Four years of war in Ukraine have cost the lives of 300,000 soldiers on both sides of the front, if only those known by name are counted. However, the losses are greater. The identities of those killed are not always established. Additionally, up to 200,000 people have disappeared without a trace. The vast majority of them are likely dead. This means that well over half a million soldiers have already lost their lives in Ukraine[1]. To this number should be added several thousand civilians killed by bombing, primarily on the Ukrainian side.
Why do wars break out?
The longer this conflict drags on, the more we ask ourselves: why are so many casualties being incurred? What, objectively speaking, is the war in Ukraine about? The governments of both sides offer at least a few reasons to justify continuing the fight. However, I would venture to agree that modern wars are primarily fought over economic spheres of influence. The situation in Ukraine is similar.
In other words, while there are non-economic explanations for the outbreak of wars, such as that their causes lie in ancient human nature, the warlike legacy of the past, the clash of aggressive cultures or civilizations, the ambitions of leaders and their personal predispositions or prejudices, and so on, economic issues at least in the case of contemporary armed conflicts have come to the fore. On the left (not necessarily strictly Marxist) since the late nineteenth century, several approaches to this issue have been distinguished. Some argued that it was related to the struggle for new markets (e.g., the theory of underconsumption); others argued that it was about achieving higher profits where labor costs were lower; subsequent researchers wrote about excess capital "seeking" investment opportunities, and so on. Proponents of particular concepts often engaged in heated debate, but sometimes attempts were also made to synthesize these positions.
In the second half of the twentieth century, amidst the growing globalization of the economy and the perceived negative effects of pressure on the natural environment, particular emphasis was placed on the importance of commodity flows and all strategic raw materials, on the one hand, and on the other, on ecological problems (depletion of natural resources, irreversible environmental degradation and pollution, climate change, etc.). Finally, the growing, and not, as some might have thought, diminishing, relationship between capital and the state was recognized. According to Noam Chomsky, for example, the most powerful states always strive for global domination, control over resources and markets, and keep weaker countries subservient. Chomsky, therefore, assigns considerable importance to the state, but it is obvious to him that the interests of specific capital groups lurk behind its back.
The fight for spheres of influence
Let's therefore attempt to reconstruct the argument regarding the economic causes of war. In short, today's economy is dominated by large capital, which seeks to dominate vast markets. Capitalist competition, therefore, extends from the national to the international, global level. To succeed, business forms an alliance with the state, and the boundaries between politics and economics are blurring.
Where large amounts of capital have accumulated, exporting them becomes important, contributing to external expansion. Establishing a business abroad allows for the exploitation and profiting from natural resources and labor in other countries. Each major economy, therefore, strives to establish its own sphere of economic influence. The amount of external investment it can make demonstrates the expansionist nature of a given country and its capital. External expansion allows capital to maintain a sufficiently high rate of profit and accumulation, while the state facilitates both the establishment of new paths and the maintenance of acquired influence.
As Russian economist Oleg Komolov[2]argues, one measure of these expansionist aspirations can be the value of direct investment, primarily through transnational corporations. Although they appear cosmopolitan, corporations are most often tied to specific centers of power. The state supports them with its own, i.e., public, funds, loans and loan guarantees, procurement contracts, or protection, and, if necessary, does not hesitate to use military force.
North American and Western European capital plays a key role in this expansion. Today, the United States, in particular, is perceived as an "imperialist" state, exploiting and imposing its will on others, a phenomenon we see almost daily. To this end, it utilizes economic policy (sanctions, tariffs, subsidies), diplomacy, and, of course, armed forces.
There are countries that are inferior to Western countries (the "core") in terms of capital size, and therefore power, yet they claim the right to subordinate countries not within the entire world, but within a specific region. Russia is certainly one such example. Russia has accumulated significant capital primarily through hydrocarbon exports. This money, circulating within the local economy, sometimes passes through various offshore financial institutions (e.g., Cyprus) to avoid paying taxes, but ultimately largely ends up in the form of direct investments in former Soviet republics. The Kremlin makes no secret of the fact that it treats this area as its own sphere of influence, both economically and geopolitically. Countries like Russia can be called "semi-peripheral," or, following the South African sociologist Patrick Bond, "sub-imperialist."
Completely "peripheral" countries, such as Ukraine, have no opportunity to establish their own economic sphere of influence, and lack developed transnational corporations through which they could explore other countries. In reality, they are merely recipients of incoming capital, "selling" their cheap labor and natural resources. Moreover, they become a venue for competition between various capitals and states.
Not just the export of capital
Some researchers argue that the value of accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to a country's gross domestic product (GDP) indicates the aggressiveness of its external economic policy. Of course, the "core," meaning Western countries, including the United States, spend the most on foreign investment relative to GDP; medium-range expenditures are typical of Russia, China, but also countries such as Brazil and South Africa, and very little in countries such as Ukraine and Bangladesh.
Direct investment is not the only measure of economic expansion policy. In the case of international trade, we speak of non-equivalent trade. This means that countries in the "core" of capitalism gain more than "semi-peripheral" and "peripheral" countries, which as Italian researcher Andrea Ricci[3]demonstrated in his 2019 calculations may even lose from such trade. Another tool can be lending "peripheral" countries are dependent on the "core" through loans. The US benefits further from the fact that the US dollar is the world's reserve currency, which also facilitates a significant portion of trade transactions on the global market (the euro is in second place).
States are not, therefore, equal, but constitute a strictly hierarchical structure. However, the relationships between them are from a historical perspective changeable and dynamic. We are dealing with a constant struggle, sometimes escalating into direct, military confrontation. Today, "semi-peripheral" states challenge the "core" of capitalism, claiming that each has the right to its own sphere of influence (this is the thesis of so-called multipolarity). "Peripheral" states, in turn, seek to advance higher in the structure, vying for conditions that allow their capital and ruling class to achieve a higher rate of profit. Countries in the "core" of capitalism fight, at the very least, to maintain the status quo, and some argue that they strive to gain the greatest possible relative advantage over others.
Internal struggle
But how does this issue look from the perspective of societies within competing states? Individual governments argue that the pursuit of expanding influence, the fight for markets, growing exports, and so on, contribute to economic modernization and the material advancement of the entire country. Citizens are promised that they will share in the growing wealth pie, which is supposed to translate into an improvement in overall living standards. This is not just about economics, but also about more leisure time, a more pleasant environment, better public services, and a higher level of culture and education. Indeed, thanks to expansion (e.g., colonial expansion), some societies (or certain social classes) have been able and still are able to live disproportionately better than others. However, in the long term, prosperity gained at the expense of other groups is not a given. In other countries, where exploitation and abuse are more severe, subordinate classes demand better living conditions. In this sense, social unrest destabilizes interstate relations. Capital flowing from outside into a given "peripheral" country cannot feel safe. Society demands that profits not flow abroad, but that more of them remain for distribution among residents, for example, to improve education and services, create new jobs, finance environmental protection, etc. Therefore, not only in the "external" system, but also in the "internal" system, is the system unstable.
More than 50 years ago, the Greek economist Arghiri Emmanuel[4]expressed his belief that it is not the inflow of capital that ruins "peripheral" countries. "Developed" countries (with higher wages) always benefit from trade with "underdeveloped" countries (with lower wages), and the working class inhabiting them also benefits. "The population," he wrote, "of wealthy countries can consume more because the population of the rest of the world consumes less." At the same time, in the broader West, xenophobia is growing, fearing the preservation of one's own way of life, which is supposedly under threat. Arghiri Emmanuel uses a historical metaphor here, writing: "Rome will fall not under the influence of the Romans, but under the influence of the 'barbarians.'"
Let's examine how the mechanisms described above operate in specific historical realities. The economic and political collapse of the USSR created conditions in which competition for new markets and resources became particularly important for Western capital. Those who failed to take advantage of this opportunity squandered opportunities for development and greater profits. The countries of the so-called Eastern Bloc, including Poland, became targets not only for incoming direct investment from the West; a political transformation also took place. The state began to protect the interests of Western capital holders, and its spearhead was directed against its former ally, the Kremlin. NATO enlargement was therefore not only a geopolitical problem for Moscow but also a sign of a loss of economic influence. Private Russian capital, which emerged from the turmoil of the early 1990s, was treated not as a business partner (as expected), but as a competitor, and ultimately an enemy. This was, moreover, entirely consistent with the logic that capitalism is, above all, a hierarchical system that enforces subordination. The once-vaunted capitalist "free competition" is not only about who operates more efficiently in the market, but also about who occupies what place in the hierarchical power structure. Moreover, in the international arena, the game is usually not played according to fair rules. These are promoted only as long as they serve to maintain the global status quo in reality, in the end, the stronger simply wins.
