will to make this framework permanent...
Why is it so complicated to build a movement in working-class
neighborhoods whose demands should, however, unite them?[6]
The evolution of La France Insoumise (LFI), whether on police violence,
Islamophobia, or Palestine, is the result of this decade of political
struggle led by the 2005-2006 generation, a genuine achievement in the
balance of power. The strategies of immigrant movements, while all
claiming autonomy, diverge: the weight of repression and reactionary
pressure leads several activists and movements to align themselves with
LFI for a time, while others seek elected representatives from their
neighborhoods in various elections to guarantee autonomy and avoid
simply being vote-getters. But these strategies risk relegating
grassroots mobilizations to the background, with the risk of reverting
to clientelistic relationships. It's important to remember that without
mobilization and a balance of power on the ground, many demands will
never see the light of day, elected representatives or not.
Class contradictions
The political subject of working-class neighborhoods can be defined as
follows: it is that of the unprotected, precarious, impoverished, and
culturally marginalized stratum of the proletariat, predominantly
racialized and divided by its racial status. Simultaneously subjected to
all forms of domination and exploitation, and various obstacles to
accessing rights (housing, healthcare), the destruction of public
services, and 30 years of neoliberal restructuring that have closed
numerous factories and destroyed the associated worker solidarity, the
inhabitants of these neighborhoods are turning to other forms of
solidarity or economic activity (religious or community-based, drug
dealing, etc.). As a result, they are subjected to stigmatization,
systemic police violence (the war on drugs and terrorism, the
persecution of migrants, etc.), and incarceration, as they are
designated as internal enemies . These populations, sometimes sensitive
to international issues like Palestine, are subjected to demands for
national loyalty and integration, while simultaneously facing
discrimination . Such a level of material and ideological contradictions
can only lead to revolts. But whether it was the MIB (Movement for the
Liberation of Burkina Faso) 20 years ago or the United Front of
Immigration and Working-Class Neighborhoods (FUIQP), created in 2011 in
Créteil, both of which have attempted in recent years to organize these
populations, no movement has managed to rise up on a mass scale.
Between the two revolts, the strikes of undocumented immigrants, the
mobilizations of Uber drivers, chambermaids, railway workers, and
garbage collectors during their retirement, and their visibility in
essential sectors of the economy during Covid, also reminded us that the
residents of these neighborhoods are workers, when attempts were made to
stigmatize them as " lumpenproletariat ," " thugs ," and "
profiteers "! But their problems go beyond the workplace, which demands
a union awakening. If we want to break down the divisions built up
within the workforce, between the working class and the middle class,
compounded by the racial divide, we must first acknowledge the effects
of these divisions: the interests of protected employees and managers ,
small business owners, sometimes overrepresented in union leadership or
organizational positions, whose interests, daily experiences, and
histories diverge significantly from those of workers in working-class
neighborhoods, where many are precarious, unemployed, temporary workers,
gig workers, or discriminated against , or in professional sectors where
unionism has little or no presence. Campaigns like " At work and
everywhere else, let's destroy the racist system ," led by the
Solidaires trade union, are a step in the right direction; we need to go
further.
A whole front to rebuild
As we can see, over the past 40 years, the so-called urban revolts,
culminating in 2005, have been concurrent with political structures and
a historical relationship with the rest of the social movement and the
left. The ease of electoral strategies is also a consequence of the
difficulty for neighborhood activists to unite in order to build a
grassroots movement and find means of exerting pressure that are not
criminalized. The goal would be to rebuild a unified and intersectional
social front of demands, like the one that began for the demonstration
of September 23, 2023, with one foot in the workplace and the other in
working-class neighborhoods. Without fetishizing a pseudo-"
revolutionary rioter ," as is sometimes seen, revolutionaries must
foster the creation of spaces for convergence and lasting
counter-powers, encouraging the mass mobilization of residents' anger in
ways other than riotous episodes that primarily involve very young
people. Revolutionaries must help to win their overall demands and stop
them being perceived with suspicion and as non-central by the left and
the trade unions, otherwise no retreat of fascism and no social
transformation will be possible.
