Index:
1. Historical genealogy (from the origins to the 21st century).2. From the 1980s to today: mutations of discourse and tactics
3. (Not so) contemporary models of fascism
3.1. Autonomous Fascism
3.2. Ecofascism
3.3. National-Anarchism
3.4. National Bolshevism and Revolutionary Nationalism
3.5. Neo-Eurasianism
3.6. Paleolibertarianism and racial anarcho-capitalism
3.7. Neoreactionism (NRx) or Dark Enlightenment
3.8. Neo-Völkisch and racial neopaganism
3.9. Identitarianism and Third Position
3.10. Red Pillers, Men's Rights, and Incels
3.11. Alt-right
3.12. Traditionalist Catholicism
Fascism doesn't die, it only transforms. It changes shape every time the world fractures a little more. It seeps in through the cracks of disenchantment, fear, and the loss of meaning. It dissolves into digital culture, blends with fitness aesthetics, internet irony, and the tedium of a generation raised amidst crises and screens. It no longer needs to proclaim its name to exist: it's enough for it to spread its logic.
In the 21st century, the radical right moves like a virus: silent, adaptable, and widespread. It appropriates symbols and themes such as environmentalism, veganism, and esotericism, reorganizing them to justify a worldview that always leads to the same thing: hierarchy, purity, violence, and elitism.
The new far-right movements have learned from their defeats. They reject the old party formalism and prefer to operate from a position of ambiguity: between culture and politics, between humor and hatred, between the marginal and the mainstream. They function as a decentralized swarm, capable of producing ideology without doctrine, action without organization.
This text attempts to outline some of the details of this transformation, tracing the thread that links classical fascism with its contemporary descendants, from esoteric sects and identity movements to accelerationist networks and combat clubs. The aim is to understand how the radical right has managed to reinvent itself within the chaos of the present and to reveal a reality far darker than it appears. Understanding its modernization is also a way to anticipate what may come. I want to emphasize, however, that this text only scratches the surface of this underworld and that I hope it will serve as an introduction for anyone interested in researching the far right.
1. Historical genealogy (from the origins to the 21st century).
The origins of the modern radical right can be traced back to old European counter-revolutionary traditions. From the late 19th century onward, fear of social emancipation, political liberalism, and Enlightenment thought fueled movements that dreamed of restoring a lost order. Absolute monarchists, Catholic fundamentalists, and romantic nationalists laid the foundations for an ideology that conceived of inequality as a natural principle and authority as a form of salvation.
In the years following the First World War, this imaginary found its most effective political form. Amid economic and social crisis, imperialist frustration, and fear of revolution, fascism presented itself as a third way between liberal capitalism and socialism. It arose as a response to chaos, but also as a project of total reorganization: a hierarchical, mobilized, and disciplined society. Luigi Fabbri defined it in * The Preventive Counterrevolution * as a movement created to defuse social revolution before it occurred, blending the rhetoric of the people with the violent defense of capital.
After the Axis military defeat, fascism did not disappear. It retreated, changed its face, and learned to survive on the margins. Formally outlawed, it survived in veterans' associations, clandestine organizations, cultural circles, and intelligence services that used it as an anti-communist tool. As a matter of interest, I invite you to research Aginter Press, Operation Gladio, or " ratlines . "
In the 1960s and 70s, attempts at ideological reconstruction emerged. From France, the Nouvelle Droite (New Right) proposed abandoning electoral politics and concentrating on the cultural sphere. Its objective was to modify society's common sense through education, the media, and language. They replaced biological racism with "cultural ethnopluralism" and translated the old idea of supremacy into the notion of "defense of identity." This metapolitical strategy sought to prepare the ground for an eventual political return of authoritarianism, but cloaked in an intellectual and presentable discourse. In other countries, national-revolutionary movements regained activist momentum. Inspired in part by the aesthetics of the radical left, they proclaimed a "patriotic anti-capitalism" and defended an authoritarian state that would unite the people under national discipline. In Italy, Germany, and France, these groups mixed working-class rhetoric with fascist symbols; their objective was to reinvent the old utopia of the totalitarian state, but without repeating the mistakes of the past. In Spain, the far right entered the 1970s weakened by the long dictatorship. National-syndicalism, the ideology of the Falange, had become a bureaucratic apparatus of the Francoist state, lacking the capacity for mobilization. As the regime neared its end, internal tensions between Falangists, traditionalists, and monarchists intensified. After Franco's death in 1975, the most hardline sectors attempted to halt the democratic opening through organizations such as Fuerza Nueva, the Youth Front , and the Triple A (Anti-Communist Apostolic Alliance). These groups resorted to political violence-attacks, assaults, and persecution-in an attempt to keep the spirit of the regime alive. During the Transition, the Spanish far right became a fragmented space: a mix of Franco nostalgics, ultra-Catholics, disaffected military officers, and young people influenced by European neo-fascist currents.
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc opened a new chapter. In Eastern Europe, the ideological vacuum left by communism allowed for the resurgence of ethnic nationalisms and projects for authoritarian restoration. In the West, globalization and neoliberalism fueled resentment against elites and immigrants, providing fertile ground for the radical right.
2. From the 1980s to today: mutations of discourse and tactics
The first major transformation was tactical. During the 1980s and 90s, much of European neo-fascism remained attached to street violence. Groups of boneheads, hooligans, and militants practiced a form of politics based on physical confrontation: controlling neighborhoods, stadiums, concerts, or demonstrations. But over time, this strategy ran its course. Arrests, repression, and social stigmatization limited its reach. In response, the new generation of activists understood that the main battle was no longer fought in the streets, but in the realm of ideas, communication, and aesthetics.
From this intuition emerged a line of thought that combined the lessons of the Nouvelle Droite with the tools of the digital age. Younger organizations began creating foundations, alternative media outlets, publishing houses, and study groups. They adopted a less aggressive and more sophisticated language: they spoke of "patriotism," "sovereignty," "tradition," and "identity ecology." Metapolitics ceased to be a theoretical idea and became an essential strategy for cultural infiltration.
Meanwhile, the remnants of the old Third Position adapted to the changing times. Its followers maintained the idea of a synthesis between nationalism and social justice, but enveloped it in contemporary elements: criticism of globalization, rejection of NATO, rhetorical anti-capitalism, and revolutionary aesthetics. Movements like Terza Posizione in Italy and their French and British equivalents served as models for a current that combined a modernized youth aesthetic with fascist symbolism.
This period laid the groundwork for the identity movements that would emerge at the beginning of the 21st century. Inspired by the French "cultural right," these identitarians used a postmodern, media-friendly language focused on defending "European civilization" and rejecting immigration. Their goal was not to return to classical fascism, but to construct a new narrative capable of appealing to depoliticized sectors and disillusioned youth. Since 2010, the identitarian movement has experienced a resurgence, with Casa Pound (Italy), Golden Dawn (Greece), Generation Identity (France, Austria, and Germany), Azov Movement (Ukraine), Escudo Identitário (Portugal), and Hogar Social (Spain) standing out as key figures in this wave.
With the expansion of the internet, the radical right found its ideal breeding ground. Social media eliminated borders, reduced organizational costs, and enabled the mass dissemination of propaganda. From forums in the early 2000s like Stormfront to today's digital platforms and chat rooms like Iron March or Terrorgram , a new political culture has developed based on anonymity, irony, unfiltered hatred, and unmediated contempt for humanity.
The discourse shifted in tone: it became more fragmented, more visual, and more emotional. Old manifestos were replaced by videos, images, and shared codes. Humor became an effective vehicle for radicalization. This new environment enabled the creation of interconnected and flexible global far-right communities, capable of coordinating campaigns and attacks, disseminating conspiracy theories, and normalizing extremist rhetoric.
The aesthetic dimension also transformed. From Oi! songs and printed pamphlets, it moved to flashwave and the production of memes, videos, and digital content. The goal is no longer to convince, but to shock. Fascist propaganda in the 21st century is built with shared visual codes, cross-references, and ironic and cryptic language. The image replaces discourse, the gesture substitutes for argument.
This "memetic war" doesn't aim to build thought, but rather to create an atmosphere: a climate of distrust, resentment, and aggression. Radicalization occurs playfully, camouflaged within communities that blend humor, aesthetics, and hatred. In this new scenario, the far right presents itself as a counterculture, appropriating symbols of rebellion and disobedience that previously belonged to the left.
3. (Not so) contemporary models of fascism
The turn of the century did not bring a complete break with the past, but rather an update of its old formulas. The ideological models that emerged between the 1990s and the 2010s were, to a large extent, reinterpretations of fascism adapted to a globalized and digital context. The contemporary far right is no longer defined by a single political project, but by a set of currents that share the same logic of exclusion, hierarchy, and a cult of force.
3.1. Autonomous Fascism
One of the first attempts at renewal was autonomous fascism, which emerged in Eastern Europe and Germany in the 2000s. Inspired by the aesthetics and tactics of the radical left, it adopted black clothing, the language of anti-globalization movements, and direct action strategies. They claimed to be revolutionaries, but with the opposite objectives: to use the imagery of protest to propagate nationalism and racism. This phenomenon demonstrated that the far right had learned to camouflage itself within the enemy's codes, imitating its methods only to empty them of their meaning.
3.2. Ecofascism
Another significant mutation was ecofascism, which transformed environmental discourse into a tool for identity politics. Under the guise of concern for nature, the idea was promoted that people should "defend their land" from cultural or demographic contamination. This current, present in groups like the Nordic Resistance Movement in Sweden or in sectors of identity movements, linked environmentalism with nativism and xenophobia. The defense of the planet-but in some cases also of animal life-became an argument to justify closing borders and excluding others.
3.3. National-Anarchism
National-anarchism represented one of the most extreme paradoxes of this period. Presented as a synthesis of libertarian communism and ethnonationalism, it advocated the fragmentation of the world into ethnically homogeneous and self-sufficient communities. Its strategy consisted of appropriating anarchism's anti-capitalist and decentralizing rhetoric and transforming it into a policy of racial segregation. Although marginal, this current demonstrated the extent to which contemporary fascism was capable of absorbing foreign discourses to reconfigure itself. In Ukraine, this trend took advantage of the war and the rise of patriotism, even claiming Nestor Mahkno as a nationalist icon, when his project was internationalist and peasant-based, not patriotic. A similar attempt emerged in Belarus, promoted by groups that filtered people by origin. Local anarchist collectives like Pramen dismantled this narrative by pointing out its contradictions ( read more here ). In the Spanish state , Bases Autónomas was even associated with National-Anarchism ( you can read about it here ).
Adding to this complex web was the case of Michael Schmidt , co-author of Black Flame , whose connections to national-anarchist and white supremacist circles came to light in 2015. For years, Schmidt maintained an active profile in supremacist forums like Stormfront , defended racial separatism, and collaborated with projects such as Black Battlefront, which promoted "white anarchism" and ethnopluralism. Furthermore, he had promoted within the South African ZACF a concept that justified separate organizations for whites and blacks. His trajectory demonstrated the extent to which these tendencies could infiltrate even leading figures of class-based anarchism (read more here) .
3.4. National Bolshevism and Revolutionary Nationalism
National Bolshevism has its roots in interwar Germany. It emerged from sectors of the former communist movement that sought to reconcile nationalism and socialism in the face of Western capitalism. Within the KPD (Communist Party of Germany), there were currents that promoted an "alliance of oppressed peoples against Versailles" and sympathized with anti-Western nationalism; Fritz Wolffheim and Heinrich Laufenberg were prominent figures in this movement .
Ernst Niekisch , founder of Widerstand , was its most prominent figure: he advocated a German-Soviet alliance against the West and a synthesis between the disciplined German spirit and the revolutionary impulse of the USSR. Along similar lines was Karl Otto Paetel , with his "left-wing national Bolshevism," who championed an anti-imperialist national socialism. These ideas resurfaced in the postwar period among European national revolutionaries and, decades later, in Russia, where Eduard Limonov and Aleksandr Dugin revived this legacy in the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), the precursor to neo-Eurasianism.
In parallel, from another ideological field, the German Conservative Revolution developed a revolutionary nationalism that was anti-liberal and anti-capitalist, hostile to both bourgeois parliamentarianism and internationalist Marxism. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck formulated the idea of an organic and authoritarian national socialism, while Oswald Spengler and Ernst Jünger contributed their civilizational critique and their ethics of discipline and total mobilization. In the postwar period, Armin Mohler systematized this legacy. Although this constellation did not form part of National Bolshevism, it did influence subsequent national-revolutionary currents and contemporary discourses that combine anti-capitalist rhetoric, authoritarianism, and a rejection of liberal democracy.
3.5. Neo-Eurasianism
Neo-Eurasianism, formulated by Alexander Dugin in the 1990s, reinterprets the continent's political geography as a struggle between civilizations: a spiritual and hierarchical Eurasia versus a materialistic and decadent West. It presents itself as an alternative to liberal globalization, but in reality, it proposes an authoritarian integration of peoples under a Russian axis. Its influence has spread from Russian ultranationalist circles to sectors of the European far right that see Russia as a model of conservative resistance against the West.
3.6. Paleolibertarianism and racial anarcho-capitalism
In the United States, economic libertarianism devolved in the 1980s into a reactionary form known as paleolibertarianism. Driven by Murray Rothbard and Lew Rockwell , it sought to unite the free market with ultraconservative social values: defense of the traditional family, natural hierarchy, and opposition to civil rights. From this environment, influenced by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, emerged expressions of racial anarcho-capitalism, where extreme individualism merges with white supremacy. Within this framework, the market is presented as a process of natural selection. A controversial figure of this current in Europe is Janusz Korwin-Mikke; however, it is an ideology that lives more online than in reality.
3.7. Neoreactionism (NRx) or Dark Enlightenment
Neoreactionism (NRx) , which emerged around 2010, translated these ideas into digital language. Inspired by Curtis Yarvin ( Mencius Moldbug ) and Nick Land , NRx rejects democracy and egalitarianism, proposing instead a "shareholder governance" based on efficiency. Its political ideal is a world run by tech corporations or "executive monarchs" with absolute power. This movement combines technocracy, social Darwinism, and a disdain for empathy, shaping the philosophical face of contemporary technoreaction.
3.8. Neo-Völkisch and racial neopaganism
The neo-Völkisch movement reinterprets the German concept of Volk: people as a unity of blood, land, and culture. These currents, present primarily in the United States and Scandinavia, appropriate Odinism and Germanic neopaganism to justify racial purity. Groups like the Wolves of Vinland and the Asatru Folk Assembly promote an exclusive ethnic paganism, where spirituality becomes an argument for identity. The "ancestral" discourse serves as a cover for a politics of exclusion: only European descendants are considered legitimate bearers of the northern spiritual heritage.
3.9. Identitarianism and Third Position
Contemporary Identitarianism is a direct descendant of the Third Position, a neo-fascist movement that emerged in Europe in the 1970s and presented itself as an alternative to both liberal capitalism and communism. Inspired by the Italian neo-fascist movements Terza Posizione and Ordine Nuovo , these movements advocated a "national anti-capitalism" and ethnic communitarianism, replacing the class struggle with the defense of the "organic people." During the 1980s and 1990s, this discourse served as a bridge between social fascism and the new cultural right, adopting an anti-imperialist and anti-globalist tone that sought to attract youth. In the early 2000s, the Identitarian movement, inspired by the French New Right and born in France with the Bloc Identitaire and later Génération Identitaire , updated this legacy for the media and digital environment: remigration, ethnopluralism, nativism, and racialism are terms they use to defend cultural separation under the rhetoric of "diversity," transforming political propaganda into visual marketing. In this synthesis of cultural fascism and counterculture, the defense of "European civilization" and "the white race" serves as an excuse for exclusion, and youth aesthetics as a mask for a hierarchical ideology that maintains the logic of order, purity, and obedience intact.
3.10. Red Pillers, Men's Rights and Incels
The digital ecosystem amplified the reach of cultural fascism through the Red Pillers and the Men's Rights Activists (MRA). Inspired by the Matrix metaphor, they claim to have "awakened" from supposed feminist manipulation. They advocate for the restoration of male authority and perceive gender equality as a civilizational threat. In their forums, misogyny becomes ideology, and sexual frustration is channeled into hatred. In this same environment, the Incels ("involuntary celibates") emerge, transforming their resentment into politics. They glorify misogynistic violence and celebrate mass murderers who target women or minorities. Their radicalization demonstrates how contemporary fascism feeds on isolation and emotional failure, transforming individual despair into collective discourse.
3. 11. Alt-right
The Alt-right , a term coined by Richard Spencer in 2008, served as an umbrella term for these movements. It was an attempt to create a new radical right adapted to the digital environment. It combines white nationalism, antifeminism, conspiracy theories, and aesthetic nihilism. Its main weapon is online communication: memes, ironic humor, and media provocation. It transformed fascist propaganda into entertainment, turning politics into a cultural war of images. It is the postmodern synthesis of authoritarianism: a movement without uniforms or parties, but with millions of followers connected by hatred and parody.
3.12. Traditionalist Catholicism
Another parallel current is Catholic traditionalism, which seeks to legitimize the hierarchical order through religion and morality. Catholic traditionalism advocates for the restoration of customs, traditions, liturgical forms, spirituality, and doctrine from before the Second Vatican Council. Groups such as Civitas or the Academia Christiana , part of the Institut Iliade think tank in France, or Palestra Christiana in Spain or the SSPX internationally, reintroduce the discourse of Christendom as a bastion against secularism, "cultural Marxism," and "modern nihilism." This traditionalism combines liturgy, medieval aesthetics, and cultural identity politics, and acts as a link between the fundamentalist Catholic right and the far-right identity movement. In Spain, some of the associations most active in political work include HazteOír, the Catholic Association of Propagandists (ACdP), Opus Dei , and the NEOS Foundation, which are prime examples of this strategy. Internationally, organizations like The American TFP or The Family are well-known names.
[The second part of this piece will be available soon.]
Don Diego de la Vega, a militant from Liza.
https://regeneracionlibertaria.org/2026/01/26/la-modernizacion-de-la-derecha-radical-primera-parte/
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