When discussing the repression in Sainte-Soline on March 25, 2023, police violence generally comes to mind, especially since body camera footage worn by gendarmes during the anti-reservoir demonstration recently brought it to the forefront. However, the government's ban on evacuating the injured actually exacerbated the effects of police violence. Thus, it can be said that the repression employed two tools: military organization and medical organization. And the latter was based on "doctrines of maintaining order" currently in vogue, as Françoise, Serge's mother, explains here.
- Following your complaint of police brutality and obstruction of emergency services [1], the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie) investigated and issued a report on these matters. What information did you glean from this report regarding the organization of emergency services?
During its investigation, the IGGN interviewed healthcare workers, firefighters, and military personnel. It collected body camera footage and seized clothing from hospitalized protesters. However, it only used a portion of this material (there are several gaps that our new complaint may uncover), and it was only this portion that experts in ballistics, medicine, and other specialties examined to provide their opinion. The IGGN then submitted a report to the prosecutor based on their findings-and the prosecutor dismissed our complaint.
To determine whether there had been any obstruction to the arrival of emergency services on March 25, 2023, experts studied the hearings conducted by the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie), as well as certain telephone communications between healthcare workers, military personnel, and firefighters. They quickly established that the emergency response had been organized based on two doctrines - the Orsec plan[organization of civil security response]in its "numerous victims" version (therefore Orsec-Novi) and the "operational doctrine for mass shootings" - and on the basis of "recommendations and organizational plans in the event of an exceptional health situation" (SSE).
According to hearings with officials from Samu 79 (the emergency medical service for the Deux-Sèvres department) and the SDIS (Departmental Fire and Rescue Service), meetings were held before the demonstration under the auspices of the prefect, with representatives from the ARS (Regional Health Agency), the departmental directorate of territories, the gendarmerie, the SDIS, and Samu 79 in attendance, to organize the emergency response. As the experts wrote, "within the framework of an ORSEC plan (emergency response plan), a departmental operations center (COD) was established at the prefecture, and interaction and coordination were implemented between a COS (commander of emergency operations) and a COPG (commander of police or gendarmerie operations)." An advanced medical post (PMA) was also set up "for emergency first aid and stabilization before extraction," and the intervention zones for operational emergency resources followed the "three-zone concept." In other words, zones have been delimited (by a COS) "according to the type of danger": a red "exclusion zone", an orange "controlled access zone" and a green "support zone" - with control of their access by law enforcement.
But the head of the fire and rescue service also referred, during his hearing, to a "mass shooting operational doctrine" which includes these same three zones (but defined by the Incident Commander and the Operational Command Post). The red zone, designated "immediate danger," is "an area in which the adversary is firing and using violence"; access to it is restricted to the police and gendarmerie, who "transport victims to the victim extraction point located at the boundary between the controlled zone and the exclusion zone." The orange zone is "partially secured by the police and gendarmerie": emergency services can access it under their protection and command." The green zone, "located on the periphery of the event site," is "secured by law enforcement," and it is there that "emergency services regroup and organize themselves, under the authority of the Incident Commander."
Finally, the IGGN experts consider that Sainte-Soline fell under the category of "an exceptional health situation (EHS)" since, according to the Ministry of Social Affairs, an EHS encompasses "all situations likely to generate a significant increase in the demand for care or to substantially disrupt the organization of healthcare provision." "In an EHS context," the experts stated, "medical care lies at the intersection of emergency medicine and disaster medicine." Police and fire department medical teams are responsible for extracting victims from red and orange zones and providing necessary first aid on site. As "in the case of an ORSEC plan, especially Novi," the collection of victims is carried out "by firefighters and rescue workers to a designated victim assembly point (VIP) where the medical teams are located."
- Did the IGGN experts make any comments regarding this organization of the rescue services?
- Some, yes. They raised concerns about several aspects of it, but generally without taking a position, always saying that it was not their mission to do so...
For example, they noted that, in the "operational directive" written by the SDIS the day before the demonstration, there is "no specific mention of the organization planned for the extraction and care of victims in a controlled area WITH a life-threatening emergency, while other situations are specified therein".
They also noted that the healthcare workers and firefighters in Sainte-Soline acted in accordance with public order protocols: they were aware of the designated zones and the procedures to follow. Numerous phone calls showed that they knew they were operating within an ORSEC (Emergency Response Plan), a "Novi" (Nighttime Emergency Response Plan), or a "catastrophe" (disaster response plan), and that
they were not authorized to intervene in the "exclusion zone." However, the experts observed that the medics were unaware of "the organizational principles of the deployed emergency response," such as the existence of a PRV (Public Response Plan) or its location; and they were also unaware that an ORSEC or ORSEC-Novi-type organization with the establishment of exclusion zones had been decided upon. The same was true for the demonstrators. Consequently, the experts concluded that, in the absence of a public announcement of the ORSEC plan before the demonstration, "the question arises as to the impact of the public's lack of awareness of the plan implemented for organizing emergency response."
They also noted that "given the gendarmerie deployment[in Sainte-Soline], the exceptional health situation was coupled with a defensive public order operation[sic!]." However, this is a scenario that the doctrines and/or recommendations used as a reference for organizing emergency services do not foresee: they do not consider "specific organization during a defensive public order operation combined with a rescue operation." These arrangements were therefore inadequate, even in the eyes of the experts.
Finally, these experts highlighted some gaps in the investigation. For example, the documents in their possession did not specify the access that fire trucks, protected by law enforcement, "could have had between 1:50 p.m. and 3:34 p.m."
Similarly, they noted the lack of information "on the responsiveness of the gendarmerie escorts in providing emergency services following requests from the fire department command post[the SDIS]," or "on the number of gendarmerie escorts planned to provide emergency services." Regarding Serge, they only noted the "incomprehensible" delay of the motorcyclists who were supposed to escort the ambulance from Ruffec for evacuation and their "disengagement" at the entrance to Sainte-Soline.
Their conclusion is that the potential "problem" may have arisen because the emergency response plan (ORSEC) had not been publicly declared, or because potential life-threatening emergencies had not been taken into account. However, they argue that "strictly speaking, there cannot be any obstacle to the implementation of emergency services by the SAMU (Emergency Medical Service) since the organization[of the emergency response]anticipated the intervention of firefighter-paramedics on the ground (...) to transport the injured to the SAMU and firefighter medical teams located at the Clussais la Pommeraie command post." Regarding the firefighter-led response, they do not comment on "the presence or absence of obstacles to[its]implementation." Admittedly, members of the SAMU stated "on numerous occasions" that they were unable to reach the firefighter command post, but the experts refuse to offer an opinion on this... because the recordings from the firefighter command post were not reviewed by the IGGN (National Gendarmerie Inspectorate).
- Can you tell us a little more about this "Orsec-Novi plan" which even the experts of the IGGN seem to find somewhat unsuitable for the Sainte-Soline demonstration?
- The Orsec plan is officially designed to combat the direct or indirect effects of a disaster and to provide support for its victims. It can, it seems, be implemented without being officially activated - for example, if the government wants to downplay the extent of a disaster for one reason or another.
Its "Novi" version is intended to define the organization of emergency services in an emergency situation that requires more medical resources than usual. It is a medical response to natural disasters such as floods, major road accidents, explosions (like the one at the AZF factory in Toulouse in 2001), etc., but also to "crises with a predominant security and public order focus": terrorist attacks, hostage takings, suicide bombings, or riots.
However, the instructions given there seem more intended to help... law enforcement than protesters. A journal published by a first aid association demonstrates this [2]. It states that, in the "exclusion zone whose access is reserved exclusively for law enforcement," there is a section "similar to a war zone in which medical treatment is impossible except for rescue by a fellow soldier"; and also that, in this section, only "the operational doctor of the unit in operation (RAID, GIGN)" can intervene.
The Orsec-Novi plan was implemented in Sainte-Soline even though there was neither a natural disaster nor a terrorist attack. And it was the government that turned this anti-reservoir demonstration into a war-like situation, because the police were supposed to be accompanying medical workers to evacuate the injured, thus helping to save lives, but instead they were the ones "manufacturing" injuries. This wasn't "defensive crowd control," as the IGGN experts claim, but "offensive crowd control": the instructions were clearly to inflict numerous injuries on the demonstrators - notably through the direct fire shown in the body camera videos.
Furthermore, no provisions had been made for evacuating the serious injuries that were inevitable; and the need for hospital beds had been underestimated from the outset. These needs had to be reassessed very quickly, as experts acknowledge, because the initial plan was based on previous demonstrations; there was a "recall of medical and paramedical personnel in response to the surge in calls and reported victims." In short, while Darmanin had announced a "very violent" event, emergency services were not prepared accordingly - the objective was clearly not to provide rapid care for the injured. "Sainte-Soline" was a chaotic scene orchestrated and maintained by the State to teach the protesters a lesson and to crush the anti-reservoir movement - as well as other movements.
- Not only were the arrangements put in place to organize the rescue efforts inappropriate for the context of an anti-reservoir demonstration, but there were unofficial instructions, particularly those concerning direct fire...
"Of course, and what happened in Sainte-Soline perfectly illustrates that there's the procedure, or the regulations, and then there's how they're applied.
