April 12th marked a major political turning point in Hungary's history. Viktor Orbán, the country's Prime Minister for 20 years without interruption since 2010, has just been ousted by the meteoric rise of his opponent, Péter Magyar, even though many believed that the aspiring dictator's numerous attacks on social-democratic institutions had made any transition through elections impossible. How can we understand this rupture, and what will its consequences be?
Yet he had done everything to consolidate his position at the head of the Hungarian state. To begin with, Orbán had gradually taken control not only of public broadcasting but also of some 500 private media outlets, allowing his party, Fidesz, to unleash its nationalist propaganda in all its forms. In parallel, he had altered the electoral rules to his advantage, notably by merging constituencies favorable to the opposition while increasing the number of parliamentarians in those where Fidesz held a majority. Benefiting from a two-thirds majority, he was able to amend the constitution in January 2012, adopting a more authoritarian and reactionary version, and install his cronies in various key positions within the state apparatus.Orbán boasted of having established an "illiberal democracy," supposedly closer to traditional Hungarian values. Sociologist Dorit Geva, a professor at the University of Vienna in Austria, prefers to describe this regime as "authoritarian and hypernationalist neoliberalism," which she calls "ordo-nationalism"[1]. According to her, Orbán's policies rest on three pillars: first, the partial nationalization of certain sectors of the economy, in order to organize capital accumulation for the benefit of an emerging national bourgeoisie.
Secondly, the capture of the state by the party and its loyalists, rewarded through a system of patronage. Thirdly, a socially repressive and patriarchal shift, seeking to curry favor with a segment of the middle class at the expense of the poorest and racial and gender minorities.
A reversal facilitated by economic factors
Ultimately, Orbán's policies amounted to nothing less than an unprecedentedly rapacious plundering of Hungarian resources and heritage, organized for the benefit of an oligarchy. Street lighting, tourism, hotels, restaurants, construction, highways, banks, insurance companies, football, tobacco shops, vineyards... all these profits were seized by the ruling power and used to reward those most subservient to it[2]. Ironically, the Hungarian economy was now functioning almost entirely on life support from the European Union, the very same EU that Orbán constantly denounced.
But since 2022, the freezing of over EUR21 billion of these funds by the European Commission following the regime's authoritarian shift has been linked to a faster-than-ever deterioration of the country's economic situation, with record inflation rates. Access to stable, well-paid employment has become a pipe dream. Budget cuts to public services have been particularly visible to the population, with approximately 15% no longer having access to a general practitioner. Public schools are being deserted by the middle class and their teachers. As a result, Fidesz has finally lost the support of its economic base[3]. At the same time, numerous corruption scandals have erupted, which government control of the media has failed to suppress. To name just a few: a presidential pardon granted to a convicted pedophile, public lighting contracts used to divert European funds to Orbán's son-in-law, preferential treatment given to a battery factory regarding its polluting and carcinogenic emissions, a foreign minister reporting almost directly to Putin...
Péter Magyar, who ousted Orbán on April 12, skillfully seized upon these various scandals, making the fight against corruption the cornerstone of his campaign. At the head of his Tisza party, which didn't even exist two years ago, he managed to capture the votes of all those who wanted to see the would-be dictator fall, from both the left and the right. Voter turnout in these parliamentary elections was nearly 80%, unprecedented in Hungary since the fall of the communist regime. Tisza crushed Fidesz by 15 points and in turn secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, enough to allow Magyar to oust the pro-Orbán operatives whom the latter had installed in key government positions. On the evening of the victory, jubilation swept through the crowds gathered in the streets of Budapest, like a massive cry of relief.
A victory... for social democracy
Can we, libertarian communists, also rejoice in this major political event? Yes... up to a point. Because Péter Magyar, the man of the hour who brought down the tyrant, is himself a dissident from Fidesz and advocates a liberal center-right program, just as anti-immigration as that of his predecessor. Furthermore, he carefully avoided addressing "controversial" social issues during his campaign, such as the rights of LGBTI people persecuted under Orbán. Moreover, since his party benefited from the transfer of votes from the left, the latter has completely disappeared from the Hungarian Parliament. In the end, the biggest winners in this story are the liberals of the European Union. One of the first consequences of this election is that it should unlock the EUR90 billion EU loan to Ukraine, which Orbán had vetoed.
Let us rejoice, however, that we have seen not only a symbol, but also a material supporter of the fascist international, stumble. Magyar has already stated that it will end public funding for the Maga structures of the ultraconservative right based in Budapest. In France, the National Rally (RN) is losing one of its most valuable allies. As recently as 2025, Marine Le Pen expressed her "most ardent support for valiant Hungary," which she described as a "model of historical resistance to oppression." She herself benefited from a EUR10.6 million loan for her 2022 presidential campaign from a Hungarian bank owned by a close associate of Viktor Orbán[4]. Let us hope, therefore, that his fall, in addition to providing respite for the populations persecuted under his regime, leaves us more room to maneuver in building our revolutionary and libertarian alternatives.
Johanna (UCL Lyon)
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[1]Dorit Geva, "Orbán's Ordonationalism as Post-Neoliberal Hegemony," 2021, Journals.sagepub.com. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276421999435
[2]"'In Orbánistan,' everything is power, corruption, and lies," Les Jours, March 29, 2026. https://lesjours.fr/obsessions/viktor-orban-hongrie-legislatives/ep2-mainmise-economie/
[3]"Elections in Hungary: Orbán mired in the economic collapse," Libération, April 10, 2026. https://www.liberation.fr/international/europe/elections-en-hongrie-orban-englue-dans-la-deconfiture-de-leconomie-20260410_CWOLW4Z4DJGR3MCVCIXW57UDNY/
[4]"With Orbán's defeat, the "The National Rally loses a role model and an ally," Mediapart, April 13, 2026. https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/politique/130426/avec-la-defaite-d-orban-le-rn-perd-un-modele-et-un-allie
https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?Hongrie-Vege-van-Orban-c-est-fini
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Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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