Nicolas Pasadena (UCL Anti-racism commission)
CHRONOLOGY
1981 " Minguettes rodeos " in Vénissieux, then in the rest of the Lyon
suburbs.
AUTUMN 1983 Marches for equality and against racism, political birth of
the youth " from immigration ", followed a year later by " Convergence
84 ": creation of SOS Racisme, the Marches will be ethnicized and
renamed " marches of the beurs ".
1990-1991 new riots in Vaulx-en-Velin following the death of Thomas
Claudio, then in Manthes-la-Jolie following the death of Aissa Ihich and
Youssef Khaif, the police officers are only given suspended sentences.
1994-1995: Riots erupted in the 18th arrondissement of Paris following
the death of Makomé Mbowolé in a police station, who was killed at
point-blank range. These events inspired Mathieu Kassovitz's film La
Haine, provoking the ire of police unions. The Immigration and Suburbs
Movement (MIB) was created.
1997 AND 2002 revolts in Dammarie-les-Lys (77) following the death of
Abdelkader Bouziane (1997) and Mohammed Berrichi (2002), creation of the
association Bouge qui bouge, which will lead a long struggle for truth
and justice and will suffer local political harassment.
May 11, 1998: Chevènement anti-immigration law.
2002-2004 " Justice in the suburbs " campaign initiated by the MIB.
SPRING 2005 movement against the Fillon law, appeal from the Indigènes
de la République, massively signed.
From October 27 to November 15, 2005, riots in working-class
neighborhoods, affecting 400 neighborhoods, led to the proclamation of a
state of emergency on November 7.
SPRING 2006 anti-CPE movement and against the Equal Opportunities law.
2007-2017 numerous revolts: Villiers-le-Bel following the death of
Mushim and Lakhamy (2007), in Grenoble following the death of Karim
Boudouda (2011), in Beaumont-sur-Oise following the death of Adama
Traoré (2016), in Aulnay following the police assault of Théo Luaka
(2017) and revolt in Bobigny during a support rally on February 11.
2018 Yellow Vest movement, awareness that police violence accepted in
working-class neighborhoods is extending to the rest of the population.
2018 death of Nahel Merzouk, followed by 11 days of riots in
working-class neighborhoods across France.
To validate
[1]It should also be noted that, during the fire on Boulevard Vincent
Auriol on the night of August 25-26, 2005, which killed 17 people, he
had asked whether the foreign residents of the building were in a
regular situation...
[2]Both to justify the CPE as the lesser evil for young people from the
neighborhoods in opposition to a youth that would be privileged, and
then following the violence at the end of the demonstration at Les
Invalides on March 24, opposition between a white youth demonstrating in
a good-natured way and " thugs " who would be " anti-white racists "...
[3]Collective, University under Tensions , Syllepses, 2011.
[4]" Urban revolts, working-class neighborhoods in the spotlight ",
Alternative libertaire no. 341, September 2023.
[5]" Call for the unified march of September 23: For the end of systemic
racism, police violence, for social justice and public freedoms ", joint
communiqué of September 23, 2023.
[6]See the articles " Social violence: who sows misery ", Alternative
libertaire no. 146, December 2005, and " Five years after the revolts,
what has changed? ", Alternative libertaire no. 201, December 2010.
https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?Octobre-novembre-2005-La-revolte-des-quartiers-populaires
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
protests for three weeks, becoming a political issue in its own right.
Seventeen years later, new revolts erupted following Nahel's death, in a
context where both the struggles and their repression have intensified.
Caught between internal contradictions within the working class, the
left, and immigrant movements, this article revisits the difficult
strategies for building a mass movement. The youth described as "of
immigrant origin" and from working-class neighborhoods have experienced
numerous political awakenings, bringing a new generation of activists to
the forefront. The first was the 1983 March for Equality, which followed
the first so-called urban revolts, the "Minguettes rodeos" of 1981.
Co-opted by SOS Racisme and municipal patronage, new waves of revolts
took place between 1990 and 2005. Numerous mobilizations of populations
with colonial origins occurred (on colonial memory, against double
punishment, for Palestine, intellectual and artistic productions, etc.).