Incidentally, the rivalry between the economic interests of the East and the West did not begin in Poland after 1989. It had existed from the very beginning of the communist system, and took on a particularly acute dimension as a result of Gierek's economic policies and the foreign debt of that period. In her work "Ontology of Socialism" (published 1989), Jadwiga Staniszkis pointed out that Poland found itself in a dual dependence and was exploited by both sides. In the 1980s, our country was openly perceived at least by some researchers as an arena of clash between opposing geoeconomic and geopolitical interests. The problem, therefore, was not only dependence on the Kremlin (with which economic ties were ultimately extremely limited), but also what some called "duality on the Elbe." The point was, no less, no more, that Poland remained, and still remains, a "peripheral" country relative to the Western, capitalist "core."
Ukraine under pressure from capital
In the case of Ukraine, economic ties with the Kremlin proved much more enduring, and the rivalry ultimately more ruthless. It's worth noting that in the early 1990s, Ukraine's economic potential was greater than Poland's. Not only was its GDP per capita greater, but so was its industrial, scientific, demographic, natural resources, and so on. Eastern Ukraine, even during tsarist times, was a site of significant foreign investment Western capital flowed in, building Donbas's industrial power. Grain grown on chernozem soil was exported to the West through Black Sea ports. Intensive industrialization also occurred during the Soviet era. In short, wealthy Ukraine had something to fight for, even more so than Poland.
Russian capital was heavily involved in Ukraine. Its direct investments totaled approximately USD 33 billion by 2014[2], including the money that arrived via Cyprus. Furthermore, Ukraine was an important transit country for Russian gas exports, and in this sense its economic importance for Russia was even greater.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine formally regained its sovereignty, it sent a signal to Western capital, which also poured billions into investments. Because the state plays a crucial role in the fight for profits in modern capitalism, the rivalry took on a political dimension. The key question was: who would the Ukrainian government favor? Russian or Western companies? What legal norms would be adopted? And so on. The rivalry between Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs also played a significant role.
The turning point came with the public protests and the so-called Euromaidan at the turn of 2013 and 2014, the main axis of which was supposed to be Ukraine's accession to the European Union, which, of course, meant adopting Western-style political and legal solutions. Viktor Yanukovych, the incumbent president of Ukraine, refused to sign an association agreement with the EU. As a result of the protests, he lost power, and Russia annexed Crimea. The struggle for economic influence intensified. Russian capital was formally banned from participating in the privatization of state assets. Companies with Russian capital were threatened with nationalization. Various pressures were applied to force them to sell their assets at very low prices and withdraw from Ukraine. For example, Lukoil was forced to divest 240 gas stations and six fuel depots. The company also lost its oil refinery in Odessa, which was nationalized. Rostek lost its ore processing plants. Lukor, Karpatneftekhim[2]and dozens of other Russian companies investing not only in the fuel sector or industrial processing, but also in mass media, banking and logistics had to withdraw.
Having lost its Ukrainian assets, Russian capital resorted to a last resort. The Kremlin's special military operation, launched on February 24, 2022, was intended to overthrow the pro-Western authorities in Kyiv and replace them with pro-Russian ones, but something clearly went wrong. What was supposed to be a quick change of government turned into a prolonged and bloody conflict. If Russia wanted to maintain its claim to regional dominance, it now had to prove its strength vis-à-vis not only Ukraine but the entire West, which supported it.
At the same time, Western companies, reportedly numbering several thousand, are investing in Ukraine despite the war. For example, NJJ Holding, a French telecommunications investor, acquired Lifecell, Ukraine's third-largest mobile operator, and TV Datagroup-Volia, a fixed-line internet provider. This is the largest foreign direct investment in Ukraine in nearly two decades, valued at $1.5 billion. Luxembourg-based ArcelorMittal, a global metallurgical giant, has invested a total of $1.2 billion in maintaining and modernizing its plants in Kryvyi Rih since 2022. Meanwhile, Rheinmetall, a German arms company, has announced investment plans totaling approximately EUR300 million[5]. Arms companies, not only German but especially American, are clearly beneficiaries of the current war in Ukraine.
