After years of political stalemate, international sanctions, and a chronic crisis that seemed to have no end, the outcome was accelerated by a lethal combination of external pressure and the implosion of the Venezuelan government's internal control structures. The final months of 2025 were marked by an unprecedented naval and air siege organized by the United States and its regional partners: the massive deployment of US forces in the Caribbean Sea, the imposition of a de facto "no-fly zone," and the constant monitoring and disruption of all electronic movements not only limited the government's operational capacity but also unequivocally demonstrated the US ability to completely isolate a country, culminating in the military capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026. However, although the strategic objective was to decapitate the supreme command to bring about an unconditional surrender, the ruling Chavista group proved far more resilient and multifaceted than CIA analyses predicted. The power structure did not evaporate with the disappearance of its leadership; on the contrary, its deeply ideologically driven vital and administrative centers remained essentially unchanged and continue to manage, albeit with difficulty, the day-to-day administration of the territory. Thus, the hoped-for transition has not evolved from a straightforward handover to a new "democracy," but into a consuming institutional war of position that is transforming Venezuela into a real-time geopolitical laboratory.
In this extremely uncertain scenario, the country's future is being contested by actors with profoundly divergent interests, first and foremost the United States, which now exercises de facto administration through direct control of local strategic resources, frozen foreign accounts, and oil flows, seeking to stabilize energy production without officially assuming the burden of a colonial occupation government. However, this geopolitical configuration-a local bureaucratic apparatus directed and controlled from a distant external metropolis-evokes surprising and disturbing parallels in Venezuela and Latin America with three centuries of Spanish colonial rule, especially for a population that shaped its historical identity on the independence struggle against the Spanish Empire and perceives this situation as a return to the past. Indeed, the current centralized and militarized management of primary resources such as oil and gold, previously controlled by the government, is now under the tutelage of the United States. While presenting itself as liberating, the United States has simply imposed itself as the ultimate beneficiary of this relationship of dependence, imposing the classic colonial logic of the "extractive periphery" that sends wealth to an external power center in exchange for fragile political stability. This configuration was further reinforced in mid-April 2026 with the authorization for the Venezuelan financial system to reconnect to international circuits for transactions and remittances, cementing the role of the United States not only as political overseer but as the ultimate manager of national liquidity.
Meanwhile, the far-right internal opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado, has re-emerged. Her leadership is constantly torn between her supporters' demand for an institutional clean slate and the dismantling of every vestige of Chavismo, and the real risk of triggering an open civil war with the military loyal to the regime and the popular armed groups (colectivos) organized primarily in the major cities. Meanwhile, powers like Russia, China, and Iran have not abandoned the field, oscillating between tactical retreat, safeguarding their accumulated billions of dollars in credit, and opaque protection of sensitive segments of the security and intelligence apparatus. This international complexity is reflected and fueled by the survival of the local Chavista apparatus, which, far from dissolving, has reorganized around the new president, who displays a complex behavior: on the one hand, an attitude open to Washington's decisions, facilitated by the promulgation of new laws of economic interest that are, in effect, reopening the country to foreign capital, including Italy, and the exploitation of mineral and oil resources; On the other hand, it continues to denounce, at least domestically, North American actions such as the capture of President Maduro, keeping the Chavista population vigilant about possible developments of future autonomy.
Meanwhile, it consolidates its power and that of the small group of historic Chavismo leaders (its brother Jorge Rodríguez, head of Parliament, and Diosdato Cabello, Minister of the Interior), reappointing many of the ministers appointed by Maduro, including the head of the Armed Forces, thus creating a new apparatus that it hopes will remain loyal. This is precisely the direction taken by the diplomatic move at the end of April, with Colombian President Gustavo Petro's official visit to Caracas to meet with the new leadership. This meeting marks the Rodríguez group's attempt to gain autonomous regional legitimacy, seeking to counteract Washington's suffocating tutelage.
However, these actors operate in an ambiguous limbo: formally, they still adhere to the old revolutionary procedures, but in practice, they must compromise with the North's surveillance to ensure access to resources and supplies. Thus, a hybrid system has been created where the technical efficiency demanded by outside observers must coexist, first and foremost, with the Chavista government's populist tradition of redistributing food to millions of families impoverished by an economy destroyed by international sanctions. It must also coexist with old clientelist practices, creating administrative friction that slows any attempt at structural reform. Thus, on a strictly material level, the economy is struggling to emerge from the rubble through a total, savage, and aggressive dollarization, which has now erased the value of the local currency from citizens' daily lives, while the IMF is already preparing to re-enter the scene.
In this scenario, the average Venezuelan has developed an extreme and almost cynical pragmatism, no longer asking "who's in charge" or "which ideology will triumph," but simply "who will keep the electricity and water running?" The country's future now oscillates between two uncertain tracks: a functional and long-lasting protectorate under US surveillance and a difficult, almost miraculous, institutional rebirth. Ultimately, Venezuela's fate will depend on its ability to transform the people's "survival resilience" into political participation, including the new bloc emerging from Chavismo, in crisis but not moribund, and the formation of a new constituency that brings together, in progressive terms, those who, against all authoritarianism, past and present, internal and external, can break the historical cycle that sees the country oscillating between internal autocracy and external authoritarian tutelage. Otherwise, Venezuela will remain a very rich land inhabited by subjects awaiting a destiny written elsewhere.
Francisco López
http://www.sicilialibertaria.it/wp-content/uploads/aprile2026_compressed.pdf
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Source: A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
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