As a result of several decades of a "cultural war" that it wages on
several fronts, the far right, and by extension its ideas, today appearsincreasingly commonplace in the mainstream media. On the Internet, it
even seems to have won the "cultural battle". From the first blogs to
the influencers of the Tik-Tok generation, two recent books help to
better understand this phenomenon. ---- Two books[1], published a few
months apart, propose to describe what seems to be the irresistible rise
of the far right on the Internet, a prelude to their omnipresence in the
mainstream media, and first and foremost those of the Bolloré sphere.
Alain Chevarin, already the author of a book on the far right in
Lyon[2], returns to "the influence of the far right on the Internet",
while the journalists from Libération Pierre Plottu and Maxime Placé
tell "how the far right has (would have?) won the cultural battle on the
Internet". Two styles, two different writings but the same observation
when reading: the increased visibility of the far right is not
accidental and is not only due to a game of algorithms, even if these
are not neutral. It is above all a considered strategy, theorized in the
1960s by Dominique Venner[3]and taken up a decade later by the Nouvelle
Droite in a perspective called "right-wing Gramscism". In an attempt to
impose a far-right cultural hegemony, these activists engage in a
"cultural war" that no longer prioritizes traditional political work but
"metapolitics," that is, acting on the level of ideas and
representations in order to transform them. The "trivialization of
far-right ideas" is, in this perspective, a prerequisite for effective
political power-taking.
A network structure
As early as 1962, Dominique Venner wrote that it was necessary to "fight
more with ideas than with force," denouncing "sterile activism" on the
part of far-right groups. His strategy involved "systematic and patient
penetration," and his action "depending on the circumstances" would be
"apparent or not"[4]. Two currents that claimed to be Dominique Venner's
followers developed: the New Right, embodying the "intellectual pole,"
and Revolutionary Nationalism, representing the "activist pole." Less
visible than the New Right, which in the mid-1970s created bridges with
the so-called Republican right - notably via the Research and Study
Group for European Civilization (GRECE) - the revolutionary nationalists
have "innervated the life of most far-right groups". But above all,
their network structure specific to the functioning of the Internet led
the members of this movement to seize digital tools very early on to
deliver their propaganda. They appear openly, but most often in a
roundabout way.
The implementation of a "metapolitical struggle" has found, with the
evolution of technologies and the development of the Internet, a
multiplied field of action. Complex thought is almost absent in favor of
emotion. In an article published in 2008, "Twelve Theses for a
Technological Gramscism"[5], Jean-Yves Le Gallou, a former member of
GRECE and the National Front, provides the instructions for the digital
activism of the extreme right and how to wage the "battle of ideas". On
the menu: manipulation and watering down of content, both via sites and
blogs and on online sales platforms - first and foremost Amazon - which
feed on the multiplication of available references, give the illusion of
numbers and make visible movements or group theories. Capitalism 2.0 and
the extreme right are not at all incompatible, far from it. As for the
manipulations, particularly on Wikipedia, they are known and are not
new[6]. The investment of mainstream site forums is a characteristic of
far-right activism on the Internet, the messages being disseminated in a
schoolboyish, diverted form or with memes that are indecipherable at
first glance for the uninitiated.
