In the general election, 80% of Hungarian voters chose to replace the right-wing sovereignist government led by Victor Orban, a white supremacist, a staunch Zionist, and a close associate of Netanyahu, whom he praises, with a right-wing government led by Peter Magyar, his former associate. ---- Brussels, a major electoral sponsor of the right-wing Tisza party, an electoral coalition formed in 2020, born out of a controversial "family split" initiated by the husband of Justice Minister Judit Varga, from whom she later divorced, is rejoicing, believing it has gained a head of government who will be a major force in its foreign policy. However, it claims its satisfaction stems from the new prime minister's intentions to restore the rule of law that Orban had dismantled, using his ex-wife as Justice Minister for two terms, establishing what Orban himself proudly called a democratura, or illiberal democracy.
In truth, Magyar has carefully avoided making such a commitment, even though the electorate has given his party 138 seats, which the new government could use to radically revise the Constitution and repeal all the changes that have transformed the country, eliminating social and political rights, workers' rights, the freedom and autonomy of social groups, religious freedom, the independence of the judiciary, and freedom of education. On a social level, these changes have targeted and repressed minorities such as the LGBTQ+ community. Taking Tisza's program as a point of reference, it seems clear instead that the new government's primary and priority objective will be to restructure the power centers distributing European Union funding for economic development, dismantling the network of Orban cronies who monopolized these funds and enriched themselves by distributing them to friends, cronies, and clients. The intent appears to be to leverage the fight against corruption, that is, the crony-family system that imprisoned the country's productive forces and prevented the Hungarian oligarchy from dividing up the spoils of the nation.In fact, Orban lost the election due to the country's severe economic crisis, which pushed inflation to 25% and significantly reduced the well-being of Hungarian citizens, deprived of any prospects. This was also due to the fact that Orban's repeated vetoes in international politics, especially regarding the financing of the war in Ukraine, had led the European Union to freeze as much as 17 billion euros. At that point, it was Prime Minister Orban's entourage that no longer enjoyed the profits to which they were accustomed and on which they had built their fortune. The corruption system entered into crisis because there was no longer any room for corruption. Hence the rebellion of Mayar, one of his own.
It was therefore necessary to reshape the governing political class, so that funding could start flowing again, managed by a new coterie of more or less recycled power supporters. In other words, everything had to change so that nothing would change. Moreover, after 16 years of uninterrupted Fidesz rule, the state bureaucratic apparatus what would be called the deep state is so accustomed to the practical division and appropriation of public funds and procurement that it is difficult to imagine the effectiveness of an effective fight against corruption.
It must also be said that Orban did his part to lose the election, so much so that immediately before the elections, he amended the electoral law, thus affecting the assignment of majorities in the constituencies, unaware that this could backfire, and conducted a dull and tired election campaign, proving that it is not always true that power corrupts those who don't have it. Choosing Russia as a potential partner, if it was wise within the international political framework, with the goal of achieving energy autonomy, did not take into account the Ukrainians' power to block, as happened with the Druzhva gas and oil pipelines, thus jeopardizing the country's supplies. To be fair, Orban did everything he could to make this issue the centerpiece of his policy, but it wasn't enough, nor did Trump (Orban's so-called friend) help him in any way. When Zelensky began blocking the Druzhva oil pipeline, he could have made a phone call to the Ukrainian despot and ordered him to reopen it. This would have been a gesture that would have helped Orban in the elections, a practical aid that would have suggested to voters that Orban's policies were somehow paying off. But nothing came of it, because in the end, Trump is so self-centered that he only helps himself (if he ever manages to).
On the other hand, Orban's blatantly pro-Israel stance, underscored by his speech in support of Netanyahu, had no bearing, much less his support for the aggression against Iran in a country with controlled information and completely focused on domestic problems. Proof of this is the complete failure of the left-wing parties, which barely reached 2% of the vote and whose election campaigns also heavily emphasized criticism of the government's international stance.
The new government and the unresolved issues
It will take about a month for the new parliament to be installed and the new government to be formed, but the problems that remain for Hungary are many and all well-known, and they will inevitably influence the political choices the new government will be called upon to make.
Even if the country is forced to repay the debt owed to Brussels by changing its position on the war in Ukraine and removing the vetoes it has raised so far (which, after all, Orban was always ready to drop in exchange for concessions), the release of the frozen EUR17 billion could provide some relief to the country's asphyxiated economy and will help repay the new, hungry cliques that will share power. However, it will not resolve the country's structural economic problems, which have their roots in the general structure of the European Union's economic and social policy. It will not resolve the energy crisis, whose necessary reference point is always Russian supplies. It will not resolve the problems related to the Hungarian diaspora. It will create a major international uncertainty regarding the country's place within the Union, with the definitive crisis of the Visagrad group. It will not resolve the problem of restoring violated civil liberties, which is the last, but truly the last, concern of the new government.
It will then have to address the issue of how to proceed or terminate established relations with China, which primarily concern strategic infrastructure and the electric vehicle (EV) industry, including battery factories (Eve Energy, BYD). These already-established relations have positioned the country as a key logistics and production hub for Beijing in Europe, also thanks to the ongoing construction of the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway, built by Chinese workers and with Chinese capital, which should connect the two countries to the Beijing-controlled ports of Piraeus. To understand the importance of the issue, it is enough to remember that this was one of the causes of the Serbian crisis, which led the United States and Europe to undertake joint destabilization actions against the Serbian government in order to prevent the project's completion.
The only result of what happened will be the speeding up of decision-making processes in Brussels, which will inevitably be pushed towards the abyss due to support for the war in Ukraine, which will increasingly erode the levels of welfare that European Union countries are able to provide to their citizens and lead to the impoverishment of the weakest classes and social classes. It is the awareness of this mechanism that has led Russian politicians to rejoice at what has happened, arguing that the effects of the change of power are accelerating the crisis of the European Union, which they, like the United States, detest. A side effect of the Hungarian elections is the failure of Vance, a propagandist for Orban, in which he implicated Trump with a live phone call. The failure and the damage to Orban's image demonstrate that Trump and his vice president have now become an effective weapon in the hands of their adversaries.
A Sovereignist-Opportunist Program
Seeking to underscore the difference from Orban's previous tenure, which restricted journalists to a select group, Mayar, on Monday, April 13, held a three-hour conference on his government's political program. He declared that he would oppose any fast-track approach to Ukraine's accession to the European Union, arguing that accession "would be impossible for a country at war. All candidate states must follow the same process." Moreover, during a public consultation organized to gauge the mood of his voters (April 13, 2025, a year ago), over 90% of Tisza's supporters supported Magyar's proposals on the fight against corruption and a more European and Western position for Hungary, but only 58.2% said they favored Ukraine's accession to the EU. In response, Magyar promised that once in government it would hold a referendum on the issue, but only when and if accession is concretely on the table and the conditions are defined in detail. This is because Magyar knows well, like all Hungarians, that as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, which in 1920 redrew Hungary's borders after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, depriving the country of approximately two-thirds of its territory and leaving millions of Hungarians outside the country, a significant portion of the population remained beyond the border, including the Transcarpathian community, now in Ukraine, which is persecuted by the Kiev government, which forcibly recruits men to fight, bans the teaching of Hungarian in schools, and does everything to assimilate the population, arresting anyone caught speaking Hungarian in public. In recent years, Orbán has done everything to support the Magyar minorities abroad, and Magyar wants to follow suit. However, in a spirit of compromise with Brussels, the new government will not oppose the EUR90 billion loan to Kiev that Orbán was blocking, but will maintain its decision not to participate financially in the loan, as well as opposing Ukraine's rapid accession to the Union.
Regarding Russia, however, he said he wants to maintain "pragmatic" relations with Moscow, especially regarding gas imports, noting that Budapest cannot "change the geography. Russia will be there and Hungary will be here," so his country will not be able to easily cut itself off from Russian supplies, as it wants to continue "buying cheap oil safely," even as it will work to diversify its sources, whatever that means in a country that, as is well known, is landlocked. For the same reason, sanctions should be lifted because "it is not in Europe's interest to buy raw materials at higher prices because this destroys our competitiveness.
I understand the moral issues, but we must not shoot ourselves in the foot." Not an alliance, then, but not a split either.
On immigration, Magyar, in line with Orbán, supports the country's total closure. In other words, a right-wing government, but not too right-wing, pragmatic and opportunistic. The European left has nothing to celebrate!
G. C.
https://www.ucadi.org/2026/04/19/ungheria-la-destra-sconfigge-la-destra/
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Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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