The war in Ukraine has transformed into traditional trench warfare due
to the presence of layered fortifications erected by the Ukrainians to
defend their territories, using cities and large urban centers as a
defensive fulcrum. The novelty is the widespread introduction of
drone-led warfare, a factor that has completely changed not only combat
strategies and tactics and the use and role of weapons systems in
battle, but also that of combatants, both men and women.
The use of cities as logistical strongholds and military bastions has
led to the exodus of most of their inhabitants, although there are
examples of populations who remained to defend their possessions, or
more likely to await the arrival of the Russians. This exodus has been
accelerated not only by the measures of the Ukrainian government, which
is keen to maintain control of its population. What is certain is that
the glide bombs and FABs used by the Russians, which extended their
range to 150 km from the target, contributed to the complete or partial
destruction of residential areas.
The result is that Ukrainian territory is now reduced to a pile of
rubble, further strewn with mines, while the destruction extends to
areas far from the front, especially to production infrastructure,
energy production, and factories dedicated to war production.
The introduction of drones into weapons systems has not only diminished
the role of tanks and armored vehicles, which have become extremely
vulnerable, but has also deprived infantry of adequate protection,
partially replaced the air force, or at least supported it, often
dominating it in the aerospace forces. It has also diminished and
partially replaced the role of artillery, extended the combat space from
the line that identified the first area of conflict between the two
sides on the battlefield, increasing its width from 30 to 60 km, and
made rear-area logistics facilities and beyond extremely vulnerable.
Proof of this is that to carry out this task of destroying front-line
depots and supplies, the Russian army has created special brigades,
called "Rubicon," which do not operate on the front lines but have the
specific task of striking and destroying infrastructure and support
lines facing the front, thus preventing logistics from fulfilling its
role. The formation of these Brigades has proven a strategic success, as
demonstrated by the fact that the current 17 will be increased to 27 by
the end of the year.
Using drones, it is now possible to remotely neutralize a tank, destroy
a troop carrier, whether armored or civilian, hit a moving motorcycle
fighter, destroy a house or shelter, and attack a trench. Typically, for
these tasks, the Russians use a special type of drone guided by a fiber
optic cable that makes it immune to electromagnetic interference that
can impede remote control and can reach up to 40 km. This type of drone
the Ukrainians have only recently acquired.
As far as we know, only the Russians have a type of drone that can
deceive missile defenses by projecting the holographic image of a larger
aircraft, thus deceiving anti-aircraft guns with nonexistent targets,
thus wasting the enemy's ammunition.
At the start of the war, Ukraine had a lead in drone production, which
was apparently supplied by England. Subsequently, the Ukrainian industry
managed to develop its own production, scattering small factories and
laboratories across the country, even locating them in civilian
apartments for better concealment and thus making them difficult to
detect. Not only that, but over time, wartime experience and the
competitiveness among various manufacturers improved and strengthened
the role of drones, both in terms of capabilities and their use for
transporting explosives, with ever-increasing flight ranges. These
characteristics the Russians immediately adapted to, improving the
capabilities of their drones and further diversifying their uses.
It's true that drones don't require large industrial complexes, but when
production is needed, it's best to do so industrially, and this is what
Russia is doing. It has built a few large plants, locating them (one
apparently in Korea) in areas far from the front or believing they can
be defended from Ukrainian attacks. Another advantage of industrial
production is the homogeneity of the drones produced, which can
consequently be controlled and maneuvered in a coherent and coordinated
manner from command centers, equipping each facility with research
laboratories dedicated to innovation.
The organizational structure adopted by Ukraine has become a problem
because, in order to minimize traceability, it forces them to pay the
price of highly heterogeneous and unmanageable production. Both sides
are beginning to deploy artificially intelligent drones that
"autonomously" select (without the need for remote control) the target
to strike. In this field, the Russians appear to have the advantage.
Furthermore, to make sure they don't miss a beat, the Russians are
developing anti-drone drones and have begun using a new tactic to detect
Ukrainian drone operators. A VPP drone, equipped with a large-capacity
battery that allows for long-range flight, flies over the front line,
rear areas, and residential areas, recording various frequency bands on
an SD card. Upon return, the video is analyzed to pinpoint the position
of the VPP pilots by triangulating the transmission signals. This
process then proceeds to locate the source. The coordinates are
transmitted to Russian drone operators, FABs, or glide bombs.
This drone neutralization technique is acceptable because it is
unthinkable to use anti-missile systems to shoot down or counter them,
which cost thousands of times more (and are not particularly accurate)
to shoot down incoming drones (at least the most powerful and dangerous
ones). These innovations have surpassed Ukrainian production both in
terms of drone quality, especially those equipped with fiber optics;
this is a significant organizational and design effort, considering that
at the beginning of the war they were dependent on Iranian supplies.
Their military industrial apparatus has organized a production that is
estimated to be capable of supplying 1,000 drones per day for combat use
by the end of the year. Technical innovations to improve the weapon's
effectiveness are engaging both sides in a competition that appears to
place the Russians at an advantage. The Russian war machine is slow and
bureaucratic, but over time it manages to overcome its disadvantages and
surpass its competitors, as history demonstrates.
The fact remains that this new type of weapon does not require large
spaces or equipment to build, is low-cost, effectively replaces the role
of extremely expensive cannons and missiles, is less vulnerable overall,
and is capable of hitting distant targets and damaging and destroying
infrastructure. For these reasons, drones have established themselves as
the primary weapon in trench warfare and attrition.
The versatility of drones as an attack weapon, both on the frontline and
beyond, has prompted those targeted to develop defense mechanisms,
ranging from equipping armored vehicles that could be their targets with
metal superstructures and antennas, to attempting to create at least
partially protected routes by erecting corridors of nets mounted on
poles in which drones could become entangled and explode, to adopting
the use of pellet guns as individual weapons for an unlikely defense, to
employ concealment techniques to avoid detection, and to employ
electronic warfare to disrupt their guidance.
The use of this weapon and the new methods of combat create challenges
for the structure and armament of all armies, which must acknowledge
this and adapt. This emphasizes the role of the Ukrainian military,
which has become the most experienced in the use of this type of weapon
among all Western European armies, including the Americans. It should
also be noted that Ukraine's use of a number certainly exceeding 30,000
"volunteers" or mercenaries to fill the shortage of men willing to fight
has led to the recruitment of members of mafia and Camorra clans who
have enlisted to learn the techniques and capabilities of using and
piloting drones, transferring this know-how to guerrilla groups or
criminal organizations, especially those affiliated with drug
trafficking gangs. Proof of this is the use by Sahel jihadists in combat
against the armies of the Central African Republic, Niger, and Mali, as
well as drug trafficking gangs from South America and Mexico.
Drones are also remarkably versatile, so much so that they are also used
by the navy. Given their specific characteristics, they possess
considerable potential for further development. Indeed, there are plans
to build aircraft and ships armed with drones that would serve as launch
pads for swarms of these weapons, capable of performing both aggressive
and defensive functions. It is widely believed that drone-armed ships
could effectively replace the role of aircraft carriers at a fraction of
the cost (which, after all, are becoming obsolete not so much because of
drones, but rather because of the use of hypersonic missiles, which are
undetectable and have the power to inflict serious damage on an aircraft
carrier). These could also be affordable for states with relatively
limited resources, maximizing the proliferation of weapons.
As proof of this, we cite the case of Lithuania, whose government has
announced training programs for children and adults. The plan, launched
in agreement between the Ministries of Defense and Education, will
involve approximately 15,500 adults and 7,000 children by 2028, out of a
school population of 460,197, and a total population of 2,888 (2024),
20% of whom are over 60 and unable to deploy.
For children and young people, the plan will be adapted to the different
age groups considered. Third- and fourth-grade students, aged eight to
ten, will learn to build and pilot simple drones. Secondary school
students, on the other hand, will design and produce drone components,
including using 3D printers, and will learn to build and pilot more
advanced types of drones.
