Last month's attempted coup in Mali cannot be understood without considering this conflict part of the instability affecting international power structures, involving Central Africa, which is undergoing a second phase of decolonization, marked by the definitive end of the French presence in the region. ---- The French presence survived the liberation processes of the 1960s, barricading itself behind the Francophone language of the colonized countries. This was thanks to the presence of ruling classes educated in France and linked to the various French governments through business ties, which allowed for a more "discreet" presence in the region than in the past, and thanks to the control exercised over their economies through the monetary instrument, the CFA franc (WAEMU). The ongoing conflicts, however, also stem from the existence of state entities whose borders were drawn on paper, without taking into account ethnic affiliations, family ties within the territory, or the different cultural and religious entities.
Central Africa as a center of penetration of Islam and Israel
Central Africa, geographically constituting a cultural area of penetration and border of Islam towards southern and southern Africa, has always been characterised by the presence of Islamic brotherhoods that have constituted and practiced forms of hybridised Islam, but capable of involving and absorbing local beliefs, such as animism, in order to assimilate and incorporate it.[1]These all belong to Sunni Islam but this, in the version in which it is translated from the Arabian peninsula, does not tolerate hybridisation and, profoundly influenced by Wahhabism, at the same time fights Westernisation, presenting the recovery of religious purity as a tool for emancipation from colonialism.
It thus becomes a tool for political penetration and a fertile ground for the spread of guerrilla movements, led by Saudi Arabia, but also by the Sunni Gulf countries. These movements are linked to the development and spread of jihadism, spurred by the US aggression against Islam following the November 11 attacks and the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere that have characterized US policy.
These cultural and political conditions, these religious affiliations, have favored the spread of Al Qaeda-related groups in the sub-Saharan region, which have always found fertile ground in these conditions, merging and aligning themselves with secular anti-colonial movements. The penetration of the Sunni countries of the Arabian Peninsula through jihadist movements in the Sahel has intensified, due to the area's wealth and the concentration of gold and diamond deposits there. These have stimulated the appetites of first Saudi Arabia, then the United Arab Emirates, and have found useful and significant allies in Israel, whose operators dominate the diamond market, with a traditional presence in the cutting and marketing sectors. This has led to an apparent, unprecedented, and contradictory alliance between Israel and the Sunni countries of the Persian Gulf in support of the guerrilla movements, which has become evident over the years and is built on solid and proven foundations. These conditions have allowed international jihadism to recruit proselytes and militarily train personnel, professionally trained in the wars in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, and most recently in Ukraine, and thus to be able to have the necessary cadres to develop penetration and to direct and use the actions of armed gangs aimed at managing the clandestine mines installed in an immense and difficult to control territory.
The destabilization of Central Africa and the Libyan crisis
The presence of a ring of stable countries protecting the Mediterranean helped contain the phenomenon until 2011, but the overthrow of Gaddafi, coerced by the United States and France, exacerbated the crisis. French rule began to deteriorate, intensifying after 2017 with the advent of the Macron presidency, under the pressure of jihadist movements, increasingly widespread across the country. These movements identified the national bourgeoisies supporting French colonialism as a fragile adversary, drawing strength from French military support, which proved ineffective. At the same time, the number of clandestine mines and convoys of gold and diamonds heading to the Persian Gulf grew: gold and diamonds mined and looted locally, thanks to forced recruitment and the use as slave labor of the non-paying migrants intercepted by militias, who captured caravans of desperate people marching towards the Mediterranean. This led to the strengthening of guerrilla movements intent on weakening territorial control.
The military forces of the countries in the region, trained in French academies, saw their failures mounting as they were sent to give their lives in defense of their respective states, while observing and becoming aware of the collusion between the corrupt local political class and the rebel forces operating in the territory, forces that could not have operated effectively without the support of collusion within the state apparatus. They saw before their eyes the proceeds of corruption flowing, fueling those who effectively sent them to their deaths in defense of their own exclusive interests. This created the conditions within the armed forces for a reversal of political power, sometimes characterized by the substitution of one clan for another, but increasingly by growing desires for emancipation from this state of exploitation and domination. Meanwhile, new actors entered the operational arena.
The continuation of the Libyan crisis led to the presence in this country of Turkey, interested in Libya for economic reasons and because it was already part of the Turkish Empire, as well as of Russia, seeking safe bases in the Mediterranean for its fleet, to face the worsening of the Syrian crisis, both these powers intending to have logistical bases in Libya to operate in the conflict in Sudan, where they could protect their respective interests in the ongoing civil war. These are the main reasons for their support for Colonel Khalifa Haftar who controls Cyrenaica, obtaining in exchange for the political and military support granted to him an operational corridor of access to Sudan[2]which allowed them to establish themselves on the African continent, constituting a political point of reference for the other countries of the continent as well.
Thus, all the conditions were created for elites trained in the armed forces of some Francophone African countries to decide to free themselves from the oppression of their colonial national bourgeoisies, as well as their colonial allies and sponsors.
This revolt sought and found military support in Russia and Turkey, as well as the opportunity to benefit from Chinese and Turkish infrastructure investments, interested in an economic presence in these countries regardless of the political power structure. They believed this would alleviate the growing frustration resulting from repeated defeats at the hands of jihadist groups and forces destabilizing state power, fueled precisely by the degradation of their respective countries' civil and political institutions. These forces were in collusion with the enemy they claimed to be fighting, and fearful of having to accommodate the region's re-Islamization tendencies.
The changing of the guerrilla's sponsors
Israel's war of aggression against Iran, with US support, has led to the involvement of the Persian Gulf states, especially the United Arab Emirates, in the conflict. These have become targets for Iran and have seen their resources reduced, forced to focus on defense, while Israel's resources have been channeled primarily into the conflict with the Shiite Islamic states linked to Iran. Thus, their operational influence in supporting the jihadist groups in the Sahael has slowed, with new sponsors emerging: France, with bases in Mauritania, driven by a desire for revenge, and, at least in part, Algerian circles, interested in channeling the growing demands of the Tuareg populations, who aspire to have their own space to develop and maintain their culture, toward external targets. These second protagonists of the guerrilla warfare in Central Africa have long been present in the territory, as the Tuareg ethnic group has always been a minority in the states designed on paper by colonialism, unable to find space for their own autonomous homeland. Tuareg nationalist identity had sought a foothold in Algerian domestic politics, but once the internal insurrectionary movements were defeated within the country, their sights were turned by Algerian leaders themselves toward the governments of neighboring countries. France, ousted following the emancipation process we have reported on in Central Africa, took advantage of this situation. This explains the intensification and current composition of the guerrilla warfare underway in Mali, which includes militants from the jihadist terrorist groups "JNIM" and the "FLA," which organizes the Tuareg, operationally united in pursuing a common strategy, facilitated by the political and diplomatic errors of the Bamako government. While the FLA aims to secure its own vital space, particularly by controlling the northern city of Kidal, on the border with Algeria, the jihadists are aiming to create the conditions for the Islamization of the country by influencing the government, guided behind the scenes by Saudi Arabia's plenipotentiary, Imam Mahmud Vic.
To direct their guerrilla operations and strengthen their effectiveness, Ukrainian soldiers, especially drone operators, appear to have been deployed to counter the deployment of Russian troops from the African Intervention Corps to support government troops, who have replaced the French. To support the government and the Russians, specialists sent from Turkey have been deployed to train the army and provide a guard post to protect President Assimi Goïta, who has assumed the role of interim president following the killing of the defense minister in the recent riots.
Why now: the new actors
It is perhaps no coincidence that guerrilla warfare intensified after Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso established their own joint military force, called UF-SAER, on February 21, 2026. It consisted of five thousand soldiers and was equipped with air, land, and intelligence assets. This marked a new phase in security cooperation between these three Sahelian states, commanded by Burkinabe General Daouda Traoré, whose close associate was General Sadio Camaro, Mali's defense minister, killed by jihadists, who had led negotiations for the Russian presence in the country.
This structure was established in September 2023, with the signing of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which created the Alliance of Sahel States , which became a confederation in July 2024, strengthening its internal political and strategic framework. At the same time, the three African states formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025, criticizing it for its ineffectiveness in managing security crises and for France's excessive influence and hegemonic role, which has also proven incapable of containing the rebels.
At the same time, the three countries have diversified their military and diplomatic alliances, with new partnerships, particularly those signed with Russia, Turkey, and China.
It is a fact that China is investing in infrastructure in the three countries, obtaining in return a sales platform for its products, objectively boosting the country's economic development. Russia is providing military support and training for its armed forces, while Turkey is also expanding investments and reaping the benefits of a market of 90 million citizens, who together constitute the population of the three Sahel states. They enjoy good relations with Ghana, a hub for the Russian and Chinese militaries, as do the Turks. China has become a major trading and financial partner in the country, as it has in Ghana, with investments exceeding $60 billion over the past two decades. Key sectors include infrastructure, mining (bauxite and gold), and energy. Ghana encourages further Chinese investment, although concerns exist about debt sustainability and illegal mining. Beijing has promised and is providing financing for infrastructure (roads, bridges, and railways) in exchange for access to Ghanaian bauxite, as part of a central agreement with the government, which has acknowledged the strong presence of Chinese companies in mining, particularly gold. Investments in infrastructure in recent years have reached $2.25 billion.
Turkey's presence is part of Ankara's broader strategy of economic and diplomatic expansion in sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish investments in the country are primarily focused on infrastructure, energy, and industry, through companies such as Summa, Limak, and Albayrak, and in the energy sector, including the supply of power generation solutions (powerships). Ghana has signed defense agreements with Turkey, which include the potential supply of drones and other military equipment, fitting into Turkey's defense technology export strategy, leading to a significant increase in trade. Ghana is seen as a Turkish logistics hub in the region, as Turkey has significantly increased its total trade with Africa through significant direct investments and thousands of infrastructure projects completed by Turkish contractors with the opening of credit lines.
Interestingly, the growth of stability is supporting the beginnings of timid economic development and has nevertheless allowed Burkina Faso in particular, whichas mentionedis one of Africa's leading producers of gold, a resource that dominates the economy and accounts for approximately 74.6% of its exports, to increase its revenues to finance development. In addition to gold, the subsoil is rich in manganese, zinc, copper, phosphates, and limestone, and this has enabled the implementation of reform policies that include the establishment of a nascent social service system, the establishment of a public healthcare system, and the beginnings of the nationalization of mineral resources, which poses a real threat to the interests of the former colonizers, Arab-Israeli plunderers, and guerrilla groups. This dangerous example risks being emulated by the other two partners.
It should be noted that the Government of Burkina Faso has already taken control of several mines and licenses, establishing the Société de Participation Minière du Burkina (SOPAMIB) to manage strategic resources, while artisanal gold mining is widespread, often informal and with serious environmental impacts (use of mercury). The control of mineral resources is in fact the strategic issue that represents and makes the area extremely interesting, especially since the possible success of this Union could constitute a pole of attraction for Gabon,[3]also marked by the expulsion of the French colonizers and offer a platform for the stabilization of Sudan and South Sudan, countries where, not by chance, both Turkey and Russia and China operate.
From this reconstruction it is clear how the area constitutes an important platform for the stable penetration into Africa and the marginalization of Western French and American interests in the area and affects the sources of financing of the guerrilla groups and the policies of the countries that support them. Beyond the ambiguities and contradictions that distinguish the objectives of the essentially nationalist Tuareg movement from the jihadists, who have clashed frequently in the past, the insurrectionary and guerrilla actions in Mali could have a destabilizing effect on all three countries, bringing them back under the control of their eternal masters.
Finally, the use of Ukrainians as soldiers of fortune, as members of an international anti-Russian militia, confirms the role that the para-fascist groups in this country have assigned themselves as Western praetorians, offering themselves as mercenaries to defend Western interests, provided they are anti-Russian, even by drawing on the many Colombian mercenaries trained on the Ukrainian battlefields where they learned their trade.
These butchers' tanneries need cannon fodder, recruited by turning migrants unable to pay the protection money to cross the desert into a shock force, and by recruiting those who, desperate, crowd Libyan concentration camps and see jihadist recruitment as the only way to escape slavery, thus becoming executioners. Another form of proselytism is offered to captured Malian soldiers, offering them the choice of joining their ranks or being executed. As can be seen, this complex picture has a significant impact on the migration phenomenon affecting our country and Europe as a whole. It therefore deserves close attention from the European side, which is completely absent from the Union, whose political decisions are managed by the three cheerful geese: Ursula von der Stupid, Kaja Kretina Kallas, and Roberta Metzola.
[1]G. Cimbalo, Islamic brotherhoods in the Balkans: a model of plural European Islam, in "Daimon". Yearbook of Comparative Law of Religions, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009, pp. 225-245; ID., Contribution to the study of Islam in Europe, in Aequitas sive Deus, Studies in honor of Rinaldo Bertolino, Giappichelli Editore, Turin 2011, pp. 557-574 .
[2]The Editorial Staff, France: Africa goodbye, Published, Newsletter, N 197, May 2025 .
[3]In Gabon a self-administered coup d'état, Newsletter, Crescita Politica, n. 176 September 2023 .
GL
https://www.ucadi.org/2026/05/23/lafrica-centrale-sotto-lassalto-di-un-nuovo-colonialismo/
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Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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