Politically, autonomous organizations emerged, such as the Immigration
and Suburbs Movement (MIB), which raised the question of the colonial
continuum, a theme taken up again in 2005 by the Indigenous of the
Republic movement. This latter movement was itself a response to the
ideological reactions that accompanied these upheavals in the symbolic
colonial order: the 2004 law on headscarves, which deeply divided the
left, and the law on the "positive role" of colonization.
The course of the revolts and their political consequences
The security reaction, however, began in 2002 with Nicolas Sarkozy's
first appointment to the Ministry of the Interior, who established "
zero tolerance ".
Reappointed Minister of the Interior in 2005 and motivated by his
presidential ambitions, several of his contemptuous public remarks
heightened tensions, such as his suggestion to "clean up" the Cité des
4000 housing project with a pressure washer in July 2005[1]. His visit
to the Argenteuil housing project, where he was booed by residents and
declared , " You're fed up with this gang of thugs, we're going to get
rid of them ," took place the day before the deaths of Zyed and Bouna
in Clichy-sous-Bois. Electrocuted in an EDF transformer while trying to
flee the police, Sarkozy accused them of burglary at a construction site.
Images from October 2006 of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré in Clichy-Sous-Bois
Three days of rioting ensued, followed by a peaceful march that seemed
to calm things down. But everything was reignited by a police grenade
thrown into a mosque during prayer, reigniting the unrest and causing
the revolts to spread to neighboring districts, from Montfermeil and
Chelles in the Seine-et-Marne department (77), and in the following days
to the entire Seine-Saint-Denis department (93). The following week, the
entire Île-de-France region was ablaze, and then the riots spread
throughout France, expressing the recognition of a shared condition.
Among the targets, in addition to the police and state or municipal
institutions, were businesses and schools, places that crystallized
humiliation and rejection. Alongside the riots, a voice was forged
through a flurry of community meetings and public statements by young
people and residents, often through the media, which only showed up when
things were at their worst. They exposed the problems of their
relationship with the police, the burden of discrimination, the feeling
of not being considered French (several young people showed their
identity cards on television), and more generally, the social conditions
of life and poverty in the neighborhood. But in order to circumvent the
social explanations for the revolt, culturalist explanations abounded,
placing the blame on families, rap music, Islamists, drug dealers,
and... polygamy! De Villepin, then Prime Minister, declared a state of
emergency on November 7th, a colonial measure dating back to the
Algerian War. Until this announcement, the entire left wing and the
unions remained silent.
15 years of political transformation on the left
The revolt occurred between the large high school mobilization against
the Fillon law, and the opposition movement to what would be Dominique
De Villepin's response to the revolt, the first employment contract
(CPE) and the equal opportunities law.
Collective work, Universities under pressure. Reflections on the
mobilization against the law for equal opportunities and the CPE ,
Syllepse, 2011, 190 pages, 10 euros.
The anti-CPE movement revealed divisions among young people and the
difficult convergence of various protests, divisions exploited by the
State[2], and led to discriminatory practices by the security services
(SO) of major student organizations like the UNEF, reflecting the
exclusion of young people from the housing projects, who were lumped
together and associated with violent gangs[3]. From this overall phase
of youth revolt, however, a new generation of activists emerged in the
following years, drawn from both groups and committed to overcoming
these divisions by addressing the issue of colonial racism. Numerous
movements and themes would shake up the left for 15 years (mobilizations
against Islamophobia, against police violence with the Adama Committee,
and the use of social media to discuss racist, sexist, and historical
issues, etc.). Through attempts to forge alliances with the Yellow Vests
and the mobilization for George Floyd, the issue of police violence will
become unavoidable, even if, in parallel, a segment of the left joins
demonstrations in support of the police, in a movement contrary to
reactionary sentiment. Indeed, since the Sarkozy years and the process
of fascization he initiated, the criminalization of residents of
working-class neighborhoods has been a relentless campaign, from Zemmour
to the Republican Spring. A large part of the left, susceptible to this
rhetoric, will not mobilize in 2021 against the Separatism Law.
