Russia has been gripped by a "partial mobilization" of people whom the Kremlin's
Z-fascism wants to throw into the meat grinder of war. Despite the fact that alarge part of the conscripts do not really want to fight, the state is apparentlyunable to provide them with adequate training, logistics or equipment, andoverall the social acceptance of the recruitment of new soldiers is ratherembarrassing. ---- Naturally, the most interesting for us are the anti-warprotests, which formed the biggest wave of resistance since the springpractically immediately after the mobilization was announced. However, as we willdiscuss in the following text, these are rather the tip of the iceberg of currentevents. ---- The initial demonstration on Wednesday was called by the liberalopposition movement Vesna with the slogan "No mogilization" (mogila = grave).They were to be held across the whole of Russia, i.e. a huge area covering eleventime zones and countless regions with various ethnicities. But traditionally,protests have been mainly in places where recruitment for the war has been - andprobably will continue to be - by far the least.The platform for monitoring repressions, OVD, registers almost 1,500 detaineesfrom about thirty places, but with a significant majority in Moscow and St.Petersburg. From this we can see that it is rather a revival of the anti-warmovement from the spring than a manifestation of new popular discontent. Theprotests were strongest in Western cities - the center of the self-proclaimedempire, where they are most visible, but at the same time they show theinvolvement of people mainly from the middle class, not those on the peripheries.For example, the news from the anarchists in Irkutsk, Siberia, was a far cry fromthe chanting crowds in Moscow and St. Petersburg: barely sixty people gathered inthe square in the heat, and before they could do anything, the police, includingheavy-duty OMON, arrived and shut down the event. It looked similar in otherplaces in the eastern part of Russia: minimal participation considering thatthese are often hundreds of thousands to millions of agglomerations, quick andinevitable repression.Although the participants deserve deep respect and it is sad, we must repeat theearlier statement: no matter how courageous and relatively visible the protestsagainst the war are in Moscow or St. Petersburg, in their current form they arenot capable of threatening the regime or significantly complicating the war. Inprinciple, the same applies to direct actions and sabotage. There have been aboutten Molotov attacks on army recruitment centers and other targets in recent days,but again: these are great acts, just not enough or causing enough damage.A far greater threat to war madness than more or less the same people in thestreets emerges as the predictable effort of many mobilized to avoidconscription. Either through bribes, false medical certificates, hiding or, inthe case of more powerful ones, going abroad. In addition, each additional mantaken away from his family naturally increases political tension.Russians: neither enthusiasm nor resistanceHere it is necessary to briefly clarify that the Western understanding of howRussia actually perceives the war has been distorted from the beginning. Althoughmanipulated public opinion polls attribute a predominantly pro-war attitude toRussians, albeit with clear differences among younger people seeking independentinformation, the prevailing phenomenon is rather apathy. Although the Kremlinregime tries to influence society without exaggeration with fascist propagandaand can easily get thousands of people to pro-war demonstrations, its mainstrength, at least until now, has been that the majority of the population wasnot directly affected by the war.Let's keep in mind that rhetorically it was still a "special operation" conductedacross borders. Even in the occupied Crimea it was possible - at least until themoment when Ukraine shelled the military airport there for the first time -relatively undisturbed. Soldiers were largely recruited from backward, poorregions and ethnicities often perceived with a heavy dose of intra-Russianracism, certainly not among Moscow's middle class. The recent efforts of theWagners to lure mercenaries into the war, including from among prisonersconvicted of violent crimes, only highlighted this.The heated ideological positions (represented, for example, by Alexander Dugin orhis daughter, who was killed in August) about "Novoruska" and the empire, whichmust absorb inferior Ukrainians, do not offend a significant part of thepopulation, but they are probably only actively supported by a small, albeitvocal, minority of radicals. They congregate around military bloggers and obscurechannels on Telegram, where they have gradually worked their way up to positionsthat are, paradoxically, even more disgusting than those held by the Kremlin itself.Radicals like the all-around bizarre scumbag Igor "Strelkov" Girkin not onlysupport the war, but even criticize Putin for being too "soft" on Ukraine. Theyhave long been upset that society as such is not mobilized and fully committed tothe war. Although they are a mixture of fascists and universally loathsomecreatures, the radicals are well aware that the average Russian will nod hissupport for the war, often mainly because it costs nothing, and his belligerenceends when it should go beyond the confines of the living room.Support for war by a large part of society is therefore not entirely illusory,but rather situational. It can be surmised that the willingness to nod and acceptthat Russia is somehow fighting even at the cost of losses is expresslyconditioned by maintaining at least the illusion of success and not returninghome in huge numbers of young ethnic Russians in coffins or maimed. After all, itis not by chance that Putin's chief war driver, Shoigu, underestimated Russianlosses by a factor of ten when commenting on the mobilization.This apathy is double-edged for all parties. At least so far, it has not allowed- in addition to other factors - Russia to spin up the war machine at one hundredpercent. But it also guarantees Putin that there won't be a real popular uproaragainst him beyond the limited number of anti-war activists who can handle policeviolence. What will happen now, at the moment of mobilization, is not certain.According to reports so far, the Kremlin is cleverly taking mainly from theperipheries again. While in the central cities in the west he seems to be callingup mainly those for whom he announced it, from the beginning there are reportsfrom the poor and ethnically non-Russian areas in the east that the recruitersare handing out call-up orders to practically anyone.The main question is what exactly Putin is trying to do now. The minimalistic -and for all those involved probably essentially the least terrible - variantwould assume that partial mobilization should serve as a legal whip on contract(professional) soldiers who could not yet be legally forced to go to war, and atthe same time as a tool for the legal deployment of conscripts in as part ofcompulsory military service. But it's a bit more complicated again.Putin is not recruiting an