Tariffs are making a comeback under Trump, but beyond US policy, global
trade as a whole seems to be shrinking and reconfiguring itself.Furthermore, the territorial ambitions of certain economic powers are no
longer disguised as a pacifying liberalism. War, or at least its
preparation, is once again at the forefront of foreign policy. The
liberalism we've been sold since the end of World War II-reinvigorated
from the 1980s onward-seems to be on its deathbed. To try to shed some
light on this and stimulate debate, this article offers reading notes on
the book *The Confiscated World: An Essay on the Capitalism of Finitude
(16th-21st Centuries)*, written by Arnaud Orain in 2025.
The return of mercantilism or the capitalism of finitude
Let's be clear from the outset: the fundamental mechanisms of capitalist
exploitation haven't changed, and we remain (will remain?) under its
yoke daily, in every corner of the world. Arnaud Orain nevertheless
attempts to characterize several major periods since the 16th century,
when the "first globalization" began. Two main forms of capitalism have
succeeded one another: liberal capitalism, which spans two periods (from
1815 to 1880 and from 1945 to 2010, with a Keynesian moderation until
the 1980s); and the capitalism of finitude, also called mercantilism,
which is predominant over time, as it is found in three major periods
(from the 15th to the 18th century, from 1880 to 1945, and since 2010).
This capitalism of finitude can be defined as a vast naval and
territorial enterprise of asset monopolization - land, mines, maritime
zones, enslaved people, warehouses, submarine cables, satellites,
digital data - conducted by nation-states and private companies to
generate rent-seeking income outside the principles of competition. It
would be structured around three main characteristics:
the closure and privatization of the oceans and seas, accompanied by a
blurring of lines between the merchant and military navies;
The elimination of market mechanisms such as free prices and
competition. In their place, monopolies are established;
the formation of formal or informal empires through the takeover of
private or public firms, leading to a strong return of territorial and
sovereign imperialism.
Be warned, these mechanisms are always present in capitalism, whatever
form it takes. As Fernand Braudel said in 1976: "Capitalism has always
been monopolistic." Certainly, but to varying degrees, and today we see
a return to the discourse of retreat and scarcity. On the economic
front, this is evident in stagnant growth, which has even become
nonexistent in many places, but also in the increasingly pressing issue
of environmental limits, which remind us of their presence through
shortages and disasters. In every mercantilist period, this scarcity is
presented as a supposed problem to be solved, but in reality, it
represents a shift and deepening of the frontier of capitalism, which
seeks to colonize other horizons that will be spatially defined through
the organization of new empires.
The closing of the oceans and the militarization of maritime trade
By examining current maritime affairs and commercial shipping routes, we
observe that these routes are being reconfigured to avoid certain areas
that have become risky due to the resurgence of piracy (such as in the
Red Sea), the weakening of US naval hegemony, and the emergence of
another form of imperialism, that of China, exemplified by the famous
"Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). However, there cannot be two hegemons
(dominant powers) simultaneously. Historically, liberal periods of
capitalism have been dominated by a maritime superpower. This was the
United Kingdom between 1815 and 1880, and to some extent, it has been
the United States since 1945, although this is increasingly contested
despite the presence of seven pre-positioned fleets, a dozen naval
bases, 300 vessels including 11 aircraft carriers, and a budget of $240
billion-five times the French military budget. Since 2023, the Chinese
navy has 370 surface ships and submarines, and plans to have 435 units
by 2030. On paper, China is becoming the world's leading naval power and
is increasing its presence in the seas, particularly between the South
China Sea and the Red Sea, as well as throughout the Pacific region as
far as Australia.
Let us recall the vital importance of maritime transport to capitalism:
80% of the volume of trade takes place at sea, and the tonnage of the
global fleet has doubled since 2010 and continues to grow by 2 to 4% per
year. Between 2000 and 2023, containerized trade increased 2.5 times.
Now, there is an umbilical link between trade and naval power, according
to the laws of Alfred Mahan, a reactionary American historian and
strategist. For him, there is a chain of events linking manufacturing,
the merchant marine, and territorial acquisition. Thus, there is a great
deal of overlap between the merchant marine and the navy. Thus, China
accounted for 30% of global manufacturing output in 2020, logically
increasing its merchant marine fivefold between 2010 and 2022 (becoming
the leading flag carrier, almost on par with Greece), and, most
importantly, becoming the world's largest naval force in terms of
numbers (see above). It is important to remember that merchant marines
are also warships. During the First World War, many passenger ships were
converted into auxiliary cruisers. Today, the Chinese shipping company
COSCO is implementing a "deep military-civilian integration" by
modifying ships to transport armed groups managed by private security
companies and military equipment, such as cruise missiles.
Ultimately, the United States lost its maritime leadership, but, to
revitalize its power, it rediscovered its interests elsewhere by
leveraging its actual or coveted territory. This refers to North and
South America, the latter historically viewed as a "backyard" by US
imperialists. Current events in Venezuela and Argentina serve as
reminders of the US appetite for these countries. At sea, the convoy
system returned, with global trade conducted under the watchful eye of
gunboats. The EU, in all of this, seemed sidelined with its
insufficiently powerful navy, even though it possesses large merchant
shipping companies (see below).
Competition is the enemy! Capitalism versus the market
Free competition is one of the pillars of liberalism: its proponents
believe in the benefits of free private interests, which will clash and
then balance each other out, while the state maintains a role of arbiter
and facilitator. But today, the return of tariffs and the creation of
new monopolies are undermining this utopia of abundance, creating
another: power. Abundance and power, as two distinct goals of
capitalism, were analyzed by the Scottish historian William Cunningham
(1849-1919). For the sake of the population's abundance, free trade is
advocated, but to ensure national power, excessive openness must be
avoided. For the capitalism of finite resources, the unbridled pursuit
of profit thus becomes a source of conflict that undermines national
foundations, especially in a non-hegemonic context where the rules are
not, or are no longer, controlled. This brings to mind Trump's slogan
"Make America Great Again (MAGA)" and his emphasis on production rather
than consumption. But in reality, this reindustrialization policy began
under Biden, and we find the same concern at the European and French
levels, particularly since the COVID pandemic. Everyone is calling for
protectionism, even the left wing of capitalism, and this is supposed to
happen through the multiple transitions we are promised, seasoned with
resilience... These policies are a return to imperialism and the control
of resources that will be essential for this new economy (rare earth
elements, lithium, etc.). It's important to note that imperialism has
always existed, even under liberal regimes, but with mercantilism it
becomes more overt, demanding a new "lost power," which leads to
xenophobic, belligerent, and authoritarian attitudes.
Thus, mercantilism openly seeks to gain by impoverishing its neighbor.
Yesterday's victors try to do without today's and want to change the
rules of the game to regain their advantage. Each economic bloc desires
a form of autarky: the United States with its MAGA policy, China with
its 2021 five-year plan that refers to self-sufficiency; the EU lags
behind but also calls for industrial relocation. Ultimately, the pie
would no longer be expandable; only the size of the slices could change.
We are at the antipodes of classical liberal thought (Ricardo), which
praises this system where each country exploits its "comparative
advantages" to ultimately increase productivity, lower prices, and
ensure abundance without real limits.
Logically, mercantilism praises the benefits of monopolies and trade
agreements, which allow for greater strength in an uncertain
environment. A monopoly is more robust and durable, while also enabling
the binding of individuals within a country, the deployment of superior
technical capabilities, and the fostering of greater external
competition to gain market dominance. This echoes the history of
colonial companies from the 16th to the 19th centuries, which reversed
the balance of power between states and other merchants. Two
possibilities exist: either a monopsony, where one is the sole buyer, or
a monopoly, where one is the sole seller. To summarize, let's quote
Morris Chang, vice president of Texas Instruments and founder of TSMC (a
Taiwanese electronic chip giant): for him, globalization "should allow
domestic companies to generate profits abroad, and foreign products and
services to enter the country, provided they do not harm national
security or the country's current or future technological and economic
leadership."
Throughout the various periods of finite capitalism, anti-competitive
ideology has taken on several forms. First, trade must be directed
towards friendly or vassal states: this is the system of imperial silos.
In the past, this was called "colonial exclusivity," which could take
two forms: a monopoly granted by the government to trading companies,
such as the VOC (Dutch East India Company) or the EIC (British East
India Company); or the implementation of exclusivity laws prohibiting
trade with others, such as the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, which
benefited British imperialism through the Commonwealth. These mechanisms
were undermined after 1945: the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade), created in 1947, was replaced in 1995 by the WTO, which ensures
multilateral free trade against the backdrop of decolonization. But
today, the WTO is practically dead, and more and more bilateral
agreements are being signed. The United States wants exclusivity in
Ukraine, Greenland, and many South American countries, such as
Argentina. China, for its part, signed its first "comprehensive regional
economic partnership" in 2020 with 15 countries in Asia and the Pacific.
It wants to create its own "resilient" silo for its supplies and value
chains.
We also see de jure or de facto monopolies that must ensure weak
competition in the markets through legal or extra-legal means,
implicitly including violence. The American antitrust policies of the
1970s and 80s are well and truly dead: for example, Google holds 90% of
the global search engine market, Windows 73% of the operating system
market, and Walmart owns between 60 and 80% of the retail market. The
United States is once again becoming an economic autocracy where
anything goes, and the White House is talking about a second "Gilded
Age" (the first golden age was between 1880 and 1914).