The revolts for Nahel in 2023
The death of Nahel, which sparked another wave of youth protests across
the country, brought working-class neighborhoods back into the spotlight
as a political issue. The fruits of the political battles waged in
previous years became evident when La France Insoumise (LFI) and the CGT
(General Confederation of Labour) publicly supported the uprising,
calling not for calm, but for justice. Unlike in 2005, the rebellious
youth did not find themselves completely isolated politically[4]. The
issue of police violence could no longer be ignored, and mobilizations
took place in Nanterre, then throughout France in the following weeks. A
day of action was called by numerous social movement organizations on
September 23, bringing together 30,000 people nationwide, with, for the
first time, a broad platform of demands[5]and the convergence of many
movements, associations, and unions. But after a day of mobilization,
nothing happens afterward, no will to make this framework permanent...
Why is it so complicated to build a movement in working-class
neighborhoods whose demands should, however, unite them?[6]
The evolution of La France Insoumise (LFI), whether on police violence,
Islamophobia, or Palestine, is the result of this decade of political
struggle led by the 2005-2006 generation, a genuine achievement in the
balance of power. The strategies of immigrant movements, while all
claiming autonomy, diverge: the weight of repression and reactionary
pressure leads several activists and movements to align themselves with
LFI for a time, while others seek elected representatives from their
neighborhoods in various elections to guarantee autonomy and avoid
simply being vote-getters. But these strategies risk relegating
grassroots mobilizations to the background, with the risk of reverting
to clientelistic relationships. It's important to remember that without
mobilization and a balance of power on the ground, many demands will
never see the light of day, elected representatives or not.
Class contradictions
The political subject of working-class neighborhoods can be defined as
follows: it is that of the unprotected, precarious, impoverished, and
culturally marginalized stratum of the proletariat, predominantly
racialized and divided by its racial status. Simultaneously subjected to
all forms of domination and exploitation, and various obstacles to
accessing rights (housing, healthcare), the destruction of public
services, and 30 years of neoliberal restructuring that have closed
numerous factories and destroyed the associated worker solidarity, the
inhabitants of these neighborhoods are turning to other forms of
solidarity or economic activity (religious or community-based, drug
dealing, etc.). As a result, they are subjected to stigmatization,
systemic police violence (the war on drugs and terrorism, the
persecution of migrants, etc.), and incarceration, as they are
designated as internal enemies . These populations, sometimes sensitive
to international issues like Palestine, are subjected to demands for
national loyalty and integration, while simultaneously facing
discrimination . Such a level of material and ideological contradictions
can only lead to revolts. But whether it was the MIB (Movement for the
Liberation of Burkina Faso) 20 years ago or the United Front of
Immigration and Working-Class Neighborhoods (FUIQP), created in 2011 in
Créteil, both of which have attempted in recent years to organize these
populations, no movement has managed to rise up on a mass scale.
Between the two revolts, the strikes of undocumented immigrants, the
mobilizations of Uber drivers, chambermaids, railway workers, and
garbage collectors during their retirement, and their visibility in
essential sectors of the economy during Covid, also reminded us that the
residents of these neighborhoods are workers, when attempts were made to
stigmatize them as " lumpenproletariat ," " thugs ," and "
profiteers "! But their problems go beyond the workplace, which demands
a union awakening. If we want to break down the divisions built up
within the workforce, between the working class and the middle class,
compounded by the racial divide, we must first acknowledge the effects
of these divisions: the interests of protected employees and managers ,
small business owners, sometimes overrepresented in union leadership or
organizational positions, whose interests, daily experiences, and
histories diverge significantly from those of workers in working-class
neighborhoods, where many are precarious, unemployed, temporary workers,
gig workers, or discriminated against , or in professional sectors where
unionism has little or no presence. Campaigns like " At work and
everywhere else, let's destroy the racist system ," led by the
Solidaires trade union, are a step in the right direction; we need to go
further.
A whole front to rebuild
As we can see, over the past 40 years, the so-called urban revolts,
culminating in 2005, have been concurrent with political structures and
a historical relationship with the rest of the social movement and the
left. The ease of electoral strategies is also a consequence of the
difficulty for neighborhood activists to unite in order to build a
grassroots movement and find means of exerting pressure that are not
criminalized. The goal would be to rebuild a unified and intersectional
social front of demands, like the one that began for the demonstration
of September 23, 2023, with one foot in the workplace and the other in
working-class neighborhoods. Without fetishizing a pseudo-"
revolutionary rioter ," as is sometimes seen, revolutionaries must
foster the creation of spaces for convergence and lasting
counter-powers, encouraging the mass mobilization of residents' anger in
ways other than riotous episodes that primarily involve very young
people. Revolutionaries must help to win their overall demands and stop
them being perceived with suspicion and as non-central by the left and
the trade unions, otherwise no retreat of fascism and no social
transformation will be possible.
Nicolas Pasadena (UCL Anti-racism commission)
CHRONOLOGY
1981 " Minguettes rodeos " in Vénissieux, then in the rest of the Lyon
suburbs.
AUTUMN 1983 Marches for equality and against racism, political birth of
the youth " from immigration ", followed a year later by " Convergence
84 ": creation of SOS Racisme, the Marches will be ethnicized and
renamed " marches of the beurs ".
1990-1991 new riots in Vaulx-en-Velin following the death of Thomas
Claudio, then in Manthes-la-Jolie following the death of Aissa Ihich and
Youssef Khaif, the police officers are only given suspended sentences.
1994-1995: Riots erupted in the 18th arrondissement of Paris following
the death of Makomé Mbowolé in a police station, who was killed at
point-blank range. These events inspired Mathieu Kassovitz's film La
Haine, provoking the ire of police unions. The Immigration and Suburbs
Movement (MIB) was created.
1997 AND 2002 revolts in Dammarie-les-Lys (77) following the death of
Abdelkader Bouziane (1997) and Mohammed Berrichi (2002), creation of the
association Bouge qui bouge, which will lead a long struggle for truth
and justice and will suffer local political harassment.
May 11, 1998: Chevènement anti-immigration law.
2002-2004 " Justice in the suburbs " campaign initiated by the MIB.
SPRING 2005 movement against the Fillon law, appeal from the Indigènes
de la République, massively signed.
From October 27 to November 15, 2005, riots in working-class
neighborhoods, affecting 400 neighborhoods, led to the proclamation of a
state of emergency on November 7.
SPRING 2006 anti-CPE movement and against the Equal Opportunities law.
2007-2017 numerous revolts: Villiers-le-Bel following the death of
Mushim and Lakhamy (2007), in Grenoble following the death of Karim
Boudouda (2011), in Beaumont-sur-Oise following the death of Adama
Traoré (2016), in Aulnay following the police assault of Théo Luaka
(2017) and revolt in Bobigny during a support rally on February 11.
2018 Yellow Vest movement, awareness that police violence accepted in
working-class neighborhoods is extending to the rest of the population.
2018 death of Nahel Merzouk, followed by 11 days of riots in
working-class neighborhoods across France.
To validate
[1]It should also be noted that, during the fire on Boulevard Vincent
Auriol on the night of August 25-26, 2005, which killed 17 people, he
had asked whether the foreign residents of the building were in a
regular situation...
[2]Both to justify the CPE as the lesser evil for young people from the
neighborhoods in opposition to a youth that would be privileged, and
then following the violence at the end of the demonstration at Les
Invalides on March 24, opposition between a white youth demonstrating in
a good-natured way and " thugs " who would be " anti-white racists "...
[3]Collective, University under Tensions , Syllepses, 2011.
[4]" Urban revolts, working-class neighborhoods in the spotlight ",
Alternative libertaire no. 341, September 2023.
[5]" Call for the unified march of September 23: For the end of systemic
racism, police violence, for social justice and public freedoms ", joint
communiqué of September 23, 2023.
[6]See the articles " Social violence: who sows misery ", Alternative
libertaire no. 146, December 2005, and " Five years after the revolts,
what has changed? ", Alternative libertaire no. 201, December 2010.
https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?Octobre-novembre-2005-La-revolte-des-quartiers-populaires
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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