We met with Assareh Assa, an Iranian comrade exiled in France, for an
interview that revisits the 2022 Iranian uprising following theassassination of Mahsa Jina Amini. In the October issue of Courant
alternatif, we published the first part, which focused on the movement's
success from the perspective of women's freedom, its dead ends on social
issues, its repression, and nationalism in Iran. In this second part,
Assareh discusses the Iran-Israel War, the situation of the working
class in Iran, and the "fascist" nature of the regime.
Let's return to the war between Israel and Iran. You mentioned that
Iranian nationalism helped the Islamic Republic. Could you elaborate on
that?
Indeed, any attack against a country generally appeals to the
nationalist sentiment of its population. In the case of the Iranians,
the situation was particularly ambiguous during the phase of the
conflict between Iran and Israel known as the "Twelve Days War." The
vast majority of Iranians deeply despise the current regime because of
the violence and brutality it displays toward its opponents. They feel
powerless to rid themselves of this regime, so they rejoice in seeing
their oppressors receive fatal blows. Undoubtedly, Israel's reprisals
against the commanders of the Islamic Republic pleased the majority of
the Iranian population. Although national sentiment was wounded during
the Israeli bombings, a large part of the population passively awaits
Israel's next move to finally rid themselves of the Islamic Republic;
they view Israeli military actions as a positive development. It must be
said, unfortunately, that the idea of being "liberated" by a state like
Netanyahu's, whose fascist nature has long been known, doesn't bother a
segment of the Iranian population. This indifference is partly explained
by the fact that liberals strive to present Israel as the only true
democracy in the Middle East-a functioning state that guarantees freedom
of expression and the economic security of its people, and so on. We
know this isn't true, but Iranian society seems far removed from seeking
the truth about the nature of the Israeli regime. This is due to the
narrative the Islamic Republic has maintained throughout its existence.
I'd like to elaborate on this point. Iran was culturally opposed to the
Israeli occupation of Palestine long before the establishment of the
Islamic Republic. But in recent years, a segment of the Iranian
population has sided with Israel because of the Islamic Republic. By
making the "Palestinian cause" a matter of national importance, it has
altered Iranians' perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Indeed, by using the Palestinian cause to repress the Iranian
population, it has made it detestable in the eyes of many Iranians. To
give an example, some time ago, the regime organized a parade of Basij
militiamen-pro-regime girls employed to assault women who dare to go out
in public without headscarves-and these Basij militiamen were holding
the Palestinian flag.
However, it is not only the use of the Palestinian emblem that leads
Iranians to believe the regime is repressing them by adopting a
pro-Palestinian stance. Indeed, throughout its existence, the Islamic
Republic has pursued a foreign policy whose direct result for Iranians
has been their relentless impoverishment. Of course, one can and should
look for the reason behind this devastating policy for Iranians in the
economic interests of their leaders. But for the average Iranian, things
are as follows: the regime spends Iranian money on the populations of
countries it considers its allies in the "axis of resistance,"
particularly on the Palestinians. This is why, in recent years, and
still today, we hear this slogan at rallies and demonstrations: "Leave
Palestine alone, find a solution for our misery." "Clearly, the regime
is using oil money to finance the armaments of the various military and
paramilitary structures in the region belonging to the 'axis of
resistance', but to claim that this money is being spent to improve the
lot of the people in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen or Palestine is a
pure lie.
In any case, the widespread idea in society is that while the regime
adores the Palestinian cause, Iranians hate the Palestinians and their
cause, and adore their enemy, Israel, which massacres them.
In my opinion, applauding Israel-psychologically, morally, and
ideologically-for what it is doing in Gaza is nothing more than a
fascist mindset. This attitude, which stems from the Iranian regime, is
deeply regrettable. Iranian society, which supported the Palestinian
cause before the 1979 revolution, has become, if not supportive of the
ongoing genocide in Gaza, at least indifferent. This is either due to
pure opportunism, according to the principle "The enemy of my enemy is
my friend," or to the reformist notion that evil is preferable to the
worst. Israel is bad, but the Islamic Republic is worse. Once again,
simplistic minds refuse to see the link between these two fascist
regimes and the way they feed off their antagonism.
Expulsion of Afghan immigrants
You have repeatedly described the Islamic Republic as "fascist," and
that's not insignificant. Everyone knows that the government in Iran is
a theocratic state, a dictatorship. But should we really call it fascist?
I'm aware that the term "fascist" is very loaded: it has a well-defined
historical meaning, so we must avoid using it indiscriminately. However,
it allows me to describe the political and social situation in Iran. The
Islamic Republic is indeed the result of a power grab by
counter-revolutionary forces; it emerged from a failed popular
revolution. Its first actions consisted of eliminating the radical
elements of society, which it did very well. It also launched a war
against Iraq, which allowed it to mobilize the masses around its
supremacist ideology, an Iranian version of Islam: Shiism. It was thus
able to stifle all voices of opposition during the war and the decade
that followed.