Even legal texts are always open to interpretation. For example, the experts from the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie) pointed out that, according to the Penal Code, 'dispersing a gathering is part of what is called "maintaining public order"'; and that a gathering is defined as 'an assembly of people, on a public road or in a public place, likely to disturb public order.' And they added: 'The word "likely" actually indicates that it's possible to use these measures against people who aren't causing any disturbance, the gathering itself becoming a disturbance that can be suppressed.' In other words, the intervention of law enforcement is left to the discretion of the government or the prefecture."
Furthermore, a failure by law enforcement to comply with a protocol or prohibition can be "justified" by the context-see the frequent debates surrounding the use of grenades based on their type. The experts reiterated what constitutes authorized grenades. They specified: "These grenades may only be used by personnel duly trained in their use"; according to the Internal Security Code, their use must "be part of a response or action proportionate to the objective to be achieved and be carried out with discernment"; and "in addition to all these conditions that define the legality of the use of force, there is also the requirement to respect technical rules on how to use the equipment." But the experts added: "Everything said here applies to 'classic' crowd control[because]in the event of gunfire directed at law enforcement, snipers will use their lethal weapons to stop the opposing fire." And they gave two examples to illustrate their point: the repression of demonstrations by the French army in the Balkans during the 1990s, and in Abidjan in 2004. So we are in a context of war, or colonialist/imperialist, when we demonstrate against mega-reservoirs (or against pension reform...)?
In reality, the debates about "good" and "bad" grenades muddy the waters, given that a "defensive" grenade can kill just as easily as an "offensive" one if fired directly - and law enforcement always finds arguments to justify this type of firing. But so do the experts, who write: "A deliberately direct and non-compliant firing of a tear gas grenade from a Cougar[grenade launcher]can be justified in certain cases of self-defense where the officer is doing what they can, for example, against an individual who rushes at them with a lethal bladed weapon, or if they cannot otherwise defend their position." But was the gendarme who fired directly at Serge from an armored vehicle located between 50 and 60 meters away, using a grenade launcher designed for a range of 200 meters, acting in "self-defense"? Was he threatened as if someone had rushed at him with a lethal bladed weapon?
The experts concluded their "demonstration" by saying: "The debate on the exceptionally dangerous nature of this or that weapon intended for maintaining order is not a technical debate, but a political one" - and on this point, we'll agree with them!
Finally, law enforcement has various ways of circumventing protocol. For example, the two warnings required to disperse a crowd: they can simply be made inaudible. According to Le Monde, the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie) confirmed that these warnings were indeed given in Sainte-Soline, but had to admit that the demonstrators did not hear them. Observers from the LDH (Human Rights League), however, heard one, but it was given after the grenades had already been fired - and was therefore deemed "non-compliant."
Three years after "Sainte-Soline", a call for mobilizations around March 25th throughout France.
- We see law enforcement proceeding in the same way on many other occasions. Isn't police violence the common thread between "Sainte-Soline" and other social or environmental mobilizations (like the Yellow Vests), or the riots in Nahel and Nouméa?
- That's certain, but for these other "events" there was no obstruction to the arrival of help like on March 25, 2023, where the health organization was a tool of repression, the other being of course the military organization.
A second distinctive feature of "Sainte-Soline 2" is the trap the government set for the protesters. Before the "Sainte-Soline 1" demonstration on October 29, 2022 (or during the "water village" in Melle from July 16-21, 2024), law enforcement officers checked people heading to the gathering place, issued them EUR135 fines, and searched their vehicles. However, for "Sainte-Soline 2," they "escorted" the protesters, allowed them to approach the reservoir, and then suddenly bombarded them with grenades.
The yellow vests or the rioters[after the death of Nahel, or in Nouméa]have, as a second point in common, having suffered a judicial repression on all fronts; concerning Sainte-Soline, there have of course been and still are prosecutions and trials, but the judicial repression has primarily targeted the "organizers" of the demonstration (including trade unionists, no doubt to encourage the unions to return to the field of "social partners" participating in the maintenance of order).
Repression is the response of those in power to any challenge to the existing system: young people from the housing projects, formerly colonized peoples, and protesters are enemies to be subdued. Faced with all these realities, we must strive to counter the propaganda of the state and the capitalist system. We must try to make another voice heard, to convince people that the police are not "guardians of the peace," but defenders of an order that is more than ever in need of overthrow.
Interview by L.
Notes
[1] Françoise is part of the group made up of four seriously injured people and their relatives who filed this complaint shortly after the demonstration, and who filed another one in January to reopen the investigation. See CA no. 356 (January 2026)
[2] Article by Patrick Chavada and René Noto published in Secourisme revue in 2016
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4683
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Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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