Regarding the United States, we must first and foremost mention the infamous agreement negotiated by Donald Trump with Vladimir Zelensky, in which the US president demanded privileges and concessions from the authorities in Kyiv for the extraction of Ukrainian natural resources, including so-called rare metals. Incidentally, the Trump family is not waiting for the end of the war but is already participating in the competition for the country's resources. Jared Kushner, the US president's son-in-law, while conducting "peace" negotiations with Moscow and Kyiv on behalf of the White House, simultaneously promoted the interests of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, which finance the assets of his company Affinity Partners worth $4.8 billion[6]. This is, among other things, to prevent Russia from blocking the export of agricultural products via the Dnieper River and then through the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf, produced by agricultural holdings with Arab capital.
On the other side of the front, in territories captured by the Kremlin, we are seeing an influx of Russian capital. According to some estimates, several billion dollars have been allocated for this purpose.
Summary
While people are constantly dying on the frontlines and as a result of bombing, Ukraine is simultaneously being "parcelled," and its division seems inevitable. Incidentally, this is not the first time in history. Despite the alliance between Petliura and Pilsudski after World War I, the geopolitical struggle for influence ended with the division of Ukraine between Poland and Soviet Russia, a decision sealed by both sides with the Treaty of Riga in 1921. Most Ukrainian historians believe that their country was betrayed at that time, both by Poland and the Entente powers, which further paved the way for the subsequent incorporation of all of Ukraine into the USSR ultimately, it fell within the Russian sphere of influence. Will history repeat itself this time? Washington's stance seems to suggest that such a scenario is not out of the question.
And what about the aspirations of Ukrainian society? It turns out that today it must resist not only Russian but also American imperialism. This was evident from the very beginning of the conflict. Moreover, at the stake of victory is not, as some anarchists hoped, a new quality of "future social system across the region, with the possibility of realizing direct democracy and social justice"[7]. From the chaos of almost every war, ruthless dictatorships and exploitation emerge faster than democracy and justice. From the barrels of guns to paraphrase Mao springs not freedom, but power.
Jaroslaw Urbanski
www.rozbrat.org
Footnotes:
[1]The number of Ukrainian losses is provided by the following websites: https://lostarmour.info/ukr200 and https://ualosses.org/en/soldiers/ (their credibility was confirmed by Western media); the number of Russian losses is provided by Mediazona: https://zona.media/casualties
[2]???? ???????, "??????? ?????": "????????????? ????? ???", May 9, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6d0wcyXpNyQ ; "? ???????? ??? ??? ??????", March 10, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgpQ0LWxO10
[3]Andrea Ricci, "Value and Unequal Exchange in International Trade. The Geography of Global Capitalist Exploitation", London New York 2021, p. 217.
[4]Filip Ilkowski, "Capitalist imperialism in contemporary theoretical approaches", Torun 2015, pp. 141-152.
[5]"Ukraine Investment Framework", European Commission, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/ukraine/ukraine-investment-framework_en; "ArcelorMittal has invested $1.2 billion since 2022 to ensure the survival of its Ukrainian division", https://gmk.center/en/news/arcelormittal-has-invested-1-2-billion-since-2022-to-ensure-the-survival-of-its-ukrainian-division/; "Rheinmetall enters the attack drone market. Germany signs a major contract", April 16, 2026, https://radar.rp.pl/przemysl-zbrojeniowy/art44170451-rheinmetall-wchodzi-w-drony-szturmowe-niemcy-podpisuja-wielki-kontrakt
[6]See, among others: Jon Queally, "Congressional Dems probe envoy Jared Kushner's Arab money ties," asiatimes.com, April 17, 2026, https://asiatimes.com/2026/04/congressional-dems-probe-envoy-jared-kushners-arab-money-ties/
[7]Aleksander Laniewski, "Anarchists and the Wars of Empires. The History of a Certain Dilemma (1914/2023)", in: "Methods and Means of Influence of Empires. Ideology and Practice of the Russian/Soviet/Russian State in the Years 1689 2022", ed. Andrzej Nowak, Warsaw 2024, p. 372.
https://federacja-anarchistyczna.pl/2026/04/22/o-co-trwa-wojna-w-ukrainie/
_________________________________________
Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten