The interim agreement signed in June 2026 between the United States and Iran does not represent a structural solution to the Middle East crisis, but rather the entry into a different phase of the conflict, marked by greater political and security complexity. The bilateral memorandum of understanding, based on a sixty-day interim truce, the easing of some economic sanctions, and the partial reopening of trade routes in the Persian Gulf, was born as a tactical solution to an escalation that threatened to overwhelm global markets and international energy security. However, its architecture presents a fundamental contradiction: while the agreement calls for a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, the militarily active actor against the Shiite militias is not Washington but Israel, whose security doctrine is unlikely to be reconciled with the constraints of a bilateral agreement perceived as favorable to Tehran.
To understand the reopening of the conflict between Iran and the Western bloc, it is necessary to trace the historical trajectory of the Israeli-Iranian conflict after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Since then, Tel Aviv's constant goal has been to keep Iran in a state of internal weakness and geopolitical isolation, deemed more compatible with Israeli national security. At the same time, the Israeli right's management of the Palestinian front, particularly under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud, has responded to a logic of political fragmentation: for years, Israeli governments tolerated Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip, thus weakening the Palestinian National Authority in Ramallah and hindering any concrete prospect of a two-state solution. Keeping Hamas active in Gaza meant maintaining a permanent state of emergency, useful both internally and as a justification for Western partners.
The attack of October 7, 2023, however, marked the breaking point of this doctrine. Israel gradually abandoned simple containment and shifted to a strategy of dismantling Iran's proximity network, targeting Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and more generally Tehran's strategic depth. During this phase, the United States accompanied and supported this trajectory through years of sanctions, economic pressure, and aggressive campaigns under the pretext of nuclear containment, effectively providing constant geopolitical leverage to the Israeli stance. Direct war between Israel, the United States, and Iran then erupted in early 2026, with the elimination of key figures in the Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the frontline of national defense and security.
Khamenei's demise and the decapitation of the military leadership have profoundly altered the structure of Iranian governance, accelerating the shift from a hierarchical, pyramidal model to a more horizontal, security-focused configuration. Historically, the Supreme Leader represented the absolute balance of power within the system, arbitrating tensions between the clergy, political institutions, and the security apparatus. In the absence of such a central figure, power was distributed among a network of parallel commands, more autonomous and less subject to civilian control. The succession of Mujtaba Khamenei met with strong theological and political reservations, but this very weakness made the new leader increasingly dependent on the military apparatus of the Pasdaran, which assumed the role of custodian and direct control of the state's decision-making centers.
Meanwhile, the reformist presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian has remained effectively paralyzed. Elected on the promise of introducing economic reforms and limiting the repressive apparatus, Pezeshkian has been excluded from crucial decisions on national security and foreign policy, now monopolized by an informal military council linked to the IRGC. On the ground, this transition has translated into a decentralized confrontation doctrine, in which local commanders of naval and missile forces operate according to pre-established protocols and with considerable autonomy, responding to attacks and targeting maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, even in the absence of direct orders from the capital. This structure has rendered American diplomatic pressure ineffective, prompting Donald Trump to publicly declare that he does not know who really leads Iran, but it has also allowed the regime to better absorb the effects of targeted offensives.
The start of talks was hampered by a deep climate of mutual distrust. Tehran demanded immediate guarantees regarding the withdrawal of its naval forces from the Gulf, the unfreezing of financial assets abroad, and the inclusion of the truce on the Lebanese front. Mediation nevertheless led to the signing, on June 17, 2026, of a transitional memorandum that guaranteed Iran significant economic concessions in exchange for a temporary commitment not to exceed the military threshold in the development of its nuclear program. However, the text does not address the dismantling of Iran's missile arsenal or the reduction of conventional forces, drawing criticism from Israel and fueling the idea that the truce was effectively a financial lifeline for a regime otherwise on the verge of default. Domestically, however, the agreement had an even more significant effect: it strengthened the bond between the religious leadership, the military, and the economy controlled by the Pasdaran. The IRGC dominates much of Iran's productive and financial structure, controlling banks, shipping companies, port infrastructure, and gray market oil trafficking. In a system where foreign investment must be conducted through joint ventures with local partners, and where many strategic businesses are controlled by military foundations or holding companies, financial flows resulting from the easing of restrictions almost inevitably end up in the hands of the security apparatus. The truce has thus further strengthened the religious-military blockade around Mujtaba Khamenei, while the merchant bourgeoisie, affected by the partial reopening of trade and the thawing of some activities in the Gulf, has reduced its hostility toward the regime.
But tactical successes in negotiations have not translated into any relief for Iranian civil society. On the contrary, the shift in power towards ultra-security has coincided with a harsh intensification of internal repression. In 2025, Iran saw a dramatic surge in executions, with over 2,000 death sentences carried out, while in 2026, open war with Israel and the United States provided the regime with a pretext to justify preventive arrests, repression of dissent, and criminalization of suspected collaboration. The protests that erupted between late 2025 and early 2026 were brutally suppressed, amid a near-total information blackout and a widespread presence of foreign security forces and Shiite militias. Estimates of civilian casualties are extremely high, testifying to the severity of a repressive apparatus that has now become a standard instrument of government.
At the end of the day, the 2026 truce does not resolve the conflict but confirms the stalemate of all the main players in the Middle East crisis. The United States regains economic and maritime maneuvering margins, but without truly undermining Iran's strategic resolve. Israel, despite having dealt severe blows to Tehran's external structures, finds itself faced with a more rigid, more security-minded Iranian leadership, less susceptible to pressure. The entire game thus continues to be played out at the expense of civilian populations: in Iran, under the weight of state terror and political hangings; in Gaza and Lebanon, under the destructive effects of a war measured not only by the balance of power, but by the number of lives lost.
JR
https://umanitanova.org/cresce-loppressione-della-guerra-interna-iran-la-tregua-instabile-e-la-ristrutturazione-del-potere-regionale/
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Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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