For three months, the comings and goings of political leaders had
multiplied between the mainland and the archipelago: delegations from
Congress or the local government were looking for funding to allow the
economic recovery of New Caledonia after the riots of mid-May;
representatives of the State or Parliament wanted to verify on site the
need for such funding. Negotiations concerning the future of the
territory were again on the agenda, and, their conclusion having been
announced for the end of 2025, the separatists were actively preparing
to participate. And then on December 4, the National Assembly voted the
motion of censure against the 2025 budget concocted by Prime Minister
Barnier and, bang, it fell...
The disappearance last spring of a large number of establishments, both
private and public, had a snowball effect on life in the archipelago in
general (1). Reports quickly showed food shortages linked to looting and
burning of businesses, but in fact all economic sectors and political
and social organization were turned upside down - and they still are.
Examples: the partial unemployment of a large number of employees led to
an increase in unpaid rents and departures from Noumea to settle in less
expensive places in the archipelago; the loss of tax revenue made it
impossible for the local government to pay social benefits, pensions or
civil servants' salaries, and for municipalities to be unable to pay
their employees, canteens or school buses.
These multiple economic problems have fueled repeated controversies in
the political class, because they have accentuated the existing
disagreements on the future of the territory. Alliances have been
broken, others have appeared - whether between independentists and
anti-independentists or within these two camps. Their longevity is
however far from assured, given the rather fluctuating nature of the
agreements between the Caledonian political parties.
Before the riots, local institutions were led by figures from the two
main pro-independence organisations within the FLNKS (Kanak and
Socialist National Liberation Front): Roch Wamytan, a member of the
Caledonian Union (UC), had chaired the Congress since 2019; Louis Mapou,
a member of Palika, was appointed head of the collegiate government (2)
in 2021. But on 29 August 2024, a coalition vote replaced Wamytan with
Veylma Falaeo, an elected member of the Oceanian Awakening (a party
presented as the "third way" between the two camps), which weakened the
government since it is supposed to be an emanation of the Congress.
In addition, two plans aimed at the "reconstruction" of the country were
launched at the end of August: one comes from the moderate right, but it
was voted almost unanimously by the Congress (3) and it is supported by
the employers; the other (called the plan for safeguarding, rebuilding
and reconstruction, PS2R), was prepared by the local government with the
support of the High Commissioner of the Republic, representative of the
French State.
However, both plans are addressed to the same State. All political
parties are following the same approach: begging it for very substantial
subsidies (we are talking here in terms of billions of euros) to avoid
the bankruptcy of the Caledonian economic and social system in the very
short term (we are talking here in terms of months). However, the French
government is essentially promising loans - not only because the state
of its finances at the national level limits its great largesse, but
also because it is the best way for it to keep the archipelago under its
control (4).
In Noumea on September 24
FOR KANAKY TO BE A REALITY
As a general rule, it is the dynamics of the struggles that give their
demands their full substance, while their spokespeople tend, in
negotiations, to soften these demands to make them acceptable to the
opposing party - hence the importance of being able to control the
spokespeople by precise mandates. In New Caledonia, if for four decades
the Kanaks have largely followed the instructions (for voting and
mobilization) given by parties claiming to be mainly FLNKS, these
parties were largely overwhelmed during the riots, and these brought to
the forefront a social issue that cannot be reduced to a cultural
problem. The flag with the spire that so many Kanaks brandish - whatever
their age and gender - was not just there to demand respect for an identity.
As a general rule, in order to separate the wheat from the chaff, the
spokespeople for the struggles tend to practice forms of dissociation
with regard to the perpetrators of violent acts committed within their
framework. From the beginning of the riots in the archipelago, we have
heard pro-independence leaders make a distinction between rioters and
activists, or even between members of the CCAT and other activists.
The "reconstruction" of New Caledonia will worsen the situation of the
most deprived, among whom we can include most of the Kanaks. This is
why, in mainland France, it is urgent to express active solidarity with
them on positions that are both anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist.
The independence struggle has so far received very little coverage:
small demonstrations in the spring (against the state of emergency
declared by the government in the archipelago); small summer gatherings
(mostly composed of Kanaks) in front of prisons holding members of the
CCAT; a few support meetings. A fraction of the left in the broad sense
claims to be for the "independence of Kanaky", but this has hardly
translated into anything other than columns or petitions from
personalities on Mediapart, interviews with ethnologists and other
specialists on the archipelago on Radio-France channels. Furthermore,
the discourse held is too often confined to a denunciation of the
repression that victimizes the Kanaks and to the support of "good"
political leaders to take care of their fate. Calling New Caledonia
"Kanaky" would however amount to having maintained an illusion, if the
result of the negotiations on a "global agreement" was a reinforced
institutional autonomy within the French framework, accompanied by
equally reinforced financial means to better maintain order, or even to
better "adapt" Kanak youth to the needs of Caledonian employers.
Intense talks ahead of negotiations on a 'global agreement'
Caledonian political figures have made several recent trips to mainland
France: "trans-partisan" delegations from Congress in September and
December, a government delegation led by Louis Mapou in November, etc.
Similarly, the French State has sent various figures to New Caledonia:
François-Noël Buffet, Minister for Overseas Territories (mid-October);
the Presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, Yaël Braun-Pivet
and Gérard Larcher (9-14 November), etc.
New Caledonia had already obtained state support of 770 million euros
for 2025. Mapou announced on Franceinfo NC 1re, on November 19, that
Barnier would propose, as part of the 2025 finance law, additional aid
of 230 million euros - which would bring "the loan guarantee for the
archipelago to 1 billion euros".
The incessant solicitations of all political parties towards the French
State produce a curious phenomenon: while the last Caledonian elections
(referendums on self-determination in 2018 and 2020, legislative
elections in July 2024) indicated a clear increase in the
pro-independence vote, the "reconstruction" of the archipelago will
accentuate its dependence on the mainland. When Pascal Vittori,
president of the French Association of Mayors of New Caledonia
(non-independence), stated on November 21: "Today, the only entity
capable of saving us is the State", he summed up the general feeling of
political and business leaders (5). We are thus faced with a rather
aberrant scenario, the perverse side of which must not fail to delight
the cynics in power: the riots, whose eminently social character was
briefly highlighted by the "left-wing" media (to at least "explain"
them), are used to justify both the approaches of the Caledonian
political class with the French State and the measures taken by its high
commissioner to prevent further "exactions".
Public order remains so fragile in the archipelago that the curfew put
in place on 14 May was only lifted on 2 December and the gendarmes'
"locks" blocking the only road to the south, to Mont-Dore, are still
reactivated from time to time. The enormous police presence and the
judicial repression of the rioters are the subject of criticism in the
pro-independence camp, but its components refrain from contesting the
ban on demonstrations that has been in place for seven months (until 20
December?) and several of them have expressed the desire for the sale of
alcohol to remain limited. None of them is in fact in a position to
confront the forces of law and order militarily or to "accompany" a
second social explosion.
This observation contradicts the accusations made by the government
against the Cellule de coordination des actions de terrain to
criminalize it: in mid-May, it blamed the CCAT, which had been founded
in November 2023 at the initiative of the UC to mobilize against the
"thaw" of the electoral body reserved for the self-determination ballots
(6), for the "abuses"; then it deported seven of its members to mainland
France.
May 3rd Mobilization
Evolution of the independence claim
As we can see, the issue of "reconstruction" works as a trap to make the
claim for independence in the strict sense improbable. But, in truth,
the riots of mid-May were quite clearly a reaction against the
"redefinition" of this claim over the last four decades.
In the 1980s, the FLNKS claimed to be fighting for "Kanak and socialist
independence" (IKS) - rightly renaming New Caledonia "Kanaky", in other
words the country of the indigenous Kanak people. It was with this in
mind that FLNKS President Jean-Marie Tjibaou signed the Matignon-Oudinot
Accords in 1988: they committed the archipelago to a process of
self-determination. But the name "Kanaky/New Caledonia" was soon used by
pro-independence leaders, while the reference to "socialism" was buried
with the disappearance of the Eastern bloc. However, attaching "New
Caledonia" to "Kanaky" already signalled a desire to maintain "special"
relations between the territory and France.
The Matignon-Oudinot Accords and then the Noumea Accords (concluded in
1998) were the work of "socialist" governments (Rocard then Jospin), but
by promoting them the PS actually aimed to keep the archipelago within
the bosom of the French state. Of course, these agreements made it
possible to delay a vote on independence that the Kanaks would have lost
because the French state had made them a minority on their land. The
idea put forward at the time was that time had to be allowed to reverse
the balance of power, counting in particular on the weight of the birth
rate among the Kanaks and on the "freezing" of the electorate reserved
for referendums on the self-determination of the territory, as well as
on the practice of a "living together" likely to convert the less
virulent anti-independence activists to the virtues of independence.
Above all, by creating new local institutions, the agreements have
helped to develop a small Kanak middle class which often belongs to the
civil service and is quite favourable to the status quo.
Within the FLNKS, the UC and its ally the RDO (Oceanian Democratic
Rally) have positioned themselves in favour of
"association-independence"; the Palika and its ally the UPM (Progressive
Union in Melanesia) have been defending "partnership-independence" since
2013. In the opposing camp, anti-independence supporters (from the
centre or the moderate right) have become "non-independence supporters",
or even in favour of "independence" in connection with France.
Over the past two decades, the gap between the rank and file of the
independence movement has widened. The emergence of the CCAT reflected a
desire to relaunch the struggle for independence when the "thaw" of the
electorate threatened to bury it. It was the choice of activists
belonging to various independence groups that were or were not part of
the FLNKS. However, the determining factor in the riots was undoubtedly
the large migration of Kanaks, during these same decades, from their
reserves to the agglomeration of "Nouméa le Blanche". 55% of Kanaks
lived in this agglomeration when the riots broke out, precisely there;
and the destruction committed was mainly by Kanak youth confronted with
both extreme precariousness and unbridled racist behavior.
Controversies and restructuring in the independence camp
The FLNKS has always experienced internal quarrels - to the point of
having, from 2001 until last November, only a rotating leadership
ensured by its four historical components. But the riots led the
independence camp to make political clarifications, during the last
congresses of the FLNKS, the UC and the Palika.
At its 43rd congress on 27-29 August, the FLNKS chose Christian Tein as
its president, a member of the CCAT who is also the general commissioner
of the UC and who is currently imprisoned in Mulhouse on various
charges; and the FLNKS integrated pro-independence groups such as the
Labour Party, the Union of Kanak Workers and Exploited People (USTKE),
the Movement of Oceanian Independence... and the CCAT. These two
decisions could have been interpreted as a "radicalisation" of the
Front, but its congress had been boycotted by the UPM and the Palika;
and, after holding their own congresses, these two groups declared, on
14 and 15 November respectively, that they were "withdrawing" from the
FLNKS. Decryption: they will no longer have representatives in the
political bureau of the Front without leaving it, and it is under the
banner of their group in the Congress (UNI, National Union for
Independence) that they will participate in discussions concerning the
future of the archipelago. On November 17, the spokesperson for Palika
criticized the FLNKS for "a growing populism that
taints[its]credibility." Atmosphere.
For its part, the UC reorganized itself at its 55th congress (November
23-25) in order to satisfy moderates and radicals. Emmanuel Tjibaou, son
of Jean-Marie and a New Caledonian MP since July, was elected party
president by obtaining ("apparently", said the press, which was not
invited) 144 votes out of 198. His nomination was hailed as a desired
"renewal of the political class". E. Tjibaou replaces Daniel Goa, who
had led the UC for twelve years and who, on June 8, had promised a
"unilateral proclamation of independence" for September 24 - the 171st
anniversary of colonization and the 40th anniversary of the FLNKS.
Demonstration against the "thaw" of the electoral body in Noumea, March
28, 2024.
E. Tjibaou's mission is to "remobilize the youth" while embodying "a
breath of fresh air" and "dialogue". His personality reassures both the
non-independence supporters and the Palika or the UPM. Will he, however,
restore unity in the independence camp? He immediately declared that the
UC was maintaining its objective of "access to full sovereignty for
Kanaky", then spoke of a "shared sovereignty".
The UC clarified its approach in a motion: the negotiations will be led
by the FLNKS (the UC will therefore be there), concerning not only the
future of the territory but also the "release of our political
prisoners" - namely the incarcerated members of the CCAT (the UC has
kept Christian Tein as the party's general commissioner). A "Kanaky
agreement" must be signed no later than September 24, 2025 (provincial
elections are scheduled for the following day). For five years,
sovereign powers (7) and those currently shared with the State will be
transferred to the "country". But when full sovereignty is achieved, a
new phase of negotiations will open in order to establish
"interdependence agreements on part of the sovereign powers". We are
therefore, it seems, more or less on the register of "independence with
partnership" defended by the Palika and the UPM; Furthermore, the
"shared sovereignty" mentioned by E. Tjibaou was also mentioned by
Gérard Larcher when he visited the archipelago, and can be found in the
preamble to the Noumea Accord. However, E. Tjibaou specified, the UC
will only agree to discuss it when the archipelago is definitively
independent, because "we can only share sovereignty if we have first
accessed it" (see the box "For Kanaky to be a reality").
Regarding the CCAT, E. Tjibaou insisted on the presumption of innocence
that his activists should benefit from ("we must wait until the matter
is judged") and on the fact that the UC "has never called for the
destruction or violence that we condemn". He indicated that Senator
Robert Xowie (a member of the UC and sitting in the Senate with the
communists) would propose a parliamentary commission of inquiry in order
to "shed full light" on the riots. Hiding behind the impartiality of the
courts or the neutrality of a parliamentary commission nevertheless
constitutes a rather weak mark of support for the CCAT. Especially since
E. Tjibaou declared on Franceinfo 1re, on November 25, that it remained
an "important tool, in particular to mobilize our activists on the
ground", but that it had to "be supervised and its objectives clarified".
SOME PERCENTAGES ANNOUNCING OTHER "CRISES"
On September 29, 2023, the Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
(ISEE) estimated the general level of consumer prices in the archipelago
in 2022 to be 31% higher than in mainland France (78% for food
products). Since then, food prices have increased by another 20%, while
the few measures set up in the overseas territories and most social
assistance disappeared with the riots.
On October 1, 2024, bus fares increased by almost 70% - and ridership on
what is the only public transport network (used almost exclusively by
people on the lowest incomes) immediately fell by 80%.
Positions among anti- and non-independence supporters
The moderate non-independence parties describe as a real "disaster" or
"complete cataclysm" the choices made by Macron to maintain the 3rd
referendum on self-determination in the midst of Covid (December 12,
2021), or to "thaw" the Caledonian electorate. Veylma Falaeo, from Eveil
océanien, thinks that they have allowed the "extremes" to reinvest the
political field.
Philippe Gomès, from Calédonie ensemble, declared (8) that he had
adopted the concept of "shared sovereignty" because it "is the key, the
balance to be found between those who aspire to a more accomplished
emancipation integrating elements of external sovereignty and those who
aspire to remain protected by France with a reinforced internal
provincial sovereignty". Then he criticized the CCAT for having
"capitalized" on the "serious existential crisis" of a Kanak youth
"partly acculturated, partly excluded", because "both marginalized in
the city in which they were born (...) and excluded from tribal life, in
which they participate only occasionally". According to him, "May 13[the
start of the riots]allowed these young people to assert their identity
in a legitimate way against the thaw of the electorate, since the
political watchword was given".
The "hard right" is also preparing for negotiations. In a press
conference held on November 20 in Noumea, the Loyalists appeared united
and advocated a "territorial federation". For Sonia Backès, president of
the Southern Province, this formula encompasses "belonging to the
Republic, the unity of the territory, respect for our diversity and our
differences". Laughter.
Demonstration against the "thaw" of the electoral body in Noumea, April 13.
Exit Barnier, make way for Bayrou
After the National Assembly censored the 2025 budget for France on
December 5, Macron promised a special law within ten days to "ensure the
continuity of the State." Nevertheless, the Caledonian political class,
all tendencies combined, has since been proclaiming its concern
regarding the billion euros promised by Barnier for the "reconstruction"
of the archipelago and currently in the drawers of Parliament.
Loyalist MP Nicolas Metzdorf did not vote for the motion of censure any
more than Emmanuel Tjibaou; and, with the two Caledonian senators Robert
Xowie and Georges Naturel (LR), they sent a "transpartisan" request to
Macron to support the "urgent needs" of New Caledonia, "seriously
weakened by an unprecedented economic, social and political crisis".
Then, as soon as François Bayrou became Prime Minister, Metzdorf and
Naturel published a column entitled "Let's save the Caledonians from the
humanitarian and economic crisis" because "the survival of a French
territory depends on it"; published in L'Opinion on December 13, it was
signed by 70 other political figures, including a certain Darmanin...
A few hours before the vote against the motion of censure, however, the
"end of management" budget for 2024 was adopted by Parliament, which
notably made it possible to release 223 million euros for New Caledonia
before 2025. This sum guaranteed the financing of the provinces and
municipalities, thus ensuring the payment of civil servants' salaries;
the operation of Ruamm (Caledonian health and maternity insurance
scheme), essential for hospitals and the payment of doctors; the
sustainability of the unemployment insurance scheme; the stability of
the Enercal electricity system. But this financial aid provoked
indignant reactions in the Caledonian Congress when it examined it to
validate it and integrate it into the archipelago's budget on December
11. On the one hand, its unchangeable text was negotiated by the local
government without the authorization of the Congress (9). On the other
hand, this aid has increased the territory's debt since it involves
repayable loans and advances, and by accepting it the Caledonian
government has committed to modifying taxes (on consumption and on the
Caledonian solidarity contribution) which will penalize the least
fortunate households. A legitimate concern (see the box "A few
percentages heralding other "crises""), but the Congress nevertheless
ended up adopting the text unanimously.
The French state is playing its part by relying on the Mapou government;
it is also doing so by inviting the political groups of the Congress and
the provinces to dialogue - and not the FLNKS, while the negotiations on
the Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa agreements were conducted by
representatives of its components. During a press conference organized
on November 15, the FLNKS considered that the state was thereby trying
to reach an agreement with the independence activists present within the
institutions, considered more moderate. It hammered home that it "has
been, is and will remain the only liberation movement of the Kanak
people" and that no political agreement will be legitimate without it
being a stakeholder.
On December 10, the UC hammered the point home by announcing that it
would not return to the negotiating table on the institutional future
before the new FLNKS congress, scheduled for the end of January 2025 and
which should allow "confirming the unitary strategy of the
independentists". Four days earlier, a "transpartisan" delegation
(including a member of the UC, Pierre-Chanel Tutugoro) had proposed to
Parliament that these negotiations begin on December 15, 2024.
We will see how Bayrou handles the "Caledonian issue". In 1989, he said,
he voted yes in the referendum ratifying the Matignon agreements. In
2017, he expressed his "incomprehension" in the face of Macron's remarks
describing French colonization as a "crime against humanity" ("a hurtful
phrase for many French people, and which does not correspond to the
historical truth")... but, at the same time, he made public his
alliance-rally to this same Macron for the presidential election. And now?
Vanina, December 18, 2024
Notes
1. Read in particular the articles published in Courant Alternatif since
last summer.
2. This government comprises 11 members (including two women since
September): 3 UC and 3 Palika; 4 Rally-Les Républicains and 1 Calédonie
ensemble.
3. Only the group led by Palika abstained.
4. The New Caledonian debt rate is, according to a press release from
Eveil océanien on November 22, 337%, mainly due to Covid and "the crisis
linked to exactions".
5. The AFM-NC (non-independence) estimates the cost of the riots for the
archipelago's municipalities at 180 million euros.
6. These elections were, in the Matignon agreements, reserved for people
established in the territory for at least ten years.
7. Ensure external security through diplomacy and territorial defense,
internal security and public order through police forces; define the law
and deliver justice; mint money through a central bank; vote its own
budget by levying taxes and managing public finances.
8. Interview from November 22 in Tomorrow in New Caledonia.
9. The local government used the same procedure in September for the
large state loan included in the 2025 finance bill.
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4349
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
multiplied between the mainland and the archipelago: delegations from
Congress or the local government were looking for funding to allow the
economic recovery of New Caledonia after the riots of mid-May;
representatives of the State or Parliament wanted to verify on site the
need for such funding. Negotiations concerning the future of the
territory were again on the agenda, and, their conclusion having been
announced for the end of 2025, the separatists were actively preparing
to participate. And then on December 4, the National Assembly voted the
motion of censure against the 2025 budget concocted by Prime Minister
Barnier and, bang, it fell...
The disappearance last spring of a large number of establishments, both
private and public, had a snowball effect on life in the archipelago in
general (1). Reports quickly showed food shortages linked to looting and
burning of businesses, but in fact all economic sectors and political
and social organization were turned upside down - and they still are.
Examples: the partial unemployment of a large number of employees led to
an increase in unpaid rents and departures from Noumea to settle in less
expensive places in the archipelago; the loss of tax revenue made it
impossible for the local government to pay social benefits, pensions or
civil servants' salaries, and for municipalities to be unable to pay
their employees, canteens or school buses.
These multiple economic problems have fueled repeated controversies in
the political class, because they have accentuated the existing
disagreements on the future of the territory. Alliances have been
broken, others have appeared - whether between independentists and
anti-independentists or within these two camps. Their longevity is
however far from assured, given the rather fluctuating nature of the
agreements between the Caledonian political parties.
Before the riots, local institutions were led by figures from the two
main pro-independence organisations within the FLNKS (Kanak and
Socialist National Liberation Front): Roch Wamytan, a member of the
Caledonian Union (UC), had chaired the Congress since 2019; Louis Mapou,
a member of Palika, was appointed head of the collegiate government (2)
in 2021. But on 29 August 2024, a coalition vote replaced Wamytan with
Veylma Falaeo, an elected member of the Oceanian Awakening (a party
presented as the "third way" between the two camps), which weakened the
government since it is supposed to be an emanation of the Congress.
In addition, two plans aimed at the "reconstruction" of the country were
launched at the end of August: one comes from the moderate right, but it
was voted almost unanimously by the Congress (3) and it is supported by
the employers; the other (called the plan for safeguarding, rebuilding
and reconstruction, PS2R), was prepared by the local government with the
support of the High Commissioner of the Republic, representative of the
French State.
However, both plans are addressed to the same State. All political
parties are following the same approach: begging it for very substantial
subsidies (we are talking here in terms of billions of euros) to avoid
the bankruptcy of the Caledonian economic and social system in the very
short term (we are talking here in terms of months). However, the French
government is essentially promising loans - not only because the state
of its finances at the national level limits its great largesse, but
also because it is the best way for it to keep the archipelago under its
control (4).
In Noumea on September 24
FOR KANAKY TO BE A REALITY
As a general rule, it is the dynamics of the struggles that give their
demands their full substance, while their spokespeople tend, in
negotiations, to soften these demands to make them acceptable to the
opposing party - hence the importance of being able to control the
spokespeople by precise mandates. In New Caledonia, if for four decades
the Kanaks have largely followed the instructions (for voting and
mobilization) given by parties claiming to be mainly FLNKS, these
parties were largely overwhelmed during the riots, and these brought to
the forefront a social issue that cannot be reduced to a cultural
problem. The flag with the spire that so many Kanaks brandish - whatever
their age and gender - was not just there to demand respect for an identity.
As a general rule, in order to separate the wheat from the chaff, the
spokespeople for the struggles tend to practice forms of dissociation
with regard to the perpetrators of violent acts committed within their
framework. From the beginning of the riots in the archipelago, we have
heard pro-independence leaders make a distinction between rioters and
activists, or even between members of the CCAT and other activists.
The "reconstruction" of New Caledonia will worsen the situation of the
most deprived, among whom we can include most of the Kanaks. This is
why, in mainland France, it is urgent to express active solidarity with
them on positions that are both anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist.
The independence struggle has so far received very little coverage:
small demonstrations in the spring (against the state of emergency
declared by the government in the archipelago); small summer gatherings
(mostly composed of Kanaks) in front of prisons holding members of the
CCAT; a few support meetings. A fraction of the left in the broad sense
claims to be for the "independence of Kanaky", but this has hardly
translated into anything other than columns or petitions from
personalities on Mediapart, interviews with ethnologists and other
specialists on the archipelago on Radio-France channels. Furthermore,
the discourse held is too often confined to a denunciation of the
repression that victimizes the Kanaks and to the support of "good"
political leaders to take care of their fate. Calling New Caledonia
"Kanaky" would however amount to having maintained an illusion, if the
result of the negotiations on a "global agreement" was a reinforced
institutional autonomy within the French framework, accompanied by
equally reinforced financial means to better maintain order, or even to
better "adapt" Kanak youth to the needs of Caledonian employers.
Intense talks ahead of negotiations on a 'global agreement'
Caledonian political figures have made several recent trips to mainland
France: "trans-partisan" delegations from Congress in September and
December, a government delegation led by Louis Mapou in November, etc.
Similarly, the French State has sent various figures to New Caledonia:
François-Noël Buffet, Minister for Overseas Territories (mid-October);
the Presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, Yaël Braun-Pivet
and Gérard Larcher (9-14 November), etc.
New Caledonia had already obtained state support of 770 million euros
for 2025. Mapou announced on Franceinfo NC 1re, on November 19, that
Barnier would propose, as part of the 2025 finance law, additional aid
of 230 million euros - which would bring "the loan guarantee for the
archipelago to 1 billion euros".
The incessant solicitations of all political parties towards the French
State produce a curious phenomenon: while the last Caledonian elections
(referendums on self-determination in 2018 and 2020, legislative
elections in July 2024) indicated a clear increase in the
pro-independence vote, the "reconstruction" of the archipelago will
accentuate its dependence on the mainland. When Pascal Vittori,
president of the French Association of Mayors of New Caledonia
(non-independence), stated on November 21: "Today, the only entity
capable of saving us is the State", he summed up the general feeling of
political and business leaders (5). We are thus faced with a rather
aberrant scenario, the perverse side of which must not fail to delight
the cynics in power: the riots, whose eminently social character was
briefly highlighted by the "left-wing" media (to at least "explain"
them), are used to justify both the approaches of the Caledonian
political class with the French State and the measures taken by its high
commissioner to prevent further "exactions".
Public order remains so fragile in the archipelago that the curfew put
in place on 14 May was only lifted on 2 December and the gendarmes'
"locks" blocking the only road to the south, to Mont-Dore, are still
reactivated from time to time. The enormous police presence and the
judicial repression of the rioters are the subject of criticism in the
pro-independence camp, but its components refrain from contesting the
ban on demonstrations that has been in place for seven months (until 20
December?) and several of them have expressed the desire for the sale of
alcohol to remain limited. None of them is in fact in a position to
confront the forces of law and order militarily or to "accompany" a
second social explosion.
This observation contradicts the accusations made by the government
against the Cellule de coordination des actions de terrain to
criminalize it: in mid-May, it blamed the CCAT, which had been founded
in November 2023 at the initiative of the UC to mobilize against the
"thaw" of the electoral body reserved for the self-determination ballots
(6), for the "abuses"; then it deported seven of its members to mainland
France.
May 3rd Mobilization
Evolution of the independence claim
As we can see, the issue of "reconstruction" works as a trap to make the
claim for independence in the strict sense improbable. But, in truth,
the riots of mid-May were quite clearly a reaction against the
"redefinition" of this claim over the last four decades.
In the 1980s, the FLNKS claimed to be fighting for "Kanak and socialist
independence" (IKS) - rightly renaming New Caledonia "Kanaky", in other
words the country of the indigenous Kanak people. It was with this in
mind that FLNKS President Jean-Marie Tjibaou signed the Matignon-Oudinot
Accords in 1988: they committed the archipelago to a process of
self-determination. But the name "Kanaky/New Caledonia" was soon used by
pro-independence leaders, while the reference to "socialism" was buried
with the disappearance of the Eastern bloc. However, attaching "New
Caledonia" to "Kanaky" already signalled a desire to maintain "special"
relations between the territory and France.
The Matignon-Oudinot Accords and then the Noumea Accords (concluded in
1998) were the work of "socialist" governments (Rocard then Jospin), but
by promoting them the PS actually aimed to keep the archipelago within
the bosom of the French state. Of course, these agreements made it
possible to delay a vote on independence that the Kanaks would have lost
because the French state had made them a minority on their land. The
idea put forward at the time was that time had to be allowed to reverse
the balance of power, counting in particular on the weight of the birth
rate among the Kanaks and on the "freezing" of the electorate reserved
for referendums on the self-determination of the territory, as well as
on the practice of a "living together" likely to convert the less
virulent anti-independence activists to the virtues of independence.
Above all, by creating new local institutions, the agreements have
helped to develop a small Kanak middle class which often belongs to the
civil service and is quite favourable to the status quo.
Within the FLNKS, the UC and its ally the RDO (Oceanian Democratic
Rally) have positioned themselves in favour of
"association-independence"; the Palika and its ally the UPM (Progressive
Union in Melanesia) have been defending "partnership-independence" since
2013. In the opposing camp, anti-independence supporters (from the
centre or the moderate right) have become "non-independence supporters",
or even in favour of "independence" in connection with France.
Over the past two decades, the gap between the rank and file of the
independence movement has widened. The emergence of the CCAT reflected a
desire to relaunch the struggle for independence when the "thaw" of the
electorate threatened to bury it. It was the choice of activists
belonging to various independence groups that were or were not part of
the FLNKS. However, the determining factor in the riots was undoubtedly
the large migration of Kanaks, during these same decades, from their
reserves to the agglomeration of "Nouméa le Blanche". 55% of Kanaks
lived in this agglomeration when the riots broke out, precisely there;
and the destruction committed was mainly by Kanak youth confronted with
both extreme precariousness and unbridled racist behavior.
Controversies and restructuring in the independence camp
The FLNKS has always experienced internal quarrels - to the point of
having, from 2001 until last November, only a rotating leadership
ensured by its four historical components. But the riots led the
independence camp to make political clarifications, during the last
congresses of the FLNKS, the UC and the Palika.
At its 43rd congress on 27-29 August, the FLNKS chose Christian Tein as
its president, a member of the CCAT who is also the general commissioner
of the UC and who is currently imprisoned in Mulhouse on various
charges; and the FLNKS integrated pro-independence groups such as the
Labour Party, the Union of Kanak Workers and Exploited People (USTKE),
the Movement of Oceanian Independence... and the CCAT. These two
decisions could have been interpreted as a "radicalisation" of the
Front, but its congress had been boycotted by the UPM and the Palika;
and, after holding their own congresses, these two groups declared, on
14 and 15 November respectively, that they were "withdrawing" from the
FLNKS. Decryption: they will no longer have representatives in the
political bureau of the Front without leaving it, and it is under the
banner of their group in the Congress (UNI, National Union for
Independence) that they will participate in discussions concerning the
future of the archipelago. On November 17, the spokesperson for Palika
criticized the FLNKS for "a growing populism that
taints[its]credibility." Atmosphere.
For its part, the UC reorganized itself at its 55th congress (November
23-25) in order to satisfy moderates and radicals. Emmanuel Tjibaou, son
of Jean-Marie and a New Caledonian MP since July, was elected party
president by obtaining ("apparently", said the press, which was not
invited) 144 votes out of 198. His nomination was hailed as a desired
"renewal of the political class". E. Tjibaou replaces Daniel Goa, who
had led the UC for twelve years and who, on June 8, had promised a
"unilateral proclamation of independence" for September 24 - the 171st
anniversary of colonization and the 40th anniversary of the FLNKS.
Demonstration against the "thaw" of the electoral body in Noumea, March
28, 2024.
E. Tjibaou's mission is to "remobilize the youth" while embodying "a
breath of fresh air" and "dialogue". His personality reassures both the
non-independence supporters and the Palika or the UPM. Will he, however,
restore unity in the independence camp? He immediately declared that the
UC was maintaining its objective of "access to full sovereignty for
Kanaky", then spoke of a "shared sovereignty".
The UC clarified its approach in a motion: the negotiations will be led
by the FLNKS (the UC will therefore be there), concerning not only the
future of the territory but also the "release of our political
prisoners" - namely the incarcerated members of the CCAT (the UC has
kept Christian Tein as the party's general commissioner). A "Kanaky
agreement" must be signed no later than September 24, 2025 (provincial
elections are scheduled for the following day). For five years,
sovereign powers (7) and those currently shared with the State will be
transferred to the "country". But when full sovereignty is achieved, a
new phase of negotiations will open in order to establish
"interdependence agreements on part of the sovereign powers". We are
therefore, it seems, more or less on the register of "independence with
partnership" defended by the Palika and the UPM; Furthermore, the
"shared sovereignty" mentioned by E. Tjibaou was also mentioned by
Gérard Larcher when he visited the archipelago, and can be found in the
preamble to the Noumea Accord. However, E. Tjibaou specified, the UC
will only agree to discuss it when the archipelago is definitively
independent, because "we can only share sovereignty if we have first
accessed it" (see the box "For Kanaky to be a reality").
Regarding the CCAT, E. Tjibaou insisted on the presumption of innocence
that his activists should benefit from ("we must wait until the matter
is judged") and on the fact that the UC "has never called for the
destruction or violence that we condemn". He indicated that Senator
Robert Xowie (a member of the UC and sitting in the Senate with the
communists) would propose a parliamentary commission of inquiry in order
to "shed full light" on the riots. Hiding behind the impartiality of the
courts or the neutrality of a parliamentary commission nevertheless
constitutes a rather weak mark of support for the CCAT. Especially since
E. Tjibaou declared on Franceinfo 1re, on November 25, that it remained
an "important tool, in particular to mobilize our activists on the
ground", but that it had to "be supervised and its objectives clarified".
SOME PERCENTAGES ANNOUNCING OTHER "CRISES"
On September 29, 2023, the Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
(ISEE) estimated the general level of consumer prices in the archipelago
in 2022 to be 31% higher than in mainland France (78% for food
products). Since then, food prices have increased by another 20%, while
the few measures set up in the overseas territories and most social
assistance disappeared with the riots.
On October 1, 2024, bus fares increased by almost 70% - and ridership on
what is the only public transport network (used almost exclusively by
people on the lowest incomes) immediately fell by 80%.
Positions among anti- and non-independence supporters
The moderate non-independence parties describe as a real "disaster" or
"complete cataclysm" the choices made by Macron to maintain the 3rd
referendum on self-determination in the midst of Covid (December 12,
2021), or to "thaw" the Caledonian electorate. Veylma Falaeo, from Eveil
océanien, thinks that they have allowed the "extremes" to reinvest the
political field.
Philippe Gomès, from Calédonie ensemble, declared (8) that he had
adopted the concept of "shared sovereignty" because it "is the key, the
balance to be found between those who aspire to a more accomplished
emancipation integrating elements of external sovereignty and those who
aspire to remain protected by France with a reinforced internal
provincial sovereignty". Then he criticized the CCAT for having
"capitalized" on the "serious existential crisis" of a Kanak youth
"partly acculturated, partly excluded", because "both marginalized in
the city in which they were born (...) and excluded from tribal life, in
which they participate only occasionally". According to him, "May 13[the
start of the riots]allowed these young people to assert their identity
in a legitimate way against the thaw of the electorate, since the
political watchword was given".
The "hard right" is also preparing for negotiations. In a press
conference held on November 20 in Noumea, the Loyalists appeared united
and advocated a "territorial federation". For Sonia Backès, president of
the Southern Province, this formula encompasses "belonging to the
Republic, the unity of the territory, respect for our diversity and our
differences". Laughter.
Demonstration against the "thaw" of the electoral body in Noumea, April 13.
Exit Barnier, make way for Bayrou
After the National Assembly censored the 2025 budget for France on
December 5, Macron promised a special law within ten days to "ensure the
continuity of the State." Nevertheless, the Caledonian political class,
all tendencies combined, has since been proclaiming its concern
regarding the billion euros promised by Barnier for the "reconstruction"
of the archipelago and currently in the drawers of Parliament.
Loyalist MP Nicolas Metzdorf did not vote for the motion of censure any
more than Emmanuel Tjibaou; and, with the two Caledonian senators Robert
Xowie and Georges Naturel (LR), they sent a "transpartisan" request to
Macron to support the "urgent needs" of New Caledonia, "seriously
weakened by an unprecedented economic, social and political crisis".
Then, as soon as François Bayrou became Prime Minister, Metzdorf and
Naturel published a column entitled "Let's save the Caledonians from the
humanitarian and economic crisis" because "the survival of a French
territory depends on it"; published in L'Opinion on December 13, it was
signed by 70 other political figures, including a certain Darmanin...
A few hours before the vote against the motion of censure, however, the
"end of management" budget for 2024 was adopted by Parliament, which
notably made it possible to release 223 million euros for New Caledonia
before 2025. This sum guaranteed the financing of the provinces and
municipalities, thus ensuring the payment of civil servants' salaries;
the operation of Ruamm (Caledonian health and maternity insurance
scheme), essential for hospitals and the payment of doctors; the
sustainability of the unemployment insurance scheme; the stability of
the Enercal electricity system. But this financial aid provoked
indignant reactions in the Caledonian Congress when it examined it to
validate it and integrate it into the archipelago's budget on December
11. On the one hand, its unchangeable text was negotiated by the local
government without the authorization of the Congress (9). On the other
hand, this aid has increased the territory's debt since it involves
repayable loans and advances, and by accepting it the Caledonian
government has committed to modifying taxes (on consumption and on the
Caledonian solidarity contribution) which will penalize the least
fortunate households. A legitimate concern (see the box "A few
percentages heralding other "crises""), but the Congress nevertheless
ended up adopting the text unanimously.
The French state is playing its part by relying on the Mapou government;
it is also doing so by inviting the political groups of the Congress and
the provinces to dialogue - and not the FLNKS, while the negotiations on
the Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa agreements were conducted by
representatives of its components. During a press conference organized
on November 15, the FLNKS considered that the state was thereby trying
to reach an agreement with the independence activists present within the
institutions, considered more moderate. It hammered home that it "has
been, is and will remain the only liberation movement of the Kanak
people" and that no political agreement will be legitimate without it
being a stakeholder.
On December 10, the UC hammered the point home by announcing that it
would not return to the negotiating table on the institutional future
before the new FLNKS congress, scheduled for the end of January 2025 and
which should allow "confirming the unitary strategy of the
independentists". Four days earlier, a "transpartisan" delegation
(including a member of the UC, Pierre-Chanel Tutugoro) had proposed to
Parliament that these negotiations begin on December 15, 2024.
We will see how Bayrou handles the "Caledonian issue". In 1989, he said,
he voted yes in the referendum ratifying the Matignon agreements. In
2017, he expressed his "incomprehension" in the face of Macron's remarks
describing French colonization as a "crime against humanity" ("a hurtful
phrase for many French people, and which does not correspond to the
historical truth")... but, at the same time, he made public his
alliance-rally to this same Macron for the presidential election. And now?
Vanina, December 18, 2024
Notes
1. Read in particular the articles published in Courant Alternatif since
last summer.
2. This government comprises 11 members (including two women since
September): 3 UC and 3 Palika; 4 Rally-Les Républicains and 1 Calédonie
ensemble.
3. Only the group led by Palika abstained.
4. The New Caledonian debt rate is, according to a press release from
Eveil océanien on November 22, 337%, mainly due to Covid and "the crisis
linked to exactions".
5. The AFM-NC (non-independence) estimates the cost of the riots for the
archipelago's municipalities at 180 million euros.
6. These elections were, in the Matignon agreements, reserved for people
established in the territory for at least ten years.
7. Ensure external security through diplomacy and territorial defense,
internal security and public order through police forces; define the law
and deliver justice; mint money through a central bank; vote its own
budget by levying taxes and managing public finances.
8. Interview from November 22 in Tomorrow in New Caledonia.
9. The local government used the same procedure in September for the
large state loan included in the 2025 finance bill.
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4349
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