The plan calls for spending EUR3.3 million on specialized equipment,
including first-person view drones for indoors and outdoors, video
control and transmission systems, and a mobile training app for unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).
It feels like a game, even though the game is a war that sows death and
destruction.
The "unwitting" drone operator
But our intent is not to delve into the wartime potential of drones, but
rather to see what effects the use of this weapon has on combatants.
Drone operators usually operate remotely from the battlefield, focusing
on the target on video from afar, remaining unseen, and effectively
performing a role in combat similar to that of snipers.
These soldiers, long present in armies, were transformed and organized
into specialized units. Those composed of women and assigned to the
Soviet Army, where they distinguished themselves for their combat and
operational capabilities, particularly proved their worth. Drone pilots,
like snipers, required stealth, patience, and determination. The
instrument they used offered them, like drone pilots, the advantage of
depersonalizing the effects of their actions due to the distance of the
target. When the target appears on video, their actions resemble the
behavior of a player emotionally involved in the impulses of a video
game. This leads them to declassify the effects and role played on the
battlefield, allowing them to channel the player's determination and
relentlessness into their actions. Drone piloting is accepted by many
because it frees them from responsibility for the consequences of their
actions, filtering the drama of their enemies' deaths through video.
While it's true that one of the problems of war is the future veterans
of both sides and their reintegration into society, their mental state,
their psychological balance, their acquired habit of using violence, and
their capacity to kill, the effects that drone piloting will have on
veterans of this war and combatants on both sides are still unknown, due
to their actions and the ease they have acquired in using depersonalized
violence through the use of remote electronic means.
Among the possible effects, we can hypothesize what we would call
"Private Ryan," from the film of the same name.
There is no doubt that in their current condition, drone pilots
constitute an elite group, extremely responsible and esteemed. Many of
them, upon returning to society, could find themselves performing roles
and functions of no importance and degrade towards the use of drugs or
alcohol.
G. C.
https://www.ucadi.org/2025/11/01/guerra-per-droni/
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
to the presence of layered fortifications erected by the Ukrainians to
defend their territories, using cities and large urban centers as a
defensive fulcrum. The novelty is the widespread introduction of
drone-led warfare, a factor that has completely changed not only combat
strategies and tactics and the use and role of weapons systems in
battle, but also that of combatants, both men and women.
The use of cities as logistical strongholds and military bastions has
led to the exodus of most of their inhabitants, although there are
examples of populations who remained to defend their possessions, or
more likely to await the arrival of the Russians. This exodus has been
accelerated not only by the measures of the Ukrainian government, which
is keen to maintain control of its population. What is certain is that
the glide bombs and FABs used by the Russians, which extended their
range to 150 km from the target, contributed to the complete or partial
destruction of residential areas.
The result is that Ukrainian territory is now reduced to a pile of
rubble, further strewn with mines, while the destruction extends to
areas far from the front, especially to production infrastructure,
energy production, and factories dedicated to war production.
The introduction of drones into weapons systems has not only diminished
the role of tanks and armored vehicles, which have become extremely
vulnerable, but has also deprived infantry of adequate protection,
partially replaced the air force, or at least supported it, often
dominating it in the aerospace forces. It has also diminished and
partially replaced the role of artillery, extended the combat space from
the line that identified the first area of conflict between the two
sides on the battlefield, increasing its width from 30 to 60 km, and
made rear-area logistics facilities and beyond extremely vulnerable.
Proof of this is that to carry out this task of destroying front-line
depots and supplies, the Russian army has created special brigades,
called "Rubicon," which do not operate on the front lines but have the
specific task of striking and destroying infrastructure and support
lines facing the front, thus preventing logistics from fulfilling its
role. The formation of these Brigades has proven a strategic success, as
demonstrated by the fact that the current 17 will be increased to 27 by
the end of the year.