For all these reasons, it seems unfair to deny the regime the label
"fascist"! However, if another term, another concept, is proposed that
would place it on the same level as the Israeli regime, I readily accept
it. Indeed, I believe that insisting on the fascist nature of Israel's
practices, rightly so regarding the genocide it is committing in Gaza,
while considering the Iranian regime as a mere dictatorship, constitutes
a major analytical error. This approach leads to practices that
ultimately support the Islamic Republic in its militaristic policies and
reinforce its repression of Iranians under the pretext of confronting
Israel. The political discourse that labels Israel fascist, but not
Iran, is often defended by the left wing of the "axis of resistance."
Those on the so-called "campist" or "anti-imperialist" left weigh the
damage and deaths caused by the two conflicting regimes against each
other. They ignore, or choose to ignore, that the Islamic Republic, by
its very existence as a perpetual threat to Israel, has worsened the
lives and struggles of the Palestinians. They also ignore that Israel
sold arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, which greatly helped the
regime consolidate its power through war. Nor do they take into account
Iran's openly antisemitic rhetoric, which allows the Israeli state to
conflate antisemitism and anti-Zionism.
Faced with this simplistic comparison coming from the left, I would like
to recall Otto Rühle's statement: "To speak of black fascism, one must
also speak of red fascism," and adapt it to current situations: "To
speak of Israeli fascism, one must also speak of Iranian fascism, and
vice versa."
But to avoid remaining trapped in this rhetoric and simply justifying
the political use of the label "fascist" to describe the regime in Iran,
let's examine the issue from the perspective of Afghan migrant workers.
Indeed, unlike a dictatorship, a fascist state needs the support of its
population to implement its fascist policies. It seems to me that this
was unfortunately the case in the Iranian regime's latest act against
the Afghans.
Are you referring to the recent expulsion of Afghan immigrants from Iran?
Yes.
I'd like to take this opportunity to discuss the situation of these
immigrants in Iran. This also allows me to elaborate on my answer to
your first question, namely how Iranian nationalism supports the regime.
To do this, I need to go back to the end of the uprising after Jinnah's
death.
Indeed, as I mentioned at the beginning of this interview, the failure
of this uprising resulted in a clash between various political forces
over the issue of territorial integrity. This conflict escalated
considerably, with Turkish nationalist forces pitted against Kurdish
nationalists, who in turn clashed with the Persians, and the Persians
against everyone else, and so on. To control the national conflict after
this failure, the regime needed to unite all the actors under a national
banner. This banner could no longer be directed against the "external
enemy," namely Western countries, because Iranians had long since ceased
to believe in them. Having lost faith in its nationalist rhetoric
against the "external enemy," the regime has sought to create another
enemy within the country: migrant workers. While most Iranians no longer
support the regime in its confrontation with Israel or the United
States, they side with it against Afghans who, in their view, have come
to Iran to "steal their bread or destroy their beautiful country."
In recent years, Afghan immigrants and people of immigrant origin have
suffered atrocities not only at the hands of the state, but also at the
hands of some Iranian citizens. Although they share the same culture,
language, and religion as Iranians, Afghans have never been welcome in
Iran. They are victims of all kinds of state discrimination: they cannot
settle where they wish, they cannot frequent certain neighborhoods, and
access to certain public spaces, such as public gardens, is forbidden to
them. They can't even get a SIM card in their own name and can't move
freely within the country. They face enormous difficulties enrolling
their children in school, and sometimes it's impossible. Recently, the
regime has even banned the sale of bread and medicine to Afghans.
Expulsion of Afghan immigrants
Of course, the state couldn't carry out all this systematic
discrimination if racism didn't exist in Iran. But even before the
Jinnah uprising, an Afghan, or even an Afghan-Iranian, wasn't safe from
racist acts: these acts committed against Afghans are countless,
especially against Hazaras, easily recognizable by their Asian features.
It starts with a simple insult in the street, progresses to a beating,
and ends with the burning of their neighborhood. Indeed, as far back as
I can remember, there has always been a sense of superiority among most
Iranians toward Afghans. I won't elaborate here on the historical,
cultural, and economic reasons for this; I'll simply say that there
exists in Iran a discourse that tends to assert that Iranians are
descendants of the Aryans, of "pure blood," etc., which would legitimize
their supposed "racial" superiority over non-Aryans. This discourse has
obviously gained more traction today, but racist acts against Afghans,
especially Hazaras, are not a recent phenomenon. In a context of
political, economic, and social crisis, this racism leads to acts that
can only be described as fascist. It should also be noted that the issue
of Afghan workers and the racism they face is gradually beginning to be
raised in society, particularly among left-wing intellectuals.
The regime, long unable to provide basic necessities for its people,
sought to lighten the burden on the state. Its solution was the
expulsion of Afghan immigrant families. To achieve this, it needed the
cooperation of society: the war provided the ideal nationalist pretext.
During the "Twelve Days' War," Iranians of all political persuasions
were in shock. They witnessed the myth of the regime's military might
evaporate and its vulnerability to its enemy exposed. They hoped the
situation would turn in their favor, but they also worried about their
own safety. So, once the bombing of the cities ended, they began to show
solidarity with the regime. How? Well, the regime sought scapegoats to
justify its failure, and it found them among the most destitute members
of Iranian society: Afghan workers. It hunted them down in their
workplaces, in their homes, and even in hospitals. The Iranian majority
does not believe the story fabricated by the regime against the Afghans,
but it has effectively helped the regime by supporting their mass expulsion.
It is estimated that between 5 and 6 million Afghan workers are toiling
for starvation wages in Iran. The regime has managed to expel between 1
and 2 million of them under appalling conditions. There have been some
deaths in the camps where Afghan workers were held for several days
without food or water before being sent back to Afghanistan. The
entrepreneurial segment of the Iranian middle class is obviously aware
of the economic value of this cheap labor. However, the regime is so
worried about its own future that it cannot foresee the damage this
still-productive segment of the bourgeoisie will suffer in the medium
term. Moreover, the economic situation of the Iranian working class is
so catastrophic that the regime is convinced that sooner or later they
will agree to replace immigrant labor in performing very low-paying jobs
in the most difficult sectors.
In the alarming material situation of Iranians, there are also shortages
of water and energy, right?
Yes, but before answering that question, I'd like to give some figures
to better illustrate the economic distress of the working class: a
working-class family of four needs about 48 million tomans to survive in
an expensive city like Tehran, while the current wage of a worker is
only 14 million tomans, or less than $100 a month. The threat of war and
the embargo further aggravates the situation of this class, but it is
also increasingly impoverishing the middle class, to the point that some
segments of it can no longer reproduce as such.
Ground subsidence
Regarding the electricity shortages, experts believe they stem from the
regime's failure to invest in upgrading power generation infrastructure.
There are significant losses in the networks, affecting water, gas,
electricity, and other utilities. I don't have specific figures, but it
appears that a large amount of Bitcoin is being mined in Iran, a sort of
scheme to circumvent cryptocurrency embargoes. The result: daily power
outages.
It is important to note, however, that these power cuts do not affect
all Iranians equally: in small towns and villages, residents are even
more deprived of electricity than those in large cities or affluent
neighborhoods. Indeed, by making this choice, the regime is trying to
reduce the risk of unrest in major cities.
Regarding the water shortage, it's important to know that Iran has been
experiencing a drought for about five years, but that's not the only
cause: poor water resource management is another. And when we talk about
water scarcity, we're not talking about a temporary phenomenon. Iran's
major historical cities are now threatened by this problem. In Isfahan,
for example, the ground is subsiding. Why? Because groundwater has been
extracted for agricultural use, in order to achieve one of the regime's
grand ambitions: food independence. On the other side of the country, in
the Northwest, Urmia, Iran's largest lake, has been drained by the
construction of dams. The consequence is that in a few years, major
cities will be directly impacted by salt carried by the wind, drying
everything in its path (this phenomenon is already underway). It is
difficult to imagine the number of rivers and ponds dried up, directly
or indirectly, for direct material interests that benefit the economic
mafia of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: drying up a pond to
exploit the oil or ore that is nearby, for example.
A few years ago, during a protest, a mullah declared: "We will not
leave. But if we leave, we will leave you a scorched earth." I
personally fear they might carry out this plan!
And what could stop the mullahs?
Ah, that's a tough question! In truth, the struggle will not end until
we find the answer to this question: what to do?
In a war-torn atmosphere where the regime arrests hundreds of people
under the pretext that they are Israeli spies, and where several have
been hanged for this reason, there are still protests here and there.
There was one recently in Balochistan, which was immediately and
bloodily suppressed. Pensioners gather every week to demand an increase
in their pensions, although they are not safe from the violence of the
security forces, despite their age. In Shiraz, people took to the
streets to protest the shortages of water and electricity; they were
immediately dispersed and arrested. In some villages, residents block
the streets to protest the water shortages.
Among the working class, there is the struggle of the workers at the
Arak aluminum plant, who have been on strike for more than fifty days.
Something unprecedented also happened, according to my information:
after a few weeks, instead of receiving a response to their demands,
these workers found themselves threatened with dismissal and arrest by
the political police, VAVAK (1). Some of them then began a hunger
strike, refusing even to drink water. They are demanding improved
working conditions-conditions which are responsible for the deaths of
two of their colleagues. They are also demanding the replacement of the
factory manager and the payment of their wages. This is clearly a rather
defensive strike, but it shows that the labor movement is still very
much alive in Iran.
Hunger strike in Arak
But from an activist perspective, it seems important to revisit the
"Woman, Life, Freedom" movement, not just to commemorate its martyrs and
emphasize its radical nature, but above all to highlight its limitations
and content. Some comrades have a tendency to fetishize this movement,
to cling to the snake's skin. In my opinion, it's time to take a
critical look at it and ask ourselves what "Woman, Life, Freedom" means
when this slogan is adopted by Netanyahu.
Interview by zyg, September 2025
Note
(1) This abbreviation for the Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic
Republic of Iran is often used to highlight the similarities between
this organization and the SAVAK (State Security and Intelligence
Service) of the Shah's era, which operated in the same way: to spread
terror and torture throughout the country. Many elements of SAVAK were
adopted by VAVAK.
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