Finally, anti-competitive practices include cartels, which are
agreements between several companies to share the market. Collusion
allows them to: attempt to reduce the costs of protection in a hostile
environment, seek monopoly or monopsony positions and thus control
prices outside the market, and ultimately gain a position of power over
other traders. To illustrate this, we can consider shipping companies
that form unusual consortia: in 2000, the top 20 companies controlled
less than 50% of maritime transport; by 2024, 95% of this transport is
managed by the four giants - the Danish company Maersk, the French
company CMA-CGM, the Italian-Swiss company MSC, and the Chinese company
COSCO. They share control of terminals in various ports around the world.
Imperialism of yesterday and today. At the top: Pitt and Napoleon. At
the bottom: Trump, Putin and Xi.
The return of the merchants, the empire strikes back!
In a mercantile era, warehousing dominates manufacturing, and logistics
and transportation become more powerful than production itself. A
network of warehouses is created and strengthened. This network already
existed in the liberal era: before 1815, manufacturing was scattered
throughout the countryside, even though a few urban centers were
beginning to concentrate the workforce. The merchant was at the center,
as it was he who brought the raw materials and left with the finished
product, which became a commodity. Merchants were also central to
colonization, as evidenced by the traders of Bordeaux, Nantes,
Marseille, or Saigon. Since 2010, production seems once again
subordinate to merchant capital, especially in the two structuring
sectors of maritime transport and retail. Large corporations, from
Amazon to Walmart, are back. Warehouses are springing up everywhere. In
the Île-de-France region, warehouse space increased by 30% between 2012
and 2022, and across France, there were 80 million square meters of
warehouses in 2015 and are projected to reach 90 million square meters
in 2024. Logistics represents 10% of the national GDP and employs 1.8
million people. With their newfound dominance, retailers are able to
dictate prices to producers, which explains, for example, the precarious
situation of some farmers.
This market capitalism also leads to the creation of sovereign firms
that seize control of state functions - see Facebook or Amazon. Market
makers like Elon Musk are able to exert regulatory control over the
conditions under which others can sell goods or services. Their income
increasingly comes from rent, which is "derived from the ownership,
possession, or control of scarce assets under conditions of limited or
no competition," according to geographer Brett Christophers' definition.
The resurgence of mercantilism marks the return of colonialism, but in
forms different from those practiced from the 16th to the 19th
centuries. One of the justifications put forward for seizing control of
resources in a country other than one's own is that its inhabitants do
not know how to manage the resources at their disposal and that this
mismanagement poses a danger to everyone by potentially leading to
famines. Land grabbing on a global scale has accelerated since the
2007-2008 food crisis. Since 2000, there have been approximately 1,500
purchase or lease agreements covering 30 million hectares. Among the
major land-grabbers is China; however, contrary to popular belief, its
investments are not primarily in Africa, but rather in Cambodia, Laos,
Brazil, and Myanmar. Less well-known than their Western counterparts,
Chinese agribusiness giants like COFCA, Dakang, and Beidahuang own
enormous plantations-and their economic model is gaining momentum (see
the oil palm plantations in Indonesia). Another justification for this
new predatory activity is the yield gap that must be bridged to maximize
resource yield. This "better management" rhetoric is also evident when
Trump considers annexing Greenland.
A period of neither war nor peace?
Arnaud Orain observes a rise in competing imperialisms that go hand in
hand with the development of reactionary and xenophobic nationalisms.
But he does not believe in an open conflict between the United States
and China, each preferring to rely on its imperial silos. Nevertheless,
on the periphery, conflicts are multiplying as countries vie for control
of land and resources. Mercantilism is supposedly a period of neither
war nor peace. Yet, if we refer to the periods chosen to define the
capitalism of finitude (see above), they are punctuated by "peripheral"
conflicts in the colonies, but also by "central" conflicts, if we
consider the two world wars. We can therefore question one of the
conclusions of mercantilism: that ultimately, competing imperialisms can
no longer rely sufficiently on their silos and end up clashing with one
another.
Arnaud Orain concludes his work with a search for a solution, proposing
the idea of a "war ecology" as defined by Pierre Charbonnier. This would
aim to weaken an adversary without weapons, but by dispensing with the
resources it can provide. Ultimately, Orain calls for a form of
collective degrowth which, if radical, would be capable of transcending
the capitalism of finitude. These final reflections are debatable and
open the discussion on the tools available to halt this march toward
isolationism and conflict. Calling for degrowth without dismantling and
confronting local and international class relations seems naive. For
beyond individual or national consumption choices, it is the intrinsic
functioning of capitalism that must be fought, and this can only be
achieved by addressing the exploitation of labor and the state of class
struggle. The latter is a significant, if not historical, lever for
change. Reading Rosa Luxemburg (The Accumulation of Capital, 1913) on
the analysis of imperialism leading up to the eve of the First World War
could be another avenue of exploration.
Margat, OCL Lille, October 2025
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4561
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