Using drones, it is now possible to remotely neutralize a tank, destroy
a troop carrier, whether armored or civilian, hit a moving motorcycle
fighter, destroy a house or shelter, and attack a trench. Typically, for
these tasks, the Russians use a special type of drone guided by a fiber
optic cable that makes it immune to electromagnetic interference that
can impede remote control and can reach up to 40 km. This type of drone
the Ukrainians have only recently acquired.
As far as we know, only the Russians have a type of drone that can
deceive missile defenses by projecting the holographic image of a larger
aircraft, thus deceiving anti-aircraft guns with nonexistent targets,
thus wasting the enemy's ammunition.
At the start of the war, Ukraine had a lead in drone production, which
was apparently supplied by England. Subsequently, the Ukrainian industry
managed to develop its own production, scattering small factories and
laboratories across the country, even locating them in civilian
apartments for better concealment and thus making them difficult to
detect. Not only that, but over time, wartime experience and the
competitiveness among various manufacturers improved and strengthened
the role of drones, both in terms of capabilities and their use for
transporting explosives, with ever-increasing flight ranges. These
characteristics the Russians immediately adapted to, improving the
capabilities of their drones and further diversifying their uses.
It's true that drones don't require large industrial complexes, but when
production is needed, it's best to do so industrially, and this is what
Russia is doing. It has built a few large plants, locating them (one
apparently in Korea) in areas far from the front or believing they can
be defended from Ukrainian attacks. Another advantage of industrial
production is the homogeneity of the drones produced, which can
consequently be controlled and maneuvered in a coherent and coordinated
manner from command centers, equipping each facility with research
laboratories dedicated to innovation.
The organizational structure adopted by Ukraine has become a problem
because, in order to minimize traceability, it forces them to pay the
price of highly heterogeneous and unmanageable production. Both sides
are beginning to deploy artificially intelligent drones that
"autonomously" select (without the need for remote control) the target
to strike. In this field, the Russians appear to have the advantage.
Furthermore, to make sure they don't miss a beat, the Russians are
developing anti-drone drones and have begun using a new tactic to detect
Ukrainian drone operators. A VPP drone, equipped with a large-capacity
battery that allows for long-range flight, flies over the front line,
rear areas, and residential areas, recording various frequency bands on
an SD card. Upon return, the video is analyzed to pinpoint the position
of the VPP pilots by triangulating the transmission signals. This
process then proceeds to locate the source. The coordinates are
transmitted to Russian drone operators, FABs, or glide bombs.
This drone neutralization technique is acceptable because it is
unthinkable to use anti-missile systems to shoot down or counter them,
which cost thousands of times more (and are not particularly accurate)
to shoot down incoming drones (at least the most powerful and dangerous
ones). These innovations have surpassed Ukrainian production both in
terms of drone quality, especially those equipped with fiber optics;
this is a significant organizational and design effort, considering that
at the beginning of the war they were dependent on Iranian supplies.
Their military industrial apparatus has organized a production that is
estimated to be capable of supplying 1,000 drones per day for combat use
by the end of the year. Technical innovations to improve the weapon's
effectiveness are engaging both sides in a competition that appears to
place the Russians at an advantage. The Russian war machine is slow and
bureaucratic, but over time it manages to overcome its disadvantages and
surpass its competitors, as history demonstrates.
The fact remains that this new type of weapon does not require large
spaces or equipment to build, is low-cost, effectively replaces the role
of extremely expensive cannons and missiles, is less vulnerable overall,
and is capable of hitting distant targets and damaging and destroying
infrastructure. For these reasons, drones have established themselves as
the primary weapon in trench warfare and attrition.
The versatility of drones as an attack weapon, both on the frontline and
beyond, has prompted those targeted to develop defense mechanisms,
ranging from equipping armored vehicles that could be their targets with
metal superstructures and antennas, to attempting to create at least
partially protected routes by erecting corridors of nets mounted on
poles in which drones could become entangled and explode, to adopting
the use of pellet guns as individual weapons for an unlikely defense, to
employ concealment techniques to avoid detection, and to employ
electronic warfare to disrupt their guidance.