Activating emotional springs
Thus a group of people who are few in number but invested and very
connected to each other, can create from scratch a significant
mobilization by activating emotional springs. This is what Alain
Chevarin demonstrates with regard to the "school withdrawal days"
organized in January 2014. They originated as an extension of the
mobilizations against same-sex marriage, taking their fight against
"gender in schools." However, they have largely overflowed their
original framework. Their success is due to the fact that the
dissemination of false information has overflowed the traditional
fachosphere and has spread outside its traditional networks. This
practice is characteristic of far-right activism in general and
particularly on the Internet. It is via lists of parents of students and
information relays, notably Farida Belghoul (a former figure of the
"Beurs march" in the 1980s, then close to Alain Soral and the
fundamentalist Catholics of Civitas) that the mobilization has reached
families in working-class neighborhoods. The success of this
mobilization was the result of putting into practice this "metapolitical
struggle" initially relayed by already established activist networks. It
then managed to expand beyond these networks, by mobilizing emotional
and affective frameworks. Fake news is also part of the means mobilized:
"obligation for little boys to dress up as girls", "right for children
to choose their gender", "initiation to fellatio in class",
"intervention by LGBTI associations to "teach" how to become
homosexual", etc. These assertions will be directly linked to comments
allegedly made by Laurence Rossignol, and widely relayed by the
fachosphere. The one who was then Secretary of State for the Family, the
Elderly, Autonomy and Children is said to have declared, according to
her detractors, that "children do not belong to their parents. They
belong to the State". This was all it took for the fachosphere to see in
it confirmation of a "desire" of the State, linked to LGBTI lobbies, to
destroy the family and subject their children to early sexualization.
The "emotional reactions annihilating reflection" on these networks
greatly contribute to sharing a "vision of the world" in line with the
interests of the far right. According to Alain Chevarin, these are the
same mechanisms that operate in the conspiracy sphere, without
necessarily displaying their support. Many far-right sites relay them,
drawing "profit, sometimes directly through integrated propaganda, and
always indirectly, from the emotional atmosphere of fear that they help
to create and the rejection of the "elites" that they arouse"[7].
Jordan Bardella, Tik-tok influencer with two million subscribers and
occasional far-right member of the European Parliament. EUROPEAN UNION
The advent of influencers
Since 2016 and the publication of the seminal work on the subject, La
Fachosphère by Dominique Albertini and David Doucet[8], a new figure has
shaken up the codes of communication via the Internet: the influencer.
Mobilization of emotions, dissemination of false information, more or
less open conspiracy theories, coded language, this is the daily life of
far-right influencers. Journalists Pierre Plottu and Maxime Placé
dissect the paths from the Web to publishing and traditional media.
Perfectly mastering the codes of a youthful web culture (trashtalk,
shitposting, etc.[9]) which remains for a very large part "under the
radar" of traditional political parties. Doing politics without doing
politics, that's their niche. Behind the schoolboy humor and the
promotion of a certain French, even Frenchy, way of life, there is a
whole business and back-and-forth between stated political positions,
which are not always rewarding in return - those who actively supported
Éric Zemmour in the presidential election learned this to their cost -
and attempts to build a broader "community". This community must then be
ready to move from membership to financial support for these
influencers. We will underline the irony on the part of those who make
their money from the continuous denunciation of "parasites" and other
"welfare recipients"!
New media conducive to the development of far-right ideas
YouTube, X (ex-Twitter), Instagram, Tik-Tok, Deezer, Spotify[10]: so
many platforms that have redefined the formats and content of the
Internet. Far-right influencers have found spaces there - originally
hyper-permissive - suitable for the direct delivery of their messages in
direct interaction with their "community". The monetization of views has
led to a business that was initially quite lucrative. Since 2020, this
windfall has partly dried up due to account closures or demonetizations
of videos taken by the main platforms. The bidding war is not always
profitable, especially since once established, it is from the
"community" that the most virulent remarks come. Influencers only have
to sound their dog whistle[11]for the pack to drool and bark the worst
insanities.
Some of the influencers have tried to make a business flourish in
parallel, particularly in coaching. Today, we also find them in more
traditional media: the written press (L'Incorrect), radio (Radio
Courtoisie or Sud Radio) or even television channels in the Bolloré
sphere (CNews, C8, etc.). Thus, note Pierre Plottu and Maxime Placé,
"Thaïs d'Escufon, Alice Cordier, Baptiste Marchais... These far-right
influencers have their napkin ring at Cyril Hanouna's" where they are
received as "spokespeople for a "legitimate" discourse". The same
discourse supports the high scores of the RN which, after the period of
de-demonization marked by the figure of Marine Le Pen, is today putting
forward the Tik-Tok candidate in the person of Jordan Bardella.
It is our duty to take the various manifestations of the far right
seriously and not worry about them only on the eve of the elections.
Understanding the channels of diffusion of the ideas of the far right in
order to combat them is a necessity, as much as countering their
presence in the street. Faced with the presence, even omnipresence, of
the far right on commercial platforms and in media run by billionaires,
the need to combine the anti-fascist struggle with the anti-capitalist
struggle is more relevant than ever.
V. Klemperer (UCL)
INFLUENCERS MASTERING THE CODES
Far-right influencers have a perfect command of the codes of web culture
found on forums frequented by young people, including the infamous
jeuxvideos.com. On this forum, some chat rooms are real racist, sexist
and homophobic outlets under the cover of trashy humor. Trashtalking,
precisely, refers to deliberately aggressive remarks, on a register
halfway between insult and provocation, which the author will defend
himself by saying that it is only humor. It is a web version of
political incorrectness and like the latter, it is used to convey a
reactionary and sexist discourse. Shitposting, which is an aggressive
and filthy message aimed at deliberately diverting a debate or
exchanges. Often, these messages lead to others, polluting the exchanges
and preventing debates. Far-right influencers have also built a whole
universe of references of their own, sometimes linked to pop culture. We
find the same methods among masculinists with, for example, the red
pill, in reference to the Matrix film series, which is the pill that
allows access to the "real" truth, accessible only to the "awakened",
those who do not swallow the "official speeches", and here in this case
who have woken up and become "real men", that is to say affirming their
"superiority" over women who must stay "in their place" as submissive. A
discourse shared by far-right influencers.
Validate
[1]Alain Chevarin, Avant les Fake News. L'emprise des extrêmes droites
sur le Net, L'Harmattan, May 2024; Pierre Plottu and Maxime Macé, Pop
fascism. How the far right won the cultural battle online, Divergences,
September 2024.
[2]Alain Chevarin, Lyon and its extreme rights, Éditions de la Lanterne,
2021.
[3]Dominique Venner (1935-2013), was an activist in Jeune Nation (a
nationalist movement of neo-fascist inspiration created in 1949 and
dissolved in 1958), was a member of the OAS and a founding member of
GRECE. He committed suicide on May 21, 2013, by gunshot, in front of
Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris to protest against "the 'great
replacement' of the population of France and Europe".
[4]Dominique Venner, "On a new revolutionary phenomenon", Défense de
l'Occident, November 26, 1962, quoted by Alain Chevarin, Avant les Fake
News, op. cit., p. 28.
[5]See Frédéric Lemaire and Yohann Douet, "Gramsci, media critic?",
Acrimed, December 21, 2020, available at www.acrimed.org.
[6]Robin D'Angelo and Mathieu Molard, "The documents that undress the
Soral system," StreetPress, August 31, 2015; The Soral System:
Investigation into a fascist business, Calmann-Lévy, 2015.
[7]Alain Chevarin, Before Fake News, op. cit., p. 101.
[8]Dominique Albertini and David Doucet, La Fachosphère. How the far
right wins the battle of the Internet, Flammarion, 2016.
[9]Far-right influencers have mastered the codes of web culture that are
found in particular on video game forums: trashtalking, which is
deliberately provocative speech, in a register halfway between insult
and provocation; shitposting, which is an often aggressive and filthy
message aimed at deliberately diverting a debate. They have also built a
universe of references of their own, sometimes linked to pop culture.
For example, the red pill, in reference to the Matrix film series, which
is the pill that allows access to the "real" truth, accessible only to
the "awakened", which we find among masculinists.
[10]Concerning music streaming and podcast platforms, see Maxime Macé
and Pierre Plottu, "Nazi anthems, racist songs, conspiracy podcasts: on
Deezer and Spotify, the far right in our ears", Libération, May 10, 2024.
[11]"Repérages: the dog whistle, it stirs up", Alternative libertaire,
no. 328, June 2022.
https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?Fachosphere-L-extreme-droite-tisse-sa-toile
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