army, but a cannon fodderIt seems certain that if Putin wants to continue the war, he must recruitwherever he can. After Ukraine liberated the Kharkiv region in a flash, it isclear that the Kremlin lacks the most basic thing on the battlefield: manpower.And it's not "just" because tens of thousands of Russians have already died inthis senseless war and several times as many have been injured, often very seriously.Although Russia is much larger compared to Ukraine and still has a largesuperiority in the number of equipment, due to several partial mobilizations,there are simply more Ukrainians in arms, they are incomparably more motivatedand they know what and why they are fighting. Moreover, they hold the interior ofthe country and thus can essentially move freely between the fronts, while forthe Russians any movement of forces means logistical hell.It is not known how many people the Kremlin will bring into the fire of warthrough partial mobilization: the official goal is 300,000 new fighters, but thatis both a lot and a little at the same time. A lot because the Russian militarysystem is probably not ready for such a number of people. In theory, he could tryto summon millions of people, but even if the people in question agreed, thesystem would be overwhelmed with them.The Soviet Union was counting on mobilizations, but Russia is far from being ableto maintain its capacities. The army is riddled with corruption, lacksinfrastructure and equipment, training is often Potemkin-style, and many of thosewho should be training new soldiers lie dead in Ukraine. Even if only reservistswith relevant military experience were really recruited, as is announced, it willtake months to get them to Ukraine. In winter, when they arrive, everything willbe much more difficult, the soldiers will be trampled by frost and any progresswill be complicated by snow or mud.Moreover, what is cynically called "combat value" can be surprisingly low due topoor organization, demotivation and insufficient equipment. Therefore, 300thousand may paradoxically be too little. Even if Russia does mobilize that manypeople, it doesn't mean they will magically appear on the front lines. With moretroops, the already unmanageable demands on logistics and everything else willincrease. Videos are already appearing where newly minted Russian fightersincredulously show off rusted old Kalashnikovs that they fashioned as personalweapons, even though the last guerilla in the jungle wouldn't be grateful forsomething like that.And since the Ukrainians, still apparently in pretty good shape and armed withmore modern equipment from the West, are not going to give up, the question iswhether pouring thousands of new people into the Russian war chaos willfundamentally improve anything for the Kremlin. In the extreme case, of course,the Russian dictator may decide to simply overwhelm the front by all means,regardless of losses and cost. This would be indicated by yet unverifiableinformation from the opposition portal Meduza, according to which the regimerealistically wants to mobilize not 300,000, but 1.2 million people.But if mobilization will lead to anything with absolute certainty, it will simplylead to further suffering in the name of Russian imperialism. Putin has made itclear that as long as he keeps sending people to their deaths and the countrydoesn't completely fall apart, he's not going to back down. Recruiting new forcesis a gesture of escalation both inside Russia and towards the West: "you don'tlet us win the 'special operation', then there will be a war", the dictatoractually says, testing whether the NATO countries will be startled. If he were toachieve this and subvert the massive Western support for Ukraine, theconsequences for the defenders might be worse than the arrival of new invasiontroops.Let's persevere in supporting Ukrainian workers!For us as anarchists, the situation is complex and naturally frustrating. We areagainst war, but we cannot objectively prevent it: the only thing that will endit is the defeat of the Kremlin, i.e. pushing it into a position that will nolonger be completely sustainable. So if we don't take as an alternative thedestruction of Ukraine and the massacre of the people there, including ourfriends - according to the model demonstrated by the atrocities of the occupiersin Buc or Izjum.We must finally admit that we are not seeing some symmetrical clash of two stateshere, but the aggression of fascist Russia, which, in its desire to regainimperial power, will not stop at brutality against people outside and inside thestate borders. Not only has Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine, but he is alsoconsistently stomping on the domestic opposition and, with a good dose of cynicalracism, sending to his death countless of those least able to resist him - thepoor, the ethnically discriminated.Arrogance will be his end sooner or later, and quite possibly a suitably painfulend. But until then, we simply don't have any pleasant solutions here. The warmay go on for a long time, but despite all the other problems - expensiveness,inflation, the climate crisis - it simply cannot be ignored.As much as it requires effort and will, we need to persevere in supportingfriends who are now defending Ukraine: whether with a weapon in hand, through theprovision of support networks or humanitarian volunteerism. Not only because itis right, but also because of the fundamental threat that Russian imperialismposes to the entire region of Central Eastern Europe.Only a naive person would think that the Kremlin, which has not hesitated formonths to threaten nuclear weapons and hold obviously rigged referendums onjoining Russia in areas it does not even fully hold, will stop if it succeeds inUkraine. We know from history where a conciliatory approach to fascism leads. Notto mention the fact that for many years Russia has supported (and if given theopportunity, will continue to support) as its fifth column in the West, variousfascist and chauvinist associations that are objectively hostile to us.The empire must fall. We wrote about how to help this in older articles - and ifyou don't know how to send support to Ukraine, for example, don't hesitate tocontact us by e-mail.P.S.: While the article was being written, another wave of protests took place onSaturday, September 24. It took place in a similar vein to the last one: peoplebravely went out into the square to be met with huge numbers of ruffians andimmediate repression. The number of detainees is not yet known, but so far itseems that protests are taking place in similar cities as last time.P.P.S.: The next few days showed that the regime has decided on the most ruthlessscenario and is sending some of the mobilized directly to the front without anypreparation or equipment. At the same time, regionally limited but, by Russianstandards, violent protests broke out in Dagestan.https://www.afed.cz/text/7757/a3-luxus-pro-vsechny_________________________________________A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C EBy, For, and About AnarchistsSend news reports to A-infos-en mailing listA-infos-en@ainfos.ca
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten