On January 6, 2026, the Syrian Transitional Government launched a major offensive against the territories of the Autonomous Democratic Administration of Northeast Syria (ADANS). Initially focused on the isolated and predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo-Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh-it quickly spread to the predominantly Arab areas of ADANS, which were conquered in a matter of days. Made possible by a realignment of regional alliances, this offensive forced ADANS to sign an agreement with the Syrian Transitional Government and cast doubt on the continuation of the political project of "democratic confederalism." This article examines the evolving geopolitical context surrounding Rojava, its latest developments, and their consequences for the political project being tested locally.
The US/AADNES Tactical Alliance
The 2014 Battle of Kobani marked the beginning of a tactical alliance between the YPG/YPJ (People's Protection Units)[1]and the United States. Leading an international coalition comprised of numerous Western and Arab countries, the US provided crucial air support for the recapture of the city by the YPG/YPJ forces and their allies. While the immediate objective of this alliance was the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS)-the YPG/YPJ being the only effective force on the ground-it also allowed the United States to gain a foothold in a strategic region. Given the growing closeness of Bashar al-Assad's regime to Iran (which increased after 2011) and Syria's importance in the strategic corridor linking Iran to the Mediterranean via Iraq and Lebanon, the American presence prevented the creation of an axis entirely controlled by Tehran, for example by allowing monitoring of arms flows between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. This presence also served to counter Russian influence in the region and to secure the flow of oil from the fields controlled by the Autonomous Administration (which owned two large fields: Rmeilane, in the Hassakeh region, and, from 2018 after its liberation from ISIS, Al-Omar, in the Deir el-Zor region). While production had significantly decreased due to wartime infrastructure damage, controlling the current and future use of these oil fields was nonetheless part of the overall American energy strategy: being able to easily cut off supplies to its geopolitical competitors (in this case, Iran, but also, through Iran, to China) should the need arise.
The AADNES (in yellow) on the eve of the Syrian government offensive (in green). Source: syria.liveuamap.com
It is worth noting that the tactical alliance with the YPG/YPJ and later with the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition created during the fight against ISIS and comprising the YPG/YPJ and their allies) has always focused solely on "counterterrorism" issues, which justified the American military presence, and has not been accompanied by official recognition of the Autonomous Administration-that is, the civilian administrative structures. As early as 2018/2019, Turkey, through its proxies, was able to seize control of the Afrin and then Serekaniye regions without any American reaction-and even with US approval in the case of Serekaniye.
This alliance of convenience, whose long-term sustainability was unlikely given the political project pursued by the Autonomous Administration[2], underwent major upheavals following the emergence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
A New Regional Landscape
Taking advantage of the slow weakening of Bashar al-Assad's regime (which was no longer even able to pay its own troops), the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group (a splinter group of al-Nusra, itself a splinter group of al-Qaeda), which had become hegemonic in the Idlib pocket since 2019, launched a major offensive at the head of a rebel coalition in November/December 2024, relying on significant logistical support from Turkey. This offensive culminated in the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime on December 8, 2024.
The new Syrian transitional government, headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, immediately opted for a policy of rapprochement with the West, which ultimately materialized in the lifting of sanctions under the Caesar Act implemented by the United States in 2019 and in pledges of investment from both Europe and (especially) the Gulf states and Turkey. While Bashar al-Assad's regime had already undergone a neoliberal shift starting in the 2000s-dismantling the proto-socialist legacy of Hafez al-Assad-which resulted in numerous privatizations (mostly benefiting those close to the regime), today the country is being subjected to "shock therapy," the repercussions of which will consolidate an emerging Islamist-comprador bourgeoisie. Massive privatizations, deregulation, opening up to foreign capital, and the dismantling of social protections are occurring in rapid succession, in a context where nine out of ten people already live below the poverty line (figures from the United Nations Development Programme for 2025). While these "reforms" risk further impoverishing an already destitute population and destroying the fragile industrial base still standing after 15 years of civil war (local businesses being unable to compete on the international market), they nonetheless allow the country to be viewed favorably by major international financial institutions[3].
At the same time, driven by the United States, a policy of normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel is underway. Although the country has not officially joined the Abraham Accords, a text was nevertheless signed on February 5, 2026, in Paris between Israel and Syria under US mediation, incorporating all the elements of the Abraham Accords except the name. This agreement officially aims to "facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination in intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic dialogue, and trade opportunities under US supervision."[4]It was signed on the eve of the Syrian transitional government's offensive against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).
Front line on January 26, 2026, after the ceasefire. Source: Rojava Information Center
AADNES at war
It is extremely unlikely that the Israelis and Americans (or even the French, who took the opportunity to hold bilateral talks with their Syrian counterparts) were unaware of the offensive planned by the Syrian government. Given the United States' military presence in northeastern Syria (where it controls the airspace), Israel's close monitoring of Syrian military movements, and the Syrian government's general alignment with the West, it is difficult to imagine that a large-scale military operation like the one carried out could have been conducted without the consultation and tacit support of these various actors. A source reportedly confirmed to Reuters that Syrian diplomats suggested a "limited operation" against the SDF during the Paris meeting, a proposal that apparently met with no objections.[5]
An agreement brokered by the Americans had been signed by the Syrian government and AADNES on March 10, 2025, to integrate AADNES institutions into the Syrian state and the SDF into the Syrian army (potentially maintaining a significant degree of autonomy for AADNES structures), but the talks were broken off beforehand by a Syrian government minister on January 4, 2026 (according to AADNES sources, who may also suspect Turkish involvement). The Syrian government offensive began on January 6, 2026, with an assault on the predominantly Kurdish, gated residential neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh, which had been largely demilitarized by the April 2025 agreements (in accordance with the terms of the agreement, SDF fighters had withdrawn from these areas, taking their heavy weapons with them, and handing them over to the AADNES internal security forces, the Asayish).
Very quickly, the offensive continued into the predominantly Arab areas of the AADNES that had been liberated from ISIS and fell within days without major fighting-Arab nationalism and the promises of development made by the Syrian state having proven difficult to counter. It was only when the Syrian army reached the borders of the predominantly Kurdish regions-Rojava, the birthplace of the locally driven political project-that an international reaction occurred (driven in particular by the very strong response from the Kurds in the four parts of Kurdistan). Ahmed al-Sharaa was then pressured into a ceasefire on January 20th and subsequently into signing an agreement with what remained of the Syrian Arab Nationalist Movement (SANM) on January 30th. This agreement formalized the SANM's integration into the Syrian state, despite its weakened position.
While the new agreement between SANM and the Syrian government at least temporarily averted all-out war-though it did not prevent the ongoing siege of Kobani, now in its month-long term-it offered few positive outcomes. As Kamran Metin points out for The Amargi website[6], even maintaining SDF fighters within nominal brigades is a fragile achievement: "If Damascus controls the selection process and the appointments to head these units, it can manipulate their composition and loyalty, draining them of their substance from within."
Generally speaking, the agreement does not establish a framework for even minimal local autonomy. However, it remains to be seen what will become of this agreement and its implementation. All indications suggest that the Syrian transitional government will try to seize whatever it can and exploit any pretext to advance its interests, possibly-if it sees an opportunity-through a new offensive: it is therefore a question of power dynamics. Indeed, many points also remain extremely vague or open to interpretation by both sides. This is the case with the future of the YPJ, the women's self-defense forces, which is not addressed in the agreement. They will likely never be willing to disband, and this issue, among others, could well provoke strong resistance from social forces in Rojava. And in a highly unstable regional context, time is not on Ahmed al-Charaa's side: his very personal conception of power and the organization of a crony capitalism that allows him to cultivate networks close to the regime (similar to what happened under Bashar al-Assad) will undoubtedly generate its share of resistance within the very territory he believes he controls.
The toppling of a statue depicting a YPJ fighter in Tabqa after the Syrian government's capture of the city on January 18
Provisional Conclusion
Unlike what happened in 2014 during the Battle of Kobani, the new government's offensive and the renewed siege of this symbolic city have received very little commentary: a sign of changing times. The Islamic State is no longer considered a threat, and those who fought against it are relegated to the dustbin of history all the more firmly because they also participated in a revolutionary moment that revived the spirit of the Paris Commune.
In recent years, the United States has devoted all its energy to unifying Syrian territory to appease Turkey (whose interests are now numerous in Syria and which has never accepted the presence of an autonomous Kurdish territory on its borders) and to normalizing Israeli-Syrian relations. The main enemy in the region has become Iran, whose control of oil flows would allow it to contain China. A solid rear base is also necessary in the event of open conflict. Sources within AADNES claim to have been approached in the past by the Americans regarding a possible deployment of the SDF in Iraq against Iranian-backed Shiite militias-an offer that, according to these same sources, was of course refused. Whether or not the Americans may have tried to use the SDF as proxies in the past, it seems that more compliant allies have been found in Sunni radicalism: these will be useful as long as there is a confrontation with Iranian Shiites and their regional allies.
While the unpredictable regional upheavals that are sure to occur in an unstable context could offer emancipatory prospects, the movements that emerge from them will have to contend with a new international order that is less rule-based than ever. In any case, the Rojava experience must not be forgotten. The social upheavals it generated will continue to influence the global revolutionary experience, whatever happens.
F.M.
February 23, 2026
Notes
1. Armed wing of the PYD (Democratic Union Party), sister party of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
2. See "What Future for the Political Project in Rojava and Northeast Syria?" published in Courant Alternatif, 348, March 2025.
3. For example, a meeting was held on February 17, 2026, with the IMF, concerning the implementation, under its auspices, of a series of neoliberal "reforms."
4. See the official statement here: https://www.state.gov/translations/...
5. See: https://www.reuters.com/world/middl...
6. See the article "Rojava at the Brink: Why the SDF-Damascus Agreement Risks Ending Kurdish Autonomy in Syria," published in The Amargi on January 31, 2026.
Map captions:
The AADNES (in yellow) on the eve of the Syrian government offensive (in green).
Source: syria.liveuamap.com
Front line on January 26, 2026, after the ceasefire
Source: Rojava Information Center
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4665
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Link: (en) France, OCL CA #358 - Rojava: The Threats of a Changing Context (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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