The use of this weapon and the new methods of combat create challenges
for the structure and armament of all armies, which must acknowledge
this and adapt. This emphasizes the role of the Ukrainian military,
which has become the most experienced in the use of this type of weapon
among all Western European armies, including the Americans. It should
also be noted that Ukraine's use of a number certainly exceeding 30,000
"volunteers" or mercenaries to fill the shortage of men willing to fight
has led to the recruitment of members of mafia and Camorra clans who
have enlisted to learn the techniques and capabilities of using and
piloting drones, transferring this know-how to guerrilla groups or
criminal organizations, especially those affiliated with drug
trafficking gangs. Proof of this is the use by Sahel jihadists in combat
against the armies of the Central African Republic, Niger, and Mali, as
well as drug trafficking gangs from South America and Mexico.
Drones are also remarkably versatile, so much so that they are also used
by the navy. Given their specific characteristics, they possess
considerable potential for further development. Indeed, there are plans
to build aircraft and ships armed with drones that would serve as launch
pads for swarms of these weapons, capable of performing both aggressive
and defensive functions. It is widely believed that drone-armed ships
could effectively replace the role of aircraft carriers at a fraction of
the cost (which, after all, are becoming obsolete not so much because of
drones, but rather because of the use of hypersonic missiles, which are
undetectable and have the power to inflict serious damage on an aircraft
carrier). These could also be affordable for states with relatively
limited resources, maximizing the proliferation of weapons.
As proof of this, we cite the case of Lithuania, whose government has
announced training programs for children and adults. The plan, launched
in agreement between the Ministries of Defense and Education, will
involve approximately 15,500 adults and 7,000 children by 2028, out of a
school population of 460,197, and a total population of 2,888 (2024),
20% of whom are over 60 and unable to deploy.
For children and young people, the plan will be adapted to the different
age groups considered. Third- and fourth-grade students, aged eight to
ten, will learn to build and pilot simple drones. Secondary school
students, on the other hand, will design and produce drone components,
including using 3D printers, and will learn to build and pilot more
advanced types of drones.
The plan calls for spending EUR3.3 million on specialized equipment,
including first-person view drones for indoors and outdoors, video
control and transmission systems, and a mobile training app for unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).
It feels like a game, even though the game is a war that sows death and
destruction.
The "unwitting" drone operator
But our intent is not to delve into the wartime potential of drones, but
rather to see what effects the use of this weapon has on combatants.
Drone operators usually operate remotely from the battlefield, focusing
on the target on video from afar, remaining unseen, and effectively
performing a role in combat similar to that of snipers.
These soldiers, long present in armies, were transformed and organized
into specialized units. Those composed of women and assigned to the
Soviet Army, where they distinguished themselves for their combat and
operational capabilities, particularly proved their worth. Drone pilots,
like snipers, required stealth, patience, and determination. The
instrument they used offered them, like drone pilots, the advantage of
depersonalizing the effects of their actions due to the distance of the
target. When the target appears on video, their actions resemble the
behavior of a player emotionally involved in the impulses of a video
game. This leads them to declassify the effects and role played on the
battlefield, allowing them to channel the player's determination and
relentlessness into their actions. Drone piloting is accepted by many
because it frees them from responsibility for the consequences of their
actions, filtering the drama of their enemies' deaths through video.
While it's true that one of the problems of war is the future veterans
of both sides and their reintegration into society, their mental state,
their psychological balance, their acquired habit of using violence, and
their capacity to kill, the effects that drone piloting will have on
veterans of this war and combatants on both sides are still unknown, due
to their actions and the ease they have acquired in using depersonalized
violence through the use of remote electronic means.
Among the possible effects, we can hypothesize what we would call
"Private Ryan," from the film of the same name.
There is no doubt that in their current condition, drone pilots
constitute an elite group, extremely responsible and esteemed. Many of
them, upon returning to society, could find themselves performing roles
and functions of no importance and degrade towards the use of drugs or
alcohol.
G. C.
https://www.ucadi.org/2025/11/01/guerra-